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Abstract 
This study is concerned with exploring the relationship between informal forms of 
political behaviour and relations and the development of formal institutions in post- 
Soviet Central Asian states as a way to explain the development of authoritarianism 
in the region. It moves the debate on from current scholarship which places primacy 
on either formal or informal politics in explaining modern political development in 
Central Asia, by examining the relationship between the two. It utilises Kazakhstan 
as a case study by assessing how the neopatrimonial system evident in the country 
has influenced and shaped the development of political parties. It investigates how 
personalism of political office, patronage and patron-client networks and factional 
elite conflict have influenced and shaped the institutional constraints affecting party 
development (institutional choice, electoral design and party law), the type of parties 
emerging (organisation, ideology and membership) and parties' relationship with 
society. The analysis reveals that informal forms of political relations and behaviour 
are affecting the ability of political parties to function effectively in terms of their 
relationship to democratisation. Due to the use of informal preference and selective 
application of formal rules and the personalisation of the political system around the 
president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, only pro-presidential parties dominate the party 
system at the expense of other political opinions. Simultaneously, political parties 
and formal institutional rules assist in legitimising informal political behaviour and 
relations, providing elite cohesion and formal vehicles for high level elites to protect 
and extend their political and economic interests. The study reveals how the complex 
relationship between informal and formal politics in post-Soviet states is assisting in 
creating durable authoritarian regimes. 
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A Note on Transliteration 
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Transliteration of Kazakh words are also transliterated from their Russian counterparts - 
except where the word itself derives from Kazakh, such as Aim (governor) and Nur Otan 
(Light of Fatherland). 
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Glossary of Main Political Parties 
Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan (APK): The Party was founded in January 1999 and 
was led by Mazhilis deputy Roman Madinov. It was considered very pro-presidential 
and it was suggested the party was a creation of the presidential administration. The 
party was close to the Civil Party of Kazakhstan (GPK) and formed a bloc with them 
prior to the 2004 parliamentary election. The party won I1 seats. In 2006 the party 
merged with Otan to become part of Nur Otan. The party supported the candidacy of 
Nursultan Nazarbaev in the 2005 presidential election. 
Ak Zhol (Bright Path): The party was founded in 2002 by Bolat Abilov, Alikhan 
Baimenov and Oraz Zhandosov, all former members of the government who had 
split from the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan movement. The party views itself as 
in `constructive opposition' to the government. However, after winning only one seat 
in the 2004 parliamentary election the party split. Abilov and Zhandosov wanted to 
take a harder line against the government and the president, so they formed Nagiz Ak 
Zhol in 2005. Alikhan Baimenov remains party chairman and sat in parliament 
during the 2004-07 convocation. The party briefly merged with Adilet prior to the 
2007 parliamentary election but split soon after. Baimenov also ran for president in 
the 2005 presidential election. 
Alga (Forward): The party was established in 2005 after DVK was declared 
liquidated by the Ministry of Justice. It is considered an outright opposition party 
and has yet to receive registration with the Ministry of Justice after two attempts. 
Therefore, the party cannot compete in parliamentary elections. It is alleged that the 
party is financially backed by Mukhtar Abliazov, one of the key figures behind 
DVK. The party's chairman was Assylbek Kozhakhmetov but he resigned in 2007 
after a dispute within the Political Council as to whether they should merge with 
OSDP and Nagiz Ak Zhol to fight the 2007 parliamentary election. The party is now 
chaired by Vladimir Kozlov. Alga backed the For a Just Kazakhstan (ZSK) 
candidate, Zharmakhan Tuiakbai in the 2005 presidential election. 
All National Social Democratic Party (OSDP): The party was created by former 
speaker of the Mazhilis, Zharmakhan Tuiakbai in 2006 after he had run for the 
vii 
presidency against President Nazarbaev. The party is considered to be a radical 
opposition party in the sense that it opposes the government and the president 
outright. It shares a close relationship with those elites from Nagiz Ak Zhol/Azat and 
briefly merged with them prior to the 2007 parliamentary election. The two parties 
went their separate ways after the election. 
Asar (Together): The party was established by the president's daughter Dariga 
Nazarbaeva in 2003. Considered pro-presidential, the party won four seats at the 
2004 parliamentary election. The party merged with Otan in 2006 to become part of 
Nur Otan. The party supported the candidacy of Nursultan Nazarbaev in the 2005 
presidential election. 
Atameken (Motherland): The party was created by its chairman, Yerzhan 
Dosmukhamedov in 2006, a former close associate of the president's second son-in- 
law, Timur Kulibaev. Initially the party was considered to have been a loyal pro- 
presidential party, but the party soon revealed itself to be in strong opposition to the 
government and the president. The party has never received registration and 
Dosmukhamedov resides abroad and has vowed not to return to Kazakhstan until his 
party and Alga are registered. 
Azat (Freedom): The party was established by Bolat Abilov in 2008 in an attempt to 
re-brand Nagiz Ak Zhol. The party is considered to be in opposition to the 
government and the president but it did receive official registration. 
Civil Party of Kazakhstan (GPK): The party was established in 1998 and was led 
by Azat Peruashev and was alleged to have been funded by Aleksandr Mashkevich 
and the Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC). It was a strictly pro- 
presidential party and won 11 seats in the 1999 parliamentary election and then 11 
seats (with APK) in the 2004 election. In 2006 the party merged with Otan to 
become part of Nur Otan. The party supported the candidacy of Nursultan 
Nazarbaev in the 2005 presidential election. 
The Communist Party of Kazakhstan (KPK): The successor to the communist era 
Kazakhstan Communist Party. The party formed in 1991 at the last congress of the 
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old party where Nazarbaev established the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan and 
disbanded the old communist party. The party was not permitted to officially register 
until 1994 having been banned by Nazarbaev. Former Chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet, Serikbolsyn Abdil'din, became leader in 1996. The party has provided the 
most consistent form of opposition to Nazarbaev throughout the post-Soviet period. 
The party won two seats in the 1995 parliamentary election, three in the 1999 
election, none in the 2004 election and did not participate in the 2007 election. 
Abdil'din stood as the main opposition candidate in the 1999 presidential election. 
The party supported ZSK candidate, Zharmakhan Tuiakbai, in the 2005 presidential 
election. 
Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan (KNPK): The party was established in 
2004 after a split in the KPK. The party is led by Vladislav Kosarev and takes a 
much softer line towards the presidential administration. The party competed in the 
2004 and 2007 election but did not win any seats. The KNPK put forward its own 
candidate, Erasyl Abylkasymov, for the 2005 presidential election. 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK): The party formed in 2002 from the 
movement Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. The movement featured many high 
profile government officials and businesspersons moving into opposition against the 
president and the government. Their complaint was the lack of democratic progress 
in the country and the preference given to members of the president's family in the 
auctioning of former state enterprises. Despite being convicted of tax evasion and 
placed in prison, former Akim of Pavlodar Oblast Galymzhan Zhakiianov was 
anointed party chair. The party participated in the 2004 parliamentary election in 
alliance with the KPK, but managed only 3.4 percent of the vote and no seats. The 
party was liquidated by the Ministry of Justice in 2004 for violating articles of the 
Law on Political Parties. The party claimed it was politically motivated and 
reconstituted itself as Alga in 2005. 
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan 'Adilet' (Justice): The party was established in 
2004 by Maksut Narikbaev, a former class mate of the president. It was originally 
called Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, but added Adidet to its name in 2006 to 
reflect the fact the party consists of many figures from the legal profession. It is a 
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loyal presidential party and participated in the 2004 parliamentary election gaining 
one constituency seat. In the 2007 election the party merged with Ak Zhol, but failed 
to win any seats. The two parties split after the election. The party also supported the 
candidacy of Nazarbaev in the 2005 presidential election. 
For a Just Kazakhstan (ZSK): Was a political movement founded in 2005 to back 
the candidacy of former speaker of the Mazhilis, Zharmakhan Tuiakbai, for the 2005 
presidential election. The movement featured all the political parties considered out 
right opposition in Kazakhstan; Nagiz Ak Zhol, KPK and Alga. It was an effort to 
replicate the political solidarity of the opposition in Ukraine which had brought 
about the Orange Revolution. 
Kazakhstan Social Democratic Party `Auyl' (Village): The party was established 
in 2000 by the prominent political figure and former deputy in the Mazhilis Gani 
Kaliev. The party considers itself a `loyal opposition' party to the president, but 
critics argue it is another pro-presidential party. It participated in the 2004 and 2007 
election but did not win any seats. The party supported the candidacy of Nazarbaev 
in the 2005 presidential election. 
Nagiz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path): Nagiz Ak Zhol was established in 2005 after 
Bolat Abilov, Oraz Zhandosov, Altynbek Sarsenbaev and Tulegen Zhukeev split 
from Ak Zhol. They disagreed with Alikhan Baimenov, the other co-chairman of the 
party, over the extent to which the party should cooperate with the presidential 
administration. The party was considered an outright opposition party despite the 
close ties many of the party elite had with the president and government. The party 
merged with OSDP to fight the 2007 parliamentary election, but after having failed 
to win any seats they both went their separate ways. The party was disbanded in 
2008 and reformed itself as Azat with Abilov taking the main role as party leader and 
Zhukeev as General Secretary. The party supported the candidacy of Zharmakhan 
Tuiakbai in the 2005 presidential election. 
Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland): Established in 2006 by the submergence of Asar, 
GPK and APK into Otan. Nur Otan is the main party in the country; it is led by the 
president, Nursultan Nazarbaev. Many government officials and regional governors 
X 
are among its membership. The party won 88 percent of the vote in the 2007 
parliamentary election and all the seats in parliament. 
Party of Patriots: The party was founded by its chairman, Gain Kasymov, in 2000, 
a former deputy of the Mazhilis and member of the government. The party is pro- 
presidential. It participated in the 2004 and 2007 parliamentary elections but did not 
win any seats. Kasymov stood in the 1999 presidential election, but the party 
supported the candidacy of Nazarbaev in 2005. 
Republican Peoples Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK) Founded in 1998 and led by 
former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin after he openly criticised the president. 
Despite Kazhegeldin moving abroad when criminal charges were brought against 
him, the party was registered with the Ministry of Justice and still competed in the 
1999 parliamentary election winning one seat. The party never achieved re- 
registration when changes were made to the Law on Political Parties in 2002 and was 
thus unable to participate in further elections. After its dissolution, many members of 
the party joined with DVK, Alga and OSDP. 
Rukhaniiat (Spirituality): Established in 2003 after its predecessor, the Party of the 
Revival of Kazakhstan was unable to obtain registration under the new Law on 
Political Parties. It is led by Altynshash Dzhaganova, a high profile figure in arts and 
literary circles and former deputy of the Mazhilis. The party strongly supports the 
president and participated in both the 2004 and 2007 parliamentary elections but did 
not win any seats. The party supported the candidacy of Nazarbaev in the 2005 
presidential election. 
R1 
Introduction: In-between the Informal and Formal - Introducing Political Party 
Development in Kazakhstan 
There has been a considerable volume of literature on the political and economic 
trajectories of former Soviet Republics. In the first ten years after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the dominant conceptual and theoretical approach applied by 
academics to the newly formed regimes and states was democratisation theory. The 
assumption underlying this literature was that these fifteen new states were 
embarking on a transition en route for democracy. The specialist and casual observer 
would have noted in recent years that many post-Soviet republics have transited not 
towards democracy but instead, varying degrees of authoritarianism. In particular, in 
the southern republics of the former Soviet Union, the Central Asian states, the 
democratisation literature has proven abstract and inoperative, as the five republics 
have remained resolutely authoritarian. ' Instead, scholars pursuing an intellectual 
and empirical discourse in the security strategic and resource rich region have 
characterised political development via two approaches. In the first instance, and 
quite understandably, there was a trend in perceiving political and economic 
developments through the lens of the formal structural remnants of the Soviet period. 
Attention was paid to the national and ethnic identities created and engineered by the 
Soviet Union during their seventy-year dominance. Analysts and researchers tried to 
understand and unpack the nation-building efforts of the post-Soviet regimes and the 
impact such labours would have upon ethnic minorities within each Republic. 
Underlying this approach is the implicit assumption the Soviet Union was successful 
in transforming and modernising Central Asia and was able to create nations and 
identities where none previously existed. Conversely, other scholars have worked 
from the counter assumption that the Soviet Union failed in transforming Central 
Asia. It is argued that rather than being wiped out by socialist modernisation, pre- 
Soviet and even pre-Tsarist forms of political and social identity resisted and 
survived the Soviet period, and moreover, the Soviet political system was adapted to 
fit the traditional peculiarities of the region. Rather than constructed Soviet national 
identities, it is the informal institutions and organisations of tribes and clans which 
1 Neil Melvin, Authoritarian Pathways in Central Asia: A Comparison of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Uzbekistan, in Yaacov Roi' (ed. ), Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia 
(London, Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 119-142. 
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are the dominant political and social forces in the region. The clan approach has 
received wide attention in recent years and as such this focus on informal politics is 
well judged. Understanding informal politics in Central Asia is key to explaining 
formal political development. 
Formal structural aspects of state building and democracy have been overlooked. 
Political party development in particular has been ignored and maybe with good 
reason considering the failure of any observable transition towards democracy. A 
great quantity of analysis has explored political parties in post-communist Eastern 
Europe and many of the former Soviet states but political parties in Central Asia 
have rarely been considered. While avoiding analysis of party development may 
seem well-reasoned in light of the informal nature of politics in the region it does not 
address why political parties have persisted. Political agents have been expedient in 
constructing and building political parties - they remain a constant and at times ever 
changing feature of the political landscape in Central Asia. There has, however, been 
no explanation of the factors affecting party development. We do not know anything 
concerning the nature of the relationship between the informal politics that arguably 
dominates the region and political parties as well as other institutions (elections, 
constitutions etc. ). Collectively political scientists have not addressed the interaction 
and influence between formal institutions and the informal political behaviour and 
relations evident in post-Soviet Central Asia (patron-client relations, factional elite 
conflict, etc. ). As this work will set out using the case of Kazakhstan, while informal 
political behaviour and relations are a crucial factor influencing the development of 
political institutions like political parties, parties and other formal institutions 
provide an institutional context within which informal political behaviour and 
relations occur. They provide elite stability, institutions to protect elite interests and 
are a source of public legitimacy for leaders seeking to consolidate power. The 
relationship between informal and formal politics has contributed to the durability of 
authoritarianism in the region. It is considered that political parties are indispensable 
to democracy but parties are also central to the embedding of authoritarianism, and 
recent scholarly work is beginning to highlight this. This work, therefore, seeks to 2 
2 See Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratisation (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) and Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, 
opponents and institutions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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explore the relationship between informal and formal politics in Central Asia by 
examining the influence and interaction between informal political relations and 
behaviour and party development in Kazakhstan and the extent to which it has 
contributed towards authoritarian consolidation. Therefore, the case of Kazakh party 
development provides scholars and observers with an opportunity to explore several 
questions and puzzles important to political development in Central Asia and other 
post-Soviet states. It is these which form the central research questions of this study: 
What is the nature of the relationship between informal neopatrimonial political 
relations and behaviour, in the shape of personalism, patron-client relations and 
factional inter-elite conflict and the formal institutional development of political 
parties? In particular, how has this relationship influenced the formal structural 
constraints of parties in Kazakhstan, the type of parties that are emerging and their 
connection with wider society? And what has been the impact of this relationship on 
overall political development? 
The case of Kazakhstan will illustrate how the informal and formal intersect and 
impact upon political development in Central Asia and in many other former Soviet 
states. The informality of much political behaviour and relations (such as patronage, 
patron-client relations and factional elite conflict) and its entwining with formal 
institutions resembles a form of neopatrimonialism. 3 For this study, 
neopatrimonialism will be used as a framework through which to examine the 
relationship between the informal and formal. It will be used as a lens through which 
the central argument of this thesis is played out. In the case of Kazakhstan, the 
president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, relied on informal forms of political behaviour and 
relations, derived from a fusion between traditional forms of politics and communist 
forms of patrimonialism, as a way to consolidate his power vis-ä-vis the specific 
uncertain context of political transition. This form of rule saw the emergence of 
competition between informal elite groups who fought over resources while the 
president arbitrated the conflict. Consequently, the president was strategically placed 
to design the institutional rules of the game concerning the institutional set up of the 
country, electoral competition and party activity and organisation. As a result, a 
3A definition of neopatrimonialism is provided towards the end of this chapter and the framework is 
explicitly covered in Chapter One. 
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dominant party emerged to provide the president with elite stability, while laws were 
purposely designed for loyal officials to selectively apply and interpret formal rules 
in favour of the president's party, Nur Otan. From this institutional context emerged 
parties which were personalistic and clientelistic. They are generally co-opted by 
informal elite groups4 and founded on the basis of securing economic and political 
interests or a form of public office. Parties also lack coherent ideologies. Parties 
form units to protect or extend interests as part of the process of elite competition. As 
a consequence their relationship with wider society is characterised by disconnection 
and passiveness with parties' relationship with citizens being defined by 
homogeneity of opinion concerning the centrality of Nazarbaev's leadership, a 
discourse spread by Nur Otan who are able to do so with ease due to the informal 
preference they receive from administrative resources. Loyal clients read ambiguous 
laws in a way that advantages Nur Otan at the expense of other political voices, thus 
helping secure Nazarbaev's power. Subsequently, parties are weak at interest 
articulation and representation, two qualities required from parties in a well 
functioning democratic system. The way informal political behaviour and relations 
exist alongside political parties, means many of the fundamentals for democracy are 
absent. Instead parties, particularly in the shape of Nur Otan, provide elite stability 
for an authoritarian leadership and formal units for informal elite conflict while also 
functioning as a legitimising vehicle for the president's consolidation of power (in 
both an informal and formal sense). In the case of party development in Kazakhstan, 
the relationship between informal politics and formal political development is 
complex. While informal political behaviour and relations impact significantly on 
political parties' ability to carry out the functions required of them in a democratic 
environment, parties as formal institutions, alongside formal rules, aid the 
consolidation of authoritarian power and provide a neat context within which 
informal politics can become legitimised. 
This chapter sets out the purpose of this research and its place in the literature on 
Central Asia and the former Soviet Union. It begins by exploring the limitations of 
democratisation literature in analysing Central Asian post-Soviet development. This 
is followed by an examination of the two approaches central to scholarly discourse in 
Equally, ambitious influential individuals are also behind political parties. 
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the field: nationalism and traditionalism. I then explore more closely, understandings 
of institutions and organisations in both the formal and informal sense within Central 
Asian politics that are both positioned on one of the two forms of approaches. I argue 
the underlying assumptions of these two approaches are counter opposed. In 
exploring the terrain between the informal and formal in Central Asia, I argue a 
midway analytical approach is necessary to unpack party development in 
Kazakhstan. As such, a theoretical framework is required to account for informal 
context (the neo-patrimonial regime) and formal party development (party 
institutional constraints, type and citizen linkages). Lastly, I address definitional 
issues associated with the research and provide a brief guide of the chapters to 
follow. 
1. Utility of Democratisation Literature in Central Asia 
The fall of communism across Eastern Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union at the end of 1991 provided political scientists with the nearest approximation 
of a real-life laboratory to apply theories of how states transit from authoritarianism 
to democracy. These theories, originally constructed to conceptualise the transitions 
in Latin America and Southern Europe in the 1970s, have been useful to varying 
degrees in analysing the processes of transition in Eastern Europe. 5 The 
democratisation literature can be divided into two categories: the functionalist and 
genetic schools. However, as will be demonstrated here, the applicability of 
democratisation literature with regard to most of the former Republics of the Soviet 
Union is questionable. 
5 Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, vol. 4, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1986); 
Philippe Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and 
Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?, in A. Brown (ed), Contemporary 
Russian Politics: A Reader, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) pp. 459-467; J. J. Linz & A. 
Stepan, (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1996); Petr 
Kopecky & Cas Mudde, `What has Eastern Europe taught us about the democratisation literature (and 
vice versa)? ' European Journal of Political Research, 37,2000,517-539. 
5 
1.1 The Functionalist vs. Genetic Schools 
The premise of the functionalist school is that `modern democracy is a product of the 
capitalist process. '6Advocates of the functionalist approach suggest democracy can 
be explained by its correlation with capitalist development, a growing and affluent 
middle class and modernisation? and is summed up in the famous maxim `no 
bourgeoisie, no democracy'. 8 While the focus on social prerequisites has been 
contested by some, 9 it is now regarded as a common assumption amongst most 
social scientists that `the level of economic development seems to have considerable 
impact not so much on whether democracy exists as on its sustainability overtime'. '0 
The genetic approach rather than focusing on correlation emphasises causation. " 
The approach is rooted in the work of Dankwart Rustow. Rejecting the concept of 
social preconditions (with the exception of the necessity of national unity), and the 
need for a minimal level of economic development, Rustow instead argued that 
choice and political agency are significant causal drivers for democracy. Democracy 
for Rustow is the result of struggles between factions of elites who eventually make 
a conscious and deliberate decision `to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, 
to that end, institutionalise some crucial aspect of democratic procedure'. 12 Other 
proponents of the approach have argued that outside forces like civil society and 
political parties did not become primarily involved until the later stages of the 
transition process. 13 Despite some scholars believing there has been a tendency to 
6 Joseph Schumpter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3'' ed., (New York: Harper & Row, 
1950) 
7 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making 
of the Modern World (Aylesbury, Peregrine Books, 1966); Seymour M Lipset, Political Man: The 
Social Bases of Politics (New York, Double Day, 1960). 
S Barrington Moore, Social Origins, p. 418. 
9 Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in G. Marks & L. Diamond 
(eds. ) Re-examining Democracy: Essays in Honour of Seymour Martin Lipset, (California, Sage, 
1992) pp. 93-139; Peter Berger, The Uncertain Triumph of Capitalism, Journal of Democracy, 3 (3) 
7-17,1992. 
10 Valerie Dunce, Comparative democratisation: Big and Bounded Generalisations, Comparative 
Political Studies, 33 (6/7), 2000 p. 706. 
11 James Hughes, Transition models and democratisation in Russia, in M. Bowker and C. Ross (eds. ) 
Russia After the Cold War (London, Longman, 2000), p. 26. 
12 Dankwart Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, Comparative Politics, 
April 1970, p. 355. 
13 Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule; Samuel P. 
Huntington, `How Countries Democratise', Political Science Quarterly 1060(4), 1991, pp. 579-616. 
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assume too much freedom on the part of transition actors, 14 the role of political elites 
as a causal variable within democratic transitions has become an accepted 
assumption. 15 
1.2 Problems ofpost-Communism and the Democratisation Literature 
Theories of democratisation have been utilised by scholars to understand transitions 
occurring in the former Soviet Union. 16 However, there are problems associated with 
applying such theories to this context. First, on a comparative level it is questionable 
as to whether it is appropriate to apply theories of democratisation, designed 
originally for the Latin American and Southern European transitions, to post- 
communist states. Phillippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl took the assumption that 
`provided events or processes satisfy certain definitional requirements, their 
occurrence in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union should be considered, at 
least initially, analogous to events or processes happening elsewhere'. 17 However, 
others disagreed suggesting the differences and contexts of the two regions' 
transitions make them incompatible for comparative research. ' 8 
Second, the democratisation literature relies heavily on democracy as an end-point. 
While a genetic approach makes it possible to ascertain that a state is not transiting 
towards democracy, it does not assist in elaborating where states not proceeding 
towards democracy are transiting to, only that they are generically authoritarian. 19 
Consequently, the democratisation approach has received well-deserved criticism. 
For example, Michael McFaul has argued that post-communist transitions `are so 
different from the third wave democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s that they 
should not even be grouped under the same rubric. Instead, the collapse of 
14 Geoffrey Pridham, Comparative Reflections on Democratisation in East-Central Europe: A Model 
of Post-Communist Transformation? in G. Pridham & A. Agh (eds. ), Prospects for Democratic 
Consolidation in East-Central Europe (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2001). 
15 Bunce, Comparative democratisation. 
16 j J. Linz &A Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, and Richard D. 
Anderson, M. Steven Fish, Stephen E. Hanson and Philip G. Roeder, Post Communism and the 
Theory of Democracy, (Princeton, Princeton University Press). 
" Philippe Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and 
Consolidologists, p. 462. 
18 Valerie Bunce, Should Transitologists be Grounded? In A. Brown (ed) Contemporary Russian 
Politics: A Reader, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 468-480. 
19 J . j. 
Linz &A Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition. 
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Communism triggered a fourth wave to democracy and dictatorship. ' 20 The 
`transition paradigm' has been further maligned by suggestions that it should be 
discarded as its assumptions are no longer necessarily valid. 21 
Third, the idea present in some of the transition literature that a path to 
democratisation is built on linear clear-cut stages has proved evidently unfounded. 22 
For instance, states like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have produced quite erratic 
patterns. Kazakhstan's post-Soviet development began fairly democratically before 
retreating to an authoritarian model post 1995. Kyrgyzstan, again, began the 
transition as a fairly open democratic state, obtaining the title of Central Asia's 
"Island of Democracys23 before reverting back to authoritarian type only to be 
reversed due to events in 2005 when a popular uprising saw the overthrow of the 
president, Askar Akaev. This inconsistent pattern has led scholars over the last few 
years to be chasing events rather than obtaining the opportunity to build on theory. 24 
Considering this, it is purposeful to ask how productive the democratisation 
approach is when analysing political developments in post-Soviet Central Asia. The 
succinct answer is, not a great deal. If applied directly, the different schools of 
democratisation provide problematic answers. In terms of a functional approach, 
Central Asia was one of the most isolated and least developed regions of the former 
Soviet Union. 25 During Perestroika, it had a reputation of conservativism and was 
seen by some as Moscow's greatest challenge in terms of modernisation. 26 Society 
based around tribal and clan culture, was and continues to be, to a certain extent, 
considered economically weak. Being the most underdeveloped, least-urbanised, and 
least educated region of the former Soviet states, it is no surprise it has been the least 
20 Michael McFaul, The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-cooperative Transitions in 
the Post-Communist World, World Politics, 54,2002 p. 213. 
21 Thomas Carothers, The End of The Transition Paradigm, Journal of Democracy, 13, (5), 2002, pp. 
6-9. 
22In particular, the work of Dankwart Rustow is built on the idea of specific stages towards 
democracy. Linz and Stepan also argue that there are three stages or conditions that need to be met 
before a democracy can be consolidated. 
23 John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy? (Amsterdam, Harwood 
Academic Publishers, 1999). 
24 Henry Hale, Democracy and Revolution in the Post-Communist World: From Chasing Events to 
Building Theory, Ponars Working Paper, April 2005, www. csis. org/ruseura//ponars 
25 Jerry F. Hough, Democratisation and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991 (Washington D. C., 
Brookings Institution Press, 1995). 
26 William Fierman, The Soviet Transformation of Central Asia in W. Fierman (ed. ) Soviet Central 
Asia: The Failed Transformation, (Boulder, Westview, 1991), pp. 11-35. 
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democratic of all former Soviet states. Clearly, from a functionalist perspective, the 
main obstacle to democracy in Central Asia is the lack of modernisation. This may 
be the case; however, what does it really tell us about post-Soviet political 
developments in Central Asia. That it is authoritarian? That the region has a long 
way to go in terms of economic development? It does not provide a deeper 
understanding of the processes within Central Asian post-Soviet development. A 
genetic approach also provides difficulties. Rustow's minimal condition of `national 
unity' would mean a fairly ethnically homogenous state like Turkmenistan would be 
ripe for democratic fruition. This has not been the case as Turkmenistan has a 
reputation as the most authoritarian of all former Soviet states. A genetic approach 
also presumes too much power on the part of elites and political actors, as well as 
containing the assumption that actors are utilitarian power seekers. The genetic 
approach does not explain how elites and political actors may have got into a 
position of advantage in the first instance. 
2. Theoretical Approaches to Politics and Society in Central Asia 
Without having the democratisation literature to rely on how have scholars 
conceptualised the post-Soviet developments of Central Asia? What have been their 
major focuses? 
Approaches to post-Soviet political developments in Central Asia have fixed largely, 
although not exclusively, on two areas. First, they have focused on the strength of 
the structures and identities that are remnants of, or creations of, the Soviet Union. 
Studies have explored Soviet constructed national and ethnic identities and have 
assessed the potentiality for ethnic conflict and the creation of new national regimes. 
This has highlighted the complex and diffuse ethnic composition of states and has 
assessed the role of political agency in nation building efforts with regards to how 
the presidents and governments constructed cohesive nations where there had been 
none previously. 27 Second, studies have stressed the strength of tribal pre-Soviet 
2' Ronald Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union, (California, Stanford University Press, 1993); Sharam Akbarzadeh, Nation-Building in 
Uzbekistan, Central Asian Survey, 15 (1), 1996, pp. 23-32; Sharam Akbarzadeh, National Identity and 
Political Legitimacy in Turkmenistan, Nationalities Papers, 27 (2), 1999, pp. 271-290; Ian Bremmer 
& Cory Welt, The Trouble with Democracy in Kazakhstan, Central Asian Survey, 15 (2), 1996, pp. 
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identities and structures. The assertion is that with independence from the Soviet 
Union tribal, clan, regional and Islamic identities, long suppressed under the Soviet 
Union, have returned to shape the direction of the post-communist transition. In 
addition, by the turn of the millennium it became apparent the Central Asian 
governments' efforts of engendering national and civic identities were secondary to 
those of traditional identities. 28 Scholars, thus, took the premise that factors of pre- 
Russian colonialism, those characterised by tribal political alliances, clan based 
social organisation and Islam, were as important, if not more so than any Soviet 
nationalist or ethnic legacy. 29 It is suggested Soviet structures were implanted on top 
of existing traditional structures and it is the latter that takes precedent in terms of 
what drives political processes. 30 
This section explores these two different approaches. Following this, I examine the 
two main approaches and works that have investigated the role of institutions in 
post-Soviet Central Asia. That is the precedence given to informal institutions (clans, 
tribes and kinship) and those of formal Soviet institutional legacies (Oblast 
[regional] and Raion [district] identities). Both approaches to institutions are in 
themselves an extension of the wider polarised debate within Central Asian 
literature. I argue that a midway approach that assesses the relationship between 
informal politics and formal institutional development is necessary to provide a 
better understanding of Central Asian post-Soviet political development. The study 
of political parties in Kazakhstan provides us with an empirical and analytical case to 
explore this relationship between informal and formal politics. 
179-199; Shirin Akiner, Melting Pot, Salad Bowl - Cauldron? Manipulation and Mobilisation of 
Ethnic and Religious Identities in Central Asia, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20 (2), 1997 pp. 362-398; 
Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations, (London, I. B. Tauris, 2000). 
28 See Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) and Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics and Beyond: The 
Power of "Blood" in Kazakhstan (Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 2004). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Jan Ake Dellenbrant, The Central Asian Challenge: Soviet Decision Making on Regional Stability 
under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, Journal of Communist Studies, 4 (1), pp. 55-77,1988; Gregory 
Gleason, Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia, Soviet Studies, 43 (4), 
1991, pp. 613-628; Mehradad Hagheyeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, (London, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 1995); Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia, 
(Glasgow, Harper & Collins, 1994); Rafis Abazov, Central Asia's Conflicting Legacy and Ethnic 
Policies: Revisiting a Crisis Zone of the Former USSR, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 5 (2), 1999, 
pp. 62-90; Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (New Haven & London, 
Yale University Press, 2002); Kathleen Collins, Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia, Journal of 
Democracy, 13 (3), 2002, pp. 137-152; Kathleen Collins, The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence From 
the Central Asian Trajectories, World Politics, Vol. 56, No. 2, January 2004, pp. 224-261. 
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2.1 Nationalism and Ethnicity Approach 
Following an agency-focused approach Central Asian specialists have explored how 
presidents and elites have tried to shape the emerging nationhood of their respective 
states. This had led also to an emphasis on the ethnic diversity of the region and the 
potentiality for conflict. Due to the unique Soviet legacy in Central Asia, the five 
Central Asian States had no prior experience of modern nation statehood. The Soviet 
government had been able to institutionalise national identities by means of creating 
independent republics in Central Asia where there had been none before. 31 While 
the newly independent regimes drew on Soviet bureaucratic structures they also 
underpinned their independence by elaborating nationalising policies in favour of the 
hegemonic titular nationality. 32 The Central Asian regimes `engaged in nation- 
building not only as a response from below by the indigenous intelligentsias, but also 
as a means of fortifying the integrity of the titular nations themselves'. 33 Elites used 
nation-building tools, such as the changing of street names and the constitutional 
primacy of the titular language, to secure political and cultural dominance of the 
titular nationality. It has been argued that governing elites turned to the tools of 
nationalism `as the new ideology to fill the vacuum left behind by the Soviet 
collapse'. 34 In Uzbekistan, for example, `after the Soviet collapse, once the Uzbek 
elite were left to their own devices, it sought to justify its existence in the language 
of nationalism'. 35 Such an emphasis on national identities and nation building is 
understandable as the shift from Soviet republic to independent national state was the 
most visible transition in Central Asia. 
Another major aspect of the nationalism literature within Central Asian post-Soviet 
scholarship has been the influence of the titular regimes nationalising policies on 
minority ethnic groups in each state. In particular, Shirin Akiner has alluded to the 
heightening of inter-ethnic tensions within each state creating a sense of `first' and 
3'Regarding the Soviet institutionalisation of nationalities, see Oliver Roy, The New Central Asia, and 
Rogers Brubaker, Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: 
An Institutionalist Account, Theory and Society, 23,1994, pp. 47-78. 
32 Annette Bohr, The Central Asian States as Nationalising Regimes, in G. Smith (ed. ) Nation- 
Building in post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 139-166. 
33 Ibid. p. 141. 
34 S. Akbarzadeh, National Identity, p. 286. 
35 S. Akbarzadeh, Nation-Building in Uzbekistan, Central Asian Survey, 15 (1), 1996, p. 31. 
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`second-class' citizens and `under such circumstances dormant hostilities could be 
activated suddenly by some otherwise trivial incident'. 36 Akiner uses the case of the 
inter-ethnic riots of 1989 in the Ferghana region of Uzbekistan, between ethnic 
Uzbeks and Meshketian Turks, to highlight her point. In this instance the riots, 
which lasted two weeks, were sparked by the price of strawberries. Her description 
of Central Asia being a `melting pot, salad bowl - cauldron' was intended to 
highlight that the ethnic displacement left by the artificial drawing of boundaries 
could create the potential for conflict in the region. 37 Warnings of the potentiality of 
conflict based on ethnic and national lines were a feature of analysis before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union too. James Critchlow argued that the stagnant economy, 
the purges of the native elites in the 1980s and the growing population were all 
factors that threatened stability in the region. 38 After the collapse, conflict and 
instability were seen as almost inevitable. Prospective destabilisation in the region 
was depicted as a potential gathering storm. 39 Understandably, predictions of conflict 
along nationalist and ethnic lines have been a reoccurring theme in the literature. 
Events in the 1980s, the ethnic displacement within each state, instability at the 
borders of the region, in particular Afghanistan, and the way nationalism and 
ethnicity played a important role in some of the other Soviet successor states all 
pointed to the strong possibility of conflict and instability engulfing the region. 40 
However, with the exception of Tajikistan, the Central Asian states have remained 
remarkably stable. 41 
36 Shirin Akiner, Melting Pot, Salad Bowl, p. 392. 
37 Stephen Sabol, The Creation of Central Asia: The 1924 National Delimitation, Central Asian 
Survey, Vol. 14, No. 2,1995, pp. 225-241. 
38 James Critchlow, Corruption, Nationalism, and the Native Elites in Central Asia, Journal of 
Communist Studies, 4 (2), 1988 pp. 143-161. 
39 Boris Rumer, A Gathering Storm, Orbis, Vol. 37,1993. 
40 There were several events that occurred throughout the region in the 1980s. The first was the riots 
in the Kazakh capital of the time Almaty. In 1986 the central government replaced the First Secretary 
in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, with a Russian Gennadii V. Kobin. 
The riots were an expression of public disapproval at the decision. Further events took place in 
Ferghana in Uzbekistan in June 1989 and Osh in Kyrgyzstan in June 1990. These were both 
considered ethnic conflicts. For further reading see Sam Nunn, Barnett Rubin and Nancy Lubin, 
Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia (New York, 
The Century Foundation Press, 1999). 
41 Soon after Independence civil war broke out in Tajikistan. It lasted from 1992 until a peace accord 
was signed in 1997. The cause of conflict was not, as first predicted, Islam or nationalism but a crude 
form of regional and clan politics in which divided elites were staking a claim on power. See Barnett. 
R Rubin, The Fragmentation of Tajikistan, Survival, vol. 34 (4), 1993, pp. 71-91. 
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The lack of emphasis on traditional identities within this approach can be posited as 
a reason for stability in the region as pre-Soviet traditional identities remained a 
constant during the Soviet period and were there to occupy the ideological vacuum 
left by communist disintegration. In emphasising the institutionalisation of national 
identities, based on Soviet delimitations, the role of traditional identities has been 
underplayed. Much literature has shown that rather than Central Asian people being 
transformed by Soviet domination, Central Asian society was, in fact, resistant to the 
particular efforts of Soviet modernisation. As a result the assumption that national 
identities, based on the defined national units set by the Bolsheviks nationalities 
policy, had taken a hold in Central Asia led to the misconception that a violent 
rejection of the Soviet legacy in a nationalist or ethnic form would occur. 42 
2.2 Traditionalism 
The view of post-Soviet politics through the lens of nationalism and ethnicity is 
based upon the assumption the Soviet Union was successful in institutionalising the 
idea of nation states built on dominant ethnic titular populations. The opposite is that 
the Soviet Union failed in transforming Central Asia. 43 Instead, despite the Soviet 
leadership's attempt to eradicate them, traditional customs, art forms and dress 
persisted. 44 Arguably, this was due to the Soviet administration being simply 
superimposed over the existing local power structure, in which local elites occupied 
leading positions. 45 These local authority structures were based on traditionalist 
tribal and clan networks particular to the region. 46 What emerged, therefore, was a 
parallel system of covert autonomy `through which Central Asian elites and masses 
circumvented the Soviet system'. 47 Consequently, the Soviets were unable to 
establish loyalty to the class and stratification of Soviet society as it never overcame 
the complexities of traditional Central Asian society. This engendered `strong 
42 See Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad and Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central 
Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London, Zed Books, 1994). 
43 William Fierman, Soviet Transformation. 
44 Edward Allworth, The focus of literature, in E. Allworth (ed. ), Central Asia 120 Years of Russian 
Rule, (Durham, Duke University, 1989) pp. 397-433. 
45 Gleason, Gregory, Uzbekistan: The Politics of National Independence, in I. Bremer & R. Taras 
(eds. ) New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 53. 
46 Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics. 
47 Pauline Jones Luong, Politics in the Periphery: Competing Views of Central Asian States and 
Societies, in Pauline Jones Luong (ed. ) The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from 
Soviet Rule to Independence (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 9. 
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informal structures and factionalism and patron-client networks which flourished in 
the party' 48 
The supposition underlying this approach is that traditional forms of pre-Soviet and 
pre-Tsarist politics and society persist in modern day Central Asia and are important 
causal factors driving political development. In particular, the concepts of tribal and 
clan affiliation are believed to be the dominant forms of social identity, subsequently 
impacting on the nature and dynamics of the political regimes in the region. 
Accordingly, a traditional framework has been used to explain the issue of 
corruption during the Brezhnev era. 49 While for others traditional structures explain 
post-Soviet regime transition divergence and convergence in the region. 50 
The above illustrates how there are two major approaches to post-Soviet Central 
Asia based on opposing assumptions. There is a nationalist/ethnic perspective 
founded on the conjecture the Soviet Union was successful in transforming Central 
Asia during its period of hegemony, institutionalising ethnic groupings into new 
nation states. It was the nationalising process the presidents of the newly 
independent republics turned to in legitimising their rule by using the language, tools 
and symbols of nationalism and ethnic distinctiveness as nation and state building 
frameworks. Therefore, the extent to which a president such as Nazarbaev in 
Kazakhstan has been able to hold together a cohesive, strong and unified state has 
been a marker of their political success and a qualification for legitimising their 
power. Conversely, the traditional approach is rooted in the postulation the Soviet 
Union failed in transforming Central Asia. As such, traditional forms of political and 
social structures like tribes, clans and Islam survived Soviet encroachment and 
returned in the era of independence to be used by political elites to influence political 
outcomes. In addition, the political leaders of the region have had to carefully 
consider the importance and impact of informal forms of politics in constructing and 
legitimising their power. It is these two approaches which have fashioned our 
understanding of political institutions in Central Asia. 
48 Rafis Abazov, Central Asia's Conflicting Legacy and Ethnic Policies. 
49 See, James Critchlow, Corruption, Nationalism, and the Native Elites in Central Asia; W. Fierman 
(ed. ) Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation, (Boulder, Westview, 1991) and Shirin Akiner, 
`The Struggle For Identity' in J. Snyder (ed. ) After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central 
Asia, (Washington, National Defense University Press, 1995). 
so Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics. 
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3. Political Institutions in Central Asia 
While much literature on Central Asia has focused on the role of agency, 51 recent 
studies have recognised the importance of exploring political structures, in particular 
institutions and organisations. 52 These studies have been influenced by the two 
opposing approaches noted above. On the one hand there is a focus on the role of 
formal Soviet institutional legacies and on the other, informal organisations such as 
clans and tribes take centre of attention. 
3.1 Soviet Institutional legacies 
Soviet institutional legacies are evident across Central Asia and to an extent can be 
found in many other former Soviet republics. 53 One particularly noticeable case is 
institutionalised Soviet regional identities. Pauline Jones Luong has explored the 
impact of this formal Soviet institutional legacy on elite preferences during transition 
and the role they played in affecting the establishment of new electoral systems in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. As Jones Luong argues, the negotiating 
process in the establishment of new electoral systems in Kazakhstan was 
characterised and influenced by elite power perceptions which stem from `the 
predominance of regional political identities among political leaders and activists 
within each state as a result of their shared Soviet institutional legacy'. 
54 
Accordingly, `the entire process by which Central Asian states adopted new political 
institutions indicated the enduring strength of the Soviet system'. 55 It confirmed that 
`far from a decisive break with the past, the design of electoral systems in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan clearly demonstrates that these Central 
51 See Timothy Colton and Robert Tucker, Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership, (Boulder, Westview 
Press, 1995), R. Taras (ed. ) Post-Communist Presidents, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1997), Sally N. Cummings (ed. ) Power and Change in Central Asia, (London, Routledge, 2002), and 
Eugene Huskey, `The Rise of Contested Politics in Central Asia: Elections in Kyrgyzstan, 1989-90, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 47, (5), 1995, pp. 813-834. 
52 See in particular, Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics, and Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change 
and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
53 See Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkley, University of California 
Press, 1992). 
54 Jones Luong, Institutional Change, p. 2. 
55 Ibid. p. 2. 
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Asian states continued to embrace certain features of a shared Soviet legacy 
following independence'. 56 
Soviet institutional legacies are evident across Central Asia. This is of course 
unsurprising. The five Central Asian states had no prior experience of modem nation 
statehood or modem political institutions other than those created by the Soviet 
regime. Formal Soviet institutional legacies are apparent and ubiquitous across the 
region. In the first instance, the form of presidential rule and hierarchical 
institutionalisation of power is directly linked to the distribution of power under 
communist party rule. In particular it has been argued that the presidency of 
Uzbekistan `draws heavily on the experience of the Soviet period'. 57 The powers 
afforded to many of the former First Secretaries of the regional communist parties, 
reflects the amount of power that has been installed in those same figures that 
became the first presidents of the newly independent states of Central Asia. 
Soviet institutional legacy is evident in the reconstitution of political elites. There is 
overwhelming evidence the near-Soviet past is crucial in `determining the make-up 
and fortunes of the post-Soviet elite'. 58 There is a debate within the study of elite 
transition in the former Soviet Union between those who argue an acquisition class 
emerged in the early transition and those who suggest that in fact any new capitalist 
elite is still drawn from the former Soviet nomenklatura. 59 The case of Central Asia 
suggests continuity as opposed to change, as the transition from Soviet to nationalist 
elite was `mainly a matter of changing the names on the office doors '. 60 
Unsurprisingly political parties are also a major source of Soviet institutional 
continuity. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, both regional communist parties 
undertook a rapid and smooth transition into two new `democratic' parties, the 
56 Ibid. p. 253. 
5' Roger D Kangas, Uzbekistan: Evolving Authoritarianism, Current History, April, 1994, pp. 178- 
182. 
58 Jonathan Murphy, Illusory Transition? Elite Reconstitution in Kazakhstan, 1989-2002, Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4, June 2006, p. 552. 
s9 See David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites 
from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (London, Macmillan, 1999) and Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen 
White, From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite, Europe-Asia Studies, 48,5,1996, pp. 711 - 733. 60 Gregory Gleason, Uzbekistan: The Politics of National Independence' in I. Bremer & R. Taras 
(eds. ) New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 118. 
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Democratic Party of Turkmenistan and the Peoples Democratic Party (Uzbekistan). 
The internal structures and composition of the parties remained static although with 
less of the power and influence of their predecessors. Even in Kazakhstan where the 
party was originally banned by President Nursultan Nazarbaev, the idea of a 
monolithic party in the structure and shape of the communist party has been the type 
of party Nazarbaev has aspired to create since independence. This was finally 
achieved at the end of 2006 when Nazarbaev was able to consolidate many of the 
pro-presidential parties into Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland). 
The implication of Jones Luong's research is that it indicates emphasis should be 
placed on formal institutions, especially with her focus on electoral design. For Jones 
Luong a formal institutional perspective (that of the structural legacies of Soviet 
rule) explain authoritarian consolidation in the region. The emphasis on formal 
institutions has received criticisms, however, from those who profess a clan 
perspective towards Central Asian political development. 
3.2 Clan Politics 
The clan perspective has gained a great amount of currency in recent years. 61 By the 
turn of the millennium it became apparent Central Asian governments' efforts of 
engendering national and civic identities were secondary to those of clan and tribal 
identities. Scholars, thus, took the premise that pre-Russian history characterised by 
tribal political alliances and clan based social organisation were as important, if not 
more so than any soviet legacy. Kathleen Collins has criticised the formal 
institutional level approach, especially the work of Jones Luong, as in her opinion it 
leads to several faulty assumptions. Above all that regions are the equivalent to 
identities and maybe more importantly that the Soviets were successful in creating 
these regional identities. For Collins `regions are not given any meaning, bonds, 
networks and staying power of an identity group'. 62 Clans, on the other hand, `have 
an intrinsic meaning, identity, and legitimacy and cannot merely change their social 
constituency. ' 63 A clan approach, therefore, works from the assumption the Soviet 
61 See Collins, Clan Politics, Edward Schatz Modern Clan Politics, and Frederick Starr, Clans, 
Authoritarian Rulers and Parliaments in Central Asia, Silk Road Paper (Washington D. C., Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Studies Program, June 2006). 
62 Collins, Clan Politics, p. 58. 
63 Ibid. p. 58. 
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Union was unsuccessful in eradicating traditional forms of identity and politics. 
Traditional relationships did not disappear or erode under Soviet dominance. 64 
Clans are not strictly defined as informal institutions and are seen more as informal 
organisations. 65 For the most eminent proponents of this approach `clans are the 
critical informal organisations that we must conceptualise and theorise in order to 
understand politics in Central Asia'. 66 Clan, in this particular literature is defined 
roughly as `an informal organisation comprising a network of individuals linked by 
kin and fictive kin identities'. 67 They are the dominant social structures and political 
players responsible for the transformation of the political system as opposed to 
formal institutions such as elected officials. 68 The evidence at times seems 
overwhelming for the case of the `clan' approach to Central Asian politics. For 
example, in Kyrgyzstan the Northern clan groups (encompassing the Chui, Kemin, 
Talas, and Issyk-Kul regions) are seen as always historically competing with the 
Southern clan groups (the Osh, Naryn and Jalalabat regions) for political power. 69 
Historically in Kazakhstan society has been divided into three social organisations 
the Ulu Zhuz (Great Hundred), Orta Zhuz (Middle Hundred) and Kichi Zhuz (Small 
Hundred). Western scholars have often referred to them as the three different 
'hordes'. 70 These social divisions are seen as powerful and imperative in that 
authority resides mainly with figures from the Great and Middle Zhuzs and that 
membership of a Zhuz can determine the power and influence a person can have and 
on their career prospects. In Uzbekistan there are the Tashkent, Ferghana and 
Samarkand clans while in Tajikistan there are the Kohdjent, Pamiri and Dangharin 
clans. All are seen as important organisations that during both the Soviet and post- 
Soviet period have provided cadre and political leadership in both countries. 
64 Schatz, Op. cit., p. xxi. 
65 Below I will discus in greater detail the definitional issues and problems associated with the term 
`institution'. 
66 Collins, Op. cit., p. 7. 
67 Ibid. p. 17. 
68 Nurbolat Masanov, Kazakhskiaia Politicheskayia i intellektual'naia elita: Planovaia 
prinadlezhnost' i vnutrienicheskoe sopernichestvo, Vestnik Evrazii, 1 (2), 1996, pp. 46-61. 
69 Vladimir Khanin, Political Clans and Political Conflicts in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan, in Yaacov 
Roi' (ed. ), Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia (London, Frank Cass), pp. 215-232. 
7° Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1987). 
18 
The developments and analytical insights provided by the `clan' literature are useful, 
insightful and informative. However, there are four problems with the approach. 
First, while proponents suggest the approach is not inherently orientalist, as clan 
influence is subject to change and evolution, there is an implied emphasis on the 
linkage between autocracy and clans as well as the conflict potential of clan 
politics. 7' For scholars like Collins the negative aspects of clan politics can only be 
broken down by the institutionalisation of a Western style market economy. This 
implies a pre-determinant understanding of Central Asian development that views 
clans as a form of social organisation which is regressive and non-responsive to 
democratisation and that their continued influence leads only to autocracy unless, 
however, they are reconciled with Western methods of economic and social 
organisation. Second, there is an issue of definitional clarity. The term clan is 
sometimes aligned with other informal concepts such as, clientelism, corruption and 
patron-client relations. A distinction between these terms is not always forthcoming. 
Third, it is possible to observe a certain over-stating of the power of kinship based 
clan identities. Recent scholarship suggests that identities can be based on wider 
social networks as opposed to narrow clan kinship identities as the events of 2002 in 
Aksy, Kyrgyzstan indicate. 72 Or as in the case of Kazakhstan, the emergence of 
inter-elite cleavages are founded not on kin-based networks but socio-economic 
cleavages. 73 Finally, recent events in both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan point to 
the restricted explanatory nature of a kinship-based clan perspective. The removal of 
members of Nazarbaev's family from political office and business interests, such as 
Rakhat Aliev, Dariga Nazarbaeva and Timur Kulibaev suggest that kinship ties are 
not as important as the clan perspective purports. Also, the smooth transition of 
power, following the death of Turkmen President Sapmurat Niiazov, which placed 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov as president was counter to claims that the death of 
Niiazov would send Turkmenistan spiralling into chaos and conflict between 
competing clans. 
" Vladimir Khanin, Political Clans and Political Conflicts in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan. 
72 Scott Radnitz, Networks, Localism and Mobilisation in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey, 
Vol. 24, No. 4,2005, pp. 405-424. 
73 Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in 
Economic Liberalization, Intra-elite Cleavage, and Political Opposition, Demokratizatsiia, Vol. 13, 
No. 3,2005 
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For these reasons, the conceptual approach of clan politics is not necessarily the most 
appropriate framework within which to explore party development in Kazakhstan. 
The clan literature is, however, crucial in bringing to the fore the relevance of 
informal politics in Central Asia and to a certain extent the rest of the former Soviet 
Union. So as not to be constrained by either focusing solely on informal politics or 
formal political institutions, this study on party development is intended to explore 
the relationship between informal political relations and behaviour and formal party 
development. Rather than using the clan perspective this work will use 
neopatrimonialism as a framework to unpack the informal nature of political 
behaviour and relations in Kazakhstan and how they sit with formal institutions, 
mainly parties. 
4. Political Parties in Kazakhstan and Central Asia 
Political parties in Central Asia, as formal institutions, represent the interaction 
between these two competing views of post-Soviet political development. With the 
case of political parties in Kazakhstan, we are witness to the role of formal 
institutions in authoritarian consolidation, yet we can also observe the influence of 
informal political behaviour and relations. 
Political parties in Central Asia are important institutions for providing elite 
stabilisation. In Kazakhstan, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, Nazarbaev used 
the formation of a dominant pro-presidential party, Nur Otan, to mitigate against the 
fragmentation of elites. The party solidified his support and brought acquiescence 
from regional elites and independent actors. Parties were used in a similar fashion in 
Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In many of these 
cases it is possible to observe the direct influence of Soviet structural legacies. In 
Turkmenistan, for instance, the Communist Party was instantly turned into a new 
party, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT), and essentially carried on as it 
had before, except its main function was to provide political support and elite 
stability to Niiazov as he constructed his personal regime. Parties have also proven 
important formal institutions for disaffected elite groups. In the case of Kazakhstan, 
as Chapter Five will illustrate, they have been utilised by liberal professional elites 
and oligarchic groups as units to protect and extend their economic interests during 
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fraught processes of elite competition while at the same time providing them with a 
formal vehicle for contesting public office. In Kazakhstan parties have also proven 
useful formal institutions for providing the president with legitimacy. They are used 
to promote and support a message regarding the centrality of the president's 
leadership to the prosperity and success of the country. Similar observations can also 
be made about dominant parties in former Soviet states, particularly Edinaia Rossiia, 
Vladimir Putin's party in Russia. 74 
At the same time it possible to see the influence of informal politics. 75 Despite some 
of the problems associated with clan literature it is evident informal political 
behaviour and relations are important causal drivers in Central Asian politics. The 
impact of informal politics on political party development is particularly acute in 
Kazakhstan. As will be discussed in Chapters One and Three, informal political 
relations pervade Kazakhstan's political system. Nazarbaev's power, for example, is 
constructed upon a high degree of personalism, extensive patronage networks and a 
factional elite conflict 76 - all forms of informal political behaviour and relations. 
This influences party development in several ways. Large levels of personalism and 
Nazarbaev's extensive patronage network (the power to personally appoint state 
officials) ensures that formal laws concerning electoral competition and party 
activity are designed in such a way so they can be selectively interpreted by loyal 
clients to the president. This benefits the president's party Nur Otan. The overall 
context of informal politics in the system also results in most political parties being 
anchored on personalistic or clientelistic characteristics. As institutions they are 
centred on the interests of those elites leading the party, in turn lacking ideological 
distinction focusing instead on personality. The effect of the panoply of informal 
politics and relations is that parties' relationship with society is weak and 
74 Other examples which will be discussed in the concluding chapter are Emomali Rakhmon's Peoples 
Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT), Heydar and Ilham Aliev's New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) and 
the President of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiev's Ak Zhol (Bright Path). 
75 In many respects some of the Soviet institutional legacies are also informal practices. Creating a 
party in order to give former Communist Party members jobs - is to a certain extent an informal 
practice. 
76 What has emerged in Kazakhstan are various `influence groups'. That is elite groups who have 
considerable access to financial and political resources and are attempting to influence the political 
process and the president in an effort to continue to secure and extend their interests. Influence groups 
are not necessarily based just on ancestral ties as suggested in the clan approach although it is one 
characteristic, but instead on elite economic cleavages. For further reading see, Evraziiskii tsentr 
politicheskh issledovanii i Agentctvo sotsal'nykh texnologii, `Gruppy vliyaniia vo vlastno policheskoi 
sisteme Respubliki Kazakhstan, November 2005, Almaty and Moscow. 
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characterised by disconnection and passiveness. Parties lack strong interest 
articulation and representation abilities and are instead dominanted by the 
informalism which protrudes into politics. These types of relationships between 
informal politics and formal party development can also be observed in other post- 
Soviet states, most notably the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, but also Russia and Azerbaijan among others. The comparable value of 
exploring the relationship between the informal and formal in the case of Kazakhstan 
will be highlighted in the concluding chapter. 
The relationship between informal political relations and behaviour and formal 
institutional development can be best understood by using a neopatrimonial 
framework for analysis. Since independence, the Central Asian states have 
developed neopatrimonial regimes where presidents maintain authority through 
personal authority and informal power networks are mobilised to capture the state (or 
state assets) in the interest of their members. " The role of the president is to balance 
the competing interests of these groups through a process where personnel selection 
and access to positions of power and resources within the state is dependent upon his 
patronage. 78 Personalism of power, extensive patron-client networks and factional 
elite conflict are the main planks of the informal and irrational elements in a 
neopatrimonial system. In Central Asia, and many former Soviet states, such aspects 
are evident. Simultaneously, formal rational aspects of politics exist. There are 
codified constitutions, rational delimitations of office, formal separation of powers, 
elections and political parties. 
In summary, it is possible to observe the relationship between informal politics and 
political parties on two levels. In the first instance informal relations and behaviour 
influence the development of political parties' by the way informal interpretation of 
the formal rules impact upon the ability of parties other than pro-presidential parties 
to compete effectively and fairly. On the second level formal parties are used to 
77 John Ishiyama, Neopatrimonialism and the Prospects for Democratization in the Central Asian 
Republics, in Sally N. Cummings (ed. ) Power and Change in Central Asia, (London, Routledge, 
2002) pp. 42-58; and Alisher Ilkhamov, Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and Patronage Networks: 
the impasses of the governance system in Uzbekistan, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 65- 
84. 
79 Spetsifika gosdarstvennoi kadrovoi politiki v Kazakhstane, APR, 20 December 2001, 
[http: //eurasia. org. ru/cgi-bin/archive/r-show-frame. pl? ka_press, 2001,12,24]. 
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contextualise informal politics. Parties provide elite stability, vehicles for the 
purpose of informal conflict and legitimisation and support devices for ruling 
presidents. 
As this research will demonstrate the relationship between informal politics and 
formal institutional development has been a factor contributing to authoritarian 
consolidation. Patronage and patron-client networks have assisted in providing 
loyalty to the personal leadership of the president, which in turn aids Nur Otan and 
marginalizes other political parties and actors. The parties emerging in this context 
are weak in the functional aspects of democratisation (interest articulation and 
representation) but strong on functions assisting in authoritarian durability 
(providing elite stability and political legitimacy). 
Therefore, this work aims to explore the relationship between informal politics and 
the development of political parties in Kazakhstan within the context of 
neopatrimonialism. In doing so it will shed light on the entrenchment of 
authoritarianism and the role parties are playing in this process. This study builds on 
the analytical explorations of the formal institutional literature and clan literature by 
examining the relationship between neopatrimonial forms of informal political 
relations and behaviour (personalism, patron-client relations and factional inter-elite 
conflict), formal institutions (political parties) and authoritarian trajectories. What is 
different about this work is that it does not make the assumption that informal 
political relations and behaviour and formal institutions are necessarily separate 
entities. It will demonstrate they are inextricably linked. Political elites, based on 
their own clientelistic interest are appropriating formal political institutions for their 
own purposes. Authoritarianism, therefore, is not so much a result of clan 
organisations but the interplay between actors within those organisations; informal 
political relations and behaviour such as patron-client ties and factional inter-elite 
conflict and their relationship with formal institutions like political parties. As such 
this work undertakes a mid-way analytical approach that reflects not just on the 
relationship between informal politics and formal institutions in Kazakhstan but also 
how agency impacts and relates to party development. The role of Nazarbaev is 
important in that while being left a patrimonial legacy built to a certain extent on 
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informal clan ties under the tutelage of Soviet communism, he has continued to 
persist with and rely on such a political system. 
The thesis will argue that while Kazakhstan's political system is a neopatrimonial 
system, consisting of a fusion between traditional politics, patrimonial communism 
and new constitutional-liberal institutions, Nazarbaev's reliance on informal 
relations and behaviour is specific to, and a response to, the uncertainties and 
dynamism of transition. Emerging from this early period of independence was a 
political system based on personalism and loyalty to the leader, underscored by an 
extensive patronage network where access to resources and jobs is dependent upon 
the patronage of the president. Emerging from this are various influential elite 
groups competing for access while the president arbitrates the conflict. From this 
position the president has been able to fashion and design the formal rules of the 
game to suit his political needs. Presidentialism, based on formal and informal power 
has weakened the emergence of other institutional centres of power. Party 
development has been managed from above by the establishment of a dominant 
party, virtual parties and the cooption of the opposition. The president has been able 
to design the institutional rules governing electoral competition and party genesis, 
organisation and activity on the expected basis his loyal network of clients will 
selectively apply and interpret the law in favour of parties he supports, namely Nur 
Otan; marginalising those parties considered oppositional. Nur Otan is also a key 
institution in providing elite stability to some of the informal factional elite conflict 
that has occurred. Out of this institutional context have emerged political parties 
which are personalistic and clientelistic. Whereas some political parties are used by 
individual political figures in an attempt to claim a form of public office, many 
others are vehicles for informal elite conflict and personal ambition. They are parties 
with limited memberships; organisations focused mainly on those elites who created 
them and without clear and succinct ideological distinctions. The emphasis is on the 
personality and popularity of the chairman or co-chairmen. Partly as a consequence, 
parties' relationship with society is characterised by disconnection and passiveness 
with citizen linkages founded on personalism and clientelism. Parties' relationship 
with society is defined by homogeneity of opinion regarding the centrality of the 
president's leadership for the future prosperity of the country. This is a discourse 
spread effectively by Nur Otan that is able to so due to the informal preference and 
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advantage they receive from loyal clients of the president. Formally, Nur Otan 
assists in publicly legitimising the president's authoritarian rule. Nur Otan, therefore, 
has been an important factor in the consolidation of authoritarianism. The 
relationships existing between informal political relations and formal party 
development in the case of Kazakhstan is comparable to political relationships 
between informal forms of politics and formal institutional development in other 
former Soviet states. 
As the clan approach is hindered by explanatory limitations and at times conceptual 
confusion, a different theoretical framework is required to analyse party 
development in Kazakhstan. Considering the nature of the informal political context, 
I propose a two-tiered theoretical framework. On the first level to theorise the 
context of informal competition for power and resources this work will use the 
theory of neo-patrimonialism. Within the neopatrimonial framework exists the more 
precise concepts of personalism (loyalty to the leader), patron-client relations 
(patronage) and factional inter-elite conflict. These concepts provide precision in 
terms of the way informal relations and behaviour influence and relate to party 
development. As such, the study will highlight instances where these different forms 
of informal politics affect and connect with formal party development. On the 
second level as the key aim of this study is to explore the relationship between 
informal politics and party development in terms of the formal institutional rules 
governing party genesis, organisation and activity, the types of parties emerging and 
parties' relationship with society, it is appropriate to use formal party theory related 
to these spheres of party development to assist in unpacking the analysis. 
Consequently a theoretical framework will be constructed out of these theoretical 
and conceptual tools to understand the formal aspects of party development in 
Kazakhstan. Before turning to address this framework in the following chapter 
definitional terms will be discussed. 
5. Issues of Definition 
5.1 Institutions vs. Organisations 
Institution is a contested term. One of the most widely accepted definitions of 
institutions is that of `the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, 
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[institutions as - my italics] the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction' . 
79 Institutions, therefore, are seen to structure human interaction whether 
political, social or economic. This definition is seen to include both formal and 
informal rules. 80 However, a distinction is made between institutions and 
organisations and importantly for this study organisations are considered to be 
political bodies such as political parties, senates, unions and city councils. 8' This 
provides a very narrow conceptual understanding of an institution. Moreover, it 
underestimates the rules that govern party activity and party organisation. Such rules 
in the West are essential in holding political parties accountable in the democratic 
process. In Kazakhstan, parties and party members are also held to fixed rules 
whether by state law governing party activity or internal party charters which party 
members and leaderships are bounded to. That these rules and obligations are not 
always met and are influenced by informal phenomena does not mean they are any 
less institutions. How informal phenomena influence formal rules with regards to 
political parties is a component of this research. Therefore, this research is instead 
informed by a far wider definition of institution that takes into account political 
parties. Institutions are defined as `the formal or informal procedures, routines, 
norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity and 
political economy'. 82 
5.2 Informal Institutions vs. Informal Phenomena 
While this broad definition of institutions is useful for encompassing both informal 
and formal institutions a distinction needs to be made between informal institutions 
and other informal phenomena. This work concerns informal phenomena, or more 
precisely those informal relations and behaviour which occur alongside formal 
institutional rules governing party and party member activity. Informal institutions 
are distinguished from formal institutions as the `socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned 
79 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 6. 
80 See Gretchen Heimke and Steven Levitsky, Introduction in Gretchen IIelmke and Steven Levitsky 
(eds. ) Informal Institutions and Democracy, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006); John 
Carey, Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 33, Nos. 6-7, pp. 
735-61, and North, Institutions. 
8' See North, Op. cit., p. 5. 
82 Peter Hall & Rosemary C. R. Taylor, `Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms' 
Political Studies, XLIV, 1996, pp. 937. 
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channels'. 83 The emphasis is on enforcement outside of officially sanctioned 
channels. Formal institutions are linked to official channels of politics, economy and 
society. Helmke and Levitsky also distinguish between informal institutions and 
other informal practice and as such they envisage four distinctions that informal 
institutions should be separated from: weak institutions, informal behavioural 
irregularities, informal organisations and culture. 84 As Helmke and Levitsky suggest 
`not all patterned behaviour is rule bound, or rooted in shared expectations about 
others behaviour'. 85 This needs to be taken under consideration when exploring the 
role of the informal in political development in Central Asia. Kathleen Collins 
avoided describing clans as informal institutions preferring to conceptualise them as 
informal organisations. 86 This is because of the unpredictable and at times opaque 
nature of informal politics in the post-Soviet era. Political identities like clan or tribal 
affiliation may not be fixed and therefore behaviour may not follow prescribed rules 
internal or external to official channels and are neither easy to locate or 
conceptualise as informal institutions. 
It is important informal practices are distinguished from social norms, customs, 
traditions, and other informal patterns of behaviour. 87 Informal political practices are 
those instances of behaviour, patterned and non-patterned, outside of formal 
channels, in which official rules and formal institutions are circumvented, 
manipulated or ignored without significant sanction. Informal political practice can 
be guided by various motivations - self-maximisation, altruism and through the 
informal expectations of others. Due to their unpredictable and changing nature 
informal political practices are not institutions. Rather than use the term informal 
practices, utilised by Alena Ledeneva, this work will use the expression `informal 
political relations and behaviour'. 88 Ledeneva's term was specifically used to 
describe instances of patterned exchange which occurred outside of formal channels. 
The broader term `informal relations and behaviour' is preferred in this work due to 
its ability to bring under its scope wider informal phenomena that is not always 
83 Ilelmke and Levitsky, op. cit., p. 5. 
84 Ibid. pp. 6-8. 
85 Ibid. p. 6. 
86 Collins, Clan Politics, pp. 16-18 and 24-28. 
87 Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet 
Politics and Business (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2006). 
88 Ibid. p . 
3. 
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patterned and which does not necessarily involve clientelistic exchange. It will cover 
the personalism inherent in the political system which is not focused on formal 
rational office, the extensive nature of patron-client networks which operate at both 
an economic level (exchange) and a political level (positions within the state 
apparatus) and factional elite conflict. Importantly it will allow for an untangling of 
the relationship between informal politics and formal rules. Informal political 
relations and behaviour take the form of selective interpretations and informal 
preferencing of formal rules which are devised in a manner which allow for such 
behaviour. 
5.3 Neopatrimonialism and Clientelism 
The relationship between informal politics and formal institutional development is 
best conceptualised as occurring within a neopatrimonial framework. A 
neopatrimonial system is defined as a system where `the chief executive maintains 
authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology or law. ' 89 The 
right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office. 90 Inherent in a 
neopatrimonial system are forms of clientelism and patronage. 91 Clientelism is 
defined as `as the informal exchange of goods and services through an asymmetric, 
dyadic tie between patron and client, based not on ascription or affection but on 
need. ' 92 
5.4 Party and Party Development 
Some scholars have applied a very strict definition of a political party. Anthony 
Downs created a popular definition in his work on party competition. He formulated 
that a party is a `team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in 
89 Ishiyama, Op. cit., p. 43. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Patronage and clientelism are inter-related concepts and practices - although there is a subtle 
distinction between the two. While denoting the same type of political exchange patronage concerns 
the distribution of public resources - goods, services and public jobs, where as clientelism is linked to 
wider political exchange where all public decision-making might become a token of exchange. This 
issue will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter. See Simona Piattoni, Clientelism, Interests 
and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 4-8. 
92 Luis Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in 
Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Luis Roniger and Ayshe Gunes-Ayate, 
eds., Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society (Boulder, CO, Lynne Reinner, 1994) cited in Collins, 
Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition p. 38. 
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a duly constituted election. '93 Implicit in this definition is a rational choice 
understanding that parties are goal oriented and seek to achieve their goals by the 
most rational means. 94 In the context of Kazakhstan a rational choice perspective has 
limited utility. Opposition elites who have left the patronage of the president stand 
minimal chances for controlling the governing apparatus. Their most rational path 
would be to remain within the patronage of the president to gain access to power 
structures. There are also other problematic definitions, for example, La Palombara 
and Weiner argue that there are four characteristics which define a party: continuity 
in organisation, permanent organisation, determination of leader to capture and hold 
decision-making power, and to seek public support. 95 The problem with such a 
definition is that it does not take into account change in political parties. For 
example, La Palombara and Weiner suggest a party should outlive the life span of its 
leader. If the party changes and evolves after the leader has passed from the political 
scene, say by changing its name, does it mean we cannot define it as a party? In the 
case of Kazakhstan this is an important issue. Political parties, as this work will 
demonstrate, are tied to political personalities and it is difficult to see how some will 
survive in their present form without their leader. Therefore, this definition is created 
from a Western-oriented understanding of political parties and does not take into 
account the great change and diversity of party organisations that are appearing 
across the world. Such an emergence of parties in different contexts has meant that 
scholars have had to review how they define and conceptualise parties. 96 Chapter 
Five will deal with this issue in greater detail in relation to Kazakhstan. Therefore, a 
more general definition of party will be used in this study. Using Alan Ware's 
definition, this work understands a political party to be an `institution that (a) seeks 
influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (b) 
usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree 
attempts to `aggregate interests. ' 97 The issue of aggregation of interests is important 
in the case of Kazakhstan's political parties as to a great extent there is a 
93 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper and Brothers) p. 25 
94 Joseph A. Schlesinger, On the Theory of Party Organization, Journal of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2, 
May 1984, pp. 369-400. 
95 Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner, The Origin and Development of Political Parties, in 95 
Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds. ), Political Parties and Political Development (New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 3-42. 
96 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, Species of Political Parties: A New Typology, Party Politics, 
Vol. 9, No. 2,2003. 
97 Alan Ware, Political Parties and Political Systems (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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disconnection between parties and the citizens they are supposed to represent the 
interests of. This will be explored in Chapter Six. 
The term party development is utilised ubiquitously in this study. But what is meant 
by party development? In general party development is linked to the role parties can 
play in democratic development and consolidation. 98 Party development is related to 
the extent that parties have developed their functional capacities in relation to 
democratic procedures. This includes parties becoming key actors in determining 
access to power via open elections through electoral participation and cabinet 
formation. 99 Such a functionalist perspective in relation to party development in 
Kazakhstan is problematic for two reasons. The most obvious is that Kazakhstan has 
not proceeded towards democracy yet there has been a linear progression of party 
development. And in connection with this, parties have developed roles which have 
been used to legitimise authoritarian regime development. Parties are playing roles 
within the Kazakh system different from those in an established or consolidating 
democracy where they are assisting in authoritarian durability. Therefore, there is a 
necessity to view party development not just in correlation with democratic 
development but also in terms of how party development can support and sustain 
authoritarian development. As such, this study utilises a more organisational 
development perspective. 100 It intends to explore how informal politics influences 
and is influenced by the different types of organisational forms and capacities of the 
parties emerging. This suggests that parties can take different forms and that their 
development is not dependent on just their functional obligations within a 
democratic polity. Conversely, it examines parties' organisations in terms of their 
capacity to exist and compete in elections in the first instance, membership building, 
the organisational role in terms of intra-elite conflict, personal ambition and parties' 
relationship with wider society. The overall perspective is that while of course 
parties are indispensable for democracy as they are in possession of crucial 
operational functions in that respect, they also have other developmental properties 
98 Carrie Manning, Party-Building on the Heel of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Mozambique, Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 2007, pp. 253-272; Grigorii V. Golosov, Who 
Survives? Party Origins, Organization Development and Electoral Performance in Post-Communist 
Russia, Political Studies, Vol. 46,1998, pp. 511-543. 
99 Richard Katz (ed. ), Future of Party Government: Party Governments -European and American 
Experiences (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987). 
10° Joseph A. Schlesinger, Party Organisation. 
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and effects. In turn, therefore, the shape their development takes can play a role in 
authoritarian consolidation. 
6. Chapter Summary 
Chapter One sets out the integrated framework for this study laying out both the 
theory of neopatrimonialism and formal aspects of party development. It explores the 
theoretical elements of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism as well as patrimonial 
communism. It also lays out the theoretical background for understanding party 
development examining both classic party theory and theory related to the 
development of political parties in the former Soviet Union. Chapter Two describes 
the methodological underpinnings of the research explaining the research method 
and strategy applied to this work. Chapter Three provides political and historical 
context to the chapters that follow. It briefly assesses Kazakhstan Soviet history 
before covering the development of Kazakhstan's neopatrimonial system during the 
post-Soviet period. It examines how Nazarbaev turned to informal political relations 
and behaviour in an effort to see off some of the uncertainties of transition namely 
institutional competition and emerging pluralism. The chapter also outlines the 
emergence of powerful influential elite groups, the process of elite fragmentation and 
how the president combated fragmentation by centralising power most significantly 
in the shape of Nur Otan. Chapter Four begins a trilogy of chapters analysing the 
relationship between the informal political relations and behaviour evident in 
Kazakhstan's neopatrimonial system and the formal development of political parties. 
It explores the influence of informal politics on the formal institutional constraints 
concerning political parties. It examines how the presidency/president, rules of 
electoral competition and the law specific to party organisation and activity, were 
impacted by informal politics and preferencing by loyal clients of the president and 
in turn how parties played a formal role in providing elite stability. Chapter Five 
examines the type of parties to emerge from this institutional context. It explains 
how the parties to evolve are elite driven based on personalism and clientelism. They 
lack ideology, focusing instead on personality and display hegemonic behaviour. It is 
also explained that parties play a key role in providing a context for factional elite 
competition. Chapter Six examines the impact of the relationship between informal 
political and relations and formal party development in parties' relationship with 
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wider society. It illustrates that parties' relationship with society is defined by 
disconnection and passiveness with citizen linkages based on personalism and 
clientelism. It outlines the extent to which Nur Otan have been crucial in providing 
public legitimacy for Nazarbaev by fostering homogeneity of opinion concerning 
the centrality of his leadership. Outlining some tenuous links developing between 
some opposition parties and society the chapter concludes by stressing that these 
linkages are essentially very weak. The concluding chapter summarises the main 
argument of the thesis regarding the nature of the relationship between informal 
politics and formal party development, before then addressing some recent changes 
to informal politics and the formal institutional context. The chapter concludes by 
placing some of the key findings of the research in a broader comparative 
perspective with other former Soviet states, highlighting some wider trends 
occurring in the region on this topic. Overall the thesis contributes to our 
understanding of how informal politics affects the development of formal political 
institutions in post-transition authoritarian states not just in the former Soviet Union 
but across the globe. It illustrates how informal political relations and behaviour 
affect the quality of democratic processes and how formal institutions take on 
different forms of functionality due to their relationship with informal politics. In 
this sense, formal political institutions act to contextualise and legitimise informal 
political relations and behaviour. 
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Chapter One 
Neopatrimonialism and Party Development: A Framework for Analysis 
Usually in any geographic or temporal case studying party development would entail 
utilising various aspects of the diverse array of theories and concepts related to 
parties and party systems. ' Party development in Kazakhstan and its relationship 
with informal political relations and behaviour, however, cannot be viewed through 
such a straightforward theoretical prism. A majority of theoretical works related to 
party and party system development were induced from empirical work concerned 
with the progress of political parties in Western advanced industrial societies. Not 
privy to the historical and geographical context of advanced party systems of 
Western Europe, party development in Kazakhstan is instead interrelated to the 
informal neopatrimonial structural context of its political system. The emergence of 
political parties in the post-Soviet era is connected to informal forms of political 
behaviour and relations inherent in the political system. Therefore, a theoretical 
approach to analysing and understanding party development in Kazakhstan requires 
a framework offering insight and assistance in both the informal and formal aspects 
of this phenomenon. 
It is imperative, therefore, to apply a two tier integrated theoretical framework to 
deal adequately with the informal and formal. The first tier places the context of 
politics in Kazakhstan within the idea of neopatrimonialism. In a neopatrimonial 
context informal relations and behaviour thrive under the guise of loyalty and 
personalism to the ruler, patron-client ties and inter-elite factional conflict. These 
informal forms of relations and behaviour influence the operation of political 
institutions which to an extent are devised purposefully to be influenced by such 
informal politics. Simultaneously, the rational elements of neopatrimonialism and 
' M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties (London, Macmillan, 1964 
[1902]), Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of 
Modern Democracy, (Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001 [1915]), Maurice Duverger 'Political Parties: 
Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State' (London, Methuen and Co Ltd, 1954), Sigmund 
Neumann (ed), Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics, Chicago, (Chicago 
University Press, 1956), Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds. ), Political Parties and 
Political Development (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966), S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, 
(eds. ), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, (New York, Free Press), Giovanni Sartori, Parties and 
Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Essex, European Consortium for Political Research, 2005 
[1976]) and Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press) 1988. 
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formal institutions (including political parties) play a role in containing and 
contextualising some of these informal forms of politics. The second tier of the 
framework is employed to investigate the formal attributes of party development by 
assessing the formal institutional constraints on political parties, the type of parties 
emerging and parties' linkages with society. Each aspect features micro attributes. In 
analysing formal institutional constraints on parties, institutional choice, electoral 
design and constitutional laws pertaining to political parties are examined. Party 
typology is evaluated by assessing party organisation, ideology and behavioural 
norms. Finally, disconnection and passiveness, personalistic and clientelistic 
linkages, homogeneity of public opinion and emerging cleavages are appraised in 
relation to parties' relationship with society. Each core attribute is related 
theoretically to classic literature on political parties and then more closely examined 
with theory generated from studies of post-communist parties and party systems. 
Through the amalgamation of the informal tier of neopatrimonialism and the formal 
tier of party development a more appropriate framework is composed to assess the 
relationship between informal politics and party development in Kazakhstan. 
The framework functions by allowing the researcher to explore the relationship 
between the informal and formal at each of the three variables of party development 
and each related micro attribute as Figure 1.1 demonstrates. The informal 
components of the neopatrimonial regime, norms of personal rulership, patron-client 
relations and inter-elite faction conflict influence the micro attributes of formal party 
development. At the same time the formal components of neopatrimonial rule, as 
well as formal party development, provide a context within which informal politics 
occurs, becomes consolidated and legitimised. While the formal attributes of party 
development are for the most part the dependent variable, with the informal taking 
precedence, as alluded to above the relationship is not entirely one-way. Formal 
institutions, and in particular political parties, provide context for informal politics. 
This chapter seeks to put forward this theoretical framework in greater detail 
utilising literature associated with both neopatrimonialism and formal party 
development. Based on the theoretical insights of prior scholarship the chapter 
begins by assessing patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism. Crucially this section 
also discusses the theoretical origins of neopatrimonialism, firstly explaining the role 
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of patrimonial communism but also arguing that the onus should be placed on the 
dynamics of transition rather than structural legacies for why informal politics has 
come to dominate post-Soviet politics in Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states. 
Each major attribute of the formal tier is then tackled. In each case the micro 
attributes are analysed in relation to classic party theory and then with the more 
fitting theory generated from the experience of post-communist studies. The 
concluding remarks offer a series of tentative propositions based on the framework 
outlined here. 
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Figure 1.1 Framework for Analysing Party Development in a Neopatrimonial 
Regime 
Neopatrimonial Authoritarian Regimes 
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1. Neopatrimonialism 
1.1 Patrimonialism 
Patrimonialism was originally conceived as a Weberian typological concept of pre- 
bureaucratic patriarchal domination. 2 According to Weber, `it is based not on the 
officials' commitment to an impersonal purpose and not on obedience to abstract 
norms, but on a strict personal loyalty. ' 3 Personal rulership is central to patrimonial 
forms of rule and a ruler's legitimacy is based on personal subjugation guaranteed by 
traditional norms as the ruler `endeavours to maximise their personal control. '4 
Patrimonial regime types are usually associated with those states viewed as resisting 
aspects of modernity. 5 Under this type of rule exists a bureaucracy infused by 
personal clientelist relations. 6 Resource allocation is dependent upon traditional 
bonds of loyalty and patronage and the political centre is organised around the 
division of spoils. 7 In Weberian logic this type of traditional rule is deeply distinct 
from rational legal bureaucracies. As Robin Theobald notes, the distinction is due to 
several fundamentals being absent. This includes the: 
"Clearly defined spheres of competence that are subject to impersonal rules; 
the rational ordering of relations of superiority and inferiority; regular systems of 
appointment and promotion on the basis of free contract; technical training as regular 
requirement; and fixed salaries paid in money. "8 
Patrimonial regimes lack well defined spheres of competence and an unequivocal 
division between the ruler and the public office they appropriate. 9 The link between 
the necessity of regularity and stability in bureaucratic offices and a stable taxation 
system and modern forms of rational-legal regimes suggests that patrimonial regimes 
are inherently `traditional'. Patrimonialism and the concepts embedded within it such 
2 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkley, University 
of California Press, 1978). 
3Ibid. p. 1006. 
° See Guenther Roth, Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States, 
World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January, 1968), pp. 195. 
5 S. N. Eisenstadt, Traditional, Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1973). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Gerald, A. Heeger, The politics of Underdevelopment (London, Macmillan, 1974) cited in Robin 
Theobald. Patrimonialism, World Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4, (July, 1982) pp. 548-559. 
8 Theobald, Op. Cit., p. 555. 
9 Ibid, pp. 555-556. 
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as patron-client relations have been the preserve of anthropologists and sociologists 
concerned with small communities as opposed to macro political structures. '0 
The most significant problem with patrimonialism is its utility and applicability as a 
political concept in traditional states as they transit towards modem forms of 
political organisation. Principally it was this issue that concerned many scholars 
during the 1960s and 1970s. 11 What became evident, especially in studies related to 
emerging modern regimes in Africa and East Asia, was that many aspects of 
patrimonialism (personal rulership, patron-client relations and the arbitrary nature of 
leadership) were ever-present features of modem bureaucracies too. The dichotomy 
between tradition and modernity led to a re-conceptualisation of patrimonialism. 
Discernibly it became apparent that it was possible to distinguish between two forms 
of patrimonialism, a traditional and modern variant. 12 The traditional variant features 
partial social mobilisation and a limited range of political structures with the king as 
the patron and chief as the client, while the modern type is characterised by rapid 
social mobilisation and the variable scope of political structures with the political 
and economic elite as the patron and the subordinate masses as the client. 13 This 
classification of patrimonialism was constructed from empirical studies 
demonstrating post-traditional and post-colonial regimes consist of a combination of 
features from both personalised patrimonial regimes and modem rational-legal 
bureaucracies. In Latin America, South East Asia, Africa and Europe forms of 
patrimonial rule based on clientelism and patronage were found present in modern 
bureaucratic regimes. 14 
10 For the different interpretations and applications of patrimonialism in an anthropological and 
sociological sense see Alex Weingrod, Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties, Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, Vol. 10, No. 4. (July, 1968), pp. 377-400. 
11 See Roth, Theobald, Eisenstadt and Jean-Claude Williams, Patrimonialism and Political Change in 
the Congo, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972). 
12 Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2. (January 1972), pp. 149-178. 
13 Theobald, Patrimonialism, pp. 552-553. 
14 See Jean-Claude Williams, 1972, Alex Weingrod, 1968, Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a 
Patrimonial Society (Westport CT, Praeger, 1999) 5`h Edition, Harold Crouch, Patrimonialism and 
Military Rule in Indonesia, World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (July, 1979), pp. 571-587, Richard 
Sandbrook, Patron, Clients and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa, Canadian 
Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 5, No. 1., (March, 1972), 
pp. 104-119, James C. Scott, Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 1. (March, 1972), pp. 91-113, Jeremy Boissevain, 
Patronage in Sicily, Man, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 1. (March, 1966), pp. 18-33, Rene Lemarchand, 
Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 1. (Mar., 1972), pp. 68-90, Scott Mainwaring, 
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1.2 Neopatrimonialism 
As a variant of patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism stresses the function played by 
vestiges of traditionalism and informal politics in newly emerging modern 
bureaucratic regimes. A starting point for neopatrimonial regimes is the 
crystallisation of power in the centre in relation to the periphery. Central elites 
establish control over political entities, which were mainly created by previous 
colonial powers, and as such attempt to structurally and ideologically transform the 
periphery. 15 According to Samuel Eisenstadt: 
"The central elites of these societies tended to emphasise certain types of 
activities of the centres more than others. Thus on the one hand, they tended more 
and more to monopolise in their own hands the societies' external relations, the 
representation of the cosmic order, and to develop internally, mostly adaptive and 
`extractive' administrative policies - with a very strong stress on distributive and 
mediatory-distributive functions. " 16 
What is distinctive from more traditional forms of patrimonialism is the emergence 
of paternalistic and distributive and extractive policies. " Tied to modem economic 
developmental trends, resources are extracted in institutional (state bodies) and 
economic forms (natural resources) and distributed along lines of informal elite 
clusters. Hence the power figure `is in a position to give security, inducements, or 
both, and his personal followers who, in return for such benefits, contribute their 
loyalty and personal assistance to the patrons design'. 18 What follows from this 
pattern of personalistic organisation of the centre is an inter-elite conflict over the 
distribution of resources. The power in the centre acts as a mediator between the 
different elite cliques vying for resources. The emergence of such groups is linked to 
traditional positions within society or through the mechanisms of modem economic 
development. The composition of these elite groups varies depending on the society 
Brazilian Party Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, 
No. 4. (Winter, 1992-1993), pp. 677-707, Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of African Economic 
Stagnation (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1986), Rex Brynen, The Neopatrimonial 
Dimension of Palestinian Politics, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1. (Autumn, 1995), pp. 
23-36. 
15 Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
16 Ibid. p. 14. 
" Ibid. p. 15. 
18 Scott, op. cit., p. 92. 
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being studied. However, there is an emphasis on the rules of the game regarding the 
cooptation to - or exclusion from - access to power and resources. Political struggle, 
therefore, is channelled through this type of political organisation and outside of it 
there is little leeway for broader more autonomous groups to access resources and 
positions. 19 The political struggles that emerge are associated with `cooptation, 
change or extension of clientele and factional networks, often coupled with general 
populistic appeals made mostly in terms of ascriptive symbols or values representing 
different ethnic, religious or national communities'. 20 
How political struggle is channelled in neopatrimonial systems `changes the meaning 
or functioning of many of those institutions - like parliaments, parties, bureaucracies 
and judiciary which are often initially shaped according to liberal-constitutional or 
other `nation-state' models'. 21 For example, political parties become `instruments for 
the forging out of symbols of common collective identity; for regulating at least part 
of the access to the centre and to positions controlling distributive policies, and for 
extensions or changes of networks of patronage rather than representing various 
broader independent and/or ideological orientations'. 22 Furthermore, parties serve as 
vehicles for broadening clientele and patronage networks in order to influence the 
centre, as opposed to mobilisation for social distribution and changing the rules of 
access to the centre. Parties in a neopatrimonial regime serve the interests of the 
cliques of elites they represent and not wider social groups or structures. 
Based on Eisenstadt's ideas, this work utilises an integrated theoretical framework to 
characterise a neopatrimonial regime (see figure 1.2). What separates 
neopatrimonialism from traditional patrimonial systems is the relationship between 
informal patrimonial and formal institutional legal-rational structural components. I 
will now turn to exploring these components in more depth. 
19 Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 15. 
20 Ibid. p. 16. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
40 
Figure 1.2 Components of a Neopatrimonial Regime 
Neopatrimonial Authoritarian Regimes 
Informal Patrimonial Components Formal rational-legal institutional 
Components and Structures 
" Patriarchal norms of personal 
rulership and loyalty to the ruler 
" Patronage, and patron-client 
relations 
" Factional inter-elite networks 
" Rational bureaucratic 
structures 
" Formal `constitutional-liberal' 
institutions 
1.2.1 Informal Patrimonial Components 
Loyalty to the Leader 
A key informal patrimonial element is patriarchal norms of loyalty to the leader and 
personal leadership. While personalism is a feature of traditional patrimonial rule it 
is also `an ineradicable component of the public and private bureaucracies of highly 
industrialised countries' . 
23 This has been asserted even in the case of modern 
political systems as scholars are beginning to address the clientelistic nature present 
in some democratic states. 24 However, newer states combining traditional and 
modern features, generally those of a post-colonial or post imperial nature, lack the 
institutional matrix of highly industrialised countries `to such an extent that personal 
rulership becomes the dominant form of government'. 25 In this sense, norms of 
personal loyalty to the ruler are a central feature of neopatrimonialism that also acts 
as an agent for regime stability. 
Patronage and Patron-Client Relations 
Due to the personal nature of rulership, a leader's disproportionate access to power 
and resources empowers them with distributive and mediatory powers. Access, 
therefore, for elites is dependent upon personal loyalty to the ruler and personal 
23 Roth, Op. Cit., p. 196. 
24 Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds. ) Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of 
Democratic Accountability and Political Competition (New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
25 Roth, Op. Cit., p. 196. 
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patronage. Consequently bonds of patron-client relations permeate through political 
structures and institutions. 
But how is the concept of patron-client understood? The meaning of the interrelated 
terms patron-client and patronage depend on the disciplinary context of its use. 
According to Alex Weingrod, anthropologists use the term to denote a particular 
type of interpersonal relationship between two persons of unequal status, wealth and 
influence and is characterised as a "lopsided friendship". 26 This bond is dependent 
upon a reciprocal exchange of goods and services and is generally conducted on a 
face-to-face basis. The classic interpretation of a patron-client relationship is a 
peasant-landlord relationship. 27 In political science patron-client relationships have a 
larger structural meaning. Instead `patronage refers to the ways in which party 
politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral 
support'. 28 The political party is seen as the main device for arranging and 
distributing favours and positions. Patronage is 'the response of government to the 
demands of an interest group - the party machinery - that desires a particular policy 
in the distribution of public jobs'. 29 In the African context, the governing party was 
usually the arena `where members of the elite competed for precedence and political 
resources'. 30 The emergence of dominant political parties in post-Soviet states are 
comparable to such arenas described above. However, patron-client networks are 
not exclusive to party organisation and can feature at different levels of a 
neopatrimonial regime. For example, a personal ruler's first level of patronage could 
be with regional governors, who in turn have their own series of patronage networks 
at each district level. The power to appoint regional governors is a fundamental 
aspect of many post-Soviet presidents power, especially in Russia and Kazakhstan. It 
gives the president a great deal of leverage in guaranteeing loyalty to their rule. In 
this sense patronage networks in a neopatrimonial system are a series of 
hierarchically linked dyadic relationships that cut across government institutions and 
bureaucracies. 
26 J. Pitt-Rivers, The People of the Sierra, 2"d Edition (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1971). 
27 Weingrod, Op. Cit., pp. 377-379. 
28 Ibid. p. 379. 
29 V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964) p. 348 
cited in Weingrod, p. 379. 
30 Sandbrook, Op. Cit., p. 109. 
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Inter-Elite Factions 
Patronage networks can result in the emergence of factional inter-elite conflict 
between those who seek the rulers' patronage and access to resources. It has been 
suggested the `logic of building political careers leads party colleagues to compete 
over patronage needed to build support leading to divisive factional disputes'. 31 
From this develops competing factions with rival ambitions. Factions in a political 
science sense have usually been conceived `as conflict units operating within, and 
struggling for control of, formal organisations - usually in practice, political 
parties'. 32 However, factional inter-elite conflict can lead to the establishment of 
formal organisations for the specific purpose of conflict. While factionalism occurs 
within political parties, political parties themselves can be created specifically for 
strengthening the position and widening the influence of a particular elite group. 
Naturally elite factions are common in modem political systems, what distinguishes 
such factions in a neopatrimonial system is their personal basis. As Sandbrook has 
argued: 
"A faction may therefore be defined very broadly as a segment of a clientage 
network organised to compete within one or more political arenas. It is a coalition of 
self-interested followers recruited personally by or on behalf of a leader, who is in 
conflict with another leader or leaders. To the extent that the persons surrounding the 
leader feel bound to him by such moral ties as friendship, kinship, or ideological 
commitment, rather than by mutual self-interest, they constitute a more stable core of 
clique". 33 
The crucial element of factions within a neopatrimonial system is the extent to which 
personal ties and moral obligation bind the faction together. The personal tie and 
loyalty to the leader is important. As such, an individual's identification with a 
particular faction is normally cited as being `x's [leader of group] man'. It has to be 
noted that relationships within factions are not just based on vertical ties as in a 
relationship between a client and a patron but also horizontal ties where heads of 
31 Allyson Lucinda Benton, The Strategic Struggle for Patronage: Political Careers, State Largesse, 
and Factionalism in Latin American Parties, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1,2007, p. 
57 
32 Sandbrook, Op. Cit., p. 111. 
33 Ibid. 
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elite factional groups may unite out of securing some form of joint interest. 
However, such partnerships are liable to collapse, disintegration and acrimony. 
While factions are segments of an overall clientage network, normally the network 
of the national leader, they are also in themselves smaller clientage networks. 
Factional elite groups are common in the post-Soviet space. While in Central Asia it 
has been argued that such groups are based on kinship ties34 and economic 
cleavages, 35 in other states factional groups appear on regional lines (Ukraine) and 
over competition for political and economic influence (Russia). 
1.2.2 Formal Institutional Legal-Rational Structural Components 
Two factors distinguish contemporary neopatrimonialism from traditional forms of 
patrimonialism. First, personal loyalty, patron-client networks and factional inter- 
elite conflict influence the formal political and administrative system and second, 
that leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service and more to 
acquire personal wealth and status. 36 The formal rational-legal aspects comprise of 
two broad elements: rational bureaucratic structures and formal `constitutional- 
liberal' institutions. 
Rational-Legal Structures 
The rational legal system is characterised by a `rationally organised and steered state 
administration, and by impersonal legal-rational rules and procedures in 
implementing law and administration'. 37 As made clear by Weber, the organisational 
characteristics of a rational-legal system common in modern societies includes fixed 
areas of defined responsibilities for officials' duties and the organisation of offices 
based upon on the principle of hierarchy. 38 While there are other characteristics 
observable in modern legal-rational systems, these two particular features are also 
present in neopatrimonial regimes. The system of political governance includes a 
rational organised bureaucracy where each official has clearly defined areas of 
34 See the clan literature discussed in the previous chapter. 
35 See Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in 
Economic Liberalization, Intra-elite Cleavage, and Political Opposition, Demokratizatsiia, Vol. 13, 
No. 3,2005, pp. 373-392. 
36 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, `Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in 
Africa', World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4. (July, 1994), pp. 453-489. 
37 Alisher Ilkhamov, Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and Patronage Networks: the impasses of 
the governance system in Uzbekistan, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 67. 
38 Max Weber, Economy and Society. 
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responsibility. State administration is divided into various departments as is common 
across all modem states, for example a department of education, health, and so on. 
At the same time, there is a rationally organised chain of command as according to 
legal rules officials are accountable to their superior officers. However, in the post- 
Soviet context rational offices are complicated by the absence of a law-based state 
and the personalised nature of politics. Political offices are heavily personalised, 
especially that of the presidency and regional governor. Thus, informal relations and 
behavior influence and de-rationalise the rational elements of administrative 
organisation. Other crucial aspects of a rational-legal system, abstract rules, 
formalistic impersonal action and appointment based on technical knowledge are 
either absent or less well observed. 
Formal-Liberal Constitutions 
Besides certain rational-legal bureaucratic structures, neopatrimonial regimes also 
display formal liberal-constitutional institutions. Constitutions are written up which 
include all the formal requirements for liberal democracies. In written form, a 
separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary is evident. In 
post-colonial Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia, formal institutions are 
given constitutional prevalence but they are sunk by the weight of informal political 
components such as personal rulership and client-patron networks. 39 Formal 
institutions are inoperative due to being severely incapacitated by the informal nature 
of politics. The incapacity of liberal institutions is reflected in their weakness in truly 
curtailing the personal nature of power allowing presidents to rule unchecked. The 
introduction of formal liberal institutional rules and constitutions could be down to 
any number of reasons ranging from international pressure to the altruistic intentions 
of post-colonial leaderships or political winds of the time. However, in a post-Soviet 
context rational laws are designed deliberately so as to have enough leeway in them 
to be informally interpreted by loyal clients of the ruler. This allows post-Soviet 
presidents to present a chimera of rational liberal democratic rule while purposely 
designing formal institutions (including political parties and the rules that govern 
their participation in electoral competition and their genesis, organisation and 
activity) in a vague and generalised fashion allowing for informal interpretation with 
39 Eisenstadt, Traditionalism, Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism. 
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preference being given to presidential parties. Therefore, formal institutions are 
influenced by informal politics. Such phenomena are common in former Soviet 
states and present a significant problem for scholars analysing formal institutions in 
a post-Soviet context. It is, however, precisely the way in which informal political 
relations and behavior influence formal institutions that is the central drive of this 
research on Kazakhstan. As a consequence formal institutions cannot be treated as 
always explicitly formal as we would do in typical liberal democracies and their 
creation and operation need to be constantly viewed in the light of the informal 
politics that forms the basis of the political system in Kazakhstan. 
2. The Relevance of Neopatrimonialism to Former Soviet States 
How useful is neopatrimonialism as an approach to analyse the politics of the former 
Soviet Union? Neopatrimonialism was not included in the overarching debates 
regarding political transition '40 despite patrimonialism 
being a feature of the politico- 
administrative system of the Soviet Union and, in particular, Soviet Central Asia. 4' 
However, it has occasionally been utilised to consider post-Soviet developments. 42 
Seemingly while the clan and regional factional perspectives outlined in the previous 
chapter are polarising debate in post-Soviet political studies, they are in essence 
explaining the same phenomena, the informal nature of politics in Central Asia. 
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Neopatrimonialism offers a more extensive framework to take account of broader 
social affiliations as opposed to just clan and regional identities. It interjects a wider 
structural narrative in comprehending the political trajectories of post-Soviet Central 
Asia. Nevertheless, neopatrimonialism is suitable not just on the grounds of utility 
but also by virtue of its historical relationship with Soviet Central Asia. Indeed, one 
40 One major exception was Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, Neopatrimonial Regimes. 
41 Yoram Gorlizki, Ordinary Stalinism: The Council of Ministers and the Soviet Neopatrimonial 
State, 1946-1953, Journal of Modern History, 74, December 2002,699-736; James Critchlow, 
Corruption, Nationalism, and the Native Elites in Central Asia, Journal of Communist Studies, 4 (2), 
1988 p. 145; John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
42 The exceptions are John Ishiyama, Neopatrimonialism and the Prospects for Democratization in 
the Central Asian Republics, in Sally N. Cummings (ed. ) Power and Change in Central Asia, 
(London, Routledge, 2002) pp. 42-58 and Alisher Ilkhamov, Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and 
Patronage Networks. 
43 The argument that both sides of the debate regarding theories of Central Asia factionalism are 
explaining the same phenomena, an informal patrimonial type of politics, is put forward by David 
Gulette in Theories on Central Asian Factionalism: The Debate in Political Science and its Wider 
Implications, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 3, (September, 2007) pp. 373-387. 
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of the major themes concerning neopatrimonialism has been its affect as a prior 
regime type on regime transition. 44 The idea that historical legacies and the strategic 
choices of actors influence the development of new political entities and economies 
is hardly original, but it still remains a persuasive factor in producing political 
outcomes and regime type. 45 Legacies `at least initially shape the resources and 
expectations that help actors define their interests and to select the ways and means 
to acquire political power'. 46 In the case of post-communist systems this has been 
given great emphasis by Herbert Kitschelt who suggested three types of communist 
rule existed and the form of rule influences emerging party systems. 47 These three 
types are: patrimonial communism, national-accommodative communism and 
bureaucratic-authoritarian communism. The type relevant for this study is 
patrimonial communism. 
2.1 Patrimonial Communism 
A patrimonial communist regime `relies on vertical chains of dependence between 
leaders in the state and party apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by extensive 
patronage and clientelist networks'. 48 Political power is concentrated in either a 
small elite clique or an individual ruler with tendencies for establishing a cult of 
personality. Rationalisation of bureaucracy is low as the elite clique penetrates the 
apparatus through nepotistic appointments. These systems `were characterised by a 
heavy emphasis on democratic centralism, which fit well with the hierarchical 
structure of dependence between leaders and the led'. 49 Under such systems, rulers 
strongly repressed any form of opposition and carefully co-opted opposition elites 
through incentives such as public office or material benefit. Patrimonial communist 
regimes typically emerged in pre-industrialised settings where they were able to 
construct rapid industrial development. Accordingly, an important legacy was the 
44 Morten Bods, Liberia and Sierra Leone- dead ringers? The logic of neopatrimonial rule, Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp 697-723,2001; Bratton and Van de Walle and Snyder. 
as Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: history, institutions, and social analysis (Oxford, Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
46 Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski and Gabor T6ka, Post-Communist 
Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation, (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) p. 19. 
47 Kitschelt et al, Post-Communist Party Systems. 
48 Ibid. p. 23. 
49 John T. Ishiyama, The Sickle of the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex- 
Communist Parties in Post-Communist Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, June 
1997, p. 300. 
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lack of a prior urbanised middle class, which consequently allowed patrimonial 
regimes to never `confront an alternative vision and practice of modernisation'"50 
Due to the co-option of any form of opposition and the paucity of any cognitive 
memory regarding alternative forms of progress and modernisation when the 
collapse of the Soviet Union took place, these regimes were able to keep hold of the 
reigns of power. When independence occurred, many of the elite remained and were 
able to continue to lead the case for their version of modernisation. In this respect 
continuity is important and patrimonial communism corresponds to a form of path 
dependency. 51 
2.2 Patrimonialism in Soviet Central Asia 
Patrimonial communism existed in Central Asia. The coexistence of patrimonial 
authority alongside Soviet Stalinist bureaucracy led to `the creation of a two-level 
political culture. ' 52 As suggested in the introductory chapter, many scholars have 
argued the Soviet Union failed in modernising Central Asia with many traditional 
forms of political organisation persisting. Indeed, while factionalism remained in 
many forms (clan, tribe and regional) this was due `not so much to remnants of old 
cultures as to the adoption by the Soviet system of a tradition of indirect 
management' of different factional networks. 53 Factionalist networks, therefore, 
were recomposed on the administrative and territorial structures of the Soviet Union. 
During the Brezhnev era, local cadre were left in charge of the administrative 
structures of the Central Asian republics and this engendered political stability in the 
region. The political leaders of the region consolidated extensive patronage networks 
around themselves. 54 First Secretaries of the regional parties like Dinmukhammed 
Kunaev in the Kazakh SSR, Sharof Rashidov in the Uzbek SSR and Turdakun 
Usubaliev in the Kyrgyz SSR were left by Moscow to rule autonomously for many 
years allowing them to establish vast patronage networks based on a form of 
50 Kitschelt et al., Op. cit., p. 24. 
51 Path dependency is an idea which refers to the persistence of institutions over time. For an explicit 
overview of this concept see Stephen Krasner, `Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and 
Historical Dynamics' Comparative Political Studies Vol. 21, (January 1984), pp. 61-94. 
52 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creations of Nations, (London, I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 85 
53 Ibid. p. 85. 
54 See Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 104-112. 
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factionalism (clan, tribe and regional networks). " Consequently, their long tenure 
`enabled them to put their personal stamp on the republican machinery as in a 
fiefdom, appointing their followers to a senior posts at republican, Oblast (province) 
and Raion (district) levels'. 56 This form of patrimonialism led to patterned 
occurrences of informal politics related to personnel policy including nepotism and 
personal devotion. 57 These political leaders manipulated personnel selection for 
those who were trusted and loyal. Besides, allegiance was owed to the leader of the 
Republic rather than the Party per se. Nursultan Nazarbaev, himself, was a protege of 
Kunaev and found his way to high office because of Kunaev's patronage. 58 This 
form of communist patrimonialism, and the informal practices of corruption and 
nepotism that arose from it, was symptomatic of the Brezhnev period across the 
whole of the Soviet Union. 59 Yet, it is necessary to be clear that patrimonial 
communism is characterised not just by traditional mechanisms governing political 
behaviour but it is rather a hybrid form of modern Soviet bureaucratic practice 
60 conjoined with elements of personalistic political behaviour. 
2.3 Contingency of Transition 
While cultural and structural legacies are certainly important in exploring the 
relationship between informal and formal politics in the post-Soviet context, 61 they 
do not address the differing degrees of influence of the formal and informal in 
different policy areas or in different parts of the Soviet world. 62 It is a uniform 
approach which does not take account of the contingencies and context of transition. 
The insistence that the use of informal politics is derived from cultural legacies 
suggests a form of pre-determinism. This research, rather than work from the 
assumption that informal politics have their roots in historical precedent, whether 
55 For example, Dinmukhammed Kunaev was First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan 
from 1960-63, and 1964-1986, Sharof Rashidov was First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party 
from 1959-1983 and Turdakun Usubaliev was leader of the Kyrgyz Communist Party from 1961- 
1985 
56 James Critchlow, Op. cit., p. 145. 
57 Ibid. pp. 143-145. 
58 Dinmukhammed Kunaev, 0 Moem Vremeni (Almaty, Dauir, 1992). 
59 Valerie Bunce, The Political Economy of the Brezhnev Era: The Rise and Fall of Corporatism, 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 2, (April 1983) pp. 129-158. 
60 For a detailed examination of patronage relations among political elites in the Soviet Union see 
John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR. 
61 Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkley, University of California Press, 
1992). 
62 Vladimir Gel'man, The Unrule of Law in the Making: the Politics of Informal Institution Building 
in Russia, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7,2004, pp. 1021-1040. 
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pre-Tsarist or Soviet, argues instead that the continued use of informal politics is 
derived from the contingent and uncertain context of transition. In Kazakhstan, the 
president has relied on informal forms of politics to ensure the consolidation of 
presidential power and the primacy of presidential interests in the face of the 
uncertainty related to transitional institutional development. Moreover, the 
contingencies of the transition to a market economy, in particular privatisation, have 
offered political opportunities to elite actors leading to informal elite factional 
conflict over access to economic resources. These contingent factors of transition 
have affected the formal development of political institutions like political parties. 
Therefore, while cultural and historical legacies have to be taken into account the 
heightened sense of uncertainty in an institutional capacity and with regards to 
actors' interests require primary consideration. 63 Chapter Three covers this issue. It 
explores the historical context of patrimonialism in Central Asia and Kazakhstan but 
also examines the construction of a neopatrimonial regime during the conditions of 
elevated uncertainty in transition. 
2.4 Conceptual Issues 
How can the theory of neopatrimonialism and the embedded concepts of 
personalism, patron-client networks and factional inter-elite conflict be 
operationalised as units of analysis? Robert Kaufman has pointed to the problem of 
using a concept such as patron-client relationships, due to inherent problems in 
applying the patron-client concept from micro to macro analysis. 64 It is easier to 
operationalise and chart clientelism when analysing and uncovering narrow small- 
scale political relationships, as in the case of anthropological studies. In wider macro 
political studies, however, clientelism is susceptible to concept stretching, with its 
value and utility being compromised by the broadness of the study. Kaufman cites 
the case of Lemarchand and Legg65 where the concept is expanded `well beyond the 
already ambiguous meanings usually ascribed to it. '66 It is also `too narrow to 
encompass all of the phenomena that should be included in a paradigm of power'67 
63 Ibid. 
64 Robert Kaufiran, The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-politics: Prospects and Problems, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16. 
No. 3, (July 1974), 284-308. 
65 Lemarchand and Legg, Political Clientelism and Development. 
66 Kaufman Op. cit., p. 290. 
67 Ibid. 
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as it adds little to our understanding of other aspects of power including `charismatic 
leadership, coercive relationships, influence or manipulation. ' 68 What use is patron- 
client as a concept when it is stretched to paradigmatic levels to encompass 
explaining a whole political system? Neopatrimonialism, however, can provide the 
theoretical context within which nested concepts such as personalism and patron- 
client relations provide smaller more precise analytical concepts. These concepts can 
be utilised to analyse their influence upon, and relationship with the development of 
rational-legal structures and formal institutional structures. In this study, 
neopatrimonialism is used as part of theoretical framework to understand the 
relationship between informal politics and party development in Kazakhstan. The 
embedded concepts of personal loyalty, patron-client relations and inter-elite conflict 
are viewed as variables influencing and relating to formal party development. Party 
institutional constraints, type and citizen linkages act as variables arising from the 
rational-legal and formal liberal-constitutional elements of a neopatrimonial regime, 
which while being the primary dependent variable, do act to stabilise, legitimise and 
consolidate informal power. Neopatrimonialism and concepts nested within it act as 
a way to explicitly engage broader issues concerning power relationships and 
authoritarian consolidation 
This section has highlighted how neopatrimonialism is a useful approach to help 
understand the relationship between informal political relations and behaviour and 
party development. The approach emphasises the role of personalism, patron-client 
relations and inter-elite factional conflict in influencing formal party development 
and the institutional rules governing their development, including the rational 
elements of a neopatrimonial regime such as formal institutional rules and a liberal 
constitution. Neopatrimonialism in Kazakhstan while having a historical precedent in 
the form of patrimonial communism has become prominent in the post-Soviet period 
due to the contingent context of transition. To explore the formal institutional 
variants of this work it is expedient to construct the second element of the 
framework. 
68 Ibid. p. 291. 
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3. Formal Theoretical Framework Regarding Political Parties: Institutional 
Factors Affecting Party Development 
Neopatrimonialism, therefore, provides an appropriate theoretical framework to 
analyse the context within which party development occurs in Kazakhstan. As this 
research involves exploring the impact of, and relationship between, informal forms 
of politics on institutional design relating to parties, party types and societal linkages 
it is appropriate to address theory related in all three spheres. Figure 1.3 sets out the 
different micro attributes within each of the formal aspects of party development. 
Figure 1.3 Formal Aspects of Party Development 
Formal Aspects of Party Development 
Formal Institutional Party Typology Societal Links 
Constraints 
Micro attributes: 
" Institutional 
Choice 
" Electoral Design 
" Constitutional 
Laws Pertaining to 
Political Parties 
" Party Organisation 
" Ideology 
" Behavioural 
Norms 
" Disconnection and 
Passiveness 
" Personalistic and 
Clientelistic 
Linkages 
" Homogeneity of 
Opinion 
" Emerging 
Cleavages 
Institutional choice plays a crucial role in affecting political development in post- 
communist countries. 69 Institutions shape incentives and identities of political actors 
and provide the context of a successful transition to democracy. Above all, two types 
of institutional choice perform a function in determining party development - the 
system of government and the type of electoral system. 70 Also important in post- 
Soviet countries are those laws specifically designed to instigate party 
development. 71 
69 See Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
70 David White, The Russian Democratic Party Yabloko: Opposition in a Managed Democracy 
(Aldershot: Ashgate) 2006 p. 33. 
71 Lauri Karonen, Legislation on Political Parties: A Global Comparison, Party Politics, Vol. 13, No. 
4 pp. 437-455. 
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3.1 Institutional Design Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism 
A large debate in the democratic transition literature has centred on whether 
presidentialism or parliamentarism aids democratic consolidation and party 
development. 72 Juan Linz's argument that presidentialism inherently hinders 
democracy and party development has become a widely accepted and at the same 
time contested norm. 73 The negative aspects of presidentialism are covered 
thoroughly in many works, 74 however, the tendency in presidential systems towards 
temporal rigidity, majoritarianism and dual legitimacy, are well established and 
increase the propensity for `executives to rule at the edge of the constitution'. 75 
Thus, presidential systems due to their liability in creating political stalemate mixed 
with the concentration of formal powers, are more likely to increase the chances of 
non-democratic outcomes. 76 Presidentialism can lead to legislative deadlock, weak 
political parties and regime breakdown. Consequently, it can have a significant affect 
on party development `in countries where power resides squarely in the office of the 
presidency and where parliament plays a rubber stamping role' as `the incentive for 
political actors to form and organise political parties is reduced'. 77 The weakness of 
parties, and institutionalised party system, creates a cycle of centralisation in the 
presidency as `the more poorly institutionalised a party system the more 
opportunities the president has to exploit divisions among the parties and exercise 
72 See Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1 No. 4,1990, pp 124-140 
and Donald Horowitz, Comparing Democratic Systems, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1 No. 4,1990, 
pp 141-149. 
73 Those who have contested the argument that presidential forms of government are an impediment 
to democracy include, Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: 
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
Maurice Duverger, A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, in Arend Lijphart 
(ed. ), Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992) 
pp. 142-149 and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York, New York 
University Press, 1997). 
74 See Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination, 
Comparative Politics Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, July 1993, pp. 198-228; Arturo Valenzuela, Latin 
America: Presidentialism in Crisis, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1993, pp. 3-16; 
Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1994, 
pp. 55-69 and Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic 
Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism, World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1, October 1993, 
1-22. X15 
Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, October 1993, p. 22. 
76 Juan Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference? In Juan J Linz 
and Arturo Valenzuela (eds. ) The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1994), pp. 3-90. 
77 David White, Op. cit., p. 27. 
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influence, even if his formal powers are weak' . 
78 The centralisation of power in 
presidential systems made presidential forms of government a strong preference for 
post-Soviet elites who remained consolidated during the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 79 Those former Soviet states that have displayed authoritarian characteristics 
have developed various forms of strong centralised presidencies. 80 
Presidentialism, therefore, correlates to weak party development and democratic 
erosion. 8' Robert Moser has posited that presidentialism has two effects on party 
development in post-Soviet states. The first is that directly elected presidents tend to 
promote less cohesive parliamentary parties, as the separate constituencies of 
legislative and executive power in presidential regimes fails to provide incentives for 
cohesive party discipline within the legislature. Simultaneously, the `winner takes- 
all' aspect of a directly elected presidency promotes the consolidation of smaller 
parties into broader coalitions as the single political reward leads parties needing to 
form larger coalitions to gain the main prize. 82 Surveying the experience of both 
Russia and Kazakhstan, it is possible to see at different temporal points both of these 
competing effects. The early stages of presidency in both countries led to a 
fragmented and weak party system. 83 The only parties who bucked this trend were 
the communist parties in each respected state. 84 The increasing centralisation of 
power, in both a formal and informal sense, in the presidencies post-1999 saw the 
creation by the ruling regimes of larger more cohesive parties in the shape of Edinaia 
Rossiia (United Russia) and Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland). 
The influence of the institution of the presidency in post-Soviet countries on political 
parties is not straightforward due to informal politics shaping its role. In the first 
78 Matthew Shugart, Presidents and Parliaments: Executive-Legislative Relations, Transition, 13 
(December 1996): 6-11. 
79 Gerard Easter, Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the 
NIS, World Politics, Vol. 49 No. 2, pp. 184-211. 
80 This includes all the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan as well as Azerbaijan, Russia, Belarus and Armenia. 
81 Stephen Fish, The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion, in Richard Anderson et al, Post-Communism 
and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 54-95. 
82 Robert Moser, The Electoral Effects of Presidentialism in Post-Soviet Russia, in J. Löwenhardt 
(ed. ), Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia (London, Frank Cass, 1988), pp. 55-58. 
83 Michael McFaul, Political Parties, in Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov (eds. ), 
Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform (Washington D. C., 
Brookings Institution, 2004) pp. 105-134. 
84 Luke March, The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 2002). 
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instance, the institution itself is infused with the significant role of the agency of the 
president. While formally, the powers of many post-Soviet presidents are strong, 
such power is outweighed by the informal power granted to the president. It is the 
person, rather than the president who has the power. This is one of the reasons why 
presidents in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Tajikistan 
have held great sway and influence over legislative bodies and in shaping the agenda 
of institutional design. It is consistent with the dimension of personalism and loyalty 
to the leader evident in neopatrimonial regimes. Presidents like Putin and Nazarbaev 
have extensive informal networks of support. Putin for example has networks of 
loyal support based on former associates from the security services. 85 From this 
position of both formal and informal power, post-Soviet presidents influence the 
development of political parties in several ways. There is the creation of loyal 
dominant pro-presidential parties. An aim of many post-Soviet presidents has been 
to establish loyal parties to serve the interests of the incumbent president. In Russia, 
Putin has Edinaia Rossiia, while in Kazakhstan Nazarbaev has created Nur Otan. 
The purpose of such parties is for presidential interests to be dominant in the 
legislature. In the case of Russia and Kazakhstan this has been achieved with great 
success. The parties achieve such dominance due to the extensive patronage they 
receive from the president and the informal preferencing they receive from loyal 
state clients. On a formal level, however, dominant parties also provide significant 
elite stability which helps aid authoritarian durability. 86 Presidents also manage party 
development by establishing virtual parties to represent certain anticipated social 
cleavages. According to the ideas of Andrew Wilson, presidential administrations in 
many former Soviet states have adopted a `many layered pie strategy'. 87 This 
involves establishing various pro-presidential parties to represent different aspects of 
the electorate. This has been particularly evident in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan 
and Belarus. This creates the impression of multi-partism. Finally, another 
instrument of presidential influence over party development is through the cooption 
of opposition parties. Opposition parties' loyalty is bought by the offer of potential 
jobs or a guarantee of gaining seats in the next parliamentary election. 
85 Daniel Treisman, `Putin's Silovarchs, Orbis, Volume 51, Number 1,2007, pp. 141-153. 
86 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratisation (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
87 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the post-Soviet World (Yale, Yale 
University Press, 2005). 
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It requires noting, however, that the concept of `opposition' in the post-Soviet 
context is problematic. Ruling elites have become very adept at neutralising 
opposition and a high degree of elite stability and minimal elite differentiation makes 
principled opposition limited. 88 What has emerged in the post-Soviet context is the 
idea of `loyal opposition'. That is, parties which are either constructed or co-opted 
by the presidential administration to create a form of institutionalised opposition 
which create the impression of pluralism and debate. Loyal opposition parties might 
consist of close associates of the incumbent president who sit squarely within his 
patronage and to that extent offer no genuine form of opposition. Other opposition 
parties feature fragmented elites who continue to have ties with the ruling regime 
and can be co-opted at times with the use of rewards in exchange for loyalty. 
Therefore, these issues need to be considered when analysing and discussing the 
opposition in Kazakhstan. Essentially, opposition in a post-Soviet context is not how 
we typically understand `opposition' in a Western democratic sense. 
Chapter Four analyses how the president of Kazakhstan in both formal and informal 
terms has utilised the above methods to manage party development. It will illustrate 
how the institutional choice of presidentialism has affected the development of 
political parties. 
3.2 Electoral Design 
There is a clear correlation between electoral design and political parties. 
`Duverger's Law' has long epitomised the relationship between electoral design and 
party systems. Duverger's hypothesis posits that `the simple majority single ballot 
system favours the two party system' and `proportional representation favours multi- 
partism'. 89 While Duverger's law has received criticism for its conceptual and 
methodological weaknesses, the main supposition underlying the law regarding the 
affect of electoral systems on reducing or multiplying the number of parties remains 
88 Vladimir Gel'man, Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species? Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 21, 
No. 3,2005, pp. 226-246. 
89 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (London: 
Methuen and Co Ltd, 1954) p. 216 and p. 239. 
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valid. 90 Evidently the format of the electoral system will impact on the type of party 
system, but it can also influence the type of political parties too. 91 Electoral systems 
can affect how parties approach party competition; undertake the responsibilities of 
government, whether parties remain consolidated or fragmented and the degree of 
personalism within a party. 92 As Sartori has argued, `different electoral systems 
bring about different ways of competing, a majoritarian system is a winner takes all 
system while losing in a proportional system is a `matter of greater and smaller 
shares'. 93 Electoral systems can affect the degree to which a party behaves 
responsibly depending on whether a party has to form a government or enter into a 
coalition. Plurality systems penalise party fragmentation, favouring party dualism 
while a single nationwide constituency accommodates party fragmentation. 94 
Finally, Sartori suggests single-member districts encourage personalism within 
politics with the stress on individual constituency representation. 95 
3.3 Electoral Systems in Former Soviet States 
The link between electoral systems and parties is theoretically durable in well- 
established democracies however the consequences of electoral systems in 
transitional states are less predictable. 96 Two issues illustrate the tenuous link 
between electoral systems and party systems: the questionable nature of electoral 
processes (or electoral engineering) and electoral reform. 
Electoral processes in former Soviet states are generally characterised by incidences 
of fraud, voter manipulation and an overall lack of transparency. Reports from 
Western based organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), despite their normative nature, consistently find electoral 
processes across former Soviet States (with the exception of the Baltic republics) to 
9OGiovanni Sartori, in particular, has highlighted the conceptual and methodological ambiguities of 
Duverger's Law in Giovanni Sartori, `The influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty 
Methods? In Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, (eds. ) Electoral Laws and Their Political 
Consequences (New York, Algora Press, 2003 [1986]), pp. 43-68. 
9' Giovanni Sartori, `The Party Effects of Electoral Systems', in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther 
(eds. ), Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 90- 
105. 
92 Ibid. pp. 101-102. 
93 Ibid. p. 101. 
94 Ibid. P. 102. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Byron Moraski, Electoral System Reform in Democracy's Grey Zone: Lessons from Putin's 
Russia', Government and Opposition, Vol. 43, No. 4,2007, pp. 536-563. 
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have fallen short of international norms and expectations. 97 This suggests election 
engineering and `virtual politics'98 obscure the relationship between electoral 
systems and party development to the extent that it is difficult to extract a definable 
law. It reflects the `lawlessness' that appears in non-comprehensive democratic 
systems. 99 The ever-changing nature of post-Soviet electoral systems makes 
consistent theory linkages between electoral systems and parties problematic. 
Initially many former Soviet states introduced Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) 
electoral systems, Kazakhstan and Russia being but two examples. 1°° One distinct 
observation to be made about the cases of Russia and Kazakhstan is that the process 
of electoral reform has challenged conventional assumptions regarding the influence 
of electoral system type on party systems. Russia and Kazakhstan's shift from MMM 
systems to fully proportional systems with thresholds of 7 percent have led to the 
consolidation of one and two party systems as opposed to typical party 
fragmentation. Russia's parliamentary elections of 2007 saw the consolidation of 
Edinaia Rossiia's grip on the Duma with 315 seats (out of 450) and likewise in 
Kazakhstan the president's party Nur Otan obtained 100 percent of seats. This 
phenomenon has been characterised as democratisation backwards. 1°' However, to 
describe it as such fails to take account of how electoral systems in post-Soviet states 
are designed to take account of elite and presidential interests and not the interests of 
democratic competition. 102 
3.4 Electoral Rules and the Influence of Informal Politics 
The personal nature of political decision-making and behaviour, and the influence of 
informal politics on electoral design are keenly felt in the conception of electoral 
rules which benefit pro-regime forces, such as thresholds for parliament, electoral 
blocs and the removal of imperative mandate. Electoral rules can influence party 
97 See any of the number of election monitoring reports on the OSCE website. www. osce. org 
98 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the post-Soviet World. 
'" Giovanni Sartori, 2001. 
100 Armenia and Tajikistan began and remain with a mixed member majoritarian system. Ukraine 
originally had a completely majoritarian system before switching to a mixed member system with 
fifty percent elected by proportional representation with a5 percent threshold. The system was then 
altered from the 2006 election onwards to a hundred percent proportional system with a3 percent 
threshold. Georgia too currently possess' a mixed-member majoritarian system. 
101 Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave 
Democracies', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 2,2001, pp. 331-354. 
102 Erik S. Herron, Political Actors, Preferences and Election Rule Re-design in Russia and Ukraine, 
Democratization, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 1994, pp. 41-59. 
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development'03 as, for example, a minimum threshold for entry into parliament in 
proportional systems is crucial for the development of democratic polities as it helps 
a few parties establish themselves as the main aggregators of citizen interests. 104 The 
practice of implementing a threshold mechanism is widespread across established 
and new democracies alike. 105 Whereas this has proved effective in some post- 
communist transitions such as Poland, 106 in post-Soviet countries such as 
Kazakhstan and Russia, it has been used as a tool to effectively keep opposition 
parties out of parliament and ensure a healthy majority in the assembly for the 
incumbent president. The threshold is also used in tandem to influence and 
manipulate electoral rules in favour of presidential forces. For instance, in both 
Russia and Kazakhstan the banning of electoral blocs further incapacitated 
opposition parties' ability to surmount the threshold for entry into parliament. 107 
The removal of imperative mandate ensures party loyalty and contributes to 
stabilising and consolidating presidential authority in the legislature. If a deputy of a 
ruling party rebels against the party line they risk losing their seat thus ensconcing 
party discipline and loyalty to the president. Finally, as mentioned above, electoral 
processes in states such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, are 
prone to electoral falsification, voter intimidation, the outlawing of potentially strong 
opposition candidates and a large degree of state administrative resources being used 
to favour the main presidential party or parties. What this indicates is the formal 
electoral process is being informally engineered to ensure electoral rules favour pro- 
presidential and pro-regime parties. Chapter Four will illustrate how formal rules 
regarding electoral competition were informally operated, due to their vague and 
generalised nature, to ensure presidential parties succeed. The formal rules regarding 
candidate registration, the formation of electoral commissions, campaigning and vote 
103 David White, The Russian Democratic Party Yabloko. 
1°4 J. J. Linz & A. Stepan, (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 
1996) pp. 274-275. 
los L. LeDuc, R. Nemi and P. Norris, Comparing Democratic Elections in L. LeDuc, R. Nemi and P. 
Norris (eds. ) Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting, 
(Thousand Oaks, CA and London, Sage Publications, 2002) pp. 1-39. 
106 Poland's first election had no form of proportional representation and therefore resulted in 29 
parties being elected to parliament. For more detail see Linz and Stepan, 1996 and David White 2007 
21. ý67 
For Russia see Byron Moraski, 2007 and for Kazakhstan see R. Isaacs, Managing Dissent, 
Limiting Risk and Consolidating Power: The Processes and Results of Constitutional Reform in 
Kazakhstan, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 44, No. 1,2008. 
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counting will be examined to demonstrate the informal preferencing of those rules in 
favour of pro-presidential parties. 
What the design of electoral systems and rules illustrate to the observer is the 
difficulty in making fixed theoretical links between electoral design and political 
parties in a post-Soviet context. An informal personal form of politics is influencing 
the design and choice of electoral system and rules where the preferences of 
incumbent presidents are preponderant. The institutional choices of powerful actors 
are influencing the development of weak parties. 108 In the case of Kazakhstan, the 
loyalty benefited to Nazarbaev has allowed him to construct an electoral system that 
ensures only his political party is guaranteed entry into parliament. The patron-client 
relations that have emerged under his political leadership maintain the informal 
engineering of the electoral process which benefits only Nur Otan. This process 
affects the development of not only Nur Otan but also all other parties in 
Kazakhstan. 
3.5 Constitutional Laws Pertaining to Political Parties 
In post-Soviet states the artificial stimulation of party development has proved a 
significant factor in the emergence of political parties through the enacting of 
constitutional laws specific to political parties. 109 Such laws have been implemented 
as a way to artificially drive the process of party development. Whereas in 
established democracies political parties arose to prominence through an organic 
process, the states of the former Soviet Union have applied constitutional law in an 
effort to encourage the institutionalisation of a party system. In Russia, for example, 
the law was introduced under Vladimir Putin in an effort to avoid the considerable 
party fragmentation which occurred under Boris Yeltsin's presidency. 110 The law 
sets out the legal basis on which party organisations can be established and 
formalises their role within the state. Similar laws have been introduced in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine. These laws vary with 
regards to construction and application, but in the case of Kazakhstan it is possible to 
108 Michael McFaul, Explaining Party Formation and Non-formation in Russia: Actors, Institutions, 
and Chance, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 34, No. 10, December 2001, pp. 1159-1187. 
109 Lauri Karonen, Legislation on Political Parties. 
10 Edwin Bacon, Russia's Law on Political Parties: Democracy by Decree? In Cameron Ross (ed. ), 
Russian Politics Under Putin (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 40-47. 
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observe three ways in which the law impacts on aspects of party development and 
also the way in which the informal nature of neopatrimonialism interacts with the 
formal law. 
In the first instance, the law can impact on the organisational capability of a party by 
providing the legal basis on which parties can be organised. As will be highlighted in 
Chapter Four, the law in Kazakhstan determines the number of members a party 
requires for state registration and controls the principle on which a party can form. 
For example, the law does not permit parties founded on the principle of ethnicity, 
gender, and religion. Second, a law related to political parties can shape the extent to 
which parties can organise on regional or national interests. Again, in Kazakhstan 
parties can only register if they have at least 700 members in each Oblast, thus, 
attempting to create national parties as opposed to regionally focused parties. A third 
dimension of its impact is on opposition parties. While in some former Soviet states, 
such as Ukraine, the law is normally interpreted in a transparent sense, in 
Kazakhstan the law is construed by officials at the Ministry of Justice in such a way 
as to impede the registration process of political parties the ruling regime is wary of 
seeing active in the political process. The law is applied in the active pursuit of 
deterring the formation of political parties which oppose the current regime of 
Nursultan Nazarbaev. Again it is possible to detect the influence of informal politics. 
Loyalty to Nazarbaev is the imperative throughout the drafting, construction and 
application of the law. The law is constructed in such a fashion as to make violation 
easy. Therefore, informal powers of discretion are handed to loyal officials as they 
have the power to selectively apply the law. In cases of opposition parties it is 
applied with vigour and strictness. In the case of pro-presidential parties it is applied 
leniently. As with the informal interpretation of electoral rules, Chapter Four will 
analyse how the formal rules regarding political parties are selectively applied to 
preference pro-presidential parties and exclude opposition parties. This is achieved 
ostensibly due to the broad nature of the law which leaves it open to informal 
interpretation on the part of loyal clients of the president. 
The above demonstrates that the formal constraints on political parties regarding 
institutional choice, electoral design, and the specific constitutional laws relating to 
party development can affect and shape the development of political parties. This 
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much is obvious. What is less so, but appears when party development occurs in a 
neopatrimonial state is how informal elements interact and overlap with formal 
institutional constraints. The personalism evident in a neopatrimonial regime 
influences the shape institutional constraints take when affecting party development. 
This combination of personal influence and institutional design epitomises 
neopatrimonialism, as it represents the interaction between informal political 
relations and behaviour, and the formal liberal constitutional elements of the 
neopatrimonial regime. 
4. Formal Theoretical Framework Regarding Political Parties: 
Party Typology 
As highlighted above, electoral design, institutional choice and constitutional laws 
pertaining to the development of political parties play a significant role in shaping 
party development. It was also suggested that in a neopatrimonial regime the 
influence of informal politics cuts across and intersects with how institutional factors 
affect party development. The question that arises is what types of parties are 
emerging from this institutional context? This section seeks to address a theoretical 
framework and appropriate conceptual types to understand the type of parties 
emerging in this situation. 
Classic party types used by scholars to frame their understanding of party 
development have almost exclusively focussed on the experience of parties in 
Western advanced industrial societies. The conceptual responsiveness of mass, 
cadre, catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel party types can prove problematic 
in alternative temporal and geographical contexts. l11 The challenge for scholars and 
students of the post-Soviet world is how these might apply in a post-communist 
context, if at all. Classic party types also lack a certain universal coherence, as each 
... For mass and cadre party types see: Maurice Duverger Political Parties: Their Organisation and 
Activity in the Modern State (London, Methuen and Co Ltd, 1954), for the catch-all party see, Otto 
Kirchheimer, The Transformation of Western European Party Systems, in J. La Palombara and M. 
Weiner (eds. ), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1969) pp. 177-200, for the electoral-professional party Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: 
Organisation and Power (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988) and for the cartel party 
Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair `Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party', Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995) pp. 5-28. 
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type is based on just a single criterion of a party. 12 Ideal party types based on 
singular criterion produce a certain level of conceptual unevenness. 
4.1 Assessing Party Types in the Former Soviet Union 
Considering the complexities of appropriateness scholars have been less inclined to 
use classic typologies in the post-Soviet context. This has less to do with conceptual 
appropriateness and more to do with the considered weakness of party development 
in the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the few works that have attempted to 
typologically characterise parties in post-Soviet countries have made little linkage 
with classic party types. Instead, the uniqueness of the post-Soviet context is 
preferred over theoretical integration. The two types that appear most frequently are 
parties of power and electoralist parties. 
Parties of Power 
A central principal behind the party of power is the party's relationship with the 
state. ' 13 Parties of power have a close relationship with the executive branch which 
is seen to co-opt parties of power for their own political purposes. 114 Thus, parties of 
power are an extension of the executive where the party `is the actual group whose 
members wield power in and through the executive branch of government'. 115 
Avoiding the deep ideological nature of the communist period, parties of power 
portray themselves as centrist de-ideological organisations' 16 allowing them to 
`adjust flexibly to a changing environment'. 117 Due to their close association with an 
incumbent figure, parties of power adopt the same ideological outlook and polices of 
their patron. Consequently, the personality of the leader is central to the 
programmatic platform of the party. A party of power's position, therefore, is 
directly linked to their relationship with leading political personalities. Scholars and 
112 For instance, the cadre and mass parties are posited on an analysis of organisational qualities; the 
catch-all party is framed in terms of ideational merits, the electoral-professional party, again on 
organisational characteristics and the cartel party on relations with the state. 
113 Zoe Knox, Pete Lentini, and Brad Williams, Parties of Power and Russian Politics: A Victory of 
the State Over Civil Society? Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 53, No. 1, (2006), p. 3. 
"" Henry Hale, Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The role of contingency in party- 
system development', Demokratizatsiia, Vol. 12, No. 2,2004 pp. 169-194. 
s Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul, Managing Democracy: Political Parties and the State in 
Russia, Journal of Communist and Transition Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 2006, p. 394. 
116 Regina Smyth, Building State Capacity from the Inside Out: Parties of Power and the Success of 
the President's Reform Agenda', Politics and Society, Vol. 30, No. 4,2002. 
117 Andrey A. Meleshevich Party Systems in Post-Soviet Countries, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007) p. 195. 
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the media when assessing parties of power have generally overlooked the centrality 
of personality. "8 Examples cited as parties of power are Vladimir Putin's Edinaia 
Rossiia, Heldiar Aliev's New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) and Nursultan Nazarbaev's 
Nur Otan. 
As a typology, the concept is flawed due to the lack of agreement among scholars as 
to the parameters of its constituent parts. 19 Moreover, the emphasis placed on the 
relationship with the state and the executive implies parties of power have decision- 
making and policy-making powers. Yet empirically parties of power are not parties 
with power neither can they be considered ruling parties. Parties such as Edinaia 
Rossiia and Nur Otan do not strictly rule or possess power and in this sense the term 
party of power is misleading. Furthermore, the concept fails to integrate with more 
universal theories on party typology. Distinct characterisations of parties in a post- 
Soviet context have not addressed the theoretical relationship between parties 
developing in the post-Soviet world and those more established parties in the 
West. 120 This is despite some considerable overlap between aspects of the party of 
power and classic party types. For instance, the state centred nature is similar to the 
cartel party and the de-ideological facet resonates with the catch-all party. '2' 
Naturally, utilising party theories developed in the West in a post-Soviet context is 
problematic. Post-Soviet parties are emerging in a distinct historical and structural 
context. Despite this, any typology appearing in a post-Soviet context should at least 
speak to the wider literature on party typology as it can tell us more about the type of 
party system that is emerging and how political parties are changing and developing 
in a global context. A closer integration would also shift the debate away from a 
normative understanding of what constitutes `normal' party development. If our 
understanding of post-Soviet parties is not integrated to some extent within a wider 
typological framework then concepts such as party of power will remain exclusive to 
the post-Soviet context and `abnormal'. 
118 The one exception is Andrey Meleshevich. 
119 Meleshevich, Party Systems in Post-Soviet Countries. 
120 Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul categorise parties in post-Soviet Russia into seven types: 
Parties of the Past, Genuine Parties, Parties of Power, Party of Power Helper Parties, Favoured 
Opposition Parties, Harassment Parties and Vanity Parties. 
12 See Katz and Mair, Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy and Otto 
Kirchheimer, The Transformation of Western European Party Systems. 
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Electoralist Parties 
The second type of party generally recognised in the post-Soviet context, and one 
that is far more universal, is the electoralist party. An electoral perspective is 
certainly pertinent as elections are fundamental to parties' goals in seeking public 
office. Not surprisingly parties in the former Soviet Union have been central to 
electoral process 122 and their primary function has been to prepare all their 
organisational resources for the sole purpose of election campaigns so as to win 
public office and wield power. 123 Resembling the electoral-professional party, the 
emphasis on electoral contestation is sought at the expense of regional party building 
and mobilising and working with their potential electorate, thus, exposing them to 
being organisationally weak and thin. 124 It suggests political parties in the former 
Soviet Union have weak social bases. 125 
The stress on electoral contestation removes emphasis on who is pursing public 
office. Placing the spotlight on who is seeking office is important, as it allows us to 
assess key political players and elite groups. In a post-Soviet context, parties 
`typically start out as small, geographically concentrated organisations or as cliques 
of governing elites in the capital. ' 126 Therefore, what is vital is not just that parties 
are focused on electoral activity but the key players and elites behind them. Across 
the former Soviet Union parties are elite dominated organisations with limited links 
to society. 127 It would be useful therefore to take account of the elites and individuals 
creating parties as these players might assist in explaining the nature of political 
conflict. Elections in the former Soviet Union are of a questionable nature and 
therefore, focusing on party typology solely in terms of elections may not provide 
enough scope to give an accurate account of parties' true nature and modus operandi. 
122 Michael McFaul, Explaining Party Formation in Russia and Herbert Kitschelt and Regina Smyth 
Programmatic Party Cohesion in Emerging Post Communist Democracies, Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol. 35, No 10, December 2002, pp. 1228-1256. 
123 David White, The Russian Democratic Party Yabloko. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Stephen Whitefield `Partisan and Party Divisions in Post-Communist Russia' in Archie Brown 
(ed. ) Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 235-243. 
126 Robert Moser, Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in 
Russian Politics, Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2,1999, pp. 147-165. 
127 Ian McAllister and Stephen White, Democracy, Political Parties and Party Formation in Post- 
Communist Russia, Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 49-72 and Thomas Poguntke, Parties Without 
Firm Social Roots? Party Organisational Linkage, Working Paper 13, Keele European Parties 
Research Unit, 2002. 
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In assessing both party types it is possible to observe how neither takes account of 
the influence of neopatrimonialism in Kazakhstan. Nur Otan's raison d'etre is to 
provide unwavering support and loyalty to president Nazarbaev. The considerable 
personalism and devotion to the leader evident within the party's organisation, 
ideology and behavioural norms demonstrates the relationship between informal 
politics and the development of party types. Other parties in Kazakhstan, 
independent from the president, are based on factional groups of elites. They are 
established either to represent or protect business or political interests of factional 
elite groups, or for the personal ambition of a famous public figure. In this sense 
parties are used as formal vehicles for informal political activity. To map the 
typological character of parties in Kazakhstan a more varied approach is required 
offering flexibility for the post-Soviet context while simultaneously assimilating 
party characterisation into a wider theoretical context. 
4.2 A Typological Framework for Parties in Kazakhstan 
Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond have stressed that `existing models of political 
parties do not capture the full range of variation of party types found in the world 
today. ' Setting out a new fifteen-fold party genus Gunther and Diamond produced a 
framework for characterising parties in different geographical and temporal 
contexts. 128 Neatly, their usage of terms central to classic party types enables the 
theoretical integration of parties in a non-Western context to be reconciled with 
wider global typological understandings. Implicit in their framework is the 
understanding that it is possible for different types of parties to exist in different 
contextual and temporal settings. Duly, their framework disposes of a normative 
understanding of political parties. What their framework lacks in parsimony is made 
up in its universal appeal and theoretical integration. While this research works on a 
certain level of presumed uniqueness of the post-Soviet case, the overarching idea is 
to integrate the study of the post-Soviet world into mainstream theoretical ideas. 
128 Gunther and Diamond's fifteen party typological genus consists of five main categories each with 
sub types within in them. These are as follows: Elite Parties including the sub types local notables and 
clientelistic elite parties; Mass-Based Parties including socialist and class based parties, nationalist 
pluralist and ultra nationalist parties and religious denominational and fundamentalist parties; 
Ethnicity-Based Parties includes Ethnic and Congress based parties; Electoralist Parties includes 
catch-all, programmatic and personalistic parties and Movement Parties includes left-libertarian and 
post-industrial extreme right parties. 
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Gunther and Diamond base their party characterisations on three criteria: a party's 
formal organisation, programmatic commitment and behavioural norms. A party's 
formal organisation can range from being, `organisationally thin, while others 
develop large mass-membership bases with allied ancillary institutions engaged in 
distinct but related spheres of social life; some rely on particularistic networks of 
personal interaction or exchange, while others are open and universalistic in 
membership and appeal. ' 129 Therefore, formal party organisation can stretch from 
thinly organised elite-based to a thickly developed party organisation with a mass 
membership. The analysis in Chapter Five illustrates that broadly speaking parties in 
Kazakhstan are elite driven with thin organisations. 
Gunther and Diamond argue their second criterion, a party's programmatic 
commitment, can range from `well-articulated ideologies rooted in political 
philosophies to parties with pragmatic or no well-defined ideologies'. ' 30 Some 
parties commit to the interests of a particular ethnic or national group. In 
Kazakhstan, it is possible to observe three distinctions on a programmatic level, 
parties with strong ideological roots, parties with an ideological front and parties 
with limited ideological concerns. Finally, Gunther and Diamond's distinguish 
parties by behavioural norms. At one end of the spectrum parties are defined by 
being committed to democratic rules of the game, `are tolerant and respectful 
towards their opponents and are pluralistic in their views of polity and society. "31 
Conversely, other parties are less loyal to democratic ideals while some are 
exclusively anti-system parties. 132 In Kazakhstan it is possible to perceive two modes 
of behavioural norms, hegemonic parties, which are based on the principle of loyalty 
to the president at the expense of a fair and transparent democratic process, and non- 
hegemonic parties, who are in principal committed to democratic rules of the game. 
129 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, Species of Political Parties: A New Typology, Party Politics, 
Vol. 9, No. 2,2003, p. 171. 
130 Ibid. p. 171. 
"' Ibid. p. 171. 
132 The term anti-system party first emerged in the writings of Sartori as a way to describe parties in a 
totalitarian and authoritarian regime. However, the term is more concerned with the distance a party is 
in terms of its ideological and programmatic commitments from the democratic norm. 
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In light of a criteria based on party organisation, ideology and behavioural norms 
parties in Kazakhstan fall broadly into two of Gunther and Diamond's categories; 
personalistic-electoralist parties and clientelistic-elite parties. 
The personalistic-electoralist party is organisationally thin and maintains a relatively 
skeletal existence, however, at election time `these parties spring in to action to 
perform what is unequivocally their primary function, the conduct of the 
campaign'. 133 The party's `only rationale is to provide a vehicle for the leader to win 
an election and exercise power. It is an organisation constructed or converted by an 
incumbent or aspiring national leader exclusively to advance his or her national 
political ambitions'. 134 The appeal of the electoral party is based not so much on 
ideology, of which is minimal, but rather on the charisma of the leader or 
candidate. 135 The personalistic-electoralist party has the potential to be non-pluralist 
in outlook and potentially `proto-hegemonic'. Taking these factors into consideration 
it is possible to observe the close links between this party type and the informal 
nature of political parties in Kazakhstan. As will be discussed in Chapter Five many 
parties are personalistic in nature, set up as vehicles for public figures in an effort to 
gain public office or protect business interests. 
Clientelistic-elite parties are `those whose principle organisational structures are 
minimal and based upon established elites within a specific geographical area'. 1 36 it 
is thinly and weakly organised and essentially, it `is a confederation of notables 
(either traditional or newly emerging liberal-professional or economic elite), each 
with geographically, or functionally, personalistically based support. ' 137 In general, 
the clientelistic-elite party's main function is to `coordinate the individual campaign 
efforts of notables, usually indirectly or loosely, for the purpose of securing power at 
the national level'. 138 It has a weak relationship with its ordinary members and 
places minimal import in building party membership from the bottom up of party 
structures. It places little value in ideology and in its programmatic content. In terms 
133 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, Species of Political Parties: A New Typology, p. 185. 
134 Ibid. p. 187. 
135 Piero Ignazi, The Crises of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties, Party Politics, Vol. 2, 
No. 4,1996, pp. 549-66. 
136 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, Species of Political Parties: A New Typology, p. 175. 
137 Ibid. p. 176. 
138 Ibid. 
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of its behavioural norms the clientelistic-elite party is non-hegemonic, tolerant and 
collaborative with other political forces. The clientelistic-elite party is an appropriate 
party type for Kazakhstan through which to observe parties emerging from factional 
elite competition. 
The institutional constraints (institutional choice, electoral design and party law) 
designed and implemented by Nazarbaev due to his prominent position with the 
political system, based on informal and formal power, has influenced the types of 
parties emerging in Kazakhstan. The analysis in Chapter Five will examine party 
types in Kazakhstan based on the theoretical types outlined here and using the 
criteria set out by Gunther and Diamond which is to assess party organisation, 
ideology and behavioural norms. Following on from party typology it is one of the 
arguments of this thesis the types of parties emerging in Kazakhstan are a factor 
shaping parties' relationship with society. It is understanding parties' relationship 
with society that forms the final piece of the theoretical framework. 
5. Formal Theoretical Framework Regarding Political Parties: Societal 
Linkages 
5.1 West European Social Cleavages 
In established democratic societies, social cleavages are important as they provide 
the social base of political parties, subsequently structuring party competition and 
political conflict. 139 The classic typology of social cleavages as the basis of party 
competition was detailed in Lipset and Rokkan's Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments where they identified four historical cleavages across Western society. '40 
The four cleavages, centre/periphery, state/church, land/industry and owner/worker 
were built on social conflicts which emerged out of national and industrial 
revolutions. Once the era of mass franchise arrived, political parties situated 
themselves as articulators of the interests of cleavage groups. For Lipset and Rokkan 
these cleavages represent the stability Western party competition is founded upon. 
However, Lipset and Rokkan's freezing thesis has been subject to significant 
19 Stephen Whitfield, Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics, Annual Review of Political 
Science, No. 5,2002, pp. 181-200. 
140 Seymour M. Lipset, & Stein Rokkan, (eds. ) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National 
Perspectives (New York, Free Press, 1967). 
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criticism, in particular from those arguing a post-materialist society has seen the 
emergence of new cleavages and the decline of parties traditionally based on class 
support. 141 The static nature of Lipset and Rokkan's model makes it unsuitable for 
explaining party system change and also the formation of new party systems. The 
model has also drawn criticism for it reductive nature. '42 
5.2 Social Cleavages and Post-Communism 
The extent to which the cleavage thesis can be used in a postcommunist context has 
been widely debated and questioned. 143 The transformations occurring in the 
postcommunist space are qualitatively different from the context within which 
political party competition emerged in Western democracies. It has been argued 
`party system building should be measured accordingly, not by comparison to any 
typical Western pattern'. 144 Evidently parties in Western systems were based on deep 
seated socio-material interests, in communist systems any interest articulation, such 
as class, was skewed due to the dominant role played by just one party. Social 
cleavages in the postcommunist space cannot be taken for granted. 
Religion, ethnicity and communist ideology are salient cultural and historical 
cleavages that have been posited as assisting the structuring of party competition in 
the post-communist context. 145 In terms of religion Catholicism, for example, has 
been a factor influencing political socialisation in Eastern Europe, 146 while Christian 
Democratic parties have also found considerable support in post-communist 
141 See Morgans N. Pedersen, The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of 
Electoral Volatility, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 7, No. 1,1979, pp. 1-26; Michal 
Shamir, Are Western European Party Systems Frozen? Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
1984, pp. 35-79; Russell Dalton (1984), Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies, Journal of Politics 46, pp. 264-84 and Ronald Inglehart (1987), 
Value Change in Industrial Societies, American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 1289- 
1303. 
142 Hans Daalder, West European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, London, Sage Publications, 
1984). 
14' See Herbert Kitschelt, Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical 
Propositions, Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4,1995, pp. 447-472, Elster et al, Claus Offe, Institutional 
Design in Post-communist Societies, and Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, How 
Russia Votes (Chatham, NJ, Chatham House, 1997). 
'44 John D. Nagle & Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization (London, Sage, 1999) p. 197, 
cited in David White, Op. Cit, p. 16. 
145 Whitefield, Op. Cit, pp. 191-192. 
146 Ibid. 
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countries. 147 Ethnicity too has proven a stable cleavage structuring political support 
in many countries, including Slovakia and the Baltic States. 148 In the case of 
Slovakia a coalition of parties has emerged to represent the country's 10.76 percent 
Hungarian population. 149A residual ideological cleavage has seen successor 
communist parties prove successful in the post-communist environment in both 
reconstructed and at times, unreconstructed forms. '5° They have relied on public 
support from an older generation who resent the lack of material security a post- 
communist economy has brought More generally the losers of the transition to a 
market economy have also responded positively to the social messages of successor 
communist parties. 
The dynamism and contingencies of transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy has seen parties seeking to represent the `winners' and `losers' of the 
process. Some parties clearly position themselves on the basis of representing those 
who favour neo-liberal reform economics and are perceived to be the `winners' of 
market transition. 151 Conversely, there are those parties who establish themselves on 
the basis of the `losers' or the forgotten classes of transition economics. As 
mentioned above, successor communist parties have been particularly successful in 
articulating such concerns. 152 Despite the context specific nuance of these particular 
cleavages, recent research has suggested social cleavages in emerging democracies 
are not too dissimilar to those of established democracies. '53 McAllister and White's 
analysis of cleavages in six post-communist states found that party formation 
147 Adrian Karatnycky, Christian Democracy Resurgent: Raising the Banner of Faith in Eastern 
Europe, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77 No. 1, January/February 1998, pp. 13-18. 
148 For example see, Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, The Structuring of Political Cleavages 
in Post-Communist Societies: the Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Political Studies, Vol. 
46, No. 1,1998, pp. 115-139. 
149 Ibid. 
150 See Tim Naughton, Explaining the Limited Success of the Communist Successor Left in Slovakia: 
The Case of the Party of the Democratic Left, Party Politics Vol. 10, No. 2,2004, pp. 177-191; Sen 
Hanley, Towards Breakthrough or Breakdown? The Consolidation of KS" M as a Neo-Communist 
Successor Party in the Czech Republic, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 
17, No. 3, September 2001, pp. 96-116; John Ishiyama, Candidate Recruitment, Party Organisation 
and the Communist Successor Parties: The Cases of the MSzP, the KPRF and the LDDP, Europe- 
Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 5,2000, pp. 875-896 and John Ishiyama, Communist Parties in Transition: 
Structures, Leaders, and Processes of Democratisation in Eastern Europe, Comparative Politics, Vol. 
27, No. 2,1995, pp. 147-166. 
's' Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces in Russia are exemplary of this case. See David White, 
The Russian Democratic Party Yabloko. 
152 See Luke March, The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia. 
153 Ian McAllister and Stephen White, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post- 
Communist Societies, Party Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2,2007 pp. 197-216. 
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continued to be dominated by class and religious cleavages, two of the original 
cleavages outlined by Lipset and Rokkan. '54 McAllister and White's results show 
that while the cleavages in emerging democracies are similar to those in established 
democracies, unsurprisingly, however, parties in emerging democracies are less 
effective at representing social cleavages. 
While it is clear that social cleavages can be found in post-communist society, the 
extent to which they truly structure party competition and political conflict is 
unclear. It is now pertinent to consider the extent to which parties in Kazakhstan are 
based on social cleavages and the relationship between the structuring of party 
competition with the neopatrimonial regime. 
5.3 Social Linkages in Neopatrimonial Kazakhstan 
The presumption that political conflict between parties should be based on social 
cleavages espousing programmatic appeals is problematic for scholars of non-west- 
European political systems. ' 55 As with party systems in Latin America and Africa, in 
Kazakhstan the relationship between parties and social cleavages is obscured by the 
weak democratic nature of the political system. It is difficult to qualitatively assess 
the linkages between cleavages, citizens and parties. If votes for parties are non- 
transparent and do not reflect the democratic will of citizens it becomes increasingly 
difficult to make a connection between the two. For analysing Kazakh parties' 
relationship with society, the framework utilises four empirically relevant attributes- 
a disconnection and passiveness between parties and society, linkages based on 
personalism and clientelism, a degree of homogeneity of public opinion regarding 
leadership in the country and emerging cleavages based on the consequences of 
market transition. 
The relationship between society and parties in post-communist states has often been 
characterised by a degree of disconnection and passiveness. In Russia, for example, 
there has been `a deepening disillusion with the mechanisms of representative 
democracy... reflected in falling turnouts at national elections (to not much more 
154 The six post-communist countries McAllister and White analysed were Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. They were compared with 14 party systems in established 
democracies. 
155 Herbert Kitschelt, Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies. 
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than half in the 2003 Duma election), and a steady increase in the vote `against all' 
candidates and parties'. 156 In Russia many citizens believe their vote will make little 
difference157 and this is common in Kazakhstan where citizens feel that parties and 
politicians do not represent their interests and hold out little prospect that a vote for a 
political party will illicit any change. Political parties are elite dominated and, 
despite suggesting they serve and articulate the interests of particular social divisions 
instead represent the interests of those elites who established and dominate the party. 
What has occurred in Kazakhstan, as a result of the elite nature of political parties, 
are linkages which exist on a personalistic and clientelistic basis. Herbert Kitschelt 
has suggested that in a post-communist context when `voters choose new parties, one 
of three considerations is key: sympathy with the personality of a party's candidates, 
expected personal and selective tangible and intangible advantages derived from the 
victory of a party, or the production of indirect advantages in the form of collective 
goods if the party of choice wins the election'. 158 Kitschelt defines these linkages as 
charismatic, clientelistic and programmatic. Typically, charismatic and clientelistic 
linkages appear in formerly patrimonial communist countries where `programmatic 
political structuring does not proceed very far, because political competition remains 
personalised'. 159 Voters are attracted to political parties on the basis of political 
personality or out of a sense of personal loyalty in relation to an exchange of goods 
and services. The charismatic and clientelistic forms mirror the personalistic- 
electoralist and clientelistic-elite parties outlined by Gunther and Diamond and 
provide a useful basis for assessing the bonds between parties and citizens in 
Kazakhstan. 
On wider structural considerations, the extent to which the economic experiences of 
Kazakhstani citizens has diversified can also impact on determining support bases 
for political parties. The lack of a general economic diversification among the 
population has produced what Richard Ahl calls `homogeneity of opinion'. That is, 
as long as economic growth continues and provides stability people are content with 
156 Stephen White, Political Disengagement in Post-communist Russia: a Qualitative Study, Europe- 
Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 8, December 2005, p. 1121. 
157 Ibid. p. 1125. 
158 Kitschelt, Op. Cit., p. 448. 
159 Ibid. p. 467. 
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the present course. 160 Ahl developed this idea through an analysis of Russia but it 
can also be applied to the case of Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev has proved 
adept at carving out a grand narrative concerning the centrality of his leadership to 
the success and prosperity of Kazakhstan economy and security. Nur Otan plays a 
critical role in soliciting this discourse and providing its legitimacy with society. 
Moreover, this is achieved on the basis of the informal preference it receives from 
loyal clients of the president and the extensive administrative resources that it is 
privy to. 
At the same time, however, it is possible to observe the emergence of parties who are 
articulating roles for themselves based on emerging cleavages which have appeared 
due to the transition to a market economy. Nominally, these are cleavages which 
represent the `winners' and `losers' of market transition. Such a division has been 
noted in post-communist Russia, and it is possible to draw similarities with 
Kazakhstan. 161 As Chapter Six will illustrate, some opposition parties in Kazakhstan 
are carving roles out for themselves as the guarantors of social rights, political 
educators and charitable foundations of those housing communities that have been 
displaced in construction of prestige projects in Almaty and other marginalised 
groups. Simultaneously many parties are rushing and claiming to represent the 
`winners' of transition in the shape of an emerging middle class. In particular a party 
like Atameken (Motherland) claims its social base is that of entrepreneurs and small- 
medium size businesses. Yet, these emerging cleavages represent only very tenuous 
and limited links between society and parties and are overshadowed by the informal 
politics which influence much of the political system. Personalistic and clientelistic 
linkages remain the dominant factor with homogenous public opinion shaped by Nur 
Otan claiming the greatness and centrality of Nazarbaev. A role they are only able to 
play due to the informal preference and resources they receive from state actors. 
The aspect of the theoretical framework which explores parties' relationship with 
society in Kazakhstan, will focus on the disconnection and passiveness that exists 
between citizens and parties in the post-Soviet context and linkages which are based 
160 Richard Ahl, Society and Transition in Post-Soviet Russia, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2,1999, pp. 175-193. 
161 Steven Fish, The Advent of Multipartism in Russia 1993-95, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4, 
1995, pp. 339-366. 
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upon personalistic and clientelistic bonds. Importantly, it will utilise the idea of 
homogeneity of opinion being shaped by the president and his party regarding the 
centrality of his leadership to the country's future prosperity. The role of the 
dominant political party in this instance is crucial in providing an extension of 
legitimacy with the public, but is only able to on the basis of the informal preference 
it receives from loyal clients in the president's patronage network. Therefore, 
political parties are weak on those attributes typically associated with their activity in 
democracies and stong on attributes which aid authoritarian durability. At the same 
time there are a number of tenuous emerging cleavages which exist on the `winners' 
and `losers' of transition. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has put forward a theoretical framework to analyse the relationship 
between informal politics and party development in Kazakhstan. It will allow for a 
better understanding for some of the factors driving authoritarian consolidation and 
will provide a basis for comparable research on other post-Soviet states. The 
framework has the benefit of being able to integrate the informal nature of politics in 
the country with the formal development of political parties While the approach 
lacks parsimony and simplicity, it does provide a greater precision to analysis rather 
than only viewing party development through the lens of either straightforward 
classic party theory or the narrow area specific framework of informal clan politics. 
At the same time, it provides a wider integration to general theoretical scholarship of 
party development and informal politics. It provides a link for Central Asia to our 
wider understanding of political development, as opposed to seeing Central Asian 
politics as completely unique. 
The framework presented here consists of neopatrimonialism as an approach to 
understand the nature of informal and formal politics. This consists of personalism, 
patron-client relations and factional elite conflict alongside rational offices and 
liberal constitutions. Such formal elements, however, are complicated by 
informalism in the way they are vaguely constructed allowing for loyal clients to 
informally interpret formal rules. Such neopatrimonialism has a great deal of 
influence on the formal aspects of party development which make up the second part 
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of the theoretical framework. The formal aspects of the framework allows for an 
exploration of the relationship between informal politics and the institutional 
constraints on political parties (institutional choice, electoral design and party law), 
the type of parties emerging (organisation, ideology and behavioural norms) and 
parties' relationship with society (passiveness and disconnection, personalistic and 
clientelistic linkages, homogeneity of opinion and emerging cleavages). 
The relationship between informal forms of political relations and behaviour and 
party development provides the observer with a series of tentative theoretical 
propositions: 
" Political actors (in this case the president of Kazakhstan) turn to informal 
political relations in an effort to manage the contingent and uncertain nature 
of transition. 
" Consequently, institutional constraints for political parties are purposively 
designed in a fashion so loyal clients of the president can utilise informal 
power to interpret and selectively apply the law to suit presidential 
preferences. This results in a weakening of genuine party competition due to 
the preference given to pro-regime parties. 
" At the same time, presidential parties provide a formal institution to enhance 
elite stability while formal rules act to legitimise the informal forms of 
political behaviour and relations which influence the preference of pro- 
regime parties. 
" The types of parties to emerge from this institutional context are clientelistic 
and personalistic elite based parties - which are internally prone to informal 
political behaviour and relations. 
" Parties also provide formal constructs for elites in the process of informal 
factional elite conflict. They function as vehicles to protect and extend 
economic and political interests of the elite. 
" As a result of the personalistic and clientelistic nature of parties and the 
overall influence of informal political relations and behaviour, parties' 
relationship with society is defined by disconnection and passiveness, 
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underscored by personalistic and clientelistic linkages and characterised by 
homogeneity of opinion regarding the president's leadership. 
" Simultaneously, the dominant pro-presidential parties help solicit the 
legitimisation of the informal power possessed by the president. 
" Political parties, therefore, are weak on those attributes which are typically 
associated with their activities in democracies and stong on factors which 
assist in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes. 
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Chapter Two: Methodological Considerations and Research Design 
This chapter explores the methodological underpinnings of this work and the core 
issues related to researching the relationship between informal politics and party 
development in Kazakhstan. It establishes a methodological framework to answer 
the central research question: 
  What is the nature of the relationship between informal neopatrimonial 
political relations and behaviour, in the shape of personalism, patron-client 
relations and factional inter-elite conflict and the formal institutional 
development of political parties? In particular, how has this relationship 
influenced the formal structural constraints of parties in Kazakhstan, the type 
of parties that are emerging and their connection with wider society? And 
what has been the impact of this relationship on overall political 
development? 
Researching political parties in a neopatrimonial context is fraught with 
complications with regards to data. There is no existing set of documents and sources 
which can adequately explain the relationship between the informal nature of the 
regime and the formal development of political parties. There is no set of files sitting 
in a government archive neatly explaining how party development, and thus, 
democratic development in Kazakhstan, is influenced by the personalism of the 
regime or the inter-elite factional networks existing in the political system. No one 
set of interviews reveals how party development contain and contextualise informal 
politics. The researcher is required to decide on not only the relative weight of each 
source but also how they should be interpreted and used to construct a narrative 
regarding neopatrimonialism and party development. While formal aspects of party 
development can be qualified by formal documents relating to party procedures, 
organisation and their participation in the electoral system, the informal 
interpretation and selective application of such formal procedures is much more 
difficult to qualify. With this in mind, careful consideration needs to be given to the 
methodology and design of the research. This chapter sets out such considerations 
and puts forward the research design and strategy required for travelling in the grey 
zone between the formal and informal. 
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The chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses grounded theory, a 
strategy which suits well the interpretative, constructivist and qualitative nature of 
this research. The second section deals comprehensively with methods of data 
collection, how data was selected and collected and all the issues and problems 
connected to the process of fieldwork in Kazakhstan. The third covers the process 
and problems related to analysing and interpreting the data. 
1. Research Strategy: Grounded Theory 
This research is grounded in an interpretative and constructivist approach which 
aims to understand and explore the relationship between informal politics and party 
development. In relation to such an approach, the research is based on a qualitative 
research strategy based on ideas inherent in grounded theory. This section covers the 
rationale and aptness of using grounded theory. 
1.1 Defining grounded theory 
Grounded theory is a strategy rather than an actual theory and is one of the most 
widely used frameworks for analysing qualitative data. ' Punch defines grounded 
theory as a `research strategy whose purpose is to generate theory from data. ' 2 
Strauss and Corbin sum up the essence of grounded theory: 
"A grounded theory is one that is inductively derived from the study of the 
phenomenon it represents. That is, it is discovered, developed, and provisionally 
verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that 
phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis, and theory stand in reciprocal 
relationship with each other. One does not begin with a theory and then prove it. 
Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed 
to emerge. 0 
1 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
2Keith Punch, Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (London, 
Sage Publications, 1998) p. 163. 
3 Anslem Strauss and Juliet Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures 
and Techniques (Newbury Park, California, Sage Publications, 1990). 
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This quote illustrates the suitability of grounded theory for this research on the 
relationship between informal politics and party development in Kazakhstan. The 
topic is a general area and the research is of an exploratory nature. Grounded theory 
licensed the study to follow a disciplined and logical path to the data by using a 
systematic set of tools for data collection and analysis. Using the procedures and 
techniques subscribed within, the approach allowed for the careful and consistent 
representation of data to provide emergent categories and concepts. This is distinct 
from an approach that might impose theoretical categories and concepts on the data 
to match preconceived generalisations and predictions concerning social phenomena. 
Initially prior to collecting data a more comprehensive formal institutional approach, 
in the shape of historical institutionalism, was pursued. However, once in the field 
and, in particular, once the interviews had commenced, it became clear that there 
was a dynamic occurring underneath the formal institutional level of political parties. 
This was the informal aspect of the phenomena identified by earlier research 
connected with informal politics in the region. 4 Therefore, the theoretical approach 
shifted from historical institutionalism to neopatrimonialism and formal party theory 
as an integrated theoretical framework for understanding the phenomena occurring. 
Such a shift was not straightforward, as during the data collection process it was 
clear formal party theory, grounded in the experience of Western industrial 
democracies, was having little resonance with the data being collected. Conversely, 
the clan perspective, discussed in the opening chapter, also had minimal 
reverberation with the phenomena being observed. The issue of tribal affiliation was 
seen almost unanimously as being of little value as an explanatory factor. 5 The shift 
in approach towards an integrated model of neopatrimonialism and formal party 
theory was driven and grounded in the data. Realising that preconceived categories 
were failing to account for the phenomena arising in the data the shift in theoretical 
approach suited the emerging data. This highlights the theoretical sensitivity central 
to grounded theory. 
°I have the work of Kathleen Collins and Edward Schatz in mind here which were both discussed in 
the introductory chapter. However, as I mentioned in the same chapter, I do not agree fully with the 
conclusions of their work and the complete salience they give to informal identities. Instead, as 
proposed in this work, there is an interaction and relationship between the informal and formal. 
This was revealed by formal interviews with elites and also informal conversations with local 
citizens. 
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1.2 Theoretical sensitivity 
Theoretical sensitivity is a term that if anything is a prescribed human quality 
necessary for the development of a theory from data. Strauss and Corbin argue it is 
an `attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to 
understand, and the capability to separate the pertinent from that which isn't. ' 6 There 
are several ways in which a researcher can achieve theoretical sensitivity. A 
researcher will come to the data with a background in the literature that can help 
sensitise them to the phenomena being observed. Bringing this background 
knowledge and insight is beneficial to providing data comprehension and inter- 
connection. As mentioned above, prior literature was important in enabling the 
research to be guided by the data being collected. Existing knowledge of previous 
research explaining some of the informal forms of phenomena occurring in the 
political life of Kazakhstan enabled a shift in the research from the purely formal 
aspects of understanding party development to the realisation that party development 
occurred in a terrain between the informal neopatrimonial political regime and the 
formal institutional aspect of party development. 
What makes theoretical sensitivity particularly useful is its development through an 
analytic process. Quite simply, this can involve `collecting and asking questions 
about the data, making comparisons, thinking about what you see, making 
hypotheses, and developing small theoretical frameworks (mini frameworks) about 
concepts and their relationships'. 7 This was a crucial aspect of the research process. 
The initial round of interviews with experts and analysts revealed problems with the 
conceptual and formal theoretical approach taken out into the field, thus leading to a 
re-examination of the theoretical approach which had an impact on the research. For 
example, early on it became apparent the presidential administration was heavily 
involved in managing and shaping party development based on the principle of 
loyalty to Nazarbaev. While being conscious of this prior to entering the field, I was 
not alert to the extent to which this was the case. It raised some interesting questions 
regarding the degree to which the principle of loyalty stretched and what other forms 
of informal personal politics influenced formal party development? Moreover, how 
should the relationship between the formal and informal be conceptualised and 
6 Strauss and J Corbin, Op. Cit., p. 42. 
Ibid. p. 43. 
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understood within the current literature on Kazakhstan, Central Asia and the Former 
Soviet Union? 
Theoretical sensitivity is also achieved by cultivating scepticism with regards to 
concepts and categories developed through background literature. Through such a 
process it is possible to maintain the rigorousness of the study by making sure 
concepts and categories are only provisional until they are supported by actual data. 
In the case of this research, scepticism with regards to the clan literature, and the 
central idea that kin and familial relations were the key identity in which politics was 
played out, and uncertainty with regards to the utility of formal institutional theory 
or formal party theory on their own, led to a synthesis between the two to fit the 
nature of the data which emerged. From the initial doubt regarding both the informal 
clan approach and a formal institutional approach it was possible to construct an 
integrated theoretical framework based on neopatrimonialism and aspects of formal 
party theory. 
1.3 Criticism of grounded theory 
Despite its wide use amongst qualitative researchers grounded theory has its 
detractors. The major criticism is the extent to which it is truly possible that 
researchers can suspend any awareness of concepts or categories until the later stage 
of the research process. 8 Grounded theory stresses that categories and concepts 
should emerge directly from the data and should not be obscured by pre-conceived 
concepts and categories. However, as demonstrated in this research, it is difficult to 
approach data collection without any prior notion or assumptions regarding concepts 
and categories. This represents a challenge to any researcher attempting to use 
grounded theory. However, as long as correct procedures are followed concepts and 
categories that do arise will still emerge tightly linked to the data as demonstrated 
above. 
There are practical issues to employing grounded theory. The procedures used for 
the actual analysis of the data can be time consuming. The time taken to transcribe 
an interview can make it difficult for researchers to carry out genuine grounded 
8M. Bulmer, `Concepts in the Analysis of Qualitative Data', Sociological Review, Vol. 27,1979, pp. 
651-77. 
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theory analysis with its constant interplay of data collection and conceptualisation. 9 
This was certainly the case during this research, and moreover, the great quantity of 
data collected can place pressure on the researcher to make judgements on which 
parts of data to concentrate analysis on. This illustrates how the researcher is 
inextricably involved with making decisions on which aspects of the data are 
important and pertinent. This goes against the objective nature of grounded theory 
where the aim has been to uncover a reality that is external from social actors. 10 The 
constructivist approach taken in this work is certainly at odds with this aspect of 
grounded theory, but other scholars have put forward a constructivist interpretation 
of grounded theory where `categories, concepts and the theoretical level of analysis 
emerge from the researcher's interaction within the field and questions about the 
data. ' 11 
The most prominent criticism of grounded theory is its limited capability in 
producing widely generalisable theory. Rather, such an approach tends to produce 
substantive work that is specific to certain phenomena. While research such as this is 
substantive and in depth it does has significant value for further comparative 
research. From a regional perspective this research has universal value and provides 
the building blocs of comparative research with party development in other former 
Soviet states. On a wider level it can speak to us about the development of 
authoritarianism and the role of political parties in that process. Despite these slight 
limitations, grounded theory still provided the most appropriate strategy for research 
on the relationship between the informal neopatrimonial regime and formal party 
development in Kazakhstan. 
2. Data Collection: Methods and Process 
As is usual for a study based on a qualitative approach, the research utilised a multi- 
method approach to data collection. This included interviews, documentary data and 
observation. 
9 Bryman, Op. Cit, pp. 395-396. 
10 K. Charmaz, `The Grounded Theory: Objectivist and Constructivist Methods' in N. K. Dezin and 
Y. S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2d Edition, (Thousand Oaks, California, Sage 
Publications, 2000) pp. 509-535 
' Ibid. p. 522. 
83 
2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Among the varying interview formats, this study applied the semi-structured format 
as distinguished by Fontana and Frey. 12 Semi-structured interviews are 
characterised by the use of open-ended questions with few pre-set categories for 
answers. The interviewer has a series of questions they may use, and while letting 
the respondent speak freely around the subject matter, the interviewer will prompt 
discussion with pre-established questions. While the respondent will be allowed to 
explain their feelings, understandings and interpretations of events and phenomena, 
the aim is to not let the interview drift off into an unstructured discussion. 
This study involved intensive interviewing of party elites. The elite interview has 
particular advantages in that: it can help interpret documents and reports, aid the 
interpretation of personalities involved in decision making, provide information not 
recorded elsewhere and it can assist the researcher in establishing networks and 
access to other individuals. 13 Difficulties lie, however, in obtaining a representative 
sample, as requests for interviews can be rejected. 14 For the purpose of this research 
the aim was to speak to a selection of party elites from all political parties in 
Kazakhstan at both the regional and central level. This was not entirely possible as 
no members of the Party of Patriots were willing to be interviewed, while in the 
party Adilet (Justice) central elites were not forthcoming for interview and at the 
same time no regional elites from Atameken were prepared to be interviewed. It was 
also important to get a balance between both opposition and pro-presidential parties. 
This was for two reasons. Firstly, opposition parties are more forthcoming for 
interviews and therefore there was a danger the data would be heavily weighted in 
their views and opinions. Secondly, as Nur Otan is clearly the most important party 
in terms of its role in the political process and its connection with informal political 
relations and behaviour, it was central to the success of the research to have the 
views and opinions of its representatives weighted appropriately in the data. The 
table below sets out explicitly the sample breakdown for party elites interviews. 
12 A. Fontana, and J. H. Frey, `Interviewing: The Art of Science', in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln 
(eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, (Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications, 1994). 
13 D. Richards, `Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls' Politics, Vol. 16,1996, p. 200. 
14 There are other drawbacks. For example, the reliability of the interviewee can be questionable due 
to poor memory recollection, the willingness to be portrayed in a positive light, and the overall 
subjective nature of the process. 
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Table 2.1 Interview Sample Breakdown by Political Party 
Party Number of 
Interviews 
conducted 
Number of 
central party 
elites 
Number of 
regional party 
elites 
Ak Zhol 2 1 1 
Ala 4 3 1 
Atameken 1 1 0 
Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan 
3 2 1 
Communist Peoples 
Party of Kazakhstan 
2 1 1 
Democratic Party 
Adilet 
1 0 1 
Nationwide Social 
Democratic Party 
3 2 1 
Nur Otan 7 6 1 
Party of Patriots 0 0 0 
Rukhaniiat 3 2 1 
Social Democratic 
Party `Au l' 
3 2 1 
Nagiz Ak Zhol (as of 
2008, Azat) 
4 2 2 
Total 33 22 11 
Throughout this chapter and this work references are made to party elites, but who 
are party elites and why is there a focus on party elites as opposed to party members? 
Party elites are those figures within a political party who hold key positions within 
the party apparatus and are central to the development of the party as an 
organisation. They are not necessarily responsible for policy or ideology but are 
situated in the upper echelons of the party hierarchy at both the central and regional 
level. Party elites are distinct from ordinary party members and supporters by their 
greater degree of influence within the party organisation. The decision to focus 
solely on party elites was based on the understanding that political parties in 
Kazakhstan clearly demonstrate oligarchic characteristics and weak party 
membership. While attempts were made to gain access to general party membership 
those efforts were generally rebutted and the research remained concentrated on 
party elites. The research reveals parties in Kazakhstan are elite led political 
institutions, generally constructed to serve the interests of elite groups or particular 
political personalities and the interview sample reflects this. 
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Identifying which party elites to speak to was achieved through a process of early 
stage supplementary interviews with regional experts. 20 semi-structured interviews 
were held with leading local experts and academics, representatives from regional 
and international NGOs and local journalists (see Figure 2.2 for breakdown). These 
interviews were an invaluable source for three reasons. Firstly, they provided the 
context and the basis on which party elites were identified for interview. Secondly, 
the process helped to sketch out the major themes to be addressed in the main 
interviews. Thirdly, these supplementary interviews provided excellent and well- 
grounded sources in themselves. In particular they offered a more objective balance 
to the partisan nature of party elite interviews. 
Table 2.2 Interview Sample of Supplementary Interviews 
Journalists International 
NGOs 
Local NGOs Local Political 
Scientists 
Total 
2 4 8 7 21 
Initially participants from the supplementary interviews were asked for their opinion 
on who were the most appropriate party elites to speak to. From this a provisional 
list was drawn up that provided the basis of the interview sample. The supplementary 
participants also supplied initial contact details. Once initial interviews were 
conducted the method of snowballing was used. In this method, participants are 
asked if they can recommend other people in their party for interview and as such the 
sample develops through a process of gradual accumulation. 
2.2 Designing and Conducting Interviews 
Interview questions were designed to take into account the position and history of 
the person being interviewed as well a set of standardised questions regarding party 
development. Interview questions were used in a flexible and varied manner to 
ensure particular expertise could be maximised. For example, in the instance of 
interviewing a journalist specific questions were addressed on political parties' 
access to the media and the varying degree of media bias towards specific parties. A 
series of standardised questions were also asked, addressing major themes within 
Kazakh party development. These questions explored general themes regarding the 
extent of party development, the role and influence of the regime on political parties, 
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the link between business groups and parties, the impact of specific constitutional 
laws on political party development and public attitudes towards political parties. 
With party elites a similar approach was taken in that a portion of interview 
questions varied depending on the political profile of the person being interviewed 
and the political party they were attached to. Again, at the same time, there were a 
series of standardised interview questions relating to party organisation, ideologies 
and party history. The aim of designing and conducting the interviews in this manner 
was to take advantage of either the specialism of the participant or their centrality to 
certain crucial political events. 
All participants were contacted in the first instance by telephone with the aid of a 
research assistant. A clear explanation was given regarding the nature of the 
research, the institutional affiliation, the funding bodies supporting the research and 
the reason why the participant was being contacted. 15 On some occasions 
participants requested a formal invite through fax and advance questions. In each 
instance this was provided. All of these actions represent a common approach to 
contacting potential participants. 16 Those participants who agreed to be interviewed 
were given the opportunity to suggest the location of the interview site. Most were 
comfortable conducting the interview in their office, while a few preferred 
designated cafes or hotel lobbies. At the beginning of the interview the participant 
was presented with a Participant Information Sheet detailing the aims and themes of 
the research, issues of confidentiality and contact information. All participants were 
asked if they were comfortable with the interview being taped. Only a few objected 
and in those cases extensive interview notes were taken. 
With the exception of a few interviews most were conducted in Russian " with the 
aid of a translator. '8 There are methodological dangers in using a translator in that it 
potentially challenges the validity of the data. Precautions were taken to ensure 
translations of both questions and answers were accurately reflected. First, the 
15 The fieldwork component of the research was funded specifically by the Leverhulme Trust. 
16 See Bryman, Social Research Methods, p. 114. 
17 Interviews are conducted in Russian as opposed to Kazakh due to the fact Russian remains the 
language of the elite. While Kazakh is recognised as the main state language, Russian continues to be 
the dominant language within the country and especially among the elite. Constitutionally Russian is 
recognised as the language of inter-ethnic communication. 
18 A few were conducted in English. 
87 
translator had a good knowledge of political language and the politics of Kazakhstan. 
This ensured the translation of political terms were not confused with similar phrases 
which may have a more conventional and common meaning. Second, my overall 
comprehension of Russian language was more than sufficient to pick up on 
inconsistencies in how the question may have been addressed. Third, a translator was 
also useful for picking up on subtle cultural references not always noticed by non- 
native speakers. Finally, there was a great deal of trust and a good working 
relationship with the translator which meant if any problems arose in translation they 
were discussed and dealt with prior to the next interview. Thus, for these reasons the 
validity of the data emerging from the interviews was not compromised due to 
translation. 
2.3 Problems with Interviews 
There are, of course, drawbacks to using interviews as a source of data collection. 
As Silverman has highlighted there is an issue as to whether interview responses 
`can be treated as direct access to experience or as actively constructed narratives. ' 19 
Due to the constructivist and interpretive approach taken in this work it would be 
fitting to see the responses from participants as constructed narratives where the data 
collected represents their interpretation of their experience of reality. Nevertheless, 
accounts produced from interviews might be inaccurate, with the participants 
pushing forward their own agenda. 20 Even when accounts might be a genuine 
reflection of a person's experience, there could be other factors concerning those 
circumstances or events to which the participant is not aware resulting in an 
incomplete account. These drawbacks indicate a better understanding of events can 
be achieved by first hand experience of the phenomena and other types of sources 
directly related to the events being researched .21 The need to supplement 
interview 
data with other forms of sources was central to the methodology of this research. In 
addition to the interview data, documentary and observational sources were used to 
contextualise and triangulate the data from interviews. 22 
19 D. Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research (London, Sage Publications, 2000), p. 45. 
20 T. May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process 3`I Edition (Buckingham, Open University 
Press, 2001). 
21 Ibid. p. 144. 
22 The topic of triangulation is discussed in Section 2.5. 
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There were several practical issues that arose in relation to the interview process. As 
referred to earlier, access to important participants is a problem. In this instance, 
while opposition parties such as Nagiz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path) and OSDP (All- 
National Social Democratic Party) were willing and accessible participants, the 
leading pro-presidential party Nur Otan, and some of the smaller presidential parties 
such as Adilet (Justice) and the Party of Patriots were less enthusiastic contributors. 
Their scepticism is drawn from wariness towards Westerners asking probing 
questions regarding the politics of the country and in light of remnant Cold War 
attitudes is understandable and to be expected. Gaining access to Nur Otan was 
important for this study, as they are quantitatively the largest and most prominent 
party in the country. A research project on party development in Kazakhstan not 
featuring interviews with elites from Nur Otan would be of considerably less value. 
Nevertheless, a commitment of continued contact with the organisation or a 
particular administrative or secretarial person in the organisation can have benefits. 
Persistence demonstrates the participant is key to the research and the researcher is 
neither a salesman nor a secret agent. 23 Eventually, a breakthrough is made and the 
participant becomes a much more willing interviewee. This was certainly the case 
with Nur Otan, once a breakthrough had been made and a senior representative of 
the Political Council had been interviewed it became far easier to enlist other 
interviewees in the party, as the initial participant recommended other figures and 
was provided as a reference in encouraging others to participate. In some 
circumstances the smaller pro-presidential parties were simply unwilling to be 
involved no matter how many phone calls and faxes were sent. With no member of 
the Party of Patriots prepared to be interviewed there was little to be done and the 
research had to go forward without their contribution to the data set. 
The interview itself can be fraught with difficulties. While the idea behind semi- 
structured interviews is to give a great deal of reign to allow the participant to 
express their views and perceptions on the topic freely, on occasions the interview 
can be used as an opportunity for the participant to proselytise against whoever, or 
whatever they see fit. Consequently, the interview can drift from the main themes the 
researcher is attempting to address. This occurred on a few occasions with party 
23 See Bryman, Social Research Methods, p. 114. 
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elites and in those instances all that could be done was to steer the interviewee back 
on to the subject of interest. Even on the occasions when this did occur interesting 
alternative details emerged ensuring the interview was not entirely redundant. 
Nevertheless, managing such instances was best achieved by a flexible approach. 
Questions were reformulated during the interview to take account of the tack the 
interviewee was taking. 
Typically there are ethical issues which have to be addressed in any study involving 
human participants, as an interview inquiry is a moral enterprise. 24 While party elites 
may not need the protection required of research that involves the general public, 
they do require certain safeguards with regards to their confidentiality. Even though 
party elites, political scientists, members from NGOs and journalists are used to 
making public statements and being interviewed, the nature of some of the questions 
were sensitive in light of the authoritarian political system in Kazakhstan. Therefore, 
all participants were offered explicit confidentiality at the beginning of the interview. 
Interviewees had the option of either: having their full name and position attributed 
to their statements and transcripts, being attributed only by their positional title, or to 
remain anonymous. Only three of the participants in the party elite sample took 
anonymity, the remainder were happy to be fully attributed. With the supplementary 
interviews a larger number wished to take anonymity especially those involved in 
local and international NGOs as there is the remote potential for them to receive 
harassment if their comments found their way into the public domain in Kazakhstan. 
All interviewees were coded during the transcription and analytical process. 
2.4 Documentary Data 
Documentary data was the main source which underpinned the data that emerged 
from interviews. Defined as, things that we can read and which relate to some aspect 
of the social world, documents have long been a source of data in the social sciences. 
Clearly this includes those things `intended to record the social world - official 
reports, for example - but also private and personal records such as letters, diaries 
24 Steinar Kvale, Interviews: An Introduction of Qualitative Research Interviewing (Thousand Oakes, 
Sage Publications, 1996), pp. 109-123. 
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and photographs. ' 25 There were three central forms of documentary sources used in 
this study: primary documents, secondary documents and websites. 
Primary documents, including party publications and official state documents, 
formed an important part of documentary sources. In terms of party documents, party 
programs, charters, newspapers and election manifestos were central to outlining the 
formal attributes of parties in Kazakhstan. Formal documents such as party 
programs, charters and manifestos were attained either directly from the parties, 
through their websites or through several specific directories published in the 
Russian language. 26 Access to party newspapers was less straightforward and proved 
problematic in terms of comparability of data. Not all political parties published 
newspapers and of those that did some only had the financial resources to publish 
them intermittently. Some were prone to title changes thus further making data 
completeness troublesome. The publication of newspapers by opposition parties, 
while more frequent, suffered from limited distribution. Access proved problematic. 
Party newspapers were not held in the national library (with the exception of Nur 
Otan's affiliated paper Strana i mir (The Country and the World) and parties 
themselves failed to keep a library of their publications. From a data collection 
perspective, the variability of access and the incomplete collection of newspapers 
available made equal data comparability between parties evidently difficult. Other 
forms of primary documents included formal state documents such as constitutional 
laws, election results and state statistics. These were generally procured from 
libraries and governmental websites and were widely available and easily accessible. 
Secondary sources such as newspapers, books, journals and analytic reports also 
formed a core basis of documentary data. A varied assortment of newspapers 
espousing different perspectives was sought. In Kazakhstan, generally speaking, 
there is a lack of independent voices in the media. Viewpoints of newspapers are 
either broadly pro-governmental or oppositional. Pro-regime newspapers, evidently, 
25 K. Macdonald, and C. Tipton, `Using Documents' in N. Gilbert (ed. ) Researching Social Life, 
(London, Sage Publications, 1993) p. 188. 
26 There have been several directories related to political parties in Kazakhstan that have been 
published since independence. All were very useful sources for this study with the most recent 
providing the most up to date relevant information. See, for example, the most recent edition, luri 
Buluktaev and Andrei Chebotarev, Politicheskie Partii Kazakhstana 2004 god (Almaty, Kompleks, 
2004). 
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are far more accessible than oppositional newspapers whose distribution is limited to 
mainly the two major cities in the country, Almaty and Astana. However, 
importantly for this study, some newspapers are connected to particular elite groups 
and therefore, are useful tools for exploring the political interests of these informal 
elite groups which otherwise might be very difficult to examine. 27 Due to 
newspapers either going out of circulation, being closed down or being sold to new 
owners under new titles, comprehensive data collection is difficult. Historical 
editions were sourced from the National Library in Almaty as well as the Library of 
the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research 
(KIMEP) and the Library of the Academy of Sciences. The dates of newspapers 
researched were concentrated on the post-Soviet period roughly from 1991 onwards. 
The focus was primarily on periods related specifically to events of interest in this 
research for example, elections (1994,1995,1999,2004 and 2007) and crucial 
events such as the different waves of elite fragmentation (1998,2001 and 2004). 
Moreover, due to the increased frequency of phenomena related to political parties 
and informal politics occurring while out in the field, there was a central spotlight on 
contemporary editions of newspapers too. The focus on specific periods within the 
post-Soviet context and contemporary editions was preferred as documentary data 
was not the central source of data. Rather it was used to produce confirmation of 
findings provided by interview data. Moreover, it was not practical to trawl all 
backdated years of newspapers due to time constraints. 
Books, journals and other documents such as analytic reports were also collected as 
part of the research. Many were accessed from the National Library, the library at 
KIMEP and the Academy of Sciences. Websites were an essential form of 
documentary data. Many of the political parties maintain websites and these 
provided crucial sources for party programmes, charters and party news and events. 
Websites provided news and information on regional and national party activity as 
well as key statements of party leaderships. Two websites provided great sources for 
up to date political information. Kub. kz and Zonakz. net, while predominantly 
27 I will not detail here the affiliation between elite groups and newspapers, as this will arise 
throughout the work. Furthermore, the nature of the media industry in Kazakhstan is that newspaper 
titles can change ownership every few years and therefore mapping ownership is not straightforward. 
Ownership is opaque and sometimes based on rumour and speculation and consequently cannot 
always be qualitatively proved. 
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oppositional in nature, do provide links to varied articles and sources. In summary, 
documentary sources in all three forms provided a varied and invaluable series of 
sources acting in a supplementary fashion providing correlation with interview data. 
2.5 Observation 
The research also applied incidental forms of observation, although it has to be 
stressed this did not form the backbone of the data collection, but was of a 
supplementary and ad-hoc nature. Classically observation, as a form of research, is 
defined as `acts of noting a phenomenon, often with instruments, and recording it for 
scientific purposes'. 28 Observation can `guide us in forging paths of action and 
interpreting the action of others'. 29 In this research, an ad-hoc form of non- 
participatory form of observation was used. 
The observation undertaken can be divided into two categories: formal and 
incidental. Formal observation took the form of press conferences held by parties, 
party rallies and public forms of protest. This form of observation was formal in the 
sense that those participating were presenting themselves openly for public interest. 
Formal observation enabled the notation and accounting of the formal actions of 
party leaderships and, as in the case of organised protests, the reaction of the 
authorities to opposition public meetings. Incidental forms of observation entailed 
the discreet observation of party offices when interviewing party elites. 30 These 
forms of observational data collection were not as systematic as either the interview 
or documentary forms but provided an additional and complementary improvised 
form of data collection which assisted in strengthening the overall data set. 
2.6 Triangulation 
This work employed the technique of triangulation. For Arksey and Knight `the 
basic idea of triangulation is that data are obtained from a wide range of different 
28 W. Morris (Ed. ), The American Heritage Dictionary of the English language, (Boston, Houghton 
Mifflin, 1973) cited in P. A. Alder, and P. Alder, `Observational Techniques' in N. K. Dezin and Y. S. 
Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, (Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications, 
1994), p. 377. 
29 Alder and Alder, Op. Cit., p. 377. 
30 For example, when interviewing the Communist Party leader Serikbolsyn Abdil'din, the lack of any 
form of communist party paraphernalia in his office illustrated the party's shift from explicit Marxist- 
Leninist ideology to an altogether more social democratic ideology. 
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and multiple sources, using a variety of methods, investigators or theories '. 31 
Clearly, as has been set out above, this study uses not only multiple methods of data 
collection but the integrated theoretical framework put forward in the previous 
chapter. This approach applies various theoretical tools to examine the relationship 
between the informal and formal in Central Asian politics. Triangulation is 
considered to have two central purposes. It can contribute towards the confirmation 
of hypotheses which is a suitable proposition for positivist studies. 32 On the other 
hand triangulation can aid the completeness of research. 33 Central to the 
completeness conceptualisation of triangulation is the idea that phenomena should be 
viewed from different angles and with different methods in order to aid the 
understanding of the complexity of a situation. Completeness sits well with 
qualitative methods and is an appropriate conceptualisation of triangulation for this 
work. 
Following Denzin's four-fold typology of types of triangulation the data form was 
applied. 34 The research utilised multiple sources of data collection as detailed above 
in order to gain a more complete understanding of the relationship between informal 
politics and party development. The use of triangulation has strengthened and given 
more confidence to the central findings of the research, aiding the reliability and 
validity of the study. The cross referencing of data across multiple sources ensured 
the reliability of conclusions drawn from the data. This was achieved by only 
referring to a particular phenomenon if it could be cross-referenced with at least two 
sources within the complete data set during the data analysis process. 
3. Data Analysis 
Data analysis and data collection are not mutually exclusive activities. They are 
reciprocal procedures working in tandem and feeding off each other. A linear 
31 H. Arksey and P., Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists (London, Sage Publications, 1999), p. 
21. 
32 N. K. Denzin, The Research Act in Sociology: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods 
(London, Butterworths, 1970). 
33 T. D. Jick, `Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Method: Triangulation in Action', in J. Van 
Maanen (ed. ), Qualitative Methodology, (London, Sage Publication, 1983) pp. 135-48. 
34 Denzin highlights four different techniques of triangulation: the methodological; data; investigator; 
and theoretical forms. 
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movement from collection to analysis would be a simplification of the two 
processes. Central to grounded theory, data analysis occurs throughout and alongside 
the collection of data. Indeed, analysis can help drive a greater precision in the data 
collection process. Early forms of analysis can concentrate a researcher's collection 
of data. In the case of this research data collection and analysis occurred as mutual 
processes and assisted in leading the research to focus on the relationship between 
the formal and informal. As consistent with grounded theory three forms of analysis 
were applied to the data: open, axial, and selective coding. These procedures of 
coding were not necessarily carried out sequentially rather they were overlapping 
concurrent procedures. 35 
3.1 Open Coding 
According to Strauss and Corbin `open coding is the part of the process that pertains 
specifically to the naming and categorising of phenomena through close examination 
of data'. 36 Open coding is a procedure whereby data are broken down, carefully 
examined, and compared for similarities and differences. The process involves 
asking questions so as to reach a set of categories pertaining to the data. It could 
involve the taking apart of a sentence in an interview, an observation, or a paragraph 
in a newspaper. Following this a label is placed on phenomena to conceptualise and 
make sense of the data. The labelling process creates a set of concepts which are then 
grouped together under categories. Categories emerge `when concepts are compared 
one against another and appear to pertain a similar phenomenon'. 37 The next step is 
to develop the category in terms of its properties and dimensions. Properties are 
attributes and characteristics of a phenomenon, for example, variation in differing 
attributes, while dimensions are the range within each property, for example the 
frequency of occurrence. The properties and dimensions of categories can assist in 
the development of relationships between categories allowing the researcher to take 
the analysis to the next level of abstraction. Strauss and Corbin note three ways in 
which open coding can be approached; through a line-by-line analysis, an analysis of 
sentences and paragraphs, or an analysis of an entire document. In this study all three 
approaches were applied. 
35 Punch, Op. Cit, p. 210. 
36 Strauss and J Corbin, Op. Cit., p. 62. 
37 Ibid. p. 61. 
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As the interview process gathered steam a series of categories began to appear 
through a sentence and paragraph analysis of the interview transcripts. These 
concepts were also cross-referenced with data from other sources, primarily 
documentary. For the purpose of identifying early stage categories, documentary 
data were generally analysed as an entire document, although some sentence-by- 
sentence analysis did occur. This illustrates a multiplicity of analytical approaches to 
open coding and the practical use of triangulation. The dimensions of these 
categories were also identified by their frequency of appearance in the interview data 
and their relative strength within other forms of data. 38 In an interpretative sense this 
enabled the more important forms of categories to emerge as central to the 
phenomenon of party development. At this early stage of analysis the formal and 
informal dichotomy emerged as significant factor. Thus, categories at this stage were 
tagged as either possessing informal or formal properties. The formal were defined 
as those that represented official phenomena in relation to party development and the 
informal - those phenomena that were viewed as influencing party development but 
had no official nature or capacity or went beyond official jurisdiction. For example, 
the Central Election Commission (CEC) formally oversaw the electoral process, 
however, in the analysis of interview data the CEC was observed as being involved 
in the informal interpretation of formal rules in favour of pro-presidential parties. 
This happened, for example, by not releasing the official protocols of election 
results. This example was backed up by documentary reports such as those published 
by the OSCE as well as opposition parties' information on this issue. 
3.2 Axial Coding 
Axial coding is `where the main categories which have emerged from the open 
coding are interconnected with each other'. 39 Therefore, axial coding concerns the 
inter-relating of categories developed through open coding. Inter-relation is achieved 
38 The process of relative strength of categories in conjunction with the documentary data set was 
essentially an interpretive task and dependent on the data collected. It has to be acknowledged that 
relevant data to a category could have been missed in the data collection process and therefore, 
reducing the relative strength of a particular category. To ensure the validity of categories and their 
emergence in the analytical process a constant process of review occurred. Essentially this entailed 
returning to the categories created and reviewing them in light of any new or emerging data, either in 
the form of interview transcripts, new documentary evidence or notations from formal and incidental 
observation. 
39 Punch, Op. Cit., p. 215. 
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by the use of a theoretical code which is a coding paradigm that describes a set of 
concepts used for making connections between categories. There has, however, been 
a debate amongst the creators of grounded theory about what these theoretical codes 
should be. For example, Glaser highlights a set of coding families40 highlighting 18 
ways in which connections between categories can occur. 41 On the other hand 
Strauss and Corbin formulated an `interactionist coding paradigm. '42 Their paradigm 
concentrates on identifying casual conditions, context, intervening conditions, 
action/interaction strategies, and consequences. 43 Glaser countered Strauss and 
Corbin by criticising their sole use of an interactionist paradigm, suggesting the 
paradigm pre-subscribes codes upon the data rather than allowing it to emerge as the 
analysis proceeds. 44 
A form of axial coding had already begun during the open coding process by the 
delimitation of informal and formal forms of categories. However, the axial coding 
process saw a more systematic inter-relation of categories with the grouping together 
of categories under more conceptual headings. The issue in this study was what the 
theoretical framework was going to begin to make sense of the inter-relation between 
categories. Following Strauss and Corbin's interactionist paradigm there was a 
concentration in trying to make the connections between the categories in relation to 
their casual conditions and context. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, various 
theoretical frameworks had been considered before and during data collection but 
what clearly began to emerge in the axial coding process was that formal party 
development was distinctly occurring in an informal context. What emerged were six 
general codes in which categories could be placed under in relation to the 
development of political parties in Kazakhstan; the role of the personal leadership of 
Nursultan Nazarbaev, the role of informal behaviour in the shape of patronage or 
patron-client relations, the connection between parties, politics and inter-elite 
factional groups, the formal institutional constraints of political parties, the internal 
structural condition of parties (their organisation, ideology and behavioural 
characteristics) and the link between parties and society. 
40 B. Glaser, Theoretical Sensitivity, (California, The Sociology Press, 1978). 
41 Ibid. pp. 72-82. 
42 See Punch, Introduction to Social Research. 
43 Strauss and J Corbin, Op. Cit., pp. 99-107. 
44 B. Glaser, Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis, (Mill Valley, CA, sociology Press, 1992). 
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These groups were identified through a process of noting the casual conditions, 
context, intervening conditions and interactional strategies of a phenomena. 45 For 
example, an early open coding category that emerged was the perception that parties 
were elite and personalistically oriented with some surfacing from disaffected 
factions of the ruling elite. Using Strauss and Corbin's paradigm, the analysis sought 
to unpack the nature of this phenomenon by reference to its underlying contextual 
and causal conditions. Figure 2.3 below demonstrates how this works in relation to 
the phenomenon of elite based parties. 
Figure 2.3 Example of Axial Coding Process 
Causal Conditions Phenomena 
Inter-elite conflict Elite and personalistic based parties 
Personal ambition 
Protection of economic and political interests 
Presidential power consolidation 
Properties of Causal Conditions 
Varied access to economic resources 
Different periods of elite fragmentation 
Perception of public popularity 
Financial Resources 
Patron-client networks 
Specific Dimensions of Phenomena 
Different Elite cliques 
Relationship with president 
Party organisation, ideology and 
behavioural norms 
Context 
Privatisation 
Presidential patronage 
Weak civil society 
Cultural and Structural Legacies 
Uncertain and contingent political and economic transition 
Presidential Strategies for Managing Conflict 
Devising institutional constraints to manage new elite oppositional parties 
Strengthening of personal grip on power 
Intervening Conditions 
Public support for new parties (or for president) 
International pressure on constraints placed on new 
The underlying causations of elite and personalistic-based parties were their 
materialisation from inter-elite conflict driven by the personal ambitions and political 
and economic interests of their creators. From this it is possible to breakdown the 
45 Strauss and J Corbin, Op. Cit., p. 100. 
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properties of casual conditions, the context, strategies for management and 
intervening conditions as illustrated by Figure 2.3. It was through this process the six 
overarching codes emerged. What is most notable about the above figure is how it is 
possible to observe an interlinking between the central codes identified, and it is 
through precisely this process it is possible to unpack a far broader abstract picture 
regarding the relationship between informal politics and party development in 
Kazakhstan. This wider analysis is constructed through the process of selective 
coding. 
3.3 Selective Coding 
Selective coding is aimed at selecting a single core category and delimiting `the 
theoretical analysis and development to those parts of the data that relate to this core 
category. 146 The idea behind selective coding is to amalgamate and combine the 
unfolding analysis around a core category through which the other categories will 
interact. Once a decision has been made to what the core category will be, Strauss 
and Corbin suggest using the concept of a storyline to provide consistent integration. 
A storyline should not just be a descriptive narrative pertaining to the data and 
categories centred on the core category, but an analytical narrative. Integration can 
be achieved by the identification of patterns during the axial coding procedure. What 
occurs is `a web, a network of conceptual relationships already there, though 
somewhat loose and tangled, that the analyst will have to sort out and refine later 
during his or her selective coding. '47 Selective coding uses the same techniques that 
can be found in open and axial coding but at a much higher level of abstraction. 48 
Once the data, centred on a core category and storyline, are integrated and related at 
the conceptual, property, and dimensional levels it is possible to begin building a 
theory. The grounding of theory occurs in its validation. That is, statements of 
relationships within the theory need to be validated against the data. Once validity 
has been accounted for, and any missing gaps within the data filled, the final product 
will be a theory grounded within the data. 49 It has to be noted, however, this work 
does not claim to produce any grand theory. Using grounded theory does not mean a 
theory has to be produced. Rather, the techniques inherent in grounded theory ensure 
46 Punch, Op. Cit., p. 216. 
47 Strauss and Corbin, Op. Cit., p. 130. 
48 Punch, Introduction to Social Research. 
49 Strauss and Corbin, Op. Cit., pp. 129-142. 
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the central findings of the research are valid and reliable due to their grounding in 
the data. 
The isolated central category of this research was the informal/formal dichotomy. 
Here the overarching theoretical explanatory framework presented in the previous 
chapter helped to concentrate the storyline locating the development of political 
parties in the terrain between informal politics. The axial coding process underlined 
the interlinking connections between categories. The central codes in the axial 
coding process also formed the key properties in the core informal/formal category. 
From this emerges the central argument of the thesis that the informal condition of 
the neopatrimonial regime, personal loyalty, patron-client relations and inter-elite 
conflict, is influencing the formal development of political parties in Kazakhstan. At 
the same time, however, it illustrates that some formal elements of party 
development are emerging to contextualise, consolidate and legitimise informal 
political relations and behaviour. It shows how overall the informal context allows 
the president to place the institutional constraints on emerging parties that are driving 
them towards being elite-led and de-ideological institutions thus correlating to their 
weak link with wider society. To fit this overarching storyline and argument 
categories are arranged to validate the relationships between them, usually based on 
triangulation. Validation can emerge through a series of patterns that occurred during 
the axial coding process. For example, a constant pattern of patron-client 
relationships emerged which underlined the president's grip on power. In sum, the 
interconnected web of categories centred on the six central codes provides the core 
framework of the analytical storyline which explain the relationship between 
informal forms of politics and party development. The conclusions and explanations 
drawn from this, and what this says about party development in informal regimes 
and the former Soviet Union in general are grounded in the data and in the 
systematic analysis of the data following open, axial and selective coding 
procedures. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter simply sought to outline the methodological underpinnings of the 
research focussing on the research strategy and analysis of this study, highlighting at 
the same time the problems that arise with researching the relationship between 
informal politics and party development. The chapter presented a clear, structured 
and consistent methodological path to answer the central research questions. The use 
of grounded theory has demonstrated that the conclusions of the research are 
grounded in the data and are subject to an analytical rigour to uphold the reliability 
and validity of the research. It provided a methodological framework which gives an 
analytical consistency to the chapters that follow, making clear how the conclusions 
and explanation of the research, despite their interpretative nature, are grounded 
solidly in the data. It makes apparent the link between the informal and formal in 
Kazakhstan and the complexity and dynamics of this relationship. The following 
four chapters present the core of the research in which the data used has been 
collected and analysed under the terms set out here. The next chapter begins this 
process by firstly outlining the context of Kazakhstan's informal neopatrimonial 
regime and its development over time. 
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Chapter Three: Uncertain Transition: The Emergence of a Neopatrimonial 
Form of Rule in Kazakhstan 
If the claim is to be made that the dominant feature of Kazakhstan's post-Soviet 
political development is a regime underpinned by neopatrimonial characteristics, 
then the questions to be addressed are how did this form of politics emerge? How 
does it function and manifest itself? What is the context in which informal political 
relations and behaviour relate to the development of political parties? Scholars of 
Central Asia have been keen to pursue a cultural and structural legacy explanation 
for the dominance of informal politics and identity in post-Soviet political 
development. ' Certainly, historical legacy is bound to be a particularly vigorous 
factor in shaping post-Soviet trajectories and influencing political leadership. 
However, the contingent and uncertain process of political and economic transition, 
that being newly awarded sovereignty, state, institution and nation building, define 
the way political actors behave and the kind of relationship that tie them together in 
collective action. 
Scholars exploring the role of informal institutions and practices in the former Soviet 
Union have made reference to how informal forms of political behaviour and 
relationships have assisted political actors in minimising transition costs and 
adjusting to rapidly changing institutional environments to overcome uncertainty. 2 
Informal politics in Central Asia and Kazakhstan is not simply explained by 
historical legacy. Informal forms of politics are not static and are subject to change. 
Traditional forms of informal political relations and behaviour changed during 
communist rule, creating a form of patrimonial communism. In the post-Soviet 
transition, informal political relations and behaviour have fused with new formal 
institutions (neopatrimonialism). At the same time, their prominence is explained by 
political actors relying on informal politics as a way to confront the uncertainty of 
transition. In Kazakhstan since 1991 the challenges from new or altered institutions 
1 See Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics and Beyond: The Power of "Blood" in 
Kazakhstan (Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 2004) and Pauline Jones Luong, 
Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
2 Vladimir Gel'man, The Unrule of Law in the Making: the Politics of Informal Institution Building in 
Russia, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7,2004, pp. 1021-1040. 
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such as parliament, political parties and electoral competition have led the political 
leadership, namely the president, to rely on informal political norms of behaviour 
and relationships to secure and consolidate power in an effort to confront the 
instability that arises with transition and new institutions. This is turn generated 
informal factional elite level competition resulting in a greater degree of political 
uncertainty and instability. This led to another round of political consolidation where 
informal politics was once again used. Therefore, the informal forms of political 
relations and behaviour present in post-Soviet Kazakhstan have arisen specific to this 
context. What this cyclical process highlights is the complex relationship between 
informal and formal politics. While formal political rules are established to 
legitimise the centralisation of presidential power, they are buttressed by informal 
politics by either acting to legitimise informal political power or being written in 
such a fashion that they are left open to interpretation and selective application by 
loyal clients. 
This chapter outlines this argument by tracing the overall political development of 
Kazakhstan and Nazarbaev's neopatrimonial regime since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In doing so it will allow us to understand the context in which informal 
politics has emerged to influence the development of political parties and other 
political institutions. It will set out how loyalty and personalism of public office, 
patron-client relations and factional elite competition have come to play such a 
central role in political development by highlighting key instances and junctures 
through Kazakhstan's post Soviet development. The chapter will set the scene and 
draw out the main players and events that have impacted on the development of 
political parties, and thus the consolidation of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan. The 
chapters to follow will explain how the neopatrimonial regime's development 
described in this chapter has come to affect, influence and in turn been influenced by 
political parties. 
The chapter is broken into five sections. The first explores the historical, cultural and 
structural legacies of patrimonialism which have been apparent in Central Asian 
history. The second examines the first years of Kazakh independence from 1990- 
1994 where institutional competition; emerging pluralism and electoral competition 
challenged the authority of the president. The third assesses the period from 1995- 
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1998 where in response to the challenges of early independence the president 
consolidated power through a formal constitutional framework which was 
underpinned by a system of patron-client networks. Due to the opaque nature of 
privatisation, this period witnessed the emergence of factional inter-elite groups. The 
fourth section traverses the fragmentation of this patron-client system during 1998- 
2004 whereby high-level elites from government and business made public their 
opposition to the president's rule and the influence of members of his family. The 
final section surveys the period from 1999-2007, when the president moved to 
combat this challenge to his authority by party consolidation, economic 
centralisation and the liquidation of independent political actors. The chapter 
concludes by suggesting the nature of presidential power, based on informal and 
formal power, placed Nazarbaev in a position to direct and construct the formal 
institutional framework which suits his preferences and interests. It is this 
institutional framework in which political parties exist and operate. 
1. Pre-Soviet and Soviet Patrimonialism in Central Asia and Kazakhstan 
1.1 Patrimonialism in Pre-Soviet Central Asia 
The argument that neopatrimonialism in Central Asia has its roots in pre-Soviet 
history due to clan and tribal identities persisting across time and embedding 
informal clientelistic practices, is certainly strengthened by contemporary research. 
The pre-Russian administration of the region, which included the Emirate of 
Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva, and Khokand were politically and social 
organised on patrimonial principles. 3 Relations between the authorities and subjects 
consisted of `relations of piety of the subjects towards the rulers, and that the ruler 
recruited his administrative staff from servants and followers of his domain. ' 4 In the 
two Khanates the office of Khan (leader) was generally appropriated by the relatives 
of the predecessor and the Khan sold land or granted it to officials as a reward for the 
5 dispensation of their services. Such practices were applied in an attempt to bring 
3 Prior to being subsumed into the Russian Empire, Kazakhstan had its own Khanate existing from the 
mid-fifteenth to the mid-eighteenth Centuries. The Kazakh Khanate existed on the territory of modern 
Southern Kazakhstan. For a good overview of the Kazakh Khanate see Martha Brill O1cott The 
Kazakhs (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1987) Ch. 1. 
" Paul Georg Geiss, Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: Communal Commitment and Political 
Order in Change, (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) p. 130. 
5Ibid. pp. 140-141 and 153-156. 
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order to the dispersed tribal nature of the region. 6 These patrimonial practices were 
also a product of tribalism, as `progeny was a preferred resource, since it produced a 
web of kin-related supporters who could consolidate authority and provide labour'.? 
The cultural legacy of tribal and clan organisation is often proffered as an 
explanation for the preponderance of informal political behaviour in post-Soviet 
Central Asia. `Patrimonialism and mutually beneficial networks of exchange were 
central to these traditional clans'"8 The properties of patronage and personalism 
observable in kinship based clans and tribes have produced enduring social and 
political networks across temporal space. 
Patrimonial forms of rule, whether in macro structures of political and social 
organisation such as the Khanates or in the micro organisations of clans and tribes, 
are not static entities. Like the original formation of clans and tribes in Central Asia, 
which took shape through successive waves of migration and invading armies, 
patrimonial forms of rule have evolved through interaction with colonial rulers. In 
the case of the Tsarist administration, while the Russians heavily influenced 
economic and social organisation by constructing roads and railways, they did not 
seek to completely transform Central Asian society. Political management was 
organised on the principle of dualism with two levels of authority existing; a native 
and a Russian tier of administration. 9 A fusion occurred between the limited 
modernising attempts of Tsarist colonial rule and the traditional patrimonial forms of 
relations and behaviour that dominated social, economic and political organisation. 
Therefore, prior to Bolshevik domination, Kazakhstan and Central Asia remained 
predominantly tribal societies based on nomadic pastoralism with minimal urban and 
industrial infrastructure. 
1.2 Patrimonial Communism 
Pre-Soviet forms of informal political relations and behaviour indicate 
patrimonialism was central to social and political order. Yet Soviet rule arguably 
6 Ibid. 
Edward Schatz, Op. Cit., p. 30. 
8 Ibid. p. 72. 
9 Adeeb Khalid. The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia, (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1998) 
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transformed Central Asian society leaving greater structural and cultural legacies. 10 
Soviet hegemony established patrimonial communism, a form of rule which 
consisted of the interaction between traditional rule and communist political and 
economic organisation. Soviet rule was to have a vital influence on the structural 
development of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. 
In the first instance, the Bolshevik government was responsible for the establishment 
of the Central Asian republics. By the end of the civil war in 1921 the Bolshevik 
government had established control over much of the region" and in 1924 the Soviet 
government `decided to proceed with the division of Central Asia along national 
lines'. 12 Bolshevik national delimitation was a strategy to strengthen their position 
by supporting a policy of self-determination. ' 3 Equating the ethnic groups of 
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, and Karaalpaks as nations the Bolsheviks 
sought to create territorial units based on these divisions. As a result, by 1936 the 
Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenia came into existence. 14 It is not the scope of this work to discuss the 
process and problems of delimitation, but what is germane is that the states we 
comprehend as comprising modem Central Asia stem directly from this process. 
When the Central Asian Republics became independent states in 1991 they had no 
previous experience of sovereign statehood. 
Rapid industrialisation, collectivisation and sedentarization further illustrate the 
impact Soviet polices had upon the region. 15 Combined with purges of national elites 
10 For strong a structural and cultural legacy account of Soviet rule see Karen Dawisha and Bruce 
Parrott, Russian and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post- 
Soviet Central Asia and Ken Jowitt New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkley, 
University of California Press, 1992). 
11 Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (London. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1964). 
12 Adrienne Lynn Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan, (Princeton and Oxford, 
Princeton University Press, 2004) p. 51. 
13 Stephen Sabo], The Creation of Central Asia: The 1924 National Delimitation, Central Asian 
Survey, Vol. 14, No. 2,1995, pp. 225-241. 
14 Kazakhstan was originally an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and only received status as a 
Union Republic in 1936. 
'S The collectivisation and sedentarization of the Kazakh nomads occurred simultaneously from 1929 
onwards. The dual process developed at a rapid rate and met considerable resistance. By 1932 70 
percent of the population had been settled into collective farms. The costs of collectivisation and 
sedentarization were high as poor economic organisation and a decline in livestock led to the 
estimated deaths of 1.5 million Kazakhs through starvation and political violence. For further details 
106 
in 1928,1937-38 and 1949-50, the process of transformation and modernisation had 
a lasting and overwhelming impact on the peoples and institutions of the region. This 
was particularly the case with informal political relations. The forms of patronage 
and patrimonial administration evident in pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia 
became even more pronounced when integrated with Soviet bureaucratic 
administration. Due to the economy of scarcity, interpersonal relationships were 
important in Soviet politics. 16 Gregory Gleason noted that, `the fusion of political 
and economic decision making tended to invest formal positions with access to 
resources'. " Within Soviet bureaucracy access to resources rested on having the 
appropriate personal contact networks. From Stalin to Gorbachev the norm of 
personal loyalty was an ever-present feature of Soviet political relations at both the 
central and regional levels. As the Soviet system evolved patronage became the 
norm for political relations. Under Brezhnev neopatrimonial forms of political 
relations were ubiquitous. Patronage networks `grew to include aspiring politicians 
sponsored by Brezhnev and his top lieutenants'. 18 But patron-client networks did not 
just exist in the centre, they prevailed at the regional level and nowhere was this 
more the case than in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. 
During the Brezhnev period, loyalty, personalism and patronage became increasingly 
observable phenomena in the Central Asian republics. 19 Prior to Brezhnev, cadre 
development had been prone to instability and intermittent purges as local party 
secretaries were accused of bourgeoisie nationalism and regionalism. 20 Brezhnev, 
however, afforded first secretaries of the republics the responsibility to appoint 
cadre. If the belief previously was that local Central Asian elites had been prone to 
localism and informal tribal practices and needed to be modernised through the 
processes of collectivisation and sedentarization, then in the Brezhnev era the idea 
of this bleak part of Kazakh history see Martha Brill Olcott The Kazakhs (Stanford, Hoover Institution 
Press, 1987). Ch. 8. 
16 Gregory Gleason, Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia, Soviet Studies, 
Vol. 43 No. 4,1991, pp. 613-628. 
17 Ibid. p. 619. 
18 John P Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 45. 
19 T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw (eds. ), Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in 
the USSR and Yugoslavia (Boston, Allen and Unwin, 1983) provides a good overview on the 
emergence of patron-client ties in the Soviet Union. 
20 See Gleason, Fealty and Loyalty and James Critchlow, Corruption, Nationalism, and the Native 
Elites in Central Asia, Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2,1988, pp. 143-161. 
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was to establish a form of indirect rule. 21 What existed during the Brezhnev era was 
a form of dual authority with power located at both the regional and central levels. 22 
From the late 1950s until the 1980s the first secretaries of the republican communist 
parties in Central Asia remained largely unchanged (See table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 First Secretaries of the Central Asian Republican Communist Parties 
Republic CP First Secretary Entry into Office Exit from Office 
Uzbekistan Sharaf Rashidov 1959 1983 
Kazakhstan Dinmukhammed Kunaev 1960 1986 
Kir hizia Turdiakun Usubaliev 1961 1985 
Turkmenia Mukhamednazar Gapurov 1969 1986 
Ta'ikistan Dzhabar Rasulov 1961 1982 
(Adapted from James Critchlow, Corruption, Nationalism, and the Native Elites in Central Asia, 
. Journal of 
Communist Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2,1988, pp. 143-161) 
As a result, each first secretary was able to construct and embed authority over their 
respective republic. This was achieved ostensibly through the power to appoint 
officials which gave first secretaries the opportunity to establish their own vast 
personal networks of support based on the principle of loyalty in exchange for 
positions and resources. The long tenure `of the Central Asian first secretaries 
enabled them to put their own personal stamp on the republican machinery, as in a 
fiefdom, appointing their followers to senior posts at both Oblast (Regional) and 
Raion (District) level. 23 The Brezhnev era model of governance led to systematic 
corruption across the Soviet Union which was particularly evident in Central Asia by 
the 19805.24 The cotton scandal in Uzbekistan was the epitome of how patronage and 
vast personal networks resulted in corruption. Under First Secretary Sharaf 
Rashidov, a series of regionally based (and some argue kinship based) elite groups 
had emerged with Rashidov at the centre managing access to resources. In 1983 the 25 
Soviet government uncovered fraud on a huge scale with regards to the management 
21 Indirect rule is the term applied by Kathleen Collins and it seems a wholly appropriate description. 
22 See Gleason, Fealty and Loyalty. This was reminiscent of the Tsarist approach to managing Central 
Asia. 
23 Ibid. P. 145. 
24 Valerie Bunce, The Political Economy of the Brezhnev Era: The Rise and Fall of Corporatism, 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 2, (April 1983) pp. 129-158. 
25 Demian Vaisman, Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan, in Yaccov 
Ro'i (ed), Muslim Eurasia Conflicting Legacies, (Ilford, Essex, Frank Cass, 1995) pp. 105-122. 
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of Uzbekistan's vast cotton plantations amounting to the sum of 3,000m roubles. 26 
The cotton scandal exemplifies how `hierarchical chains of personal dependence 
between leaders in the apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by extensive 
patronage and clientelist networks' underscored political administration in a fashion 
resembling Kitschelt's personification of patrimonial communism. 27 
In Kazakhstan, Dinmukhammed Kunaev established his own vast networks of 
patron-client ties based primarily on loyalty in exchange for goods and services. 28 
Generally accredited with promoting the interests of Kazakh elites, Kunaev `built up 
an ethnic Kazakh, largely politico-administrative cadre and helped sponsor the 
educational and cultural development of ethnic Kazakhs. i29 Kunaev's position as a 
protege and loyal lieutenant of Brezhnev secured not only his own position but also 
those of his followers. 30 An often-cited example was the appointment of his brother 
as president of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences. 31 Nazarbaev too was a faithful 
protege of Kunaev and was duly rewarded, as Kunaev was instrumental in 
appointing him chairman of Kazakhstan's Council of Ministers, effectively the 
second most powerful position in the republic. 32 As a witness to the method of 
patronage used by Kunaev and Brezhnev to manage political relations among 
competing elite groups, Nazarbaev would have been acutely aware of the role loyalty 
played in sustaining power. 33 He observed himself how `Brezhnev selected the party 
Central Committee leaders in the republics, and they in turn appointed the heads of 
the regional committees completely on the basis of personal loyalty. ' 34 Patrimonial 
communism proved a good schooling for Nazarbaev allowing him to develop the 
Z6 Neil J. Melvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road, (Amsterdam, 
Harwood Publishers, 2000). 
27 Herbert Kitschelt, Op. Cit., p. 453. 
28 There was a two-year break during the period 1962-1964 when Kunaev served as the Chairman of 
the Kazakhstan Council of Ministers. He was reinstated as First Secretary when his patron, and 
former First Secretary of Kazakhstan, Brezhnev came to power. 
29 Sally Cummings, Kazakhstan p. 16. 
30 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, Chapter 10. 
31 Critchlow, Corruption, Nationalism and Native Elites. 
32 Sally Cummings, An Uneasy Relationship - Power and Authority in the Nazarbaev Regime in Sally 
Cummings (ed. ) Power and Change in Central Asia, (London, Routledge, 2002), pp. 59-73. 
33 Of course, Kunaev's position depended upon Moscow which was made clear when he was removed 
in 1986. Nonetheless, until the death of Brezhnev the loyalty displayed by Kunaev to Brezhnev would 
have made Nazarbaev aware of the way in which loyalty and patron-client relations can sustain 
p4ol itical leadership. 
Nursultan Nazarbaev, Without Right and Left, (London, Class Publishing, 1992) p. 15. 
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bureaucratic skills and patronage necessary to rise to the top of Kazakhstan's party 
oligarchy. 35 
Nazarbaev assumed the leadership of the Kazakh Republic in 1989, later becoming 
the first popularly elected president and then with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
the head of an independent sovereign Kazakh state. 36 As in other former Soviet 
republics, independence and transition brought a greater degree of institutional 
competition, a re-allocation of state resources and the emergence of new powerful 
economic network groups, some with criminal affiliations. 37 The challenge for the 
Republics' leaders, Nazarbaev among them, was to maintain their authority and the 
integrity of the state they inherited. 
To view the preponderance of political relations and behaviour based on informal 
and personal terms as solely a response to structural and cultural legacies, 
underestimates the extent to which contingency plays a role during periods of 
transition and flux. Indeed, it is clear from the above exposition that personal loyalty 
and patron-client relations have been persistent temporal features. Yet, such a 
deterministic view fails to take account of the incursion and fusion which occurs at 
critical temporal junctures. 38Just as the change from nomadic tribal political 
organisation to Soviet rule engendered a fusion between traditional politics and 
Soviet bureaucracy in the shape of patrimonial communism, the uncertain context of 
post-Soviet transition elicited another fusion between political behaviour and 
institutions. As outlined above, each transition in Central Asian history has seen the 
fusion between informal politics and new institutions. Neopatrimonialism is the 
logical step on from patrimonial communism and its evolution occurred during a 
dynamic and uncertain period of political transition (see table 3.2). Informal political 
relations and behaviour are now fused with not only residual communist structures 
's Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 
2002) p. 28. 
36 K. Burkhanov, B. Sultanov and B. Ayagan, Sovremennaia Politicheskaia Istoriia Kazakhstana, 
(Almaty, Institut Istorii i etnologii im. Ch. Ch. Valikhanova, 2006) pp. 57-65. 
37 J. Heilman, Winner Takes All: The Politics of Partial Reform in post-communist Transition, World 
Politics, Vol. 50, No, 2,1998, pp. 203-234; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Central Weakness and Provincial 
Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1, 
1999, pp. 87-106 and V. Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism 
(Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 2002). 
38 Ruth Collier & David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 
1991). 
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and behaviour but also new political institutions and actors; in formal rational offices 
and liberal democratic constitutional organisation. It is this uncertain context in 
which informal political relations become prominent as a way to minimise 
transaction costs and the emergence of other centres of institutional power. It is in 
this circumstance that informal political relations and behaviour influence political 
parties, but at the same time formal institutions including parties have helped 
legitimise and consolidate informal forms of politics. 
Table 3.2 The Evolution of informal political relations and behaviour in Central 
Asia 
Type of rule Component Parts 
Tribal Organisation (with Tsarist Personalistic and patrimonial rule 
administration) (moderate Tsarist administrative 
structures) 
Patrimonial Communism Combination of informal political 
relations and behaviour, personalism, 
patron-client networks, elite factions and 
Soviet bureaucracy. 
Neopatrimonialism Fusion between informal political 
relations and behaviour, residual 
communist structural and behavioural 
legacies and formal rational offices and 
liberal constitutions taking place in a 
dynamic and uncertain transitional 
context. 
2.190-1994 Institutional Conflict and Emerging Pluralism 
Independence brought significant challenges to Nazarbaev and Kazakhstan. The 
multi-natured dynamics of Kazakhstan's early independent period created a degree 
of uncertainty with regards to power and authority. This uncertainty was reflected 
through three broad processes: institutional competition, a degree of emerging 
pluralism in society manifested in the shape of new political parties and social 
movements, and electoral competition. These processes reflect the new political 
landscape post 1991 and in dealing with these challenges, Nazarbaev turned to 
informal politics to maintain control. This in turn was to influence the formal 
institutions to emerge after 1995. This section discusses the three broad processes 
which challenged the authority of the president and which saw him utilise informal 
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forms of political behaviour and relations to re-assert his power and control of the 
political system. 
2.1 Institutional Competition and Conflict 
Kazakhstan's original constitution introduced in January 1993 encapsulated the 
degree of institutional uncertainty apparent in the political system. This uncertainty, 
as in other post-Soviet republics, manifested institutional competition between the 
president and the parliament. The constitution invested considerable powers in the 
presidency as parliament lacked the power to impeach. 39 Nevertheless, based on the 
French constitution of the Fifth Republic, the constitution enshrined a parliamentary- 
presidential form of government40 where the president lacked powers of dissolution 
and the parliament `enjoyed a wide range of formal rights including the right to 
approve the budget, amend the constitution and elect the constitutional court. '41 The 
constitution embodied the considerable institutional challenge the president faced as 
parliament emerged as a body responsible for pivotal and important decisions. 
Between its inception in April 1990 until its self-dissolution in October 1993 the 
Twelfth convocation of the Supreme Soviet approved and introduced the post of 
president (24 April 1990), declared state sovereignty (25 October 1990), the 
Constitutional Law on State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan (16 
December 1991) and the first constitution of independent Kazakhstan. 42 According 
to the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Serikbolsyn Abdil'din, the body was 
now `radically different to its traditional role during the Soviet period, as it was now 
the original creator of laws. '43 
The parliament was a hangover of the Soviet era and consisted of representatives of 
entrenched interests from former communist organisations, state enterprises and 
institutions. 44 A new parliament was established under the 1993 constitution, the 
39 Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan of 28 Yanvaria 1993 Goda. 
40 K. Burkhanov et at, Sovremennaia Politicheskaia Istoriia Kazakhstana, p. 68. 
41 John Anderson, Constitutional Development in Central Asia, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
1997, p. 307. 
42 K. K. Aitkhozhin and I. O. Buluktaev, Rol' Parlamenta v sisteme gosudarstvennoi vlasti (Almaty, 
Tentr Analiza Obshchestvennykh Problem, 2004). 
43 Serikbolsyn Abdil'din, Stanovlenie Parlamentarizma v Kazakhstane, (St. Petersburg, Sekretariat 
Soveta MPA, 1993) p. 4. 
44 See chapter 4, Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence (Oxford, 
Westview, 1997). 
112 
unicameral Supreme Kenges, however, the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, under the 
leadership of Abdil'din, were unwilling to cede power and call elections for the new 
body immediately. Rather the parliament was beginning to `serve as a magnate for 
growing popular disenchantment with a failing economy' and the chief opponent of 
the president's economic reform program. 45 
Driven primarily by Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan's early post-Soviet economic policy was 
influenced by the economic trends in Russia and was concerned mainly with 
maintaining close economic ties with its former patron. 46 The economic program of 
price liberalisation followed the model set out by Yeltsin. Like Yeltsin, Nazarbaev 
appointed a number of reform-minded colleagues and officials including Erik 
Asanbaev as vice-president, Uzakbai Karamanov as Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, Daulet Sembaev as vice-prime minister and Sergei Tereschenko as Prime 
Minister. 47 Similar to Russia, Nazarbaev's reform and destatification agenda 
included price liberalisation, liberalisation of the consumer market, a privatisation 
program and the reconstruction of the country's economic infrastructure. 48 All of 
this was reinforced by the signing of huge deals with foreign companies regarding 
the oil deposits in the Tengiz oil field in Western Kazakhstan and an IMF backed 
stabilisation program. 49 The de-statification program and the sell off of Kazakhstan's 
oil and gas deposits to foreign companies met considerable resistance in parliament. 
In 1993, led by Abdil'din many deputies in the Supreme Soviet opposed the reform 
agenda fearing displacement from stakes they possessed in state enterprises and 
other organisations. As a result economic reform stalled. Nazarbaev, concerned 
Kazakhstan was now lagging behind Russia as well as feeling threatened by the 
constitutional power of parliament, invited deputies to dissolve the parliament on the 
basis that there had not yet been a democratic election for the body and thus their 
legitimacy was under question. Parliament eventually acquiesced, but only through a 
45 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan Unfulfilled Promise, p. 101. 
' Richard Pomfret, Kazakhstan's Economy Since Independence: Does the Oil Boom Offer a Second 
Chance for Sustainable Development? Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 6,2005, pp. 859-876. 
47 Sally Cummings, Kazakhstan Power and Elite, (London, I. B. Tauris, 2005) p. 23. 
as A law regarding de-statification was passed by parliament as early as June 1991; however, it was 
not active until March 1993. 
49 For an excellent overview of Kazakhstan's economy since independence see Yelena Kalyuzhnova, 
The Kazakhstani Economy: Independence and Transition (Basingstoke and London, St. Martins 
Press, 1998). 
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process of informal deal making which insured deputies were appropriately 
rewarded. Sally Cumming notes that in her conversations with local commentators it 
was suspected that Nazarbaev struck a deal with the deputies, as the president 
decreed the status and income of deputies. Indeed Abdil'din, himself, has noted how 
the president used informal techniques of persuasion. He suggests the president 
twisted the arms of those deputies who worked in state organisations and within the 
state apparatus by offering them re-election or a new post. 50 Such informal 
bargaining illustrates the powers of patronage that was at the president's disposal. 
Moreover, it demonstrates how the president turned to relying on such informal 
powers of patronage due to the institutional competition which had arisen between 
the legislative and executive branch. The use of informal persuasion to coerce 
loyalty began the president's deep dependence on informal political norms to 
centralise powers in his presidency. With the dissolution of parliament Nazarbaev 
was invested with plenipotentiary powers until new elections were held. These 
events began the formal concentration of power in Nazarbaev's presidency which 
was to have a significant impact on future institutional development, including that 
of political parties. This was the beginning of the process which enabled the 
president to determine the institutional constraints which would affect party 
development (see Chapter Four). 
2.2 Emerging Pluralism 
Another process contingent to transition was the emergence of pluralism, in the guise 
new political parties and organisations. During the Soviet period the Communist 
Party was the only political party permitted. The new era of openness duringl986- 
1989 saw the surfacing of informal political movements and discussion clubs. 5' The 
earliest of these organisations centred on ecological issues as disparate groups 
appeared across Kazakhstan concerned with confronting the ecological problems 
facing the country, 52 including a patchwork of independent groups in Alma-Ata 
called Zelenyi Front (Green Front). 53 The most famous and popular movement was 
the Nevada-Semipalatinsk International Anti-Nuclear and Ecological Movement. It 
50 Serikbolsyn Abdil'din, Kazakhstan: of demokratii k avtokratii (Almaty, KPK, 2003) 
51 V. A. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane (1987-1991), (Alma- 
Ata, Glagol, 1991) pp. 13-14. 
52 Ibid. pp. 14-15. 
53 M. B. Zaslavskaya, Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye ob'edineniia Kazakhstana na 
sovermennom etape razvitiia, (Almaty, KISI, 1994) pp. 6-7. 
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is suspected the Soviet authorities created the movement to get a steer on developing 
pluralism, and Nazarbaev has claimed to be behind its creation. 54 The need to 
establish political parties and movements that would be loyal to the incumbent elites 
was in response to the new confidence public organisations had in organising and 
expressing their views and interests. Grassroots movements were appearing across 
urban centres in Kazakhstan. 55 The emergence of such pluralism was connected to 
events occurring at the centre. Under Gorbachev the Soviet Union was undertaking a 
process of gradual de-centralisation of power. Therefore, in many of the former 
Soviet republics the ability for new political movements and parties to emerge was 
as a direct response to Gorbachev's policies of reform in Moscow. Comparatively, 
Kazakhstan lagged behind many of the other Soviet republics (especially the Baltic 
republics and Russia) in terms of greater demokratizatsiia (democratisation). 
However, the process of change and reform did reach the southern states of the 
former Soviet Union. 
The decision in Moscow in March 1990 to remove the Communist Party's 
constitutional right as the only political party in the Soviet Union further exacerbated 
the trend towards a plurality of ideas and interests being represented in the public 
realm across many of the Soviet republics. In Kazakhstan, although small in 
membership, parties were founded on strong principles, ideological tenets and 
particular ethnic or national interests. 56 The plethora of new parties signified the 
unpredictable nature of transition as it unleashed a plurality of ideas and interests. 
The key for the president was to produce top down political organisations to manage 
sa Vladimir Babak, Kazakhstan: How its Multiparty System Came into Being, Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, Vol. 32, No. 2,2005. 
" For example at this time groups like the Alma-Ata Peoples Front, Akikat (Truth), Zheltoksan 
(December), an organisation set up by participants of the December 1986 riots in Alma-Ata, and 
Memorial, a group dedicated to rehabilitating victims of the Stalinist repressions, were challenging 
the intellectual and cultural domination of communist elites. See I. O. Buluktaev, C. A. D'iachenko 
and L. I. Karmazina, Politicheskie Partii Kazakhstana Spravochnik 1998 (Almaty, IPK, 1998) p. 76. 
'6 For example, there was the Alash party established in April 1990 on the principles of Pan-Turkism 
and Pan-Islamism, the Azat (Freedom) Civil Movement committed to an independent and sovereign 
Kazakhstan, the Slav movement Lad created on the basis of representing Russian and Slavic 
ethnicities, the Social Democratic Party, founded on the principles of Scandinavian socialist 
democratic systems and Edinstvo (Unity) emerged in response to ethnic tensions between Kazakhs 
and other European populations regarding land seizures in Alma-Ata, committed to inter-ethnic 
harmony and `arresting the problems of chauvinism and nationalism. For info on early parties and 
movements see V. A. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, M. B. 
Zaslavskaya, Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye ob'edineniia Kazakhstana and Vladimir Babak, 
Demian Vaisman and Aryeh Wasserman, Political Organisation in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: 
Sources and Documents, (London, Frank Cass, 2004) 
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the emerging party system and ensure a limitation of political risk. The strategy was 
to establish a political party which could replace the institutional dominance the 
Communist Party previously held. In September 1991, at the final extraordinary 
congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev pushed for the 
dissolution of the party and the establishment of a reformist Socialist Party of 
Kazakhstan (SPK). 57 For a proportion of communist party members the decision of 
the `funeral congress' was unacceptable and they established a revival committee 
which later re-constituted the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (KPK). 58 The KPK 
viewed themselves as true heirs to the old Communist Party and it was originally 
unreconstructed in its ideological beliefs, committed to the `scientific and ideological 
basis of Marxism-Leninism as the uniform materialistic theory of societal 
development'. 59 While the KPK may have inherited the ideological foundation of the 
old Communist Party, the SPK acquired its financial and administrative resources. 
The SPK was a reaction to the development of competition from other political 
institutions and organisations, as the president sought to create a party in which he 
could centralise these centrifugal forces and use as an instrument that would be loyal 
to his political requirements. SPK, however, proved to be neither acquiescent to 
Nazarbaev's rule nor committed to a strong presidential republic. By 1993, the party 
withdrew its support for him and moved into opposition. 
Unable to rely on the support of the SPK, Nazarbaev ordained another broad based 
pro-presidential party, the Union of People's Unity of Kazakhstan (SNEK). The 
party was committed to supporting Nazarbaev's policies and direction. SNEK 
advocated the dissolution of parliament in December 1993 and supported the 
president's bid for a stong presidential system. Nazarbaev was elected leader of the 
party, but due to the state law forbidding anyone working in state posts from being a 
member of a political party, Serik Abdurahmanov was selected as leader instead. 60 
The party leadership also featured prominent figures that would later play important 
57 Programma Sotsialisticheskoi partii Kazakhstana (Almaty, Proket, 1992). 
58Ainur Kurmanov, `Kompartiia umerla, da zdravstvyet', Turkestan. communist. ru, 
htty: //www. turkestan. communist. ru/chronic/2005/11/24/comparty, November 2005[accessed 
04.10.2006]. 
59 `Programmnoe zayavlenie kommunistichesoi partii kazakhstana', adopted 20 Congress of the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan, 19 September 1992. Document can be found in B. G. Ayaganov, S. 
Z., Baimagambetov and G. Zh. Zhumanova, Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye dvizheniia 
sovremennogo Kazakhstana Spravochnik Vypuski 1 (Almaty, TUDAP, 1994) pp. 74-75. 
60 Ibid. 
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roles in the political life of the country including Marat Tazhin, Serge D'iachenko 
and Kenzhegali Sagadiev. 61 
Added to the emerging melting pot of parties and organisations was the Party of 
People's Congress of Kazakhstan (NKK). The party was created by the leaders of the 
Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement and was headed by Olzhas Suleimenov, a famous 
Kazakh poet and writer and Mukhtar Shakanov, also a writer. 62 Set up in October 
1991 the party was initially supported by the authorities. A split in the leadership, 
however, left Suleimenov in sole charge and the party shifted to what they termed 
`constructive opposition'. NKK had considerable financial support from influential 
sponsors and private businesses. Suleimenov effectively became the head of the 
Kazakh opposition during 1993-94 and there was great pressure on him to challenge 
Nazarbaev for the prospective presidential elections in 1996.63 Again, using informal 
bargaining to establish a patron-client relationship, Nazarbaev struck a deal with 
Suleimenov that saw him appointed the Kazakh ambassador to Italy. 64 This secured 
not only loyalty to the president from his chief opponent, but also it meant he would 
not confront a potentially popular candidate in the presidential election. 
The nature of party development during this very early period of Kazakhstan's post- 
Soviet development (from 1989-1995) illustrates that two types of parties were 
emerging. There were those who formed parties under the tutelage of the president 
(SNEK) and those that were autonomous (KPK, NKK and other smaller parties). 
However, autonomous parties that posed a threat were kept out of competing for 
power altogether (as in the case of the KPK) or were co-opted by the presidential 
administration by offering rewards in exchange for loyalty (as in the case of NKK). 
It points to a phenomenon common within the post-Soviet context in that pluralism 
and the development of political parties was something that had to be managed by 
the ruling elite. It was not permissible to have autonomous parties and groups 
provoking institutional conflict and proselytising a different political outlook. It 
created uncertainty and instability for those in power, especially incumbent former 
First Secretaries of the Communist Party like Nazarbaev. Therefore, party 
61 Vladimir Babak et al, Political Organisation in Central Asia, pp. 175-176. 
62 B. G. Ayaganov et al, Politicheskie partii, pp. 24-26. 
63 Vladimir Babak et al, Political Organisation in Central Asia, pp. 146-147. 
64 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan Unfulfilled Promise, p. 91. 
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development had to be controlled from above either through the creation of pro- 
presidential parties (as in SNEK) or through cooption (as in NKK). Informal forms 
of political relations and behaviour were deployed to ensure party development from 
above would succeed whether through electoral manipulation in ensuring SNEK won 
the most seats in the legislative elections or through offering rewards for loyalty, as 
in the cooption of Suleimenov. In both cases informal politics was being used to 
manage the uncertainty of post-Soviet transition. 
2.3 Electoral Competition: 1994 Parliamentary Election 
The third process adding to the sense of political uncertainty was electoral 
competition which the presidential administration sought to manage and control. For 
the first post-Soviet legislative election the president was allowed to appoint 42 
deputies from a state list to the new 177 member Supreme Kenges. The intention 
was to guarantee a dependable majority of support for Nazarbaev. The process and 
conduct of the election was strictly controlled and the voting process closely stage- 
managed65 to such an extent that it received heavy criticism from international 
observers. 66 Opposition figures claimed the vote was rigged and underpinned by 
serious violations. 67 The election, held on March 7 1994 saw 76 out of the 177 
elected deputies connected with either parties or public organisations. Of the other 
deputies 59 were elected as independents and the remaining 42 provided by the 
presidential state list. On the surface the election result seemed to provide the 
president with a pliant and loyal majority with SNEK winning 30 seats to sit 
alongside the 42 state list candidates. However, this was not sufficient to guarantee 
the parliament would be subservient to presidential rule. There continued to be a 
large oppositional bloc within parliament focused on the Socialists and ancillary 
Communist Party organisations such as the Peasants Union. 68 
65 Ibid. p. 102. 
66 See Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report on the March 7,1994 
Parliamentary Election in Kazakhstan (Washington, D. C., Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, March 1994), p. 7. 
67 See Nurbulat Masanov, Political Development of Sovereign Kazakhstan, Speech given at the 
European Parliament in Brussels 10 December 2002, http: //www. kub. info/article. phn? sid=2851 
[accessed 14.02.2007]. 
68 The KPK was not permitted to participate in this election. 
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Table 3.3 March 7 1994 Parliamentary Election Results Seat Distribution 
Party or Affiliation Seats 
Union of People's Unity of Kazakhstan (SNEK) 30 
Trades Union Federation 11 
People's Congress of Kazakhstan (NKK) 9 
Socialist Party 
Peasants' Union 4 
Lad (Harmony) Movement 4 
Republican Council Women's Organisations 3 
Democratic Committee of Human Rights of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
1 
Organisation of Veterans of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1 
Republican Party of Kazakhstan 1 
Union of Young People of Kazakhstan 1 
International Public Committee 'Aral-Aziya-Kazakhstan' I 
Congress of Businessmen Kazakhstan 1 
Union of Industrialists and Businessmen 1 
Independent Candidates 59 
State List 42 
(Adapted from K. Burkhanov et al, Sovremennaia Politicheskaia Istoriia Kazakhstana, p. 79) 
Despite the loyal bloc of support for the president in parliament, the opposition 
demonstrated strength and resolve to some of the president's policies. In the first 
instance, the parliament was unwilling to elect the president's favoured candidate for 
parliamentary speaker, Kuanish Sultanov. 70 Furthermore, the privatisation program 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Sergei Tereshchenko also met steep 
resistance. Buoyed by public opinion that ran strongly against privatisation, several 
opposition blocs materialised in the legislature determined to arrest economic 
reform. In May 1994, the opposition led by NKK passed a vote of no confidence in 
Tereshchenko's government by 111 to 28 votes. 7' Claiming there was no 
constitutional basis for the Government to resign, Tereshchenko kept his position but 
in July 1994 the opposition continued their sustained pressure by overriding the 
presidential veto on two consumer protection bills. 72 By now the legislature had 
become what Olcott describes as a `bully pit' where the floor was used to air 
69 Even though they were unable to stand the KPK were represented by the affiliated Peasants Union 
and by other independent candidates. 
70 Martha Brill Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise. 
71 Only 139 deputies were present at the vote. 
72 Olcott, Op. Cit., pp. 103-104. 
119 
concerns over Nazarbaev's leadership and policy program. 73 Reports of opposition 
deputies' speeches and criticisms of the president were published in independent 
media outlets and even state newspapers such as Kazakhstanskaia Pravda. By 
October 1994, Tereshchenko's resignation was eventually accepted and conflict 
between the ever-vocal legislature and the president seemed to be approaching an 
impasse. 
The reason for why competition in Kazakhstan was reflected along institutional lines 
during the period from 1990-1995 was because constitutionally the parliament still 
retained a significant degree of power within the constitution. The explanation for 
the intensification of opposition after the 1994 election can be linked to the dynamic 
and changing nature of transition politics. According to Olcott, `the patronage of the 
president was seemingly limitless-but those who lacked personal ties to the leader 
were also freer to follow their own political instincts'. 74 Therefore, the old elite 
began to divide `into those who felt advantaged by the new political and economic 
world and those who did not'. From this perspective, it was principally those not 
privy to the benefits of transition politics that emerged as the main opposition in 
parliament. 
As noted above, opposition from parliament was acting as a roadblock on 
Nazarbaev's ability to see his decisions enacted. For Nazarbaev this represented an 
uncertain institutional context. Without a loyal parliament willing to rubber stamp 
his decisions and ensure his privatisation programme was passed, and as long as 
parliament retained a degree of power over the executive branch, there was no 
guarantee his position was stable. Unable to counter the opposition from parliament 
and stabilise his rule the president needed to extend his constitutional powers at the 
expense of the legislative branch. However, there was little chance of being able to 
achieve this with the convocation elected in the 1994 parliamentary election. As with 
the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in December 1993, Nazarbaev once again 
relied on his informal power of patronage to dissolve the legislature affording him 
the opportunity to re-draw the constitutional and institutional framework of the 
73 Martha Brill Olcott, `Nursultan Nazarbaev as a Strong President' in Ray Taras (ed. ) Post 
Communist Presidents (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 113. 
74 Ibid, p. 92. 
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country. This dissolution of parliament was achieved through the backdoor. In 
March 1995, a failed candidate from the Abylaikhanov electoral district in Almaty, 
Tatiana Kviatkovskaia, filed a complaint to the Constitutional Court arguing the 
electoral districts for the 1994 election were disproportionate, resulting in deputies 
representing vastly different size constituencies. 75 On the 8 March 1995 the court 
ruled in her favour and annulled not only the result for the Abylaikhanov district but 
for the whole election stating that `the Central Election Commission had broken 
article 60 of the constitution. ' 76 Using the judiciary the president was able to 
legitimise the decision to dissolve parliament. The extent to which Nazarbaev was 
involved in pushing for the courts decision has been subject to speculation and may 
never be known. However, the fate of those people who were involved in the case 
demonstrates how patronage was used to make certain the president got the desired 
result. The main players involved found themselves well rewarded for their services. 
Kviatkovskaia went on to head the pro-presidential Otan (Fatherland) party list in the 
1999 parliamentary election and served as a deputy. Kairbek Suleimenov, a deputy 
minister of Internal Affairs, was close to many of the judges on the court and was 
reported to have been influential in their final decision. After the dissolution of 
parliament Suleimenov was soon promoted to Minister of the Interior. 77 
The three processes of institutional competition, emerging pluralism and electoral 
competition were a product of transition from communist rule. The uncertainty of 
this period (1991-995) created instability for Nazarbaev's position. To overcome this 
uncertainty Nazarbaev used informal political relations and behaviour. Both the 1993 
and 1995 dissolution of the legislature came about through informal backroom deals 
and the use of rewards in exchange for loyalty to the president. The emergence of 
political opposition in the form of pluralism was also managed either from above 
with the creation of loyal presidential parties or through cooption where again 
loyalty was bought in exchange for rewards. This period highlights two points. First, 
informal political relations and behaviour emerged in response to the contingent 
context. Second, it illustrates the fusion between new postcommunist institutions 
(new constitution, legislature), communist legacies (vested interests that made up 
75 Martha Brill Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise. 
76 S. G Sheretov, Politicheskaia istoriia Kazakhstana 1985-1995, (Almaty, NVSIIGY, 1997) p. 61. 
77 Martha Brill Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, pp. 110-111. 
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some of the opposition in parliament) and informal forms of political relations and 
behaviour (the clientelism and patronage used by the president). 
3.1995-1998 The Consolidation of Presidential Power and the Emergence of 
Informal Factional Elite Groups 
After the uncertainty of the early years of independence, Nazarbaev sought to 
formally codify and strengthen his power in a formal constitution. Yet, this formal 
institutional power, exhibited in a presidential republic, was buttressed by informal 
power. This appeared in two ways. First, the president rewarded those parties and 
institutions which ensured the formal consolidation of presidential power. A number 
of political parties proved crucial in providing support and legitimacy for the 
strengthening of presidential power. These parties were duly rewarded for their 
loyalty by being awarded seats in the new legislature. Second, the program of 
privatisation saw former state assets passed onto new emerging informal elite groups 
who were beginning to compete for these resources. Nazarbaev assumed the position 
of arbitrator of elite conflict for resources. This gave him greater informal power as 
he was in a position to withhold or give access to resources on the basis of the extent 
groups can demonstrate loyalty to his leadership. This section highlights this process 
whereby formal constitutional power underlined by informal political power was 
used to insulate the president from the transaction costs from Soviet rule had 
involved. It will assess the formal concentration of power, the informal focus of 
power, the process of privatisation and the emergence of informal elite groups. 
However, as will be noted, rooting political power on neopatrimonialism (the 
combination of both informal and formal rule) proved to be as unstable as accepting 
the risks associated with open democratic competition for power. 
3.1 Formal Concentration of Presidential Power 
Free from institutional competition the president made full use of his plenipotentiary 
powers using the eight-month period without a legislature to implement by decree 
his program for Kazakhstan . 
78 Despite ruling by personal decree Nazarbaev still 
78 In the eight month period from when parliament was dissolved until being reconstituted in 
December 1995 Nazarbaev issued 134 decrees which had the force of law relating to a broad 
spectrum of polices including the privatisation of banking activities, gas, tax, land code, elections, 
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sought to maintain a public commitment to democracy. This commitment was 
embodied in the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan (ANK); an institution intended 
to represent all peoples and ethnicities in the country. The idea that the ANK was a 
democratic body was undermined by the fact its members were appointed by the 
president himself, leading some scholars to describe the body as `the assembly 
without people' and `parliamentarism according to Nazarbaev. '79 All members of the 
ANK relied on the patronage of the president for their position. The ANK 
demonstrated that establishing new institutions on the basis of loyalty and patronage 
could aid the consolidation and legitimisation of presidential power and mitigate 
against the uncertainties of institutional competition. The ANK was used as the 
forum to suggest and promote the extension of Nazarbaev's tenure of office until 
2000 (an election was scheduled for 1996) and a new constitution limiting the 
powers of the legislature and strengthening the institution of the presidency. 80 
With any form of potential challenge to his authority deferred until 2000 the 
president sought to formally institutionalise the powers he had accumulated with the 
dissolution of parliament. The new 1995 constitution placed the prime minister as 
the head of the executive authority, but in reality the large number of powers 
residing with the president and the widespread qualitative affect of his decision- 
making powers, made certain the president was chief executive. 8' Under the new 
constitution the president was given power to appoint the prime minister albeit with 
the consent of parliament. However, `as there is no real opposition in parliament to 
the head of state, he is free to appoint anybody'. 82 The 1995 constitution bestowed 
on the president the institutional right to: appoint and dismiss members of the 
government, without parliament's consent; appoint all members of the judiciary and 
the security services; give direct assignments to members of the government and 
preside over the government on especially important questions. The new constitution 
also modified the country's institutional infrastructure by creating a new bicameral 
parliament and the budget for 1996. This intensive activity contrasts with the Supreme Soviet between 
March 1990 and December 1993 which only accepted and passed 265 laws. See, K. Burkhanov et al, 
Sovremennaia Politicheskaia Istoriia Kazakhstana, pp. 84-85. 
79 V. N. Khlupin, Bol'shaia Sem'ia Nursultana Nazarbaeva: Politicheskaia elita sovremennogo 
Kazakhstana (Moscow, Institute for Contemporary Political Research, 1998) p. 45. 
80 The referendum to extend Nazarbaev's mandate until December 2000 was put to a popular vote in 
April 2005. Ninety five percent of those who turned out voted in favour of the extension. 
81 Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1995 (Almaty, lurist, 2006). 
82 E. A. Borisova, Kazakhstan prezident i vneshiaia politika (Moscow, Natalis, 2005), p. 24. 
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legislature with the Senate as the upper chamber and the Mazhilis (parliament) as the 
lower chamber. The Mazhilis consisted of 67 seats to be elected for four-year terms 
while the Senate was to have two senators for each Oblast as well as seven senators 
appointed directly by the president. A referendum held in August of 1995 found 
approval with 89 percent of the electorate. 
3.2 Informal Concentration of Powers: Loyal Parties and Cadre 
A number of pro-presidential parties, some newly created, played a substantial role 
in supporting both Nazarbaev's referendum on extending his mandate and the new 
constitution. SNEK, now renamed Party of People's Unity of Kazakhstan (PNEK), 
alongside the newly established Party of Revival of Kazakhstan (PVK), led by 
Altynshash Dzhaganova, and the diluted NKK (now no longer an opposition party) 
co-signed a declaration of support to the ANK's original decree to prolong the 
president's mandate beyond 1996. The campaign was reported actively in the mass 
media83 and was followed by a similar campaign led by PNEK, PVK, NKK and 
another new pro-presidential party, Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (DPK) led by 
Tulegen Zhukeev and Altynbek Sarsenbaev, in support of the new constitution 
centralising power in the presidency. 84 The establishment of these new parties 
demonstrates how the presidential administration was supporting and encouraging 
key allies within the elite to create political parties from above as a means to loyally 
support and give legitimacy to the consolidation of the president's power. 85 The 
December 1995 parliamentary elections saw these political parties and elite figures 
receive their rewards for supporting the president. In another questionable election 
PNEK and DPK won the majority of seats (see table 3.4). Dzhaganova also got her 
prize for backing the president in the two campaigns by winning a seat too. 
Opposition deputies within the legislature were reduced to just 7-9 percent of the 
83 S. D'iachenko, L. Karmazina and S. Seidumanov, Politicheskie partii Kazakhstan god 2000 
sravochnik (Almaty, Information-Analytical Centre of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, 2000), P. 311. 
94P Ibid, p. 312. 
85 Zhukeev and Sarsenbaev were key high-level elite figures. The DPK chairman Zhukeev was a key 
figure on the Security Council and had previously been deputy Prime Minister, while Sarsenbaev was 
Minister for Print and Mass Information. Dzhaganova had previously been the chairman of the 
Central Committee of the Supreme Soviet of Woman's Affairs. See, Daniyar Ashimbaev, Kto est Kto 
v Kazakhstane 2005 (Almaty, Credo, 2005) and S. D'iachenko, L. Karmazina and S. Seidurnanov, 
Politicheskie partii Kazakhstana. 
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total composition. 86 While not proving to be completely compliant, the new 
legislature was no longer a second centre of power and remained on the whole, loyal 
and acquiescent. 
Table 3.4 December 1995 Parliamentary Election Results Seat Distribution 
Party or Affiliation Political Seats 
Orientation 
Party of Peoples Unity of Kazakhstan (PNEK) Pro- 24 
presidential 
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (DPK) Pro- 12 
presidential 
Peasants Union Opposition 7 
Federation of Professionals Pro- 5 
presidential 
Union of Young People Pro- 3 
presidential 
Engineering Academy Pro- 5 
presidential 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan Opposition 2 
Peoples Congress of Kazakhstan (NKK) Pro- 1 
presidential 
Peoples-Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan Opposition I 
(NKPK) 
Party of Revival of Kazakhstan Pro- 1 
presidential 
Independents Pro- 6 
presidential 
Total number of pro-presidential deputies 56 
Total number of opposition deputies 
Total number of deputies 66 
(Adapted from S. G Sheretov, Politicheskaia istoriia Kazakhstana 1985-1995, p. 67). 
The president sought also to secure and concentrate power within the bureaucracy 
and administration of Government. As Olcott has argued, `with the muscle taken out 
of parliament, the cabinet and ministry system was becoming one of the few 
potential arenas for political contestation. ' 87 The cabinet was slimmed down with the 
number of ministers reduced from 21 to 14 as well as sub cabinet committees and 
commissions culled so that by the end of May 1997 a third of the national 
86 Feruza Zhani, Kazakhstan Kontr-evoli"tsiia parlamenta, ili Kratkaia istoriia izgnaniia oppozitsii, 
Fergana. ru, 19 August 2007, httn: //www. ferihana. ru/article. phl2? id=5295. 
87 Martha Brill Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise p. 114 
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government had been eliminated. 88 The streamlining of government and bureaucratic 
administration escalated instability among governmental elites. Officials and 
functionaries were shifted from post to post and made aware they `had been selected 
by the president personally and served his political interests'. 89 Emanating from this 
was the formation of a `protectorship-client system gravitating to oligarchic forms 
with a supreme patron on top of the power pyramid, namely the president of 
country'. 90 Based on the principle that the president assigns all public positions, 
including regional Akimats (local administration), law enforcement bodies, courts, 
the cabinet and some members of the Senate, the system is based on a series of 
dyadic and interconnected patron-client relationships. The relationships are used for 
the `bilateral exchange of resources, information, mutual help, services and other 
responsibilities'. 9' An example of how this worked was the appointment of Amalbek 
Tshanov as Akim (governor) of Dzhambul Oblast. Akim between 1995 and 1998, 
Tshanov removed 140 ranking officers across the region and replaced them with his 
own reliable and loyal clients. 92 Therefore, the formal consolidation of power in the 
1995 constitution, which concentrated powers in the presidency, was buttressed by 
the power of informal patronage networks, where access to positions and resources 
was based on loyalty to the president. 
The evolving nature of patron-client ties witnessed a staffing policy that gave 
increasing influence to members of the president's family and close associates. 
Saginbek Tursunov, the president's brother-in-law was appointed head of the 
presidential administration in October 1995. His son-in-law Rakhat Aliev was 
appointed head of the tax police. His other son-in-law Timur Kulibaev was 
appointed vice-president of KazakhOil, the predominant oil company in 
Kazakhstan. 93 Other close associates, related by tribe and clan, also found high 
S8 Ibid, pp. 114-115. 
89 Nurbulat Masanov, Political Elite in Kazakhstan: The Changes of Kazakhstani Political Elite 
During the Period of Sovereignty, International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political 
Research, (Almaty, 2000) htti: //iicas. or en l@ ish/publ 22 11 00. htm. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See V. N. Khlupin, Bol'shaia Sem'ia Nursultana Nazarbaeva. 
93 V. N. Khlupin, Kazakhstanskaia politicheskaia elita mezhdu modernizatsiei i traibalizom, Report to 
the Second All-Russian Congress of Political Scientists, Moscow MGIMO, 22 April 2000, 
http: //www. iicas. or-z/articles/pub 27 05 00. htm. 
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positions, for example, Akhmetzhan Esimov94 was appointed State Secretary and 
Nurtay Abykaev became a senior presidential advisor. 95 These elite figures provided 
a sound basis of personal loyalty to Nazarbaev contained within extensive patron- 
client networks. These networks are evidently based on kinship (especially in the 
case of Tursunov, Aliev and Kulibaev), although clan based associates such as 
Abykaev and Esimov are much less so and their promotion was likely sought in 
exchange for loyalty. Therefore, while we can make the distinction between kinship 
based networks and general clientelistic networks (e. g. the power to appoint all 
Akims), as Nazarbaev's regime has evolved kinship based networks have become 
less powerful. As will be discussed later in this chapter, Nazarbaev has been willing 
to move against kinship related elites if he feels they threaten his power and fail to 
demonstrate sufficient loyalty. Therefore, kinship is not the main driver determining 
the influence and power of patron-client networks. For example, Aleksandr 
Mashkevich (see below) has no kinship ties to the president, yet has managed to 
secure extensive access to Kazakhstan's natural resources in exchange for political 
loyalty. 
3.3 Privatisation and the Emergence of New Business Elite Groups 
The extension of the privatisation program had a decisive effect on the progression 
of neopatrimonialism in Kazakhstan. The selling off of former state assets led to 
factional elite competition for access to these resources, and Nazarbaev enhanced his 
authority by arbitrating these conflicts. He secured loyalty from these powerful 
groups as they presumed their closer proximity to the president ensured greater 
access to resources and increased political and economic influence. 
Privatisation 
The major stage of privatisation began in 1993 with the launch of a coupon 
privatisation program based on the Czech and Russian voucher models. Specially set 
up Investment Privatisation Funds (IPFs) bought shares in medium and large sized 
state enterprises so Kazakh citizens could then purchase shares in IPFs. 96 With 170 
94 Esimov went on to fill many important positions in government and the executive including Deputy 
Prime Minister, Minister of Agriculture and his current post as Akim of Almaty. 
95 Nurlan Amrekulov, Zhuzy v sotsialno-politicheskoi zhizni Kazakhstana, Tsentral'naia Aziia i 
Kavkaz, Vol. 3, No. 9,2000. 
96 Richard Pomfret, Kazakhstan's Economy Since Independence. 
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1PFs registered by April 1994, it was expected citizens would have a wide choice. 97 
However, the lack of transparency in the process saw more than three fourths of the 
vouchers end up in the hands of just one fourth of the funds. For example, Butya- 
Kapital set up by Bulat Abilov, monopolised nearly 10 percent of the total vouchers 
released in the scheme. The scheme established a new economic elite dominated by 
figures such as Abilov and Mukhtar Abliazov, the head of Astana Holding IPF. 98 
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, the Prime Minister who oversaw the implementation of the 
privatisation process, was also alleged to have benefited from the sell off of state 
resources due to some of his former colleagues winning ownership of large metal 
deposits. 99 
Some of the new business elites were drafted into government. Galymzhan 
Zhakiianov, a director of two private enterprises in the city of Semipalatinsk and a 
protege of Kazhegeldin, was appointed Akim of Semipalatinsk and then Pavlodar 
ob! asts. 100 Abilov drew closer to the president becoming firstly a patron of the 
Children's Fund charity run by the president's wife Sara Alpysovna and then a 
presidential advisor. 101 Abilov was also elected a deputy in the Mazhilis as a member 
of the pro-presidential Otan (Fatherland) in the 1999 parliamentary elections. 
Abliazov was appointed Minister of Energy. Their introduction into government 
circles was a mechanism for the president to exhibit openness to new liberal elites. 
Conveniently it also proved a useful means to keep their ambitions in check. 
However, their emergence in the corridors of power resulted in increasing levels of 
factional elite conflict with older associates of the president from the communist 
period and family members. This was compounded by the final stage of privatisation 
where the sale of the largest formerly state owned factories and industries led to 
intense competition between elite groups in which a non-transparent process saw the 
most profitable industries fall into the hands of those closest to the president. 102 
Through both patronage and privatisation a number of informal factional elite groups 
97 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise. 
98 Ibid. 
99 D. R. Ashimbaev, N. Sulemenov and V. Andreev, Pravitelstvo Kazhegeldina: privatizatsiia, 
korruptsiia i borba za vlast (Almaty, Credo, 2003). 
10° Jonathan Murphy, `Illusory Transition? Elite Reconstitution in Kazakhstan, 1989-2002, Europe- 
Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4, June 2006. 
101 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise. 
102 Ibid. 
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emerged in Kazakhstan. These groups became influential in shaping the economy 
and forming policy. These groups form a central part of the neopatrimonial regime. 
Figure 3.1 provides a power map of the groups considered instrumental in political 
life during the post-Soviet period. 103 There are other factional elite groups but these 
examples reflect those operating at the highest level. 104 
103 As will be discussed later in this chapter, reconfigurations have occurred regarding the influence 
and power of these top groups. 
104 Second tier groups include the groups of Nurlan Balgimbaev, Imangali Tasmagambetov, Bulat 
Utemuratov, Marat Tazhin, Nurtai Abykaev and the president's nephew Kairat Satbaldy. For more 
details see Dosym Satpaev, An Analysis of the Internal Structure of Kazakhstan's Political Elite and 
an Assessment of Political Risk Levels, in Uyama Tomohiko (ed. ) Empire, Islam and Politics in 
Central Eurasia, (Sapporo, Slavic Research Center Hokkaido University, 2007) pp. 283-300 and 
Andrei Grosin, Kto est kto v sovremenom Kazakhstane. 
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Nazarbaev, therefore, had moved to consolidate his power and insure himself against 
institutional competition by instituting his power on both a formal and informal basis. 
Formally this was achieved by strengthening presidential power in the constitution, 
creating pro-presidential political parties and other institutions (ANK). Informally, 
Nazarbaev's power rested on informal patron-client networks and the loyalty 
generated from factional elite conflict arsing for privatisation and competition for 
resources. However, by relying on informal political relations to stabilise his political 
position he also unleashed some destabilising forces. As will be highlighted below, 
the case of Kazakhstan illustrates how informal political relations can produce 
instability. The emergence of competing factional elite groups created instability 
among the ruling elite. Until 1998 conflict between the groups remained behind 
closed doors. After 1998, this form of closed politics burst into the public realm and 
despite the president's concerted effort to secure his authority, through both formal 
and informal means, political uncertainty and instability arose once again. 
4.1998-2004 Elite Fragmentation 
In an effort to see off the challenge from other institutional centres of power, the 
president relied on informal political relations and behaviour to underpin his formal 
constitutional domination. However, in doing so he unleashed a further degree of 
instability. A consequence of privatisation was the growth of influential elite groups 
competing against one another over access to former state enterprises. Such conflict 
undermined the stability the president was arguably attempting to install. Some 
groups became disaffected with the extent of the president's power and the privilege 
and influence afforded to those elite groups connected with his family. This led to the 
phenomena of elite fragmentation; the process whereby the closed politics of factional 
elite competition became public and whereby leading members of the government and 
business openly challenged the president. It was also to have important consequences 
for the overall development of parties. Elite fragmentation occurred in three waves; 
the first in 1998 with former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, the second in 
2001 with the emergence of Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK) and finally in 
2004 with Zamanbek Nurkadilov and Zharmakhan Tuiakbai. 
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4.1 First Wave 1998: Akezhan Kazhegeldin 
Nazarbaev removed Kazhegeldin as prime minister in October 1997. Kazhegeldin had 
connections with powerful economic interests in defence related industries, and as a 
former employee of the KGB 106 was emerging as a potential rival to the president. 107 
Moreover, he was popular with Western business having been awarded `Reformer of 
the Year' in 1996 by the Adam Smith Institute for his government's privatisation 
program. These cumulative factors were enough for Nazarbaev to be nervous of 
Kazhegeldin's political ambitions. Once released from the duties of office 
Kazhegeldin made sharp public statements regarding the political leadership and 
direction of the country. While not formally criticising Nazarbaev, the text of 
Kazhegeldin's book published in the summer of 1998 critiqued the economic and 
political stagnation in the country and it was clear at whom this critique was directed: 
"The Constitution does not provide the balance it should between the 
authorities of different branches of power. Although it proclaims the fundamental 
democratic principles, it does not facilitate their fulfilment. The division of power, 
human rights, and the superiority of rights over bureaucratic discretion remain only 
declarations. Those in power do not foster constructive criticism or opposition. The 
mass media is pressured without just cause, as those in power either try to suppress or 
co-opt them. "' 0' 
On 8 October 1998 Kazhegeldin stated his intention to stand in the pre-term 
presidential election of January 1999.109 The president moved quickly to ensure 
Kazhegeldin was unable to participate in the election by utilising state and 
governmental bodies to marginalise his competitor. The Central Election Commission 
(CEC), appointed by the president, was loyal to Nazarbaev. It denied Kazhegeldin 
registration as a candidate due to his conviction in October 1998 by Almaty 
106 Kazhegeldin had served as an officer on Semipalatinsk Regional Department of KGB. He also 
trained with the KGB in Moscow. 
'o' Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise pp. 115-116. 
108 Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Kazakhstan: The Right to Choose, Chapter One, (Sourced online at 
hgp: //kazhegeldin. addr. com/en2lish/Book- original publishers unknown). 
1090n the 7 Oct 1998 the parliament moved to pass legislation which altered aspects of the constitution. 
This included bringing forward the date of the election by one year but at the same time extending the 
president's term in office by two years from five to seven years. There were also changes to 
parliamentary elections and composition. Ten seats were added to raise the number of deputies to 77. 
These seats were to be awarded on the basis of proportional representation through a party list system. 
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Medeusky District Court for participating in an unsanctioned meeting of the 
Movement for Fair Elections. This was followed by a campaign to completely 
discredit Kazhegeldin with accusations of money laundering. It is claimed that in 
1998 a special team was established on the orders of the head of the KNB Alnur 
Musaev, a close associate of Rakhat Aliev, to liquidate the activities of Kazhegeldin 
and investigate his economic interests. 110 
Having moved into opposition, Kazhegeldin created a political platform to build on 
his public appeal and drive forward his political ambitions. Kazhegeldin's party, the 
Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK) was established on 17 December 
1998.111 Kazhegeldin was elected chairman and the congress adopted a party program 
committed to `a socially-oriented market economy, on the power of the people, and on 
unconditional respect for civil liberties and human rights'. 112 The party was registered 
with the Ministry of Justice on the 1 March and managed to win one seat in the 
October 1999 parliamentary election. " 3 Due to the pressure of the investigation into 
his financial dealings in which charges of tax invasion and the illegal purchase of 
property in Belgium were brought against him, Kazhegeldin left Kazakhstan in April 
and moved into exile firstly in Moscow and then Europe. In September 2001 he was 
convicted in absentia and sentenced to ten years. The RNPK have always maintained 
the charges were politically motivated. 114 
Kazhegeldin's move into opposition is important for three reasons. First, it was the 
first time the politics of the elite had become public revealing the lack of elite 
consolidation. Second, the case of Kazhegeldin makes it possible to see the 
relationship between the politics of the informal and formal. Formal state bodies such 
as the KNB were used at the service of the president to ensure a potential rival was 
politically marginalised. The courts and the CEC, comprising of members appointed 
by Nazarbaev, were also utilised to ensure Kazhegeldin was unable to register as a 
1°Taszhargan, June 28 2007. 
"' D'iachenko et. al, Politicheskie partii Kazakhstana. 
"Z Ibid. p. 101. 
113 Party registration at this time was fairly straightforward. The 1996 Law on Political Parties required 
that parties have 3000 registered members. In response to RNPK and other opposition parties the laws 
were tightened considerably in 2002. See Chapter Four. 
114 Press Service of RNPK, Zaochnyi sud nad Kazhegeldinym kak rezul'tat politiki bezzakoniia i 
proizvola, 7 September 2001, http: //kazhegeldin. addr. com/articles/About 07 09 01 3. htm [accessed 
26.06.2008]. 
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candidate whilst facing criminal charges. Finally, his move into opposition had an 
impact on the development of political parties. It was the first time a political party 
not sponsored by the authorities had secure financial backing. It demonstrated how 
parties could be used to promote the political careers and protect the economic 
interests of elite figures. Furthermore, the rise of an opposition party backed and 
funded by former ruling elites led to a rethinking by the authorities of how to deal and 
manage political parties. This included creating a new large pro-presidential party, 
Otan (Fatherland) and establishing tougher more restrictive party laws in 2002.115 
4.2 Second Wave 2001: Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan 
The second wave of elite fragmentation was far larger featuring the move into 
opposition of many of the young liberal elite personally appointed by the president. 
The second wave hinged on conflict between factional elite groups, in particular 
between Rakhat Aliev and Mukhtar Abliazov. Once again the fragmentation process 
resulted in the establishment of several new opposition parties. 
The fragmentation has its roots in competition over sugar. Both Aliev and Abliazov 
had interests in Kazakhstan's sugar market and using his contacts within the tax police 
Aliev ensured Abliazov's Astana-Sugar Company was subject to intense auditing, 
resulting in penalty fines and an increased tax burden on the company. Through this 
method Aliev conquered the market marginalizing Abliazov's interests. "6 The 
conflict between the groups intensified as Aliev used his position as deputy head of 
the KNB to take control of many of Abliazov's business including Turan Alem Bank 
and some media assets. 117 It was clear `Aliev was gaining too much power and 
accruing too many business interests'. ' 18 Other leading figures came into conflict with 
Aliev. Galymzhan Zhakiianov, for example, believed Aliev was running a campaign 
to discredit him through the TV station KTK. 119 At the beginning of November 2001 
"s The creation of Otan will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter and the role of restrictive 
party laws is analysed in the following chapter. 
116 Victor Shelgunov, `Let's See Who's Come', Analytic Report, International Eurasian Institute for 
Economic and Political Research, 7 January 2000 [accessed 26.06.2008]. 
117 Barbara Junisbai, and Azamat Junisbai, The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in 
Economic Liberalization, Intra-elite Cleavage, and Political Opposition, Demokratizatsiia, Vol. 13, No. 
3,2005. 
18 Author's interview with anonymous senior figure in Ak Zhol, 18 January 2007, Almaty. 
119Zhakiianov-Aliev Khronika informatsionnoi voiny, Internews. kz, 13 November 2001, 
http: //www. kub. kz/article. php? sid=304 [accessed 30.05.07]. 
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led by Abliazov a group of Kazakhstan's leading businessmen published a letter 
addressed to Nazarbaev in which they appealed to him to protect them against the 
arbitrary actions of state enforcement bodies. 120 
Nazarbaev at first seemed to heed the call of these notable figures by forcing Aliev to 
resign his position as Deputy Chairman of the KNB while some media outlets 
associated with Aliev were blocked, 121 However, two days later on 17 November 
Nazarbaev appeared on state television with Aliev at his side having appointed him 
Deputy Chief of Presidential Security. The president exonerated Aliev from any 
wrongdoing 122 arguing his relatives had `the same right, as any citizen, to be involved 
in business or public service... therefore any insinuations around this question are 
groundless'. 123 The same day an auction was held to sell the state's share of the Halyk 
Savings Bank. Both Kazkommertsbank (owned by Nurzhan Subkhanberdin) and 
Astana Holdings (owned by Abliazov) had made public their interest in buying the 
bank only for the shares to go at the last minute to Mangistaumunaigaz financial 
group, reportedly a business with connections to Aliev. 124 The following day, on 18 
November, those who had signed the original letter appealing for Nazarbaev's help in 
the informal conflict, alongside many prominent ministers and ex-members of the 
government, Aims and businessman, announced the creation of the public association 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK) (see figure 3.5 for table of signatures). 
Table 3.5 Signatures of the Creation of DVK, 18 November 2001 
Name Position 
G. Zhakiianov Akim of Pavlodar Oblast 
U. Zhandosov Deputy Prime Minister 
N. Chairman of Kazkommertsbank 
120Zhanar Serdalina, Biznes-elita pozhalovalas' prezidentu, Komsomol'skaia Pravda, 1 November 
2001, http: //www. kub. info/article. php? sid=211. 
12` This included the TV channel KTK and the newspaper Karavan. 
122 This was surprising to many as there were rumours Aliev had been responsible for setting up a 
website which spread malicious details regarding Nazarbaev and his financial dealings, including 
notable cases of corruption with South Korean businessmen. It has to be noted this allegation has never 
been proved. Many political analysts and observers believed that Aliev was planning to conduct a coup 
against the president. The president's decision to appoint Aliev deputy head of the presidential guard 
may have been an opportunity to keep him close by. Later the president made the decision to send 
Aliev into exile by appointing him Ambassador to Austria with special dispensation to work with the 
OSCE. 
123 V dva golosa: papa ziat', Khabar, 17 November 2001, http: //www. kub. kz/article. 12hD? sid=346 
accessed 30.05.07]. 
24 Junisbai and Junisbai, The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, p. 381. 
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Subkhanberdin 
M. Abliazov Ex-Energy Minister and Head of Astana-Holdings 
A. Ashimov Director and Actor 
T. Tokhtasynov Mazhilis Deputy 
B. Abilov Mazhilis Deputy and member of the Political Council of Otan 
S. Konakbaev Mazhilis Deputy 
Z. Ertlesova Deputy Defence Minister 
A. Baimenov Minister of Labour and Social Protection 
B. Imashev Chairman of the Anti-Monopoly Agency 
K. Kelimbetov Deputy Finance Minister 
T. Alzhanov Chairman of the Investment FM 
S. Esimkhanov Senate Deputy 
G. Amrin Deputy Secretary of the Security Council 
Z. Battalova Senate Deputy 
A. Mashani Senate Deputy 
N. Smagulov President of Kazprodkorporatsii 
I. Meltser Editor in chief of uremia 
E. Tatishev Chairman of Turan-Alem 
Those who signed the statement believed democratic development in Kazakhstan was 
in peril and `recent events demonstrated the dangers of concentrating in the same 
hands the control of the security forces and the information resources of the 
country, 125 
As a unified movement DVK did not last long. The retribution against the senior 
public figures participating was tough. Immediately the prime minister, 
Kassymzhomart Tokaev, appealed to the president to sack those in government posts 
involved in the movement. 126 The president obliged and many lost their positions and 
portions of their business interests. 127 Zhakiianov and Abliazov had what many 
considered politically motivated trials brought against them on charges of 
corruption. 128 Such pressures and suppressions forced some members, primarily 
Zhandosov, Albiov and Baimenov, to reconsider their position in being part of DVK 
and in doing so they created Ak Zhol, a political party anchored on being more 
125Zaiavlenie o sozdanii obshchestvennogo ob'edineniia `Demokraticheskii Vybor Kazakhstana, 
Vremia, 22 November 2001. 
126 `Prem'er-ministr impoviziruet', Kazakhstan Today, 21' November, 2001, accessed from 
htto: //www. kub. kz/article. php? sid=397 [retrieved 30.05.07]. 
127 Andrei Chebotarev 'Politicheskii krizis oseni 2001 goda i ego pocledstviia: 5 let spustia' 7`s 
November, 2006, http: //www. kub. kz/article. php? sid=15070. 
128 Human Rights Watch Report, Political Freedoms in Kazakhstan, April 2004, Vol. 16 No. 4 
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acquiescent and constructive with power. 129 Ak Zhol also split in 2005 over similar 
issues. 130 
After Ak Zhol was formed the remaining members of DVK created the party 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. Zhakiianov was the figurehead of the party even 
though he remained in prison. DVK contested the 2004 parliamentary election in a 
bloc with the KPK. The bloc polled poorly in what was considered a non-transparent 
and unfair election131 and soon after DVK was banned by the Ministry of Justice for 
minor infringements of the Law on Political Parties. '32 The party Alga DVK was 
established from DVK with Assylbek Kozhakhmetov as Chairman. Zhakiianov has 
since stated he has nothing to do with Alga and that `Alga is not DVK', 133 however, it 
is alleged Abliazov sponsors Alga. 134 
The 2001 wave of elite fragmentation illustrates the extent of informal politics under 
Nazarbaev's leadership and the influence this had on political institutions. The 
patronage cultivated by the president to secure his position vis-a-vis the uncertainty of 
transition led to conflict between informal factional elite groups as they fought over 
the spoils of privatisation. While family connections were important, kinship 
identities were not the predominant factor in who got what. Mashkevich's group 
which is not related to the president also found favour and patronage with the 
president ensuring their monopolisation of the aluminium market. The result of 
extensive patronage was a series of informal elite conflicts which came to a head in 
129 Kazakhstan: Power shows muscles, opposition strengthens, Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 22"d February 
2002, lttp: //www. Zhakiianov. info/en&article. t)hn? id=60 [accessed, 31.07.07]. 
130 After the elections of 2004, Baimenov wished to pursue a closer dialogue with the authorities while 
the other leading figures in Ak Zhol did not. This led to Abilov and Zhandosov, with Tulegen Zhukeev 
and Altynbek Sarsenbaev to create Nagiz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path). The issue of the extent to which 
the opposition should cooperate with the regime has divided them ever since and was a major factor 
responsible for the split. See Rozlana Taukina `Raskol v partii Ak Zhol: Konflikt liderov ili idei? ' Club 
Polyton, 29th April, 2005, 
http: //www. club. kz/index. php? lang=en&mod=analitics&submod=self&article=310 [retrieved 
14.10.06]. 
131 OSCE/ODIIIR Election Observation Mission Report, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary 
Elections 19`h September and 3'' October, Warsaw, 15`h December 2004. 
132 Zaiavlenie o likvidatsii iuridicheskogo litsa, 13th December, 2004, 
htip: //www. procuror. kz/? iid=5&type=news&lanz=ru&nid=61 [retrieved: 03.05.07]. 
133 Authors interview with Galymzhan Zhakiianov, 18 January 2007, Almaty. 
'34 After being released from prison it was a condition of his release that he remained out of politics. 
Since then Abliazov has officially stuck to business and was able to reclaim some of his interests in 
Temir Bank. However, it is widely considered among local analysts and many people I interviewed that 
Alga receives some kind of financial funding from Abliazov even though it is difficult to qualify. 
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2001. Those elite groups involved went on to form a number of political parties which 
were either an attempt to extend their political and economic interests, as in the case 
of DVK or as with Ak Zhol, a platform to protect their interests, secure them from 
criminal charges and an attempt to retain their political positions. Simultaneously we 
can observe how informal politics is contextualised by formal institution. In this 
instance political parties were used to formally protect and consolidate political and 
economic interests. 
4.3 Third Wave 2004: Zamanbek Nurkadilov and Zharmakhan Tuiakbai 
The most recent wave of elite fragmentation occurred in 2004 when two big public 
figures, and previously staunch allies of Nazarbaev, openly criticised the regime. 
Firstly, Zamanbek Nurkadilov, a popular figure in the Southern regions of the 
country, former Akim of Almaty and Emergencies Minister, openly criticised the 
president accusing him and his family of corrupt practices. 135 Nurkadilov joined 
forces with the opposition party Ak Zhol but in November 2005 he was found dead 
with two gunshot wounds to the chest. The authorities declared it was a case of 
suicide but many in the opposition argue it was politically motivated, claiming 
Nurkadilov was about to produce documentary evidence proving corruption at the 
highest levels of the government, including Nazarbaev. 1 36 
Another occurred after the parliamentary elections of 2004. Zharmakhan Tuiakbai, 
deputy leader of Otan, and speaker of the Mazhilis publicly criticised the conduct of 
the elections in which his party won. 137 Tuiakbai believed the elections `were 
accompanied by mass infringements of the rights of voters'. 138 He entered the 
opposition and was their unified candidate for the presidential elections in 2005 under 
the loose public association For a Just Kazakhstan (ZSK). In September 2006, 
Tuiakbai, with encouragement from other opposition parties, set up his own party, the 
133Politicehskaia `bomba Zamanbeka Nurkadilov, Respublika, 12 March 2004. 
136 Kazakh Opposition Wants Probe of Politician's Death, RFE/RL, 14 November 2005. 
137 According to local analysts the cynical interpretation of why Tuiakbai left the president's inner 
circle was that his term as speaker of the Mazhilis was ending and he had not been offered a new post 
that was satisfactory to his perceived standing. 
138 Vremia, 14 `h October, 2004, http: //www. kub. kz/article. php? sid=7105 [retrieved 28.10.06]. 
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All-National Social Democratic Party (OSDP). 139 OSDP's platform was based on 
social reform and social democracy. 140 
Nurkadilov and Tuiakbai's exit from the president's direct patronage was not as 
significant as the wave of 2001, but it was equally damaging for Nazarbaev. It 
illustrated again how instrumental informal elite conflict is for party genesis. The 
consequence of elite fragmentation is that the reliance on informal political 
relationships and behaviour, intended to consolidate power, only led to a greater 
degree of uncertainty. It demonstrates how neopatrimonialism (where the informal is 
fused with the formal) can be inherently unstable. In response to elite fragmentation a 
counter process was instigated which sought to reinstate and consolidate the personal 
rulership of the president once again. This process continued to rely on a fusion of 
personal informal norms of political relations and behaviour and formal political 
institutionalisation. 
5.1999-2007 Pro-presidential Consolidation 
The president's re-assertion and further consolidation of power in response to the 
uncertainty generated by elite fragmentation took four forms: party consolidation, the 
centralisation of media and economic assets, the arbitrary crackdown on informal elite 
groups who presented themselves as potential challengers, including family members, 
and the formalisation of his personal rulership through constitutional changes. 
5.1 Party Consolidation 
The coalescing of pro-Nazarbaev forces began soon after the 1999 presidential 
election and was a reaction to the emergence of Kazhegeldin as a political rival. The 
Republican Staff in Support of the President decided the organisation they created to 
support the President's bid for re-election should transform into Otan. Volunteers 
decided `they were unwilling to break the union up, and the leadership decided they 
wanted a larger united party. ' 141 On the 19 January 1999, a constituent congress was 
139 Respublika, 15th September, 2006, http: //www. kub. kz/article. php? sid=14413 [retrieved 04.01.07]. 
140 Tezisy vystupleniia Zharmakhana Tuiakbaia na uchreditel'nom s'ezde obshchenatsional'noi sotsial- 
demokraticheskoi partii, www. zonakz. net, 13`h September, 2006, http: //www. zonakz. net/articies/15511 
[retrieved 02.02.07]. 
141 Author's interview with K. M. Kazkenov. 
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held and the Ministry of Justice registered the party less than one month later on the 
12 February. 142 Otan was a conglomeration of many pro-presidential parties and 
movements including PNEK, DPK, Liberal Movement for Kazakhstan (LDK) and For 
Kazakhstan 2030. The former Prime Minister, Sergei Tereshchenko, was selected as 
party chairman. The party was created purely as a basis to support the president. 143 
The party competed in the 1999 parliamentary election becoming the dominant party 
in the Mazhilis allowing them to establish their own party faction (see table 3.6). 144 
Two new pro-presidential parties also proved successful; the GPK, backed by 
Mashkevich, and the Agrarian Party (APK). Combined with Otan, these political 
parties ensured Nazarbaev had a forcible presence in the legislature. 145 In Otan the 
president had the vehicle he desired since independence, a party that was his personal 
political vehicle to ensure the legislature would be a compliant body. However, 
complete institutional dominance was not assured as other pro-presidential parties 
continued to vie for influence and power including, GPK, APK and Asar (established 
by Dariga Nazarbaeva and Rakhat Aliev). 
Table 3.6 Distribution of Seats won in the 1999 Parliamentary Elections 
Party or Affiliation Seats 
Otan 24 
Civil Party of Kazakhstan 11 
Communist Party 3 
Agrarian Party 3 
_ Peoples Co-operative Party of 
Kazakhstan 
1 
Republican People's Party IINPK 1 
_ Business 10 
Independents (Government Associated 20 
_ Independents (other) 4 
Total 77 
(Adapted from Olcott, Kazakhstan Unfulfilled Promise). 
142 S. D'iachenko, L. Karmazina and S. Seidumanov `Politicheskie Partii Kazakhstana, p. 79. 
143 This was to have an enormous impact on the development of Otan as a political party. For example, 
the party has yet to establish a distinct identity or branding separate from the president. 
144 In post-Soviet terms a faction is a parliamentary grouping. 
145 The 1999 parliamentary election also saw the last electoral appearance of many of the older parties 
which emerged in the early years of independence. Azmnat, Alash and the NKK were de-registered as 
political parties after tighter controls of party organisation and registration were brought in 2002. See 
Chapter Four. 
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The emergence of Asar in 2003, on top of the critical wave of elite fragmentation in 
2001, added to the sense of political uncertainty among the highest echelons of 
political elites in Kazakhstan. This was especially the case, as Asar was viewed as 
Nazarbaeva's vehicle to succeed her father. 146 With this in mind the president sought 
to unify all pro-presidential forces and weaken the power of independent political 
players, even if they were kinship related. The major process of pro-presidential 
consolidation began in the autumn of 2005 with the gradual assimilation of pro- 
presidential political parties into a national coalition to back the candidacy of 
Nazarbaev for the 2005 presidential elections. 147 The formal merger occurred at 
Otan 's congress in July 2006 when a decision was taken to join with Asar. 148 The 
unification of Otan and Asar was followed by the assimilation of GPK and APK later 
the same year. 149 On the 22 December 2006 a special congress of Otan took place 
which recognised the unification process by re-naming Otan as Nur Otan (Light of 
Fatherland). The merger of these parties was widely considered to be the curtailing of 
alternative sources of power. In particular with Asar, it was a sign `the president had 
grown tired of his daughter's experiment in politics'. '50 
Despite pro-presidential parties winning all but one seat in the 2004 parliamentary 
elections (see table 3.7) the president clearly was not comfortable cohabiting the 
political space with political players who possessed their own independent power 
bases. The emergence of parties associated with former ruling elites reinstated an 
atmosphere of uncertainty driving the president to seek greater consolidation with the 
creation of a loyal party in which he could institutionalise the informal patronage on 
which his power was based. In August 2007 Nazarbaev finally achieved the complete 
compliant and wholly pro-presidential legislature he had sought since independence. 
146 Respublika Assandi Times, 13`h February 2004. 
147 This saw Asar, GPK, APK and the Democratic Party Adilet (Justice) establishing the People's 
Union of Kazakhstan. The Union provided a consolidated and formidable base from which the 
president comfortably won the presidential election. The logic of the Union according to one senior 
figure in Otan was that the pro-presidential forces had received a clear signal from the uniting of the 
opposition forces behind Tuiakbai, `that if they kept on fighting among themselves, when the 
opposition was united, then the opposition forces might win. Thus, the pro-presidential parties decided 
they should have some kind of treaty among themselves, and decided some kind of union was 
necessary'. Author's interview with Sharipbek Amirbekov, Deputy Head of the Central Apparatus of 
Nur Otan, 10`h February 2007, Almaty. 
148 Otan i Asar stall edinym tselym, www. Khabar. kz. 4 July 2006, www. khabar. kz/index. cfm? id=18620. 
149 Panorama, 3`d November 2006, p. I and Kolkhoznyi odobyams Agranaia partiia na vnechrednom 
s'ezde progolosovala za sliyanie s partei Otan', Kazakhstan Today, 23nd November 2006, Almaty. 
150 Gaziza Baituova 'Vremia 'Asara' Vyshlo' 
hn: HiyMr. net/? al2c state=hrufrca322172&1=en&s=f&o=322416 [retrieved 2 nd May 2007]. 
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Nur Otan, in a highly questionable election, won all the seats under a new fully 
proportional electoral format. 151 
Table 3.7 Distribution of Seats Awarded for 2004 Parliamentary Election 
Political Party or Affiliation Number of Seats 
Otan 42 
AIST Bloc (GPK and APK) 11 
Asar 4 
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (Adilet) 1 
Ak Zhol 1 
Independents 18 
Total 77 
(Source, Kazakhstan Central Election Commission, 
htta: //election. kz/portal/page? pa2eid=73,1 & dad=nortal& schema=PORTAL). 
5.2 Economic and Media centralisation 
Alongside the consolidation of political forces in Nur Otan, the president also began 
to centralise the economic resources of the state as a means to avoid the instability 
generated by elite conflict over access to economic resources. The JSC Kazakhstan 
Holding for State Assets `Samruk' was established by presidential decree in 2006. 
Claiming to be based on the Singaporean `Temasec' model established in the 1970s, 
Samruk was utilised in consolidating the economic assets and shares the state 
possessed in a single holding company. Companies included high profile names such 
as KazMunaiGaz, the Kazakh Railways and Kazakhtelecom. Some argued it was a 
return to the ineffective policies of the Soviet era, while other analysts suggested 
Samruk represented a Krysha (roof) 152 for lobbying interests. 153 Centralisation was 
also pursued in the mass media. The media, despite 80 percent officially residing in 
private hands, has generally held a pro-Nazarbaev and government bias. This has been 
maintained by a restrictive law of mass media that `seriously stifles free expression', 
151 See Rico Isaacs, Parliamentary Election in Kazakhstan August 2007, Electoral Studies, Vol. 27, No. 
2,2008, pp. 381-385. 
152 The term Krysha is used to denote the idea of a roof as a form of protection. In many post-Soviet 
states business elites and criminal groups sometimes require a Krysha to protect their activities and 
interests. This can take the form of political institutions or formal legal businesses which can provide 
cover for illegal activities. 
153 V Kazakhstane sozdan gosudarstvennye kholding `Samruk', www. zonakz. net, 3 February 2006 and 
Kogo stanet zashchishchat' svoimi kryl'iami ptitsa `Samruk'? www. zonakz. net, 10 February 2006. 
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resulting in a media lacking independence from the state. 154 Any media outlets 
perceived to be disloyal are marginalised or brought to public trial and face 
sanctions. 155 Despite this scenario, many of the larger media organisations were taken 
back under state control. For example, the large media portfolio previously managed 
by Dariga Nazarbaeva and Rakhat Aliev came back under state jurisdiction. 156 As 
with the consolidation of pro-presidential parties, the president demonstrated a 
keenness to pre-empt any form of challenge to his authority from the informal elite 
groups who exist under his patronage, even if that meant reducing the influence and 
assets of members of his own family. 
5.3 The Aliev Affair and Controlling Elite Ambition 
Securing his authority from the political risk associated with the high degree of 
informal elite level conflict which had persisted under his rule, the president moved to 
limit the opportunities for those groups to usurp him. Principally this involved 
arbitrarily removing Rakhat Aliev from positions of influence. In response to the 
alleged involvement of Aliev in the kidnapping of two leading directors of the board 
of Nurbank, one of Kazakhstan's largest banks, in which he attempted to violently 
coerce them into handing the bank over to him, the president personally ordered the 
Prosecutor General and the Minster of Internal Affairs to conduct `a detailed 
investigation of these criminal charges without regards for positions of privilege'. '57 
Aliev went into hiding in Vienna as the government failed in extraditing him back to 
Kazakhstan for trial, while Dariga was left in no other position but to divorce Aliev. 
Nazarbaev's decision to cast Aliev out from his political circle surprised observers, as 
the prevailing assumption was that politics in Kazakhstan was about `the family. ' iss 
Instead the president was now insuring his rule at the expense of the political ambition 
and clout of his own family. 159 The events suggest the president had tired of Aliev's 
154 For example there is the recent case of Internet journalist Kaziz Toguzbayev who faced charges for 
insulting the honour and dignity of the president in two articles he wrote concerning the murder of 
opposition leader Altynbek Sarsenbayev. Toguzbayev received a two-year suspended sentence. 
15 Article 19, Memorandum on Kazakhstan's Law on Mass Media, (London, 2006). 
156 This included the television stations Khabar, Eurasia TV, and KTK and the newspapers Karavan, 
Novoe Pokelennie and Gazeta KZ. 
157 MVD RK: K ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti privlekaetsia Rakhat Aliev, www. zonakz. net. 23 May 2007. 
158 Author's interview with a representative from a leading international NGO, 31 October 2006, 
Almaty. 
159 Rossiiskiye Vesti, No 29,6`s September 2007. 
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behaviour and could no longer tolerate the potential threat Aliev represented. 160 Aliev 
has argued this was the reason why his father-in-law moved against him, as he had 
told Nazarbaev he would run for president in 2012.161 It illustrates how state bodies 
were used for personal political tactics of the political ruler in a fashion similar to 
Weber's idea of the personalisation of public office in patrimonial regimes. In this 
case the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the judiciary were used to perform the 
personal wishes of the president in rooting out another potential competitor. 
Aliev was not alone in being targeted. Timur Kulibaev, the president second son-in- 
law, was removed from his position as deputy chairman of Samruk to ensure his 
ambition did not grow in the wake of Aliev's marginalisation. Mashkevich too had his 
political influence curtailed with the dissolution of the GPK. While in the wake of the 
Aliev affair the president presided over extensive elite reshuffling. This included the 
moving of Aliev's rival the former Prime Minister Imangali Tasmagambetov, who 
was transferred from his power base as Akim of Almaty, where he had cultivated 
much popularity, to Akim of Astana where the president could keep a closer check on 
his political ambitions. 162 
5.4 Formal Constitutional Consolidation 
The process of elite fragmentation underlined the instability of neopatrimonial 
politics. As a consequence of elite fragmentation the president has sought to formally 
introduce constitutional and institutional mechanisms to counter the threat posed by 
factional elite groups. This has included changes to the constitution relating to the 
presidency, parliament and political parties which have established mechanisms to 
keep challengers at bay. 163 The following chapter deals with this topic in greater detail 
in relation to political parties and won't be discussed here. It will illustrate how the 
institutional design created by the president, and subject to changes in response to the 
ever dynamic, uncertain and contingent conditions of transition, and sustained by 
160 On top of the events in November 2001 and the alleged involvements of Aliev in a website 
spreading malicious stories about the president he had also been accused of being involved in the 
murder of opposition leader, Altynbek Sarsenbaev in February 2006. 
16' Aliev's Message, Kazakhstan Today, 26 May 2007. 
162 Kadrovyi Pas'ians prezidenta, www. posit. kz, 2 March 2008, 
httD: //www. posit. kz/? Ian=ru&id= 100&pub=7724. 
163 See Rico Isaacs, Managing Dissent, Limiting Risk and Consolidating Power: The Processes and 
Results of Constitutional Reform in Kazakhstan, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 44, No. 1,2008. 
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informal forms of politics in the shape of loyalty and patronage, have marginalised the 
oppositional elite who established political parties as a means of fulfilling their 
political ambitions and protecting their political interests. 
In countering the instability and uncertainty caused by elite fragmentation the 
president used both formal institutional consolidation and informal politics to stabilise 
his rule. The centralisation of political forces in Nur Otan, the consolidation of 
economic forces in Samruk and placing previously independent media outlets under 
state control were all reinforced by using the power of patronage to ensure loyalty and 
guarantee the right result was achieved. In the case of Nur Otan it was using informal 
methods to ensure they won the election (see Chapter Four) and with competing elite 
groups the president leant on the judiciary to make certain Aliev faced criminal 
charges and was thus politically marginalised. These processes highlight the fusion 
and complex relationship between the formal and informal in Kazakhstan. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has argued that informal political relations and behaviour in Central Asia 
are rooted in history as prior scholarship suggests. However, their use in Kazakhstan 
is specific to the uncertain context of post-Soviet transition. The contingent and 
dynamic nature of political and economic transition is a more adequate explanation 
for understanding why informal political norms have become so dominant during this 
era of political development. Moreover, the use of informal politics in the post-Soviet 
period denotes a new fusion between traditional informal politics, communist legacies 
and new post-Soviet institutions. It represents a shift from patrimonial communism (a 
combination of traditionalism and communist bureaucracy) to neopatrimonialism. 
Nazarbaev relied on informal politics to counter the political instability derived from 
institutional competition, pluralism and electoral competition; all contingent processes 
specific to the post-Soviet transitional context. The president consolidated power 
through formal (new constitution, political parties and other new institutions like the 
ANK) and informal (patronage networks and informal elite groups competing for 
access to resources) means. This form of neopatrimonial rule (the fusion between the 
formal and informal) further increased political instability and uncertainty but just in a 
different form. High-level factional elite competition over the allocation of resources, 
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distributed by the president as the patron, 1" led to conflict and elite fragmentation 
which challenged presidential rule. Again, the president responded by consolidating 
his power in formal terms through party consolidation and economic centralisation 
and informal terms by using the personalism and the loyalty to his leadership he has 
acquired to move against other powerful political actors, which ensured there were no 
political actors independent of him. 
The development of Kazakhstan's post-Soviet political system has been founded on a 
fusion between formal and informal politics that can be characterised as 
neopatrimonialism. However, as will be noted throughout this work informal politics 
trump formal political institutions as personal loyalty to the leader, patron-client 
networks and informal factional elite groups are the basis of Kazakhstan's political 
system. The fusion between the formal and informal has seen informal political 
relations heavily influence the development of formal political institutions like parties. 
However, at the same time, as will be noted in the following chapters, political parties 
do assist in shaping, contextualising and legitimising informal politics. This 
neopatrimonial context has placed Nazarbaev in the key position, despite some of the 
uncertainty and instability involved, to create and organise the institutional framework 
that governs the activities and organisation of political institutions and organisations 
both connected to and separate from the state. Political parties have been especially 
susceptible. The institutional framework the president has adopted has been a key way 
in which he has been able to manage and control their development. Both the formal 
legal restrictions and the interpretation and selective application of formal rules by 
loyal clients of the president have significantly shaped the development of political 
parties and their relationship with informal political relations and behaviour. The 
chapter that follows explores this issue. 
164 This has been a phenomena witnessed across the former Soviet Union especially in those countries 
considered to have weak states during the 1990s such as Russia and Ukraine. See David Hoffman, The 
Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (New York, Public Affairs, 2003); Paul D' Anieri, 
Robert Kravchuck and Taras Kuzio, Politics and Society in Ukraine (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 
1999). 
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Chapter Four: Institutional Constraints on Political Parties 
Introduction 
In transitional regimes institutional design is a series of choices political actors 
undertake in devising the rules of the game for, and the constraints of, political 
competition. ' Institutional choice, therefore, has an important affect on regime 
transition, the functioning of institutions and organisations and the quality of 
democracy. 2 Many authors have sought to explore not just the effects of institutional 
choice but also institutional origins. 3 Cultural and structural legacies, elite bargaining 
and the uncertainty of transition have all been posited as factors explaining 
institutional origin and change. 4 This chapter is concerned with both institutional 
change and the institutional effects of institutional choice and design. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the uncertain context of transition played a central role in the 
decision-making process of the president of Kazakhstan and his reliance on informal 
political relations and behaviour and thus on his preference of institutional choice. 
Implicit in such a view is the assumption that `political actors are motivated by 
concerns for their individual political power and choose institutions under varying 
degrees of uncertainty. ' 5 What, therefore, has been the impact of political 
institutional choice and design on political parties in Kazakhstan? And how has the 
president's reliance on informal political relations and behaviour affected the 
operation of those institutional constraints? 
Following the previous chapter, which illustrated how the president was able to 
consolidate his rule vis-ä-vis the uncertainty of transition by relying on informal 
1 Douglass C., North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
2 Key works which have explored the effects of institutional choice are Stepan, Alfred, and Skach, 
Cindy, Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus 
Presidentialism, World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1, October 1993, p. 1-22 and Juan J Linz and Arturo 
Valenzuela (eds. ) The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 
1994), pp. 3-90. 
3 Kathleen Bawn, The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law a Social Outcome, 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 4,1993, pp. 965-989; Pauline Jones Luong, After 
the Break Up: Institutional Design in Transitional States, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 33, No. 
5,2000, pp. 563-592 and Timothy Frye, A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist 
Presidencies, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 5,1997,523-552. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Frye, A Politics of Institutional Choice, p. 524. 
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political relationships and behaviour, this chapter argues that the president's informal 
and formal institutional dominance placed him in a key position to implement 
institutional constraints on parties to suit his political preferences. This occurred in 
three forms. First, through his preponderant formal and informal position as 
president, Nazarbaev was able to shape party development from above through the 
creation of a dominant pro-presidential party, the establishment of virtual and 
satellite parties and the co-option of opposition parties. Second, he was in a position 
to define and construct the institutional constraints which affect parties' participation 
in electoral competition. Electoral rules were designed to increase the chances of 
electoral success for pro-presidential parties on the expected basis loyal clients of the 
president would selectively apply and interpret the electoral law to ensure victory for 
pro-presidential candidates. Thus, despite formal `rational' electoral rules evolving 
ostensibly for the purpose of establishing pluralism and democracy, the informal 
interpretation of those rules guarantees presidential preferences are met at the 
expense of other political voices. Third, there is the law designed to formally govern 
party organisation and activity. By instituting a `Law on Political Parties', the 
president sought to legalise, rationalise and codify the role of political parties in 
Kazakhstan. However, the selective application of the law on the part of government 
agencies and ministries ensures, similar to the law regarding electoral competition, 
only pro-presidential parties truly benefit. These three forms of institutional 
constraints reveal the complex nature of the relationship between informal politics 
and party development. Informal politics influence formal institutional rules 
governing political parties as formal rules are written in a manner which leave them 
open to interpretation and selective application by loyal clients of the president. This 
shapes party development by marginalizing all parties except pro-presidential 
parties, in particular Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland). At the same time formal rules 
act to legitimise such informal political relations and behaviour. Moreover, as a 
formal institution Nur Otan, provides elite stability and domination of the state 
apparatus, an important role which consolidates authoritarian rule. 
What this chapter explains is that Nazarbaev is in a pivotal position to define the 
formal institutional constraints shaping party development. Simultaneously, 
however, the informal components of a neopatrimonial regime, in particular loyalty 
to the leader and the patronage of patron-client relations underscore and influence 
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the operation of the formal aspects of the institutional constraints affecting party 
development. It results in weak plural electoral competition, a marginalisation of 
opposition parties and the institutionalisation of the president's loyal party Nur Otan 
as the only political party that matters in Kazakhstan. Importantly, it reveals the 
central role Nur Otan plays in providing elite stability helping to consolidate and 
secure Nazarbaev's authoritarian rule. 
1. Institutional Choice: The Presidency and the President 
1.1 Structure and Agency 
A major problem when considering the role of presidentialism in Kazakhstan and its 
impact on the development of political parties is the extent to which, as an 
institution, the presidency is infused with the agency of the president. Indeed, 
Nazarbaev and the office of President in Kazakhstan is a rather pertinent example of 
the complex debate between structure and agency in political science. Historically, 
scholars have wrestled with the issue of the extent to which political conduct shapes 
political context. Pluralist analysts place emphasis upon the role of decision-makers 
in shaping events, while stucturalist authors emphasise the limited role of agency and 
greater power of form and structure. 6 The design of the presidential system in 
Kazakhstan was fitted and constructed around the desire of the incumbent president 
to retain control of the contingent and contextual circumstances of post-Soviet 
transition (see previous chapter). The strengthening of presidential authority in 
Kazakhstan `is defined not only by pre-Soviet traditions and the Soviet period, but 
also by the personality of the president'. 7 The development, therefore, of 
presidentialism in post-Soviet Kazakhstan is entangled with the personality and 
holder of the office of president. This has implications on the `rationality' of state 
institutions, as `one person controls executive power and all other centres of powers 
in the country'. 8 The office of president is personalised to fit around Nazarbaev and 
consequently the rational-liberal elements of the office are diluted. For example, 
according to the 1995 constitution a person is prohibited from holding the office of 
president for more than two terms. Having stood for office under these conditions in 
6 Colin Hay, Political Analysis, (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002). 
E. A., Borisova, Kazakhstan prezident i vneshiaia politika (Moscow, Natalis, 2005). 
8 Author's interview with Tolen M. Tokhtassynov, Deputy Leader of the KPK, 9 February 2007, 
Almaty. 
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the 1999 and 2005 presidential elections, Nazarbaev was faced with a constitutional 
dilemma if he wished to stand for presidential office again in 2012. The rationality of 
this clause, which is to avoid one person remaining in office indefinitely and the 
dangers of dictatorship such longevity evokes, was overcome by the deputies in 
parliament introducing a new clause to the constitution in 2007 which allowed the 
first president of Kazakhstan (Nazarbaev) to stand for as many terms as he liked. 9 
The personal desire for continuing in power both on the part of Nazarbaev and his 
loyal clients in parliament, overcame any rational-legal institutional restrictions 
embedded within the institution of presidency. Evidently, in Kazakhstan it is 
Nazarbaev who holds power not the office of presidency. 
1.2 Formal Institutional Dominance 
The complex nature of the relationship between structure and agency in Kazakhstan 
should not detract from considerable strength of formal powers concentrated in the 
office of president. Nazarbaev's leading position afforded him the opportunity to 
construct the institution of presidency setting the tone for the distribution of power in 
post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Consequently, he has institutionalised personal political 
power. Formally, the powers granted to the president in the 1995 constitution were 
wide ranging and comprehensive with power invested in the presidency at the 
expense of the legislature. Article 44 of the constitution endows the president with 
the power to appoint the prime minister, the government, the general prosecutor, the 
head of the National Bank, the National Security Committee and to determine the 
structure of government. Furthermore, Article 45 awards the president the power to 
`issue decrees and resolutions which are binding on the entire territory of the 
Republic... which have the force of laws'. 10 The powers of the legislature are limited 
to four short and otiose clauses. The constitutional power of the presidency gives the 
president in office the constitutional right to dominate and shape the political space. 
While this is not unusual in any given presidential or semi-presidential political 
system, the checks and balances apparent in established Western democracies are 
either absent or simply far too immature in Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, there is `an 
expert presidential system, where the president has greater control of all political 
9Aleksei Nikitin, Nazarbaev stanet pozhiznennym prezidentom Kazakhstana, www. kub. info, 
hM: //www. kub. info/article. php? sid=17526 
1°Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1995 (Almaty, lurist, 2006). 
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levers, and all political players, compared to the legislative and judicial branches'. ' 1 
As a result, `the government is under the total control of the president. The executive 
branch is totally under his control. The position of Prime Minister is not important; it 
is rather a position that is managerial or technical'. 12 
Kazakhstan is not unique in the post-Soviet world or even beyond. Many of the other 
former Soviet states, with the exception of the Baltic Republics, opted for strong 
presidential or semi-presidential systems. 13 Russia, for example, has seen the 
concentration of power in the presidency at the expense of the influence and 
effectiveness of other centres of power. Russia also provides an illuminating 
example of a phenomenon that has been present in Kazakhstan; the personalisation 
of presidential power. Vladimir Putin, despite no longer being president in Russia is 
still believed to hold power. 14 It illustrates that meaningful power is held not in an 
institutionalised established office (as present in rationalised bureaucratic polities) 
but instead in the personal power of an individual (as in a neopatrimonial regime). In 
Kazakhstan Nazarbaev not only formally possesses a great deal of power but it is 
buttressed and interlaced with informal personal political power. This `informal' 
power is crucial to Nazarbaev's ability to see his political preferences enacted into 
legislation. 
1.3 Informal Institutional Dominance: The Power of Patronage Networks 
The strong form of presidentialism is Kazakhstan is underpinned by informal 
personal power. This essentially flows from the president's ability to appoint vast 
swaths of key positions in the political system. `The president, appoints the regional 
Akims, regional Akims (local governors) appoint city Aims, the president appoints 
the government, the president appoints the judges, the president controls the 
parliament and the senate, the Maslikhats (local councils) are elected by the 
population, but are under the control of regional Akims. '15 Consequently, the 
president controls the political edifice based on a system of patronage through the 
" Author's interview with Dosym Satpaev, Political Analyst, 28 February 2007, Almaty. 
12 Author's interview with Senior Ak Zhol official, 18 January 2007, Almaty. 
13 Gerard Easter, Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the 
NIS, World Politics, Vol. 49 No. 2,1997, pp. 184-211. 
14Medvedev sworn in, but Putin still holds power in Russia, Independent, 8 May 2008. 
15 Author's interview with Galymzhan Zhakianov, Chairman of Public Foundation "Civil Society", 10 
January 2007, Almaty. 
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power of appointment. Appointed by the president, local Akims utilise their own 
network of subordinate Akims (Raion [district] and Auyl [village] level), as well as 
local officials and state employees under their control, to secure presidential 
interests. The president awards positions and resources in exchange for political 
loyalty. Political positions therefore, are not based on rational lines of division but 
`depend on the will of one man'. 16 Outside of state appointments important 
`influence groups', those business groups that have appropriated former state 
enterprises through the privatisation process (see Chapter 3) also offer a degree of 
personal loyalty to Nazarbaev. " These elites `support Nazarbaev and think the 
reason why they have all their wealth is because Nazarbaev is in power' and as a 
result remain loyal to him. 18 He is the key arbitrator of all conflicts over resources 
and any group failing to demonstrate loyalty can find themselves sidelined, as 
Mukhtar Abliazov and Galymzhan Zhakianov discovered when they formed 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK). 19 These extensive patronage networks 
give Nazarbaev an almost inexhaustible base of personal loyalty to his leadership. 
Combined with the formal institutional powers granted to the president, Nazarbaev is 
able to rely on personal loyalty and extensive patronage networks to influence and 
foster a party system that suits his personal preference. The presidency provides a 
formal structure which is internationally recognised, to supplement informal powers 
of patronage. In this sense it represents a fusion between both formal constitutional 
power and informal personal power. As suggested in Chapter One, the problems 
associated with presidentialism, in general terms and with regard to the specific post- 
Soviet context, are particularly evident in Kazakhstan. Weak party development has 
certainly been an effect of the choice of presidential rule due to the centralised nature 
which presidentialism can slide towards. This is compounded by the post-soviet 
particularity of neopatrimonialism where informal political loyalty to the president 
has delivered a loyal and obedient dominant political party at the expense and 
marginalisation of other parties. Similar to Russia, an early effect of presidentialism 
16 Author's interview with Sergei Duvanov, Independent Journalist, 28 November 2006, Almaty. 
17 Andrei Grosin, Kto est kto v sovremenom Kazakhstane. Zanimatel'no -o klanovykh gruppirovkakh 
(Moscow, Instituta Stran SNG, 2005). 
18 Author's interview with Yevgeni Zhovtis, Political Analyst, 31 January 2007, Almaty. 
19 Both found themselves convicted of abuse of office and financial mismanagement and placed in 
prison, divorced from their influence, businesses and positions. See Chapter Three. 
152 
in Kazakhstan was a fragmented party system, 20 however from 1995 onwards, using 
loyalty and patronage as a tool, the president was able to shape and foster party 
development from above to suit his preferences. This has been achieved through 
three particular means: the establishment of a dominant party, the creation of virtual 
and satellite parties for the purpose of creating an aura of multipartism and the co- 
option and marginalisation of opposition parties. While formal institutional power, 
underpinned by informal patronage has shaped party development, the creation of a 
dominant party was particularly crucial for elite stability. 
1.4 Establishing a Dominant Pro-Presidential Party 
The relationship between the formal institution of presidency and the informal 
personal nature of Nazarbaev's power bequeathed him a position of centrality in the 
political system allowing him to construct and shape party development to his 
personal preferences. Initially, the early years of independence from 1991 to 1995 
witnessed a more fragmented party system which seemingly the president had less 
control over. As argued in Chapter Three, the contingency of transition from 
communism witnessed the emergence of many small political parties and public 
organisations .21 However, 
from 1995 onwards there was a concerted effort to 
establish a cohesive party system manageable from above. 
The major project undertaken by the president and his administration in relation to 
party development has been the creation of a political party loyal and sympathetic to 
presidential interests. The goal was to create a party which would fill the vacuum left 
by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), a party that would prove loyal 
to the president, provide elite stability, dominate state structures and act as a vehicle 
for presidential interests in the legislature and across the country. The first attempt at 
establishing a dominant party occurred at the `funeral congress' of the Communist 
Party of Kazakhstan (KPK) in October 1991. Simultaneous to the liquidation of the 
KPK the president encouraged delegates to form the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan 
20 Robert Moser, The Electoral Effects of Presidentialism in Post-Soviet Russia, in J. Löwenhardt 
(ed. ), Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia (London, Frank Cass, 1988), pp. 55-58. 
21 M. B. Zaslavskaia, Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye ob'edineniia Kazakhstana na 
sovermennom etape razvitiia, (Almaty, KISI, 1994) pp. 6-7. 
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(SPK), a more reform minded political entity. The delegates duly obliged. 22 The 
strategy was to transfer the power and privilege from the KPK to the SPK in the 
belief the party would be a valuable resource of loyalty and legitimacy. The SPK, 
however, was not forthcoming in its acquiescence to the president and a sizable 
proportion of its deputies in the Supreme Soviet soon emerged as the centre of 
opposition to Nazarbaev's economic reforms. After the failure of the SPK the 
president blessed the creation of another party, the Union of People's Unity of 
Kazakhstan (SNEK), later re-named Party of Peoples Unity of Kazakhstan (PNEK) 
in 1995. PNEK provided a key vehicle in coalescing other political forces around the 
president and the push for stronger presidential powers in 1995 (see Chapter Three). 
The party in its program explicitly stated that its `mission is to provide support for 
the course of reforms conducted by the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
Nursultan Nazarbaev'. 23 It was the first sign of the personal attachment between the 
president and a political party. The basis of their foundation was to support the 
personal programme of Nazarbaev. It was not, however, until prior to the 
presidential elections of 1999 that the president began to truly consolidate a political 
party around him capable of imitating the role of the CPSU. The merger of several 
small pro-presidential parties, and PNEK, into the newly established Otan 
(Fatherland) in 1999 was a pivotal moment in the development of political parties in 
Kazakhstan (See Chapter Three). 
The culmination of the project occurred in 2006 when other independent pro- 
presidential forces merged with Otan. The other main parties with representation in 
parliament Asar (Together), the Civil Party (GPK) and the Agrarian Party (APK)24 
joined forces with Otan at the suggestion of Nazarbaev who had called for `the 
consolidation of all constructive political forces in the country . 
25 The assimilation of 
these parties into Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland) was widely viewed as the 
`minimisation of independent political forces', in particular Nazarbaev's daughter, 
22 A hardcore of disgruntled Communist Party members did later re-establish the KPK. The Ministry 
of Justice registered the party in 1994, and Serikbolsyn Abdil'din became the leader of the party in 
1996. 
23 PNEK Party Programme in I. 0., Buluktaev, C. A. D'iachenko and L. I. Karmazina, Politicheskie 
Partii Kazakhstana Spravochnik 1998 (Almaty, IPK, 1998). 
24 After the mergers with Asar, GPK and APK possess over 90 percent of seats in the Mazhilis. 
25 `Head of State Nursultan Nazarbayev took part in the 7`h congress of the Civil Party of Kazakhstan', 
www. akorda. kz. 10 November 2006, www. akorda. kzJpage. php? id=353&lang=2news id2535 
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Dariga, who had set up Asar only in 2003.26 It was argued by some analysts that 
Dariga was `attempting to jump ahead of her father and that in the end he got fed up 
with her and saved face for her by merging the parties. ' 27 It was felt the inspiration 
behind Otan was not so much the CPSU, although it was established to give jobs to 
former communist officials, 28 but other dominant parties across the world. The party 
leadership declared they were following the experience of other dominant parties 
such as the People's Action Party in Singapore which has been in power since 1959, 
the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan which has been in office since 1958 and the 
Barisan Nasional (National Front) ruling coalition in Malaysia in power since 
1995.29 However, Nur Otan is distinct from these parties in two senses. First, many 
of these parties emerged in a genuine competitive atmosphere where they had 
struggled to assume power before becoming expert at holding on to it. Nur Otan is 
not a particularly competitive party and is regarded as consisting of `the least 
competitive people possible', as it enjoys the substantial advantage of administrative 
resources. 3° Second, Nur Otan is built around the personality of the president. 
Typical of the personalism found in patrimonial regimes, the party's identity, 
ideology and policies are tied inextricably to Nazarbaev. 31 
The consolidation of pro-presidential parties into Nur Otan indicated an important 
development for political parties in Kazakhstan. Coinciding with changes to the 
constitution in 2007, which were ostensibly introduced to expand the role of 
parliament and parties in the political system, Nur Otan was the perfect institution 
for the president to be able to control such changes. 32 Thus he was able to 
demonstrate to the international community a commitment to devolving power but at 
the same time ensuring that his power was not affected. Nur Otan was essential to 
this process. Consequently, Nur Otan is the only political party significantly 
involved in the political process. It has become a central mechanism for publicising 
26 Author's interview with Marina Sabitova, OSDP Mazhilis Candidate, 14 November 2006, Almaty. 
27 Author's interview with independent journalist, 30 October 2006, Almaty. 
28 Author's interview with senior figure in Nur Otan, 8 May 2007, Almaty. 
29Andrei Grozin, `Kazakhstan is on its way to create `The Party of All Parties", RIA Novosti, 6 July 
2006. 
'0 Author's interview with Marina Sabitova. 
31The importance of this will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Five. 
32 Rico Isaacs `Managing Dissent, Limiting Risk and Consolidating Power: The Processes and Results 
of Constitutional Reform in Kazakhstan', Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 44, No. 1,2008. 
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new national programmes and campaigns designed by the presidential 
administration. 33 
Importantly, the development of Nur Otan also illustrates two factors central to 
Nazarbaev's consolidation of, and sustainability in, power and the nature of Nur 
Otan itself. First, it provides an institution which can maintain elite stability and 
support behind the president. It is no coincidence that Otan emerged in the aftermath 
of Akezhan Kazhegeldin moving from the president's inner circle into opposition 
(see Chapter Three). Likewise, the consolidation of many pro-presidential parties 
into Nur Otan in 2006 was in response to the growing power and independence of 
political actors like Nazarbaeva and Aliev. With the lifting of the ban of senior state 
officials becoming members of political parties in 2007, many key figures in the elite 
responded by joining Nur Otan. 34 It demonstrates how political parties can be 
utilised to bind in the country's elite behind the leadership of the president, thus 
potentially protecting their grasp of power. It also illustrates how a formal institution 
like a political party formalises the informal power of the president by binding in the 
president's power of patronage. Many of the country's Aims rushed to join Nur 
Otan in 2007 out of loyalty. Thus it provides a formal context for some of the 
informal political relations and behaviour that underpins Nazarbaev's personal 
power. The second factor is Nur Otan's dominance of the state apparatus. The 
constitutional lifting of senior state employees becoming members of political parties 
in 2007 made legitimate what was already informally apparent. Previously, many 
state officials had always preferenced or favourably biased Nur Otan within state 
processes (see below), now as they were permitted to become members of the party, 
they could preference the party on a legal basis. It illustrates how Nur Otan has 
become a prevalent force within the state apparatus. While it does not resemble the 
complete fusion between party and state that existed during the Soviet period, it 
appears as a gradual and more moderate reformulation of Soviet party-state relations. 
Nur Otan is the party of the state and as such this development has been central to 
Nazarbaev's consolidation and reach of power across the state in Kazakhstan. 
33Obshestvennye sovety po bor'be korruptsiei, www. ndp-nurotan. kz. 8 February 2008 
[http: //www. ndp-nurotan. kz/index. php? show&ft=27&type=l 1 &id=89222753721 ]. 
34 Three More Ministers Become Members of Nur Otan, Kazakhstan Today, 4 July 2007. 
156 
Nur Otan, therefore, was the culmination of the president's long-standing desire to 
possess a political party that could represent his interests in the legislature, unite the 
country's elite behind his leadership formally cotextualising some aspects of his 
informal power and through which dominate the state apparatus. The party, however, 
is also shaped by informal political relations and behaviour as it benefits from 
patronage and administrative resources (discussed below). As a consequence of 
Nazarbaev's occupancy of the presidency the party has secured the patronage of the 
president and the advantages such patronage affords. 
1.5 Constructing Multipartism: Virtual Parties 
The creation of a dominant pro-presidential party has not been the only way in which 
the structure and agency of the presidency has shaped the development of political 
parties in Kazakhstan. Determined to engender credibility into a party system 
designed to favour the dominant pro-presidential party, `virtual' or `fake' parties 
were established for the purpose of simulating multipartism. It was a widely held 
view among those analysts and party elites interviewed for this research that several 
political parties where `fake' or `facade' parties. They were supported by the 
presidential administration to create the appearance of multipartism and to siphon 
votes from opposition parties. 35 According to Gani Kaliev, chairman of Auyl 
(Village), `such parties have been created from the top down by Vlast' (power)36 and 
emerged to create a picture of a multiparty system in Kazakhstan'. 37 Referring to the 
APK and the GPK, one analyst argued that `these parties were all a project of the 
leadership of the country. The idea was that they would create a two or three party 
system'. 38 Moreover, parties such as Rukhaniiat (spirituality), Democratic Party of 
Kazakhstan `Adilet' (Justice), Party of Patriots, Auyl, and the Communist Peoples 
Party of Kazakhstan (KNPK) emerged from the interview data as examples of 
`virtual' parties. Many of these small parties fit Andrew Wilson's idea of designer 
35 The majority of analysts, and some party elites, held this view. Unsurprisingly there was no 
consensus as to which parties were fake. Opposition figures would accuse most pro-presidential 
parties as being virtual, arguing they had been set up by the presidential administration. Pro- 
presidential elites on the other hand would argue that some of the opposition parties were fake as 
businessmen and oligarchs set them up. 
36 Nast' has a wider range of meaning that just `power' in Russian. Its use also denotes the `president' 
and the `presidential administration' or the more generic `authorities'. 
37 Author's interview with Gani Kaliev, Leader of The Social Democratic Party Auyl, 5 March 2007, 
Astana. 
38 Author's interview with Bektas Mukhamedzhanov, Director of International Institute for Modem 
Politics, 22 February 2007, Almaty. 
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parties which are either actively created or supported by the leadership of the country 
in an attempt to capture different sections of the electorate. Rukhaniiat represents 
cultural, moral and spiritual interests, Adilet judicial and educational interests, the 
Party of Patriots, nationalist interests and Auyl rural interests. According to Wilson, 
designer parties play an important role in managed democracies in that while outputs 
(election results) are politically manipulated so are the inputs (politicians and 
parties). 39 
Is it fair to describe these political parties as fake and/or virtual? If we reference the 
extent of their physical collateral then a case could be put forward that parties like 
Rukhaniiat, Auyl, Adilet, the Party of Patriots and the KNPK are virtual. These 
parties have few resources, limited memberships and a small number of formal 
premises. 40 Yet, to imply these parties are nothing more than fronts for the regime 
fails to take into account that these parties exist as important organisations for certain 
groups of political elites whose political career depend on them. Yevgeni Zhovtis, 
for example, argued that many of the parties `were established by ambitious political 
players who had money and wanted to reflect their position'. 41 Indeed, as will be 
noted in the following chapter a case can certainly be made that many of the smaller 
political parties such as Auyl, Rukhaniiat and the Party of Patriots were primarily 
organised by charismatic political personalities seeking to reclaim some form of 
public office. 
The debate over whether these parties are `virtual' is misleading. These parties have 
meaning to those involved in them. What is important is the parties do create the 
impression of a multiparty system for an international audience. Yet, the president is 
safe in the knowledge that these parties pose no threat to the dominance established 
by his ruling party Nur Otan. Many of the parties mentioned here are loyal and serve 
at the patronage of the president. For many there are pay offs. Gani Kasymov, leader 
39 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (Bury St Edmunds, 
Yale University Press, 2005) pp. 38-41. 
40In particular, the fact that the Party of Patriots refused and were unable to put someone forward for 
an interview suggests it has a weak membership, a skeletal organisation and is primarily supported by 
the presidential administration to give the appearance of multipartism. Despite administrative 
assistants giving numbers of people to recommend for interview from the party, when called these 
people claimed no longer to be involved in the party and declined to be a part of the research. 
41 Author's interview with Yvengeni Zhovtis. 
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of the Party of Patriots, was selected for a seat in the Senate after the 2007 
parliamentary election. Gani Kaliev and Altynshash Dzhaganova were given key 
places on the State Commission for Democratic Reforms in 2006. After the 2007 
parliamentary elections the president established a new Obshchestvennoi palate 
(Public Chamber) for those political parties who did not gain entry into parliament. 
Seemingly introduced "to provide a high level of civic participation at the most 
crucial stage of realisation of state legislative policy and is one of the major tools for 
the continuation of dialogue of all active political forces of society', 42 the new body 
was in reality a peace offering and `gesture of good will from Nur Otan' to those 
parties and elites who failed to gain entry in parliament. 43 It was a small offering for 
loyal service to the president's cause. The chamber continues to offer a public 
platform for Dzhaganova, Kaliev, Maksut Narikbaev (Chairman of Adilet) and 
Vladislav Kosarev (Chairman of KNPK). 
Another advantage these parties offer the presidential administration is their ability 
to divert votes and support from opposition parties. There are several notable cases 
where smaller political parties assisted the cause of the president by disrupting the 
development, activities and electoral opportunities of opposition parties. For 
example, Maskut Narikbaev, an old classmate of Nazarbaev, 44 established Adilet as a 
democratic party that would not criticise the president but divert interest and votes 
away from opposition parties. 45 At the time the official title of the main opposition 
party was Democratic Party of Kazakhstan `Ak Zhol ', Adilet's original name was the 
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan. 46 Clearly, such similar names had the power to 
cause confusion for voters at the ballot box. The case of the KNPK is comparable. 
Vladislav Kosarev, a member of the Political Council of the KPK, established the 
party after an internal dispute with the leader of the KPK, Serikbolsyn Abdil'din. 47 
However, many in the KPK, and other analysts, believe the split was engineered by 
42`Obrashchenie Obshchestvennoi palaty pri Mazhilise Parlamenta Respubliki Kazakhstan', Press- 
sluzhboj Mazhilisa Parlamenta RK, 26 November 2007, http: //zonakz. net/articles/20194. 
4301eg Nilov, Koshki-myshki Ak Ordy, www. zonakz. net, 30 November 2007, 
hgR: //zonakz. net/articies/20252. 
44 Once again illustrating the power and role of patronage in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. 
45Demokrat ne tot, kto kritikuet, Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 16 July 2005. 
46 Adilet was originally called `Democratic Party of Kazakhstan' and only changed its name to Adilet 
in 2006, meaning Justice. This is related to the fact that the party consists of lawyers. 
07 Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Respubliki Kazakhstan, Pochemu my sozdaem novuiu partiiu (Almaty, 
KNPK, 2005). 
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the presidential administration to weaken the KPK's chances in the 2004 
parliamentary elections. Nurbolat Masanov noted that `the KNPK was especially 
created to neutralise Abdil'din'. 48 Abdil'din is clear on the matter, `the current 
regime tried to weaken the KPK, so they made a quite obvious step to divide the 
party' . 
49 The argument of those who subscribe to the view that KNPK was a project 
of the presidential administration was strengthened by the appearance of Erasyl 
Abylkasymov among KNPK's ranks. Abylkasymov is a strong advocate of the 
government and the president and was appointed the KNPK's candidate for the 2005 
presidential election. 50 Moreover, Kosarev is viewed as being on friendly terms with 
many in the presidential administration and Nur Otan. 51 There are allegations that 
Kosarev was `promised something' for his role in the division of the KPK but this is 
an accusation that cannot be reliably corroborated. 52 
The most significant split, allegedly instigated by the presidential administration, 
was between Alikhan Baimenov and the other co-chairmen of Ak Zhol, Bolat Abilov, 
Tulegen Zhukeev, Oraz Zhandosov and Altynbek Sarsenbaev, after the fraudulent 
elections of autumn 2004. Ak Zhol had a fairly successful election in 2004 despite 
only winning one seat. It was evident to those in the opposition they had received far 
more votes than the official total released by the Central Election Commission 
(CEC), but administrative resources had been deployed against them to ensure 
victory for pro-presidential parties, particularly Otan. 53 Their emergence as a popular 
opposition force in the country represented a considerable threat to the president and 
it was entirely possible he would call upon further administrative resources of the 
state to halt their chances of obtaining further popularity, power and influence. 
48 Author's interview with Nurbolat Masanov, Political Scientist, 4 October 2006, Almaty. 
49 Author's interview with Serikbolsyn Abdil'din, Leader of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, 30 
January 2007, Almaty. 
50 Loyal pro-presidential candidates were used in the 2005 presidential election to create the 
impression of a greater multiplicity of candidates even though they were very loyal to the president. 
Abylkasymov even suggested that despite being a candidate himself he would vote for Nazarbaev. 
Alikhan Baimenov also ran in an effort to take votes away from the official opposition candidate 
Zharmakhan Tuyakbai. 
51 When interviewing Kazbek Kazkenov, the chief historian and ideologist of Nur Otan, he mentioned 
he was close-friends with Kosarev and he openly displayed KNPK paraphernalia in his office. 
Author's interview with Kazbek Kazkenov, Chief Assistant to the Vice President of Nur Otan, 7 
March 2007, Astana. 
52 Such a claim arose in several interviews with opposition elites. However, even they weren't able to 
o beyond the idea that these assertions were only allegations. 
3 Author's interview with Tulegen Zhukeev, General Secretary of Azat, former co-chairman of Nagiz 
Ak Zhol, 21 February 2007, Almaty. 
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Fearing the retribution that had been handed out to Zhakianov and Abliazov when 
they established DVK, Baimenov seemed unwilling to publicly criticise the president 
and the election results. Baimenov, however, argued the split occurred because he 
`wished to be transparent about negotiations with Vlast". 54 For those other chairmen 
who went on to form Nagiz Ak Zhol, the reason was because Baimenov was `afraid 
to go against the structures of power'. 55 Just the dominance of Nazarbaev divides 
parties on how they are to interact and work with Past'. 
1.6 Sleeping With the Enemy: The Cooption and Marginalisation of Opposition 
Parties 
At the same time as attempting to split opposition party votes by supporting the 
creation of similar parties the presidential administration has put in efforts to co-opt 
the opposition too. The fact that many of the main protagonists in opposition parties 
such as Ak Zhol, Azat and OSDP were former members of the ruling elite illustrates 
the problematic nature of understanding the concept of opposition in Kazakhstan and 
to an extent the post-Soviet world. However, we can distinguish between parties the 
presidential administration have some role in creating (such as Adilet and the KNPK) 
and those which presidential parties attempt to co-opt (Ak Zhol, Azat and OSDP). 
The opposition parties which the presidential administration attempt to co-opt are 
those which feature former members of the elite who are viewed as `business people 
who were created by Nazarbaev'. 56 They are not necessary those who we can 
describe as loyal opposition (KNPK and Auyl) because they do criticise the 
government. However, there is a degree of co-option with the presidential 
administration as there is an informal agreement that parties like Ak Zhol, Azat and 
OSDP will not criticise the president outright. 57 Moreover, the president has at times 
held meetings with leaders from these parties in an effort to bring them on board and 
curtail their opposition. 58 While the content of these meeting are never made public, 
the overwhelming impression is that they are still keen to stay onside with the 
president as he holds the key to their potential participation in parliament and 
54 Author's interview with Alikhan Baimenov, Chairman of Ak Zhol, 6 March 2007, Astana. 
ss Author's interview with Tulegen Zhukeev. 
56 Author's interview with Sergei Duvanov. 
;' Author's interview with political analyst, 24 October 2006, Almaty. 
58'Nazarbaev and opposition leaders discussed country's political development', Kazakhstan Today, 
24 April 2007. 
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whether they will face any legal recriminations against their business interests. 59 By 
cooperating with the presidential administration in keeping the tone of their 
criticisms limited to any institution or actor other than the president, these parties in 
the first place guarantee themselves party registration, and second hope to secure 
some form of benefit by winning seats in parliamentary elections. However, the 
degree of co-option should not be overstated. It is at times tenuous, and parties like 
Azat, OSDP and Ak Zhol have yet to receive any tangible benefits other than official 
party registration (which should not be overlooked considering the difficulties of 
other opposition parties such as Alga and Atameken) and are still marginalised in the 
electoral process. Cooption of the opposition reveals firstly another tactic in the 
presidential administration's arsenal of managing party development and secondly 
the problematic nature of how we understand the opposition in Kazakhstan (see 
Chapter One). 
By establishing a dominant party, supporting virtual parties and co-opting opposition 
parties the president, in utilising the formal and informal powers of the presidency 
has attempted to manage and direct party development. The purpose behind it has 
been to ensure there is a party which represents the president's interests in the 
legislature while at the same time providing an institution to bind in the country's 
elite behind his leadership and dominating the state apparatus. The key result, 
however, of the presidency shaping party development has been the dominance of 
Nur Otan and the marginalisation of the opposition. The 100 percent result for Nur 
Otan in the 2007 parliamentary election despite being engineered through the use of 
administrative resources (see below) was a source of embarrassment for the 
president as he had been trying to secure the chairmanship of the OSCE for 2009. 
Kazakhstan was awarded the chairmanship for 2010 on the informal condition there 
would be reforms to the political system. 60 The president is keen to illustrate to the 
West a commitment to multipartism despite the evidential institutional dominance of 
Nur Otan. Speaking at the opening of the 2008/09 session of parliament, Nazarbaev 
spoke of designing an institutional mechanism which `would allow parliament to 
form with the participation of not less than two parties, even if the second party does 
59 Author's interview with political analyst, 24 October 2006, Almaty. 
'Bruce Pannier, Kazakhstan To Assume OSCE Chairmanship In 2010, RFE/RL, 1 December 2007. 
Author's interview with political analyst, 24 October 2006, Almaty. 
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not overcome the seven-percentage barrier'. 61 Such statements and intentions have 
been common in post-Soviet Kazakhstan as the position of president, in both the 
formal and informal sense provided Nazarbaev with the tools to construct and design 
the institutional framework which can determine the electoral success of political 
parties. The following section illustrates how electoral design, driven by the 
president, has favoured Nur Otan or similar pro-presidential parties at the expense of 
opposition parties. The formal electoral rules are designed in such a way that they 
can be selectively applied by loyal clients in an effort to preference Nur Otan. On the 
surface some of the rules seem rational and democratic but the interpretive nature of 
some rules illustrates the way informal political relations and behaviour influence 
formal political rules which in turn influences political parties' ability to compete 
effectively in electoral competition. At the same time, however, these formal rules 
legitimise and make constitutional such informal forms of political relations and 
behaviour. 
2. Electoral Design: Constraints on Electoral Competition 
Nazarbaev's position of strength has given him the ability to establish the formal 
rules of electoral competition in a manner which allows for the selective application 
and interpretation of those rules to benefit Nur Otan, but also at earlier times other 
pro-presidential political parties. The use of informal political behaviour and 
relations to selectively interpret formal institutional rules, which are already 
politically weighted in favour of personal presidential rule, obstructs genuine party 
competition and political parties' ability to compete effectively. In a political society 
where historically political competition was muted and monocratic, this phenomenon 
only compounds path dependent processes. The evolution of electoral design can be 
divided into three periods, early stage Majoritarianism (from 1993-1998), Mixed- 
Member Majoritarianism (1999-2007) and Proportional Representation (2007- to the 
present). In each period, despite the system evolving ostensibly `to further the 
democratisation of society', the narrowing of political interests has taken place, with 
the system giving substantial advantage to pro-presidential parties through the 
61 `Nazarbaev: Vybory v Mazhilis parlamenta RK proidut v 2012 godu', www. zonakz. net. 2 
September 2008, htt,: //www. zonakz. net/articies/22927 
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informal operation of formal laws. 62 This occurs in many forms but this work will 
examine four forms where the informal interpretation, selective application and the 
ignoring of formal rules, benefits pro-presidential parties: candidate registration, the 
composition of election commissions, the election campaign and voter falsification. 
2.1 Early Stage Majoritarianism 
The first constitution of post-Soviet Kazakhstan in 1993 instituted a 177 seat 
legislature based63 on a majoritarian system with 135 seats founded on territorial 
constituencies with the remaining 42 selected from a state list (the president's list). M 
Registered parties and civic organisations could nominate candidates. To be 
registered, a party or civic organisation was required to submit a list of 3000 
members from at least 12 of the country's 19 Oblasts. Independent candidates could 
stand as long as they too submitted a list of 3000 signatures. 65 In the 1994 election 
only three parties obtained registration, SNEK, the People's Congress of Kazakhstan 
(NKK) and SPK. Typically, majoritarian systems produce a stable two or three party 
system. However, in the dynamic context of transition in which the 1994 Kazakh 
parliamentary election took place a fragmented party system emerged, as in other 
post-Soviet states, particularly Russia, which was composed of nascent parties, civic 
organisations and independent candidates (the election results can be found in 
Chapter Three). 
In September 1995 a presidential decree established a constitutional `Law on 
Elections'. A majoritarian system was retained66 but seats available through electoral 
67 competition fell from 135 to 67. The restructured legislature consisted of a 67 seat 
lower chamber, the Mazhilis, and a 40 seat upper chamber, the Senate. The formal 
changes adopted in 1995 represent the president's move away from a democratic 
62Nursultan Nazarbaev, Novyi etap demokratizatsii Kazakhstana - uskorpennoe razvitie svobodnogo 
Demokraticheskogo, www. akorda. kz, 16 May 2007, http: //www. kub. kz/print. php? sid=17456 
63 The body prior to the Supreme Kenges, The Supreme Soviet, was dominated by Communist Party 
functionaries and related interests and met only infrequently. 
64 The state list consisted of two seats for each of Kazakhstan's 19 Oblasts and the cities of Almaty 
and Leninsk (Leninsk was renamed Baikonur in 1995). 
65 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), The Parliamentary Election in 
Kazakhstan March 7 1994 (Almaty, 1994). 
66 A further change was that a candidate was now only considered elected if they received more than 
50 percent of votes in a single constituency. Therefore, in some cases second rounds of voting would 
take place in constituencies were no one candidate obtained more than fifty percent of the vote. 
67 The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, August 30 1995. 
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liberal path of development and the end of what opposition members call `the 
romantic liberal period'. 68 This is observable in the first instance in the continuing 
policy of presidential appointments to the legislature, as the president appointed one 
third of senators. This policy ensured that in the absence of a strong political party 
able to carry out the president's bidding in the legislature (PNEK was is its very 
early stages of formation), and still reeling from the scars of his early confrontations 
with parliament, Nazarbaev would have a large delegation of loyal supporters in the 
parliament who owed their position to his patronage. Another formal rule change 
indicating a further diversion from democracy was the increase in the cost of the 
registration fee for candidates. 69 It made electoral competition unaffordable for 
smaller less well-financed parties, many were of an oppositional nature, thus edging 
out smaller opposition parties. 70 The use of presidential appointments and high 
registration fees are evidence of the early use of formal rules to gain an advantage 
for pro-presidential parties. 
The majoritarian system under which the 1994 and 1995 elections were conducted 
saw the selective application and informal preferencing of the formal rules to 
guarantee the victory of pro-presidential parties and candidates. The role of local 
Akims was crucial to this process. The CSCE report for the 1994 election notes how 
`one candidate told Commission staff that friendly officials in a local election 
commission had confided that they were under orders to ensure the victory of ten 
candidates supported by the mayor of Almaty'. 7' In general terms this was achieved 
by the selective application of the rules on the part of state officials. For example, the 
Central Election Commission (CEC) arbitrarily removed prospective independent 
candidates during the registration process using selective application of the rules. 
The local courts acquiesced too, failing to overturn any decision made by the CEC 
regarding the disqualification of candidates. Other aspects of the electoral process 
saw the informal preferencing of pro-presidential candidates, despite aspects of the 
68 Author's interview with Tulegen Zhukeev. 
69 Sergei D'aichenko, Politichekie partii Kazakhstana v kontekste izbiratel'nykh kampanni. 
Tsentral'naia Aziia i Kavkaz, Vol. 5 No. 17,2001. 
70 In the 1995 election the increase in candidate fees meant smaller parties with limited finances such 
as the pro-Slavic LAD, the Islamist Alash and the Social Democratic Party did not have the funds to 
put forward a significant number of candidates. 
Iurii Buluktaev, Vybory v Kazakhstane kak indicator demokratizatsii obshchestva, Tsentral'naia 
Aziia i Kavkaz, Vol. 6 No. 24,2002. 
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law supposedly guaranteeing objectivity. Pressure was placed on local media to give 
preference and air time to pro-presidential candidates. 72 The administration and 
counting process was also subject to informal behaviour as local administrations 
defied the formal rules and instead falsified the vote. International observers found 
the voting process to have been subject to serious violations such as frequent and 
systemic occurrences of multiple voting and ballot box stuffing all overseen by the 
local Akim. 73 In both elections informal behaviour, in the shape of the selective 
application and preferencing, and at times simply ignoring the formal rules impacted 
the development of political parties not supported by the authorities. Opposition 
parties (SPK, KPK and NKK) found themselves subject to such selective application 
of rules regarding candidate and party registration, an unfavourable bias in the media 
and the abandonment of fair rules in the vote counting process. Local Aims, keen to 
prove their loyalty to the president, engaged in such informal political behaviour to 
ensure victory for approved candidates. In the 1995 election, as in 1994, the process 
weighted in favour of pro-presidential parties and candidates ensured `a vast 
majority of the candidates who contested the elections were officials of the regional 
74 executive organs nominated by the various pro-presidential parties'. 
From his position as president, Nazarbaev was able to construct formal rules which 
benefited pro-presidential candidates and parties thus, impacting on the quality of 
electoral competition and party development. However, this was achieved through 
formal rules which were left open to informal forms of political behaviour such as 
the selective application of rules, a preferencing of pro-presidential candidates and 
parties in the wider media environment and even the blatant ignoring of rules in the 
vote counting process. The formal electoral process was undermined by such 
informal political behaviour where state employees were cajoled into voting and 
supporting approved candidates. Moreover, there was a significant media bias in 
favour of pro-presidential parties and candidates and the falsification of the vote 
counting process overseen by local Aims who owed their position to the patronage 
of the president. It illustrates the impact the emerging neopatrimonial regime was 
72 CSCE, The Parliamentary Election in Kazakhstan March 7 1994 (Almaty, 1994). 
73 International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Preliminary Findings Mazhilis Elections 9 
December 1995 Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty, 1995). 
74 Bhavna Dave, A New Parliament Consolidates Presidential Authority, Transition, Vol. 2 No. 6,22 
March 1996, p. 35. 
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having on the formal elements of the political system. The formal electoral system 
was being subverted by informal factors such as Aims pursing loyalty to Nazarbaev 
by producing the desired result and using their own patronage networks to guarantee 
that it happened. 
2.2 Mixed-Member Majoritarianism (MMM) 
The rules governing electoral competition were changed again in May 1999 at the 
behest of Nazarbaev. Internal and external factors explain why the president sought 
to alter the electoral system. The Kazhegeldin affair (see Chapter Three) required 
Nazarbaev to display his commitment to democracy to ward off internal criticism 
regarding the strengthening of presidential power. Externally, the criticism of the 
1999 presidential election by the international community hit Nazarbaev's reputation 
significantly. Any illusions Nazarbaev was a democratic reformer evaporated with 
the conduct of the election. The OSCE declared that `the election process fell far 
short of the standards to which the Republic of Kazakhstan has committed itself as 
an OSCE participating State'. 75 Eager not to be seen by the West as comparable to 
the excessive authoritarian leaderships in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan Nazarbaev 
advocated changes to the design of the electoral system to satisfy critics at home and 
abroad. 
The new rules included a proportional element with ten new seats added to the lower 
chamber elected by a party list vote. The other 67 seats remained as single-mandate 
constituencies. A7 percent threshold was introduced for entry into parliament for 
those seats available by party list. The introduction of a proportional element was 
praised by the OSCE as a move towards a more `pluralistic political environment'. 76 
The president proudly announced that the first elections held under these institutional 
conditions, heralded `the birth of our multi-party democracy'. 77 In reality, the 
reforms were meagre and little more than an olive branch to the international 
community and critics within the country. There were also changes to the 
75 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Republic of Kazakhstan 
Presidential Election 10 January 1999: Assessment Mission, (Warsaw, OSCE, February 5,1999). 
76 ODIHR, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections 10 and 24 October 1999: Final Report, 
(Warsaw, OSCE, January 2000). 
77 Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 9 October 1999. 
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registration process with the registration fee for candidates reduced by 75 percent. 78 
This eased the financial burden on less well-financed political parties and self- 
nominating candidates. 
The 7 percent threshold acted as an institutional barrier limiting opportunities for 
political parties not favoured by the presidential administration. Thresholds are 
commonly used to ward off party fragmentation but 7 percent is at the higher end of 
the scale. Consequently, just four parties obtained seats from the list vote in the 1999 
parliamentary election. The KPK, as one of the most well-supported and organised 
parties in the country, was the only opposition party to pass the 7 percent barrier. 
Others, such as Azamat (citizen) under the pressure of media bias and having 
administrative resources applied against them obtained just 4.57 percent. 79 Certain 
the key pro-presidential party Otan and its satellite parties GPK and APK would 
cross the 7 percent threshold thanks to informal preference and selective application 
of the rules by loyal patronage networks, the formal threshold was introduced by 
Nazarbaev to try and ensure opposition parties would not gain representation in the 
Mazhilis. 80 The 2004 parliamentary election took place under similar conditions. As 
the more moderate opposition party Ak Zhol arguably had sufficient support across 
the country to surpass the 7 percent barrier in spite of informal bias against them, the 
more outright opposition bloc consisting of the KPK and Democratic Choice of 
Kazakhstan (DVK) found themselves subject to harassment and the full weight of 
administrative resources. 81 As a result, the KPK/DVK bloc only received 3.4 percent 
despite an earlier poll suggesting the party would emerge with 12.5 percent. 82 Both 
the KPK/DVK bloc and Ak Zhol focused their attention on the party list vote as 
opposed to single mandate constituencies because they understood local Akims 
would ensure victory for pro-presidential candidates in most instances in 
's ODIIIR, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections 10 and 24 October 1999. 
79 The main opposition party in the 1999 election, RNPK, refused to submit a list of candidates for the 
party list vote in protest of their leader Kazhegeldin being refused registration as a candidate. 
8o Ak Zhol managed to win one seat through the party list vote. However, initially the Ak Zhol 
Mazhilis Deputy Alikhan Baimenov refused to take up his seat in protest of what he and his party 
considered fraudulent election results. After the split between the leadership in 2005 Baimenov took 
up his place in the Mazhilis. 
81 Author's interview with senior Nagiz Ak Zhol Official, 24 October 2006. 
82 Roman Kuznetsov, All Together Now, Transitions Online, 13 September 2004. 
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constituency based seats. A MMM system did not produce greater pluralism in the 
legislature, as Otan and other pro-presidential parties dominated the parliament. 83 
As noted by one Kazakh analyst, `the authorities will do anything to not let 
opposition parties into parliament'. 84 The devising of formal rules which are written 
with the expectation they will be informally interpreted and selectively applied 
illustrates how the authorities achieve their desired result. It also demonstrates how 
informal politics affects the operation of formal rules regarding electoral competition 
and thus the development of political parties. Yet, at the same time it exemplifies 
how formal rules are used to bind in and, to an extent, legitimise the informal 
behaviour of clients as they seek to exhibit loyalty to their patron - the president. 
2.3 Full Proportional (PR) System 
In May 2007, president Nazarbaev announced further alterations to the institutional 
arrangement of the political system. The changes were constitutionally wide ranging 
altering the role of parliament, the judiciary and political parties. 85 The key change 
to the electoral system was the implementation of a fully proportional electoral 
system by party list. The change according to the president would `give political 
parties additional opportunities to strengthen their role in the political system of the 
country, having provided a real reflection of the distribution of political forces and 
the valid will of the population. ' 86 However, the reform resulted in a one-party 
parliament and the marginalisation of other political parties. 87 The change in 
electoral design can be explained again by internal and external factors. The murder 
of Altynbek Sarsenbaev, co-chairman of Nagiz AK Zhol had created tension between 
the authorities and the opposition. A commitment to `democratic reforms' was an 
effort to defuse some of the pressure and improve public perceptions of the 
authorities after the murder. 88 Kazakhstan's pursuit of the OSCE chairmanship for 
83 Most of the self-nominated candidates who won seats in these elections, 24 in 1999 and 18 in 2004, 
were either affiliated with Otan, backed by local executives or supportive of the president. 
84 Author's interview with political analyst, 1 November 2006, Almaty. 
85Vladislav Shpakov, Zavtra Nachinaetsia segodnia, Ekspress-K, 16 May, 2007. 
86 Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 17 May 2007. 
87 See, Rico Isaacs, Parliamentary Election in Kazakhstan, August 2007, Electoral Studies, Vol. 27, 
No. 2,2008, pp. 381-384. 
88 Sarsenbaev was found murdered alongside his driver and bodyguard in the mountains outside of 
Almaty. Ten people were convicted of the murders including Yerzhan Utembaev, the former chief of 
staff to the Senate who was convicted of requesting Rustam Ibragimov, a former Interior Ministry 
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2009 was also a significant driver in Nazarbaev wishing to redesign the electoral 
system in an effort to prove his democratic credentials. 89 
The changes were arrived at through a process of national and state level 
commissions which explored the potential of `further democratic reform'. 90 The new 
design established a full proportional electoral system by party list and an increase in 
the number of deputies in parliament from 77 to 107. Nine seats were to be elected 
by the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (ANK), a loyal institution, to recall the 
previous chapter, appointed by the president. The president, therefore, was given the 
constitutional right to appoint members to the lower chamber. It was understood by 
some elites that the shift to a fully proportional system `in the short-term [would] 
cause the domination of one party. ' 91 The amalgamation of the other pro-presidential 
parties into Nur Otan ensured, with the use of administrative resources by state 
agencies and local executives, no other party would surpass the 7 percent threshold. 
A further change to the law outlawed the use of electoral blocs in parliamentary 
elections. The removal of electoral blocs was an attempt to constrain the opposition's 
chances of surmounting the threshold. It was introduced on the basis that if the 
opposition parties wished to unite they would have to do so formally as opposed to a 
loose electoral coalition. The authorities assumed correctly that divisions between 
the parties were insurmountable to formally united, only Nagiz Ak Zhol and OSDP 
managed to merge, with the KPK and Alga refusing to be involved. 92 As with the 
MMM system many of these institutional constraints were established to assist the 
electoral and legislative domination of Nur Otan on the expected basis that formal 
employee to murder Sarsenbaev for a critical article he had written about him. The opposition, and 
Sarsenbaev's family, believed the official outcome of the trial to be unrealistic and have since pursued 
a re-investigation in to the murders. See Joanne Lillis, 'Kazakhstani Assassination Trial Concludes 
with Guilty Verdicts, Questions Continue', www. eurasianet. org, 9 May 2006, 
httn: //www. eurasianet. org/departments/insight/articles/eav090506. shtml 
89 Oraz Zhandosov, 7 bystrykh myslei v kontse zharkogo let 2001 goda, www. kub. kz, 
httv: //www. kub. info/article. php? sid=18990 23 August 2007. 
90 The process and forums for the discussion of further political reform had taken the form of three 
bodies, the Standing Council on Proposals for Further Democratisation and Development of Civil 
Society (PDS) which was active from 2002-2004, National Commission for Democratisation and 
Civil Society (NKVD) which was active 2004-2006 and the State Commission for Democratic 
Reforms which was active from 2006-2007. See Rico Isaacs, `Managing Dissent, Limiting Risk and 
Consolidating Power: The Processes and Results of Constitutional Reform in Kazakhstan', Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 44, No. 1,2008. 
91 Author's interview with Alikhan Baimenov, Chairman of Ak Zhol. 
92'Alga' (DVK) otklonil predlozhenie o vkhozhdenii partii v sostav OSDP, Press-sluzhba NP 'Alga' 
(DVK), 14 June 2007. 
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rules will be informally interpreted and selectively applied by state agencies and 
local executives to ensure advantage for Nur Otan. Some of these changes mirror 
alterations in Russia where the Russian Law on Elections was also amended 
including the introduction of a7 percent threshold and the banning of electoral blocs. 
2.4 The Influence of Informal Political Behaviour and Relations on Formal Rules 
Each wave of reform of the electoral system has been designed to create the 
impression of a slow evolution towards democracy in Kazakhstan. They were also 
designed, however, to create advantages for pro-presidential parties under the 
assumption that the local executives and state agencies would selectively apply, 
informally interpret and preference, and at times ignore the formal rules in favour of 
pro-presidential parties. The experience of the post-Soviet world suggests that formal 
rules are subject to different forms of informal politics, 93 here however four 
particular forms will be addressed in relation to Kazakhstan; candidate registration, 
the formation of electoral commissions, campaigning and vote counting. 
Candidate Registration 
In the cases of both the 1999 and 2004 elections held under the MMM system the 
selective application of the law, directed by local executives and other state agencies 
strengthened the position of pro-presidential parties and marginalised the opposition. 
For example, the improvements in the registration process were undermined by the 
barring of candidates the authorities did not want to see participating. In the 1999 
election, Kazhegeldin was barred from running due to an earlier administrative 
penalty which had kept him from partaking in the 1999 presidential election (see 
previous chapter). 94 In the 2004 election while the initial registration of candidates 
was seemingly fair and open, a process of de-registration was used during the 
election campaign to ensure candidates the authorities considered undesirable were 
removed from the electoral process. The most notable example was Bolat Abilov, 
co-chairman of Ak Zhol, who was removed from the ballot on the basis of a 
suspended sentence for slander. In total there were 32 cases of candidates being de- 
registered, many close to election-day mainly on questionable grounds for financial 
93 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics. 
94 Ibid. 
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reporting errors. 95 The decisions on de-registration were held in closed sessions of 
the CEC and demonstrates how formal state bodies only strictly applied the formal 
rules regarding candidate registration in the case of opposition candidates. 
Candidates who were able to appeal the decision at the Supreme Court level found 
the decision upheld in favour of the CEC. 96 These instances illustrate that while 
formally the rules were being adhered to, the informal selective application of the 
rules were used by the CEC and the courts to demonstrate loyalty to the regime by 
making sure non-preferred opposition candidates were excluded. 
Electoral Commissions 
Electoral Commissions are bodies that oversee the electoral process. 97 It has been 
argued by political parties that `commissions significantly help make the election 
process more fair and transparent'. 98 Prior to 1999, regional Akims were responsible 
for appointing the commissions. Loyal patrons, reliant on local executives for their 
livelihood, such as teachers or doctors, were usually selected on the basis that they 
represented a reliable source of patronage. 99 The rules were changed in 1999 so that 
political parties would be guaranteed at least one seat on all commissions through the 
process of drawing lots. Yet, concern remained that local Akims were influencing the 
selection of commission members. 100 The rules were altered again in 2002 so that the 
corresponding Maslikhats based on nominations put forward by political parties 
would elect commissions. '°' Despite outwardly seeming to grant political parties 
greater control over the electoral process the election commissions remained 
resolutely staffed with pro-presidential parties. For example, prior to the 2004 
election Asar and Otan had 99 and 98 percent of their nominees elected to 
95 ODIIIR, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections 19 September and 3 October 2004: 
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report, (Warsaw, 15 December 2004). 
96 There was one instance where the decision was overturned involving a candidate in Pavlodar, 
constituency 52. 
97 There are four levels to electoral commissions in Kazakhstan: National (CEC), Territorial (Oblast 
Level), District (Raion level) and Precinct (polling district level). Electoral commissions are 
responsible for the organisation of the election, voter lists and vote counting at each level. Each 
commission consists of seven members. 
98 Author's interview with Adisha Amanovna, Chief Coordinator of the Almaty City Branch of Auyl, 
25 April 2007, Almaty. 
99 ODIIIR, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections 10 and 24 October 1999. 
'°° ODIHR, Republic of Kazakhstan: Review of the Election Legislation for Parliamentary Elections 
(Warsaw, 18 January 2001). 
1o' Article 10, Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Elections (2004). 
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commissions compared to 51 and 20 percent for Ak Zhol and DCK respectively. 102 In 
2007, opposition representation on the commissions was minimal compared to all 
other parties. Nur Otan topped the number of representatives on the commissions 
with 9943 (see table 4.1), but most other parties were represented fairly (all were 
from either loyal opposition or pro-presidential parties) with the exception of OSDP 
(including Nagiz Ak Zhol) who only had 1358 members on all election commission 
across the country. 103 
Table 4.1 Composition of Electoral Commissions for the 2007 Parliamentary and 
Local Elections 
Parties Members of the Election Commissions 
Nominated by Political Parties 
Nur Otan 9943 
Auyl 8360 
Ak Zhol (with Adilet) 8343 
Rukhaniyat 7312 
Party of Patriots 6684 
KNPK 4375 
Other Public Associations 16605 
OSDP (with Nagiz Ak Zhol) 1358 
Total opposition representation 1358 
Total pro-presidential or loyal opposition 
representation 
616,622 
(Table adapted from figures taken from a press conference given by Zharmakhan Tuiakbai, leader of 
OSDP, in Astana August 17,2007). 
The dominance of pro-presidential representation on the commissions was important 
for the regime as it allowed it to control the electoral process and guarantee a 
102 ODIIIR, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections 19 September and 3 October 2004. 
103 All other parties were considered sufficiently loyal to the regime, even Alikhan Baimenov's Ak 
Zhol who after merging with the outright pro-presidential Adilet before the election was now 
considered by many of his former colleagues as `just another pro-presidential politician'. Author's 
interview with Marzhan Aspandiarova, former Head of the Almaty City Branch of Nagiz Ak Zhol, 16 
May 2007, Almaty. 
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predominantly pro-presidential parliament. To make certain opposition parties' 
appearance on election commissions was kept to a minimum, local Akims and 
Maslikhats were called upon to provide loyalty and assistance to generate the 
preferred result. 104 In the first instance, the Maslikhats are dominanted by pro- 
presidential parties, most notably Nur Otan who claimed to hold 64 percent of 
Maslikhat seats across the country and it is their responsibility to elect commission 
members. 105 Therefore, it should be no surprise that Nur Otan Maslikhat deputies 
elect Nur Otan or other pro-presidential nominees. The voting procedure is supposed 
to be carried out by secret ballot, however, one opposition observer noted `there 
were no cabins for secret voting, and all the members of the Maslikhats were sitting 
right next to each other while voting. '106 The lack of transparency guaranteed local 
authorities could provide the conditions in which Nur Otan Maslikhat deputies 
upheld their duty as loyal clients of the local Akim and as members of the president's 
party by ensuring few opposition members are elected. Akims continued to influence 
the selection process by utilising their power of patronage to guarantee that state 
employees under their authority represent pro-presidential parties who make certain 
their subordinates do them same, thus informally instituting a series of patron-client 
relationships. For example, an Akim appoints the directors of schools who will then 
`not allow their teachers to represent political parties other than Nur Otan '. 107 
Therefore, the use of patronage by local Akims protects the electoral commissions 
from the influence of opposition parties. As a result, the authorities and the local 
executives have greater control over the rest of the electoral process. 
Election Campaign 
With control over the election commissions secured through the use of patronage 
local executives are positioned to exert further influence over the election campaign 
on behalf of their patron, the president. Despite Article 27 of the Constitution 
prohibiting officials of state bodies from using administrative resources or the 
advantage of their position to influence the election, 108 the interference of local 
104 Olga Petrova, A kem by byli do vyborov v izbirkomy, www. kub. kz, 29 May 2007, 
httg_//www. kub. info/article. php? sid=17709. 
105 Politsoveta `Otan', 0 prodelannoi rabote za periods 2002 po 2006 god, (Astana, RGKP, 2006). 
106 Author's interview with Amirbek Togussov, Head of the Almaty City Branch of OSDP, 15 April 
2007, Almaty. 
107 Author's Interview with Amirbek Togussov. 
108 Zakonodatel'stvo o vyborakh v respublike Kazakhstan (Almaty, Iurist, 2006). 
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executives was a common feature of the 1999,2004 and 2007 parliamentary 
elections. Candidate intimidation, the cross-pollination of official election activities, 
the distribution of Nur Otan party material, the threat of job losses for state 
employees for supporting candidates not approved by local executives and the 
campaigning of local executives for favoured candidates have been common 
instances. One newspaper report on the 2004 parliamentary election noted how the 
Akim of Northern Kazakhstan, Tair Mansurov, held a closed meeting where the 
Akims of the local districts and villages were invited and instructed to provide 
victory in the elections for the candidate from the AIST bloc (GPK and APK), 
Mikhail Troshikhin, with 70 percent of the vote. 109 The report makes further 
reference to teachers, doctors, directors of schools and heads of state factories being 
strongly pressured into agitating only for Troshikhin. 110 In the 2004 parliamentary 
election opposition candidates in the Karaganda Oblast suggested the Aim, 
Kamaltin Mukhamedzhanov, used similar tactics. They argued he applied `the 
majesty of administrative resources' to falsify the result in favour of the preferred 
pro-regime candidate. l l' Similar excesses of Aims influencing the electoral process 
were present during the 2007 parliamentary election to the extent that it had become 
`an integral part of the operated electoral process'. "2 
Local executives fulfilled their loyal duties in other ways to achieve the right result 
in their Oblast. For example, Akims were responsible for compiling voter lists and 
were able to massage the numbers by including names of people who were resident 
in properties that had since been demolished. 113 In other instances, the power 
afforded to local Akimats gave them the opportunity to influence political parties' 
ability to organise public meetings. To arrange public campaign meetings parties 
109 Respublika, 1 October 2004. 
10 The interesting angle of this case is that the candidate who complained and put forward these 
allegations was from Otan. Indeed the intense conflict between the main pro-presidential parties was 
one of the features of the campaign and more likely than not a significant factor in the president 
deciding to unite the major pro-presidential parties in 2006. However, when the author interviewed 
the leader of the Civil Party, Azat Perushev, he complained of Akim interference against several of his 
candidates during the 2004 parliamentary election campaign. 
111 Respublika, 24 September 2004. 
Il2Kazis Toguzbaev, Zharkoe leto 2007-go, www. kub. kz, 29. June 2007, 
http: //www. kub. info/article. phD? sid=18327. 
113 The OSCE report for the 2007 election highlights the case of Almaty where observers noted the 
inclusion of over 400 persons from demolished properties on the voter list. See ODIHR, Republic of 
Kazakhstan Parliamentary Election, 18 August 2007, (Warsaw, OSCE/ODIHR, 30 October 2007). 
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have to request permission from local executives. With this power local Akimats 
discriminate against opposition parties by either rejecting their applications to hold a 
public rally or only permitting them on the basis they are held in remote locations 
outside the city. Rallies for Nur Otan, on the other hand, were granted permission to 
be held in main public places. The 2007 election, in particular, saw the selective 
application of the law used to good effect by Akims. OSCE observers reported that 
OSDP and Ak Zhol were give unsuitable venues in Aktobe, Atyrau, Karaganda and 
Almaty while Nur Otan was permitted to organise meetings with voters in a variety 
of ways. 114 Aims also allowed the distribution of Nur Otan material in some polling 
stations. 115 Combined with the preferential treatment given by the media throughout 
the country, ' 16 the selective interpretation of rules by Aims keen to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the president, offered Nur Otan an unparalleled advantage in the 
elections of 1999,2004 and 2007. This phenomenon illustrates the centrality of 
loyalty and patronage to election processes. The impact on party development is 
clear; political parties other than the leading pro-presidential parties are 
marginalised. 
Vote Falsification 
During both the 1999,2004 and 2007 parliamentary elections instances of multiple 
voting, the absence of voters' names from the electoral roll, incorrect signatures on 
ballot papers, the presence of unauthorised persons at polling stations, transparent 
ballot boxes, the removal of international observers and the altering and late posting 
of protocols were all noted occurrences. 17 The biggest impact of these violations 
was on the opposition, in particular with the alleged altering of the protocols prior to 
the official announcement of the results. When discussing the 2004 election, Tulegen 
Zhukeev, co-chairman of Ak Zhol at the time, stressed `the election results were 
falsified. In the evening after the election the party got 21 percent even after the 
government manipulated the votes, then in the morning it was announced that we 
"" Ibid. 
1 15 ODIIIR, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Election, 18 August 2007. 
116`Rezul'taty monitoringa respublikanskikh elektronnykh SMI po osveshcheniiu deiatel'nosti partii', 
www. zonakz. net, http: //zonakz. net/articles/18726. 
117 See ODIHR, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections 10 and 24 October 1999, ODIHR, 
Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections 19 September and 3 October 2004 and ODIHR, 
Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Election, 18 August 2007. 
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had less. "' 8 Zhukeev's argument that Ak Zhol received a higher proportion of the 
vote rather than the 12 percent announced by the CEC is supported by opinion polls 
prior to the vote. 19 The role of the election commissions was important in this 
process and by ensuring they were staffed with loyal supporters the Akim could 
guarantee the desired result for the president. During the 1999 election the OSCE 
alluded to such collusion between the Akimats and the election commissions, for 
example reporting that `in one district of Almaty, District Election Commission 
members met with the Aim shortly before the tabulation of results started. ' 120 In 
2007 while the formal campaign and the management of the elections by the CEC 
was declared to have improved significantly by international observers, ' 21 the vote 
counting process, under the control of smaller electoral commissions, influenced 
heavily by the local executives, were prone to blatant electoral violations seen in 
previous elections. 122 OSDP complained vigorously that under the supervision of 
local executives there were a significant number of violations in the electoral process 
that denied OSDP's perceived collection of votes they claim took them over the 7 
percent threshold. 123 For some political elites it was clear who was responsible for 
the falsification vote counting process, when asked directly one respondent simply 
replied `it was the Aims'. 124 
The institutional dominance of the presidency and the personal power of the 
president have afforded Nazarbaev the opportunity to design electoral rules to suit 
his ambition of centralising power in his hands. This is achieved by promoting 
electoral changes which provide a surface image for critics at home and abroad of 
democratic evolution. However, many formal rules were introduced to advantage 
parties supporting the president and these formal rules were designed in a fashion 
118 Author's interview with Tulegen Zhukeev, former co-chairman of Nagiz Ak Zhol and now 
currently General Secretary of Azat, 21 February 2007, Almaty. 
119 Roman Kuznestov, Better on Paper than in Reality, Transitions Online, 22 September 2004. 
120 ODIHR, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections 10 and 24 October 1999, p. 20. 
121 ODIHR, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Election, 18 August 2007, (Warsaw, 
OSCE/ODIHR, 30 October 2007). 
122 The author observed a news program on Channel 31 (considered the only `independent' TV 
station) were secret film footage was shown of several incidences where election precinct managers, 
under the authority of local executives, were caught participating in ballot stuffing and multiple 
voting. On election-day itself OSDP held regular press conferences and released hourly updates of 
their observation of electoral violations. 
123 OSDP Press Release, Po dannym protokolov uchastkovykh izbirastel'nyh komissii OSDP uverenno 
preodolela 7protsentyi barer, Astana 23 August 2007. 
124 Author's interview with senior figure in Ak Zhol, 18 January 2007, Almaty. 
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which allowed for either the selective application or complete ignoring of the rules 
and the informal preferencing in favour of pro-presidential parties. The extensive 
presence of patronage at the local level ensures the president can rely on loyal Akims 
to place pressure on their clients to make sure the electoral process is engineered in 
favour of loyal pro-presidential parties. Local executives use informal forms of 
political behaviour to undermine opposition efforts in parts of the electoral process 
including; candidate registration, electoral commissions, election campaigning and 
vote falsification. At the same time, the rules of electoral competition also provide a 
formal institutional context within which these informal forms of political behaviour 
and relations become legitimised. As the rules regarding electoral competition are 
strict in places it gives state actors the legitimate opportunity to apply those rules 
where they see appropriate, usually against opposition parties. As such, this indicates 
the complex nature of the relationship between informal politics and formal 
institutions. The effect of loyalty and patronage influencing and shaping electoral 
design and institutional constraints has been the eventual domination of parliament 
by a single pro-presidential party, now argued by many to be the modern version of 
the CPSU, which the president has been keen to establish since independence. 125 The 
strength of the presidency and the president's position in society goes beyond 
influencing the institutional constraints through electoral design as the president has 
also established a law affecting how parties can organise, operate and exist in 
Kazakhstan. `The Law on Political Parties' is an effective measure, if not more so, 
than electoral rules, for guaranteeing the president can maintain dominance of the 
legislature and the political parties emerging in the country. 
3. The Law on Political Parties 
Similar to the institutional constraints of the president/presidency and electoral 
competition, the Law on Political Parties is subject to informal forms of political 
behaviour and relations in the shape of selective interpretation and application of the 
rules. State agencies interested in proving loyalty to the president selectively apply 
the existing rules governing party genesis, organisation and activity in a manner 
which benefits pro-presidential parties. The consequence of this relationship between 
125 Mukhamedzhan Adilov, Vse vozvrashchaetsia na krugi svoia? Respublika, 6 July 2007. 
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the law and its execution is the marginalisation and criminalisation of political 
parties the presidential administration does not wish to see active and participating in 
the political process. While some opposition parties are registered, it tends to be 
those who have previous connections with the regime and who are less stringent in 
their criticisms of the president. Moreover, by registering such parties the president 
is able to demonstrate to the international community that opposition parties are 
permitted in Kazakhstan. Parties such as Azat and OSDP possess less of a threat to 
Nazarbaev than the more outright oppositional Alga. However, the law is restrictive 
and places major requirements on political parties to achieve registration. The law 
was originally introduced in 1996 as a way to manage and define the role of political 
parties in the state; it was considerably altered in 2002. This section deals mainly 
with the reasons for the changes in the law, its affect on political parties and the 
relationship between formal rules and their selective application. It will again 
illustrate how informal political behaviour influences the development of political 
parties, but also how formal rules legitimise the informal behaviour of loyal state 
agencies. 
3.1 Drivers for the 2002 Law on Political Parties 
The pre- and early post independence flowering of public associations and political 
parties in Kazakhstan saw rather limited rules governing their official status and role 
within society. According to one report in Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, `in the late 
eighties numerous clubs and fringe groups of different movements appeared like 
mushrooms after the rain. They were easily registered at the time. To file an 
application to local Akimats and add a protocol of its members meeting and rules was 
enough to register the group. ' 126 It was the lack of cohesion within the law that led 
the president to introduce laws regarding Public Associations (adopted May 1996) 
and Political Parties (July 1996). The 1996 `Law on Political Parties' was established 
to define `the legal role and basis for the creation of political parties, their rights and 
duties, guarantee activities; regulate relations between political parties, parties with 
126 Zakony rabotaiut na stabilnost' Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, I June 2001, 
h! M: //www. kazpravda. kz/index. php? uin=l 1151 64545 7&chanter=1004060102&act=archive date&day 
=0 1 &month=06&year=2001. 
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state organs and other organisations. ' 127 Under Article 6 of the 1996 law a party 
could be created on the initiative of no less than ten citizens convoking a constituent 
congress. To achieve registration with the state parties must have no less than 3000 
members in at least half the Oblasts of the country. '28 The law possessed no formal 
restrictions on the basis of which parties could organise. Therefore, parties 
representing various interests and segments of society were able to register officially 
with the state. 129 Under the law of 1996, political parties had minimal restrictions 
placed on them and in many ways it helped `further the development of political 
130 pluralism'. 
So what were the drivers influencing the change in the law in 2002? The change in 
law can be explained by the emergence of new opposition parties linked to the 
process of elite fragmentation. RNPK, DVK and Ak Zhol appeared as new political 
parties with financial backing, a well-organised and supported structure and fronted 
by well-known public figures. The presence of well-developed opposition parties 
posed a threat to Nazarbaev's dominance of the political space and his monopoly of 
political ideas. One senior figure of Ak Zhol alliterated this point: 
"The Law on Political Parties was created against Ak Zhol. The first meeting 
of the party was on the 16 March 2002. We were working under the previous law. 
We had to hold conferences in nine regions of the country and establish branches 
there. In order to officially register we needed 3000 members and we were able to 
conduct conferences in all regions of Kazakhstan. By May we filed in all regions the 
documents necessary to register the party. We were moving so far and so fast that the 
Otan deputies in parliament pushed through the new Law on Political Parties, which 
was of course created by the administration. The law was accepted and we did not 
127 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan 0 politicheskikh partikh, 1996, in I. 0., Buluktaev, C. A., 
D'iachenko and L. I. Karmazina, Politicheskie Partii Kazakhstana Spravochnik 1998 (Almaty, IPK, 
1998). 
128 Ibid. 
129 For example, Alash was based on the interests of ethnic Kazakhs and was committed to a policy of 
uniting all Turkic speaking people, while Compatriot's ideology was based on the interests of ethnic 
Russians and `EI Dana' the Democratic Party of Women obviously represented the female 
constituency. 
130 Zakony rabotaiut na stabilnost' Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 1 June 2001. 
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get any registration in any region of the country. We were held back and they were 
trying to prevent us getting registered. 9131 
It is clear from the perspective of this new opposition that the law was altered to 
impede their development, their ability to register and their chances of participating 
in electoral competition. A representative of DVK further stressed the correlation 
between new opposition parties and the change in the law. `We have influenced 
some laws. For example, the previous Law on Political Parties required that a party 
registers 3000 members. After the creation of DVK, which shocked the government, 
the number went up to 50,000. ' 132 The process of elite fragmentation, derived from 
factional inter-elite competition, impacted on how the authorities used formal rules 
to manage party development. The emergence of competitive factional elite groups 
using parties as formal vehicles to promote and protect their political and economic 
interests was a harbinger of instability. The law was amended to manage and 
stabilise this phenomenon. 
3.2 The 2002 Law on Political Parties 
It was the rise of an opposition with the potential to threaten Nazarbaev's hold of 
power which prompted the alteration of the Law on Political Parties. Otan deputies 
proposed the law to the Mazhilis during the spring session in 2002 with the backing 
of both the GPK and APK factions. The Political Council of Otan drew up the draft 
law with considerable prompting, input and support from the presidential 
administration. 1 33 In this it is worth noting the importance of Otan as a vehicle for 
pushing through laws on behalf of the president while at the same time creating a 
veneer of independent activity on the part of the legislature. There were three central 
contentious clauses in the amended law. The first was the increase in the number of 
members required for parties to achieve registration with the Ministry of Justice from 
3000 to 50,000. Under Article 10.5, `to obtain state registration, a political party 
must have at least 50,000 members representing structural subdivisions of the party 
in all Oblasts, with the number of members not less than 700'. 134 Second, under 
Article 6.1 the number of members required to be present at the constituent congress 
131 Author's interview with senior figure in Ak Zhol, 18 January 2007, Almaty. 
132 Author's interview with Vladimir Kozlov, leader of Alga, 9 January 2007, Almaty. 
133 `Ispravliat' partinoe zakonodatel'stvo', Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 3 May 2002. 
134 Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan `Law on Political Parties in Kazakhstan' (2002). 
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increased from ten to 1,000. Third, Article 5.8 outlined how `no political party may 
be founded on the basis of a particular profession, race, nationality, ethnic origin or 
religion, and no local organisation of a political party may be founded within any 
governmental or local self governmental authorities. ' 135 
The initial reaction from the opposition was negative. The political council of RNPK 
declared that the law aimed `to remove from the political life of the country those 
political parties that have offended the current administration'. ' 36 The law creates 
restrictive boundaries on party registration. In particular, the necessity of having 
50,000 members was viewed by nearly all party elites and analysts as almost 
farcical. According to one analyst, `this law is ridiculous, Kazakhstan has a 
population of 15 million to have 50,000 members to start a political party is too large 
a number'. 137 Even members of Nur Otan argued the central weakness in the law 
was `the large numbers required for registration'. 138 This aspect of the law formally 
limits the ability of parties to obtain registration. It has acted as a lever for the 
authorities to control which parties can achieve registration and, therefore, compete 
in electoral competition. The Ministry of Justice is able to selectively apply the rules 
according to its discretion. Officials from the Ministry are able to check every 
signature fastidiously and under the rules if just one signature is found to be 
illegitimate then the whole registration process can be cancelled. The necessity of 
having a 1000 people present at the constituent congress also places formal 
restrictions on parties not favoured by the authorities. Opposition parties found 
accessing a venue capable of holding 1000 people difficult `as the most suitable 
venues require permission from the Akimats'. 139 Moreover, `getting together 1000 
people from all regions of the country requires huge financial and human capital 
which is not always at the disposal of the opposition'. 140 
The immediate effect of the new law was the re-organisation of the party system, as 
all political parties were required to seek re-registration under the new rules. Of the 
135 Ibid. 
136 `Zakonu o partiiakh - boikot! ' Zaiavlenie Ispolnitel'nogo komiteta RNPK, Press-sluzhba RNPK, 
29 May 2002, httr): //kazhegeldin. addr. com/2002/-3-0-05 02 1 About. htm. 
137 Author's interview with Political Analyst, 21 November 2006, Almaty. 
138 Author's interview with senior figure in Nur Otan, 8 May 2007, Almaty. 
139 Author's interview with senior figure in Ak Zhol, 18 January 2007, Almaty. 
140 Author's interview with Vladimir Kozlov, leader of Alga, 9 January 2007, Almaty. 
182 
19 parties registered prior to the change in the law seven were re-instated under the 
new rules, four failed the new registration procedures and the remainder never re- 
applied. Ak Zhol, GPK, Otan, APK, KPK, Party of Patriots and Auyl were all re- 
registered. Ak Zhol's close association with the administration, their more collegial 
and softer approach towards Viast' ensured it safely navigated the pitfalls of the 
registration process. 14' The KPK, according to its leader, only obtained state 
registration because he sat with the registration committee and `made them check all 
the list of signatures we had line by line. '142 Other opposition parties had neither the 
connections nor the gravitas (Abdil'din is widely respected among Kazakh political 
elites) to ensure their parties' applications were approved. The major opposition 
party of the previous few years, RNPK, led by former Prime Minister Akezhan 
Kazhegeldin, was refused registration on the basis of invalid documentation. '43 
Therefore, the alteration of the formal rules had guaranteed the political vehicle of 
Nazarbaev's chief political opponent had been removed from the political 
mainstream - unable to compete electorally and denied the opportunity to publicly 
appeal to the nation for support. As the deputy leader of RNPK had predicted the 
new party law was sought to `candidly squash the opposition and other objectionable 
parties'. '44 Other opposition parties also failed to make it through the registration 
process; Azamat, Alash, NKK, SPK and Compatriot were all rejected official party 
registration by the Ministry of Justice. '45 All parties were liquidated on the basis 
that some of the documents they submitted for registration were considered void. 
Most pro-presidential parties had little difficulty obtaining registration even with 
little visible membership and support. 146 Evidently, the Ministry of Justice had a 
great deal of discretion with regards to what is acceptable in terms of how they 
applied the rules. 
141'Na 9 iiunia v Kazakhstane zaregistrirovano 10 politicheskikh partii', Kazinform 10 June 2004, 
htti): //www. nomad. su/? a=3-200406100019. 
142 Author's interview with Serikbolsyn Abdil'din. 
'43'V Kazakhstane likvidirovany chetyre partii', www. nomad. su. 12 May 2004, 
htto: //www. nomad. su/? a=3-200405120021. 
144 `Zakonu o partiiakh - boikot! ' Zaiavlenie Ispolnitel'nogo komiteta RNPK, Press-sluzhba RNPK 
145 'Skol'ko v Kazakhstane partii? ', Press-Sluzhboi Mazhilis, 10 April 2003, 
httv: //zonakz. net/articies/? artid=3125. 
146 The one outright pro-presidential party not to be officially re-registered was Altynshash 
Dzhaganova's Party of Revival of Kazakhstan which according to the Ministry of Justice did not 
submit documents in accordance with the new law. However, while her party was denied registration 
in March 2003, she reconstituted her party as Rukhaniiat and was quickly registered with ease in 
October of the same year. 
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The introduction of a Law on Political Parties was ostensibly introduced in 1996 to 
manage and codify the role of political parties. However, tough and restrictive 
amendments to the law in 2002 were established to manage the emergence of new 
opposition parties who had appeared due to elite level factional competition. The law 
was designed in such a way that actually meeting the targets for membership 
numbers required for registration was incredibly difficult. As a result, it gave a great 
deal of informal power to officials at the Ministry of Justice with regards to how they 
applied the law. As might be expected, the law was applied leniently to pro- 
presidential parties and strictly to opposition parties, as officials sought to impress 
upon the president their loyalty. 
3.3 The Selective Application of the Formal Rules: The Case of Alga 
The above factors illustrate the relationship between the institutional law governing 
party genesis and organisation and informal political behaviour. The law consists of 
formal articles that are strict and violable which allows for the interpretation of the 
rules to be left to the personal judgement of officials keen to illustrate loyalty. 
Yevgeni Zhovtis outlined this phenomenon, `the law not only has restrictive 
democratic provisions but inherent in the nature of this legal act is wording which 
provides for discretion and manipulation. The authorities misinterpret it and 
implement it in a way to benefit the ruling elite. This law, the 50,000 required for 
membership and the necessity for getting a 1000 people in one place is absolutely 
stupid and it is clear that it has nothing to do with any desire to create a viable 
political system and political parties. ' 147 
The most prominent case of selective application of the formal rules being used 
against a party is Alga. Alga was created after DVK was liquidated by a court in 
Almaty on the grounds the party was responsible for undermining the `social 
harmony, political stability and the national security of the state', due to encouraging 
people to undertake actions of civil disobedience after the falsified parliamentary 
elections of 2004.14' A new amendment was added to the law after the liquidation of 
DVK which ruled out parties taking on the name of political parties that had been 
147 Author's interview with Yevgeni Zhovtis, Director of Kazakhstan's International Bureau for 
Human Rights and the Rule of Law', 31 January 2007, Almaty. 
148`Zaiavlenie o likvidatsii ioridicheskogo litsa, www. procuror. kz, 13 December 2004, 
h "/ttp /www_procuror. kz/? iid=5&type=news&lang=ru&nid=61. 
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banned. As a result, under the leadership of Assylbek Kozhakhmetov, the remaining 
members of DVK established Alga. The party has attempted to register with the 
Ministry of Justice on two occasions, but at the time of writing the party still remains 
unregistered and unable to participate formally in electoral competition. Alga's 
process of registration provides a vivid example of how the explicit application of 
the rules by government agencies can ensure a party fails in its registration process. 
Alga's first attempt was in 2005 after they had failed to overturn the verdict on the 
liquidation of DVK. Despite collecting 63,000 members registration forms the 
Ministry of Justice used delaying tactics and then discrimination against Alga to 
deny registration. The Ministry of Justice is required by law to give a political party 
a decision on their registration within 30 days. However, after 30 days Alga 
`received notification that state registration process was to be suspended in necessity 
for the Ministry of Justice to check all the documents. ' 149 Five months later after 
finding 469 `inaccuracies' among the documentation the party was refused 
registration. According to senior party figure Vladimir Kozlov, `the party's 
registration was refused on the basis of just 0.7 percent falsifications. 150 For 
example, the falsification in the number of people who nominated Nazarbaev for the 
presidential election was 1.5 percent. This is the official figure announced by the 
Ministry of Justice, but still the president was allowed to compete in the 
elections. ' 151 It exhibits how the tough nature of the formal rules gives scope to loyal 
clients of the president to selectively apply the rules to discriminate against political 
parties critical of the president. 
In an attempt to overcome the fastidious approach of the Ministry of Justice towards 
their registration, Alga ensured themselves against alleged falsification of documents 
`by copying every new members identification documents on the back of each 
application'. 152 The authorities once again used a delaying tactic informing the party 
on the last day legally possible that their registration process has been suspended 
149Vystuplenie predstavitelia Narodnoi partii Alga! Vladimira Kozlova na soveshchanii OBSE po 
chelovecheskomu izmereniiu, www. npdvk. kz, 4 October 2007, 
h! M: //www. npdvk. kz/index. 12bD? r)art--announcement&message id=2222. 
150 Falsifications are essentially those members' application forms where the person listed on the form 
is either in fact deceased or no longer residing at the address stated on the form. 
I" Author's interview with Vladimir Kozlov. 
152 Ibid. 
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while a check on all documents was undertaken. '53 However, the authorities 
employed other tactics and in particular local executives and the KNB played crucial 
roles in disrupting the formal process of Alga 's registration. During their 2006 
campaign to recruit members to the party in the Almaty region, Alga party activists 
were arrested and had their belongings and party papers taken from them on the 
instruction of the Akim. '54 In Kostanai Oblast unidentified persons attempted to 
include a number of applications which were forgeries of deceased persons thus 
filling Alga's party documents with falsified applications., 55 However, after the 
submission of documents, there were allegations from all the regions of the country 
that Akims were using informal powers of patronage to get state employees who 
registered with Alga to retract their membership by `threatening non payment of 
wages and grants'. 156 The KNB, according to the party, was utilised to intimidate 
people who signed up. The party received several letters from the Ministry of Justice 
on behalf of members from Pavlodar Oblast who wished to retract their registration 
as members, due to intimidation by the KNB. 157 The case of Alga's attempts at 
registration illustrates how the relationship between the formal institutional rules and 
the informal political behaviour of the president's clients influence party 
development by not allowing for a pluralism of political parties to officially register. 
In particular, the role of Akims highlights how their patronage and patron-client 
networks, based on their ability to award state jobs, allows them to influence the 
process by cajoling party members to resign and retract their registration papers. 
Local executives and state agencies such as the KNB, the courts and the Ministry of 
Justice have consistently proved loyal to Nazarbaev by ensuring DVK and Alga are 
kept out of the political process. 158 
153`Ko mne prikhodili iz Mininosta, is boios', Press-Sluzhba Alga, 11 January 2007, 
htty "//www. kub. info/article. php? sid=15811. 
154 This was attested to by a letter shown to the author by the then leader of Alga, Assylbek 
Kozhakhmetov from the party organisers in the region. Author's interview with Assylbek 
Kozhakhmetov, 26 January 2007, Almaty. 
155 Nasha oppozitsiia... partia Alga delaet tret'iu poytku gosudarstvennoi registratsii, Panorama, 10 
November 2006. 
156 `Ko mne prikhodili iz Miniusta, is boius', Press-Sluzhba NP Alga, 11 January 2007. 
157 The author observed these letters in a meeting with Vladimir Kozlov where he presented eight 
letters of this nature. 
158 Alga is not the only political party who currently is awaiting registration with the Ministry of 
Justice. Atameken (Motherland) another opposition party is also frozen out of the political process. 
Similar tactics by state agencies have been used to disrupt the party's efforts. The leader, Yerzhan 
Dosmukhamedov, has often accused state agencies, including the KNB, of disrupting their 
registration process, intimidating party members and of attempting to engineer a split in the party. 
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The selective nature of the implementation and operation of the `Law on Political 
Parties' can be illustrated by contrasting Alga's difficulties with that of smaller less 
well-financed pro-presidential parties. 159 Two good examples of this are the cases of 
Adilet and the KPPK whose registration process was fast, efficient and not subject to 
the rigours applied to opposition parties. Adilet was originally announced as a 
political party on April 6 2004,160 six months prior to the scheduled parliamentary 
elections. With crucial support from the presidential administration they were 
registered in time for the election without any signatures being questioned. 161 The 
KNPK had a speedy registration process too. The creation of the party was 
announced on the 10 March 2004,162 their constituent congress held on 24 April, 163 
the registration documents were handed to the Ministry of Justice on the 20 May'64 
and the Ministry registered the party on the 21 June. 165 That parties who support and 
are linked to the presidential administration are fast tracked through the party 
registration process is no surprise. What it does illustrate is the relationship between 
informal forms of political behaviour and formal legislation. The law is framed in 
such a way that violation is almost inevitable. The immense hurdles parties are 
required to overcome mean that most parties are likely to violate the law in some 
fashion or another. Therefore, officials are left with the informal power to selectively 
Dosmukhamedov currently resides abroad in Europe and has stated that he will not return to 
Kazakhstan until both Atameken and Alga are registered. 
159 Alga is believed to be a well-financed party and Assylbek Kozhakhmetov admitted in the author's 
interview that `money is not a problem for the party'. They maintain a well-kept large office space for 
their headquarters in Almaty and the offices in the regions are generally well funded and active as a 
result. It is widely believed among almost all the analysts interviewed as part of this research that 
Mukhtar Abliazov (ex-energy Minister, key elite figure and founder of DVK) funds the party. This, 
however, it has to be stressed cannot be reliably corroborated due to the opaque nature of party 
funding. It was also the opinion of some analysts that Abliazov allegedly also funds Atameken. Again, 
however, the same proviso applies, although when the author met with Dosmukhamedov he did 
suggest that he shared a close relationship with Kozhakhmetov and that he represented the opposition 
abroad and Kozhakhmetov inside Kazakhstan. 
160 'Maksut Narikbaev zayavil ob obrazovanii politicheskoi partii, Kazinform, 6`h April 2004, 
[accessed from http: //www. nomad. su/? a=3-200404060021], retrieved 01.05.2007. 
161 'Demokrat ne tot, kto kritikuet', Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 16`h July 2004, [accessed from 
httn: //www. nomad. su/? a=3-2004071900131 retrieved 06.05.07. 
162 `Kompartiyo rvut na chasti', Novyi vestnik, 10`h March 2005, [accessed 
httn: //www. nomad. su/? a=3-200403170015 - retrieved 01.05.07]. 
163 `Est' takaia partiia! ' , Politika, 
[accessed http: //www. nomad. sul? a=0-200404300000 27th April 
2004 - retrieved 01.05.07]. 
1" 'Novye kommunicty podali dokumenty na registratsiyo', Politika, 20`h May 2004, [accessed 
http: //www. nomad. su/? a=3-200405210008, retrieved 01.05.07]. 
165 `Segodnia poluchila cvidetel 'stvo o gosdarstvbennoi registratsii Kommunisticheskaia Narodnaia 
partiia Kazakhstana', Politika, 22nd June 2004, [accessed http: //www. nomad. su/? a=3-200406220014, 
retrieved 05.05.07]. 
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apply the law as they see fit. Out of loyalty to the president they discriminate against 
opposition parties such as Alga and favour pro-presidential parties such as KNPK 
and Adilet. 
This section has illustrated how the institutional constraint of a law regarding the 
genesis, organisation and activities of parties has been implemented at the behest of 
the president as a way to manage and control party development. Due to the 
instability of elite fragmentation and competition, which produced new well- 
financed opposition parties which threatened his power, the president sought the law 
to maintain control of independent political forces. However, the law is constructed 
in such a strict fashion that violation is mostly inevitable. Therefore, it gives a degree 
of informal power to loyal clients of the president to selectively apply and interpret 
the law as they see fit. This results in the marginalisation and criminalisation of 
opposition parties and the favouring of pro-presidential parties. In this instance the 
relationship between informal and formal politics can be distilled into two points of 
interest. Firstly, informal politics is influencing the development of genuine party 
competition due to the exclusion of opposition parties. Loyal officials have an 
informal degree of power regarding the application and interpretation of the law. 
They do so due to being linked into a patronage network where their position is 
dependent upon the patronage of either the president or a subordinate of the 
president. Second, the nature of formal rules acts to legitimise these informal forms 
of political behaviour and relations. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has sought to explain the relationship between president Nazarbaev's 
position, in both formal and informal terms, and the design of institutional 
constraints affecting political parties. Nazarbaev's political position is sustained by 
the formal powers attached to the presidency underpinned by informal powers of 
patronage based on an extensive patron-client network. From this position the 
president is able to construct institutional constraints which suit his political 
preferences at the expense of other political voices while at the same time appealing 
to the international community by talking the language of democracy and reform. 
Institutional constraints such as the presidency and rules concerning electoral 
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competition are seemingly rational in nature. However, it is the informal underlying 
operation of those institutional constraints which impact significantly on political 
parties. It is the informal powers Nazarbaev possesses such as the extensive patron- 
client network underpinning his rule which invests a great deal of loyalty in his 
leadership, which has helped Nazarbaev control and manage the political system. 
This has ostensibly been achieved by the establishment of a dominant political party 
in the shape of Nur Otan, the creation of small satellite parties and the cooption of 
the opposition. Through the formal and informal powers of the presidency the 
president has been able to shape the emergence of a party system which reflects his 
political interests and helps maintain his political control. Simultaneously, the formal 
institution of a dominant party provides a vehicle for elite stability binding in 
factional elite groups and previously independent actors, and greater control of the 
state apparatus. This has been crucial to the president's centralisation of power. 
Formal rules regarding electoral competition have evolved over time as a way to 
appease critics at home and abroad. However, the formal rules are written in both a 
broad fashion and feature tough articles that give loyal officials of the president 
scope to selectively apply the rules as they see fit. Local executives and state 
agencies interpret and at times ignore the rules to ensure victory for pro-presidential 
parties. This culminated in the 2007 parliamentary election where Nur Otan now 
monopolises parliament. All other political parties are marginalised from the 
political process. Similar to electoral rules the constitutional law specifically 
pertaining to political parties is restrictive in its formal form. The law was initially 
introduced as a way for the administration to manage the emergence of political 
parties and public associations in the early period of independence. It was updated to 
include more restrictive provisions as a way for the authorities to manage the 
emergence of opposition parties, which were created in the aftermath of the different 
waves of elite fragmentation. The scope of the law, however, and in particular the 
restrictiveness of some of the articles regarding state registration, makes violation a 
likely outcome. This gives informal power to state officials to selectively apply the 
law. In the case of pro-presidential parties it is applied leniently and in the case of 
opposition parties such as Alga it is applied strictly. 
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This chapter has highlighted how Nazarbaev, from his critical position within the 
political system, is able to design institutional constraints that limit the development 
of political parties which are critical of his rule. He relies on his informal powers of 
patronage to ensure loyal clients interpret and selectively apply formal rules, which 
are designed with such informal political behaviour in mind, to benefit parties who 
sign up to his political agenda. This has resulted in the complete domination of Nur 
Otan within the party system. It illustrates the complex nature between both informal 
and formal politics. While informal political behaviour and relations are clearly 
affecting the ability of a party system which allows for pluralist views, formal rules 
such as those concerning electoral competition and party genesis and organisation, 
are acting as a way to bind in and legitimise such informal politics. 
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Chapter Five: What Type of Parties? Membership, Organisation, 
Ideology and Behavioural Norms 
Underpinned by informal powers of patronage and an extensive patron-client 
network the president of Kazakhstan has been able to define and manage the formal 
institutional boundaries within which political parties emerge and operate. Formal 
rules, while for the most part are seemingly operating at a rational level in order to 
appeal and impress the international community are designed on the assumption and 
expectation that state agencies and local executives will demonstrate loyalty to the 
president in exchange for their political positions by ensuring the marginalisation of 
political voices which are critical of the regime. It has led to a party system 
dominated by the president's party Nur Otan. What affect, therefore, have these 
formal institutional constraints, influenced by the selective application and informal 
preferencing of formal rules, had on the types of parties that have emerged in 
Kazakhstan? How have parties memberships, organisations, decision-making 
structures, ideologies and behavioural norms been affected by both the informal and 
formal rules of the game within which they have to operate? Moreover to what 
extent, and in what shape, does the formal-informal dynamic apparent in 
neopatrimonial regimes appear internally within political parties? This chapter seeks 
to address these questions. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the party types that have appeared in the post-Soviet 
literature through empirical studies are those generally organised for the purpose of 
competition in electoral politics or alternatively those parties which have been 
created, designed or co-opted to represent or protect elites in power. As will be 
highlighted in this chapter, Kazakh parties display similar characteristics of being 
predominantly vehicles for electoral competition as well as being designed to protect 
the interests of elite groups (although not always those elites who are in power). 
However, this work, and more specifically this chapter, will move away from using 
these post-Soviet specific typologies, in particular the concept of party of power. As 
also discussed in Chapter One, the concept of party of power is a confused and at 
times misdirected term that seems to suggest a party of power possesses power and 
decision-making capabilities. It infers that parties of power are `abnormal' parties 
specific to the former Soviet Union. As discussed earlier, many parties considered 
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parties of power including Nur Otan, the New Azerbaijan Party and Edinaia Rossiia 
(United Russia), do not actually possess or wield power and policy-making faculties. 
Instead, rather than using party types that have evolved in the specific context of the 
experience of the former Soviet Union this chapter will apply the typological 
framework conceived by Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond. As explained in 
Chapter One, Gunther and Diamond's framework is preferred as it empowers the 
observer to place parties' characteristics in a specific temporal and geographical 
context while simultaneously allowing for a more integrative approach with classical 
party typological theories. 
What is the relationship between the institutional constraints discussed in the 
previous chapter, in both the formal and informal sense, and the types of parties 
emerging in post-Soviet Kazakhstan? While the formal constraints of the Law on 
Political Parties signifies on the surface mass nationwide parties the informal 
constraints, characterised by the use of patron-client networks to favour pro- 
presidential parties ensure that membership throughout parties is overall opaque, 
non-voluntary and weak. Party organisation and ideology too is affected by the 
dominance of informal behaviour and relationships. The central role of loyalty and 
personalism in the political system has led to the emergence of parties dedicated to 
serving the interest of political elites, either those close to Nazarbaev, or Nazarbaev 
himself, or those who were once part of the ruling regime and are now in opposition. 
The ideology of political parties in Kazakhstan is therefore reflective of this and has 
a tendency to be based on the personality and personal views of the party leaders. 
Informal forces too have affected behavioural characteristics. The majority of pro- 
presidential parties are subservient to the hegemonic vision of Nazarbaev and his 
party Nur Otan and reflect the loyalty and personalism inherent in the political 
system. The influence of local executives and state agencies in preferring pro- 
presidential parties in the laws and process of electoral competition ensures those 
parties have a competitive advantage without developing genuine competitive 
characteristics. On the other hand, opposition parties seemingly on the surface 
present a commitment to democracy and non-hegemony. However, there are 
concerns that the interest in the language of democracy is only a means to an end in 
their struggle for power and interests. Formal and informal constraints have pushed 
opposition parties to the margins of the political system and therefore they are using 
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the terminology of democracy and transparency as a means of public appeal at home 
and abroad. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to explicitly unpack the structural and 
typological nature of parties in post-Soviet Kazakhstan thus observing their 
organisational, ideological and behavioural characteristics and their relationship with 
the informal forms of political behaviour and relationships that are evident in 
neopatrimonial regimes, some of which have been highlighted in the previous two 
chapters. It will explore not just how the external nature of the informal-formal 
dynamic influences parties, but also how it occurs within them. The chapter explains 
how political parties' formal membership is only of surface appeal and that parties 
are reliant on informal patron-client networks and other informal political techniques 
to acquire and expand party membership. Parties' formal organisations are based on 
a Soviet model which attempts to direct power and decision-making upwards from 
the party base. Informally, however, power lies almost solely with party elites who 
are constructing political parties either for the purpose of protecting, securing or 
representing their economic and political interests or for the purpose of obtaining 
public office for, and increasing the public profile of, a political individual. 
Consequently, while most parties formally put forward ideologies in some shape, 
ideologies are in fact based on the informal politics of personality and personalism. 
Most parties proffer a form of ideological pragmatism which sees them ditch any 
ideological commitments in favour of the best means to meet their political goals and 
economic interests. The chapter will also reveal how parties' behavioural norms are 
also affected by the informal-formal dynamic. Formally they all claim a commitment 
to democratic rules of the game, however, informally some parties are proto 
hegemonic, supporting and consolidating the personal rule of Nazarbaev. Other 
parties are complicit in this hegemony by legitimising Nazarbaev and Nur Otan's 
preponderance, while some are committed to democratic norms but seemingly only 
because it offers them the best chance of protecting their economic and political 
interests. 
The chapter is set out as follows: It begins by tackling the opaque and informal 
characteristics of party membership before assessing formal party organisation, the 
power of party elites and the different models of the organisational rationale of 
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parties. The chapter then explores the ideological and programmatic content of 
political parties. It is achieved by placing parties into three categories: those who 
have a strong ideological basis, those parties who attempted to base themselves on a 
particular ideology, and those parties which lack any form of ideological 
distinctiveness. However, it is argued that due to the domination of Nur Otan, most 
parties in an effort to compete lean on ideological pragmatism and political 
personality. Finally, the chapter explores parties' behavioural norms and divides 
parties into three types: those who are hegemonic, those who are complicit in 
hegemony and those who do pursue a democratic and pluralist outlook. 
1 Memberships, Organisation and the Power of Party Elites 
1.1 Party Membership 
As discussed in Chapter Four, Article 10.5 of the `Law on Political Parties requires 
parties to have at least 50,000 members in order to obtain registration with the 
Ministry of Justice. Consequently, the official membership figures of parties are 
quantitatively large for a country of just 15 million people (see table 5.1). It suggests 
that nearly 12 percent of the total population is a member of a political party. From 
the official statistics it is clear the main pro-presidential party Nur Otan has the 
largest membership with 607,557 members. The Party of Patriots, OSDP and Ak 
Zhol are listed also as having six-figure memberships. Taking these statistics at face 
value would infer that parties in Kazakhstan have mass memberships and would 
therefore fit rather adroitly Duverger's concept of a mass party. 
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Table 5.1 Party Membership of currently registered parties (as of 2008) 
Party Official Membershi 
Communist Party 54,246 
Nur Otan 607,557 
Party of Patriots 172,000 
Kazakhstan Social and Democratic Party P' 61,043 
Ak Zhol 175,862 
Rukhaniiat 72,000 
Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan (KNPK) 90,000 
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan `Adilet' 70,000 
Azat Formerl Nagiz Ak Zho 87,012 
National Social Democratic Party 140,000 
(All official membership data was taken from the Central Election Commission. See 
www. election. kz). 1 
The official party statistics regarding membership are unreliable and unlikely to be 
representative of the true level of party membership. As a researcher, obtaining up- 
to-date membership statistics is difficult as not all parties are willing to disclose the 
information, moreover, some party elites admitted to not keeping up to date figures 
on the level of their membership. 2 Therefore, reading into official party membership 
statistics is neither particular revealing or relevant to understanding the nature of 
party development in Kazakhstan. However, if we examine party membership 
through the lens of the informal element of the political system some useful insights 
can be observed in relation to how political parties, and in particular pro-presidential 
parties, rely on the powers of patronage to enlist and ensure people join and sign up 
as party members. 
1.2 The Informality of Party Membership 
There are several informal characteristics observable in parties' membership in 
Kazakhstan linked to the neopatrimonial nature of the regime. The first is that some 
analysts and party elites have noted a tendency among pro-presidential parties to use 
non-voluntary forms of party membership based on patron-client relations to bolster 
their membership base. One analyst interviewed suggested that when the Civil Party 
1 Atameken and Alga are not included, as they are not officially registered as political parties. No 
figures for Atameken were available, but Alga provided a membership total of 54,487 as of 2007. 
2 Author's interview with Kuanysh Assylbekovich, Head of the Astana City Branch of Adilet, 6 
March 2007, Astana. 
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(GPK) was operating, due to it being financed by Aleksandr Mashkevich and the 
other members of the Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC), `any person 
who was to take up a position in one of their factories would have to write a letter of 
acceptance for the job and at the same time write a letter applying to become a 
member of the GPK'. 3 Joining a political party, therefore, is analogous to working in 
one of the industries owned by ENRC. One figure in Nur Otan admitted that `not all 
the people who joined the party became members through voluntary means'. 4 What 
this suggests is that clients join political parties as a way to ensure they do not lose 
their positions. This of course favours pro-presidential parties like Nur Otan and 
previously GPK because `people are frightened to be associated with anti- 
government parties as it means they would automatically lose their jobs'. 5 Akims 
have the power of appointment over many state employees from those employed in 
schools to the health services. Akims use their power of appointment to ensure if 
people join a political party it is the president's party. According to a senior official 
in the Auyl (Village) party, `even members of Auyl, when they get jobs in the public 
sector, they get to hear "why don't you join Nur Otan? " That's how Nur Otan gets 
its members'. 6 The informal nature of politics at the heart of the neopatrimonial 
regime in Kazakhstan has a deep impact on how members are recruited by political 
parties and the use of patron-client ties to bind people into the ruling party. At the 
same time the relationship works both ways. Nur Otan as a political party is often 
portrayed as a viable framework for career development. Nur Otan is viewed as the 
`party of bureaucrats' 7 and therefore a position within the party is desirable as 
`people think they can make a career out of the fact they are in Nur Otan'. 8 
A degree of neopatrimonialism exists within opposition parties. In the first instance 
there is a tendency for the leaders of the opposition to bring their `own' people with 
them when they establish new political parties. When the Akim of Pavlodar 
3 Author's interview with analyst from an NGO, 2 November 2006, Almaty. 
° Author's interview with senior figure in Nur Otan, 8 May 2007, Almaty. 
5 Author's interview with local Journalist, 30 October 2006, Almaty. 
6 Author's interview with Erkin Zheynullaevich, Head of Central Apparatus of the Social Democratic 
Party `Auy! ', 5 March 2007, Astana. 
Author's interview with Tulegen Zhukeev, General Secretary of Azat, former co-chairman of Nagiz 
Ak Zhol, 21 February 2007, Almaty. 
8 Author's interview with Bektas Mukhamedzhanov, Director of the International Institute for Modem 
Politics, Member of Nur Otan Political Council and former Member of Asar, 22 February 2007, 
Almaty. 
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Galymzhan Zhakianov established Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) in 
2001, he took with him some of his own personnel, people who owed their positions 
to his patronage. For example, Bakhyt Tumenova current leading member of Alga's 
Political Council highlighted this phenomena relating to her own experience. 
"I came here as a person of Zhakianov. When he came to power in 1994 as 
Akim through business structures he invited me to work with him in the Akimat. I 
came to the party in 2001 following Zhakianov, because he is the person that 
introduced me to power, and he probably did that because I worked in health care, by 
education I am qualified doctor". 9 
There is nothing necessary negative regarding the political relationship between 
Tumenova and Zhakianov. The cultivation of a protege is a familiar political practice 
across all kinds of political systems. However, it does illustrate the ingrained nature 
and importance attached to patron-client ties in party membership development at 
the higher elite level. In terms of the broader mass membership opposition parties 
have seemingly at times been accused of using informal means to augment their 
party membership numbers during the registration process. As highlighted in the 
previous chapter, Alga was subject to, or implicit in, the phenomena of including 
mertvye dushi (dead souls) to their membership list. 10 The Ministry of Justice 
refused Alga's registration on their first attempt in 2006 on the basis that mertvye 
dushi were included in their membership list, Alga has never denied this, but on their 
second attempt they tried to ensure this did not occur again (see Chapter Four), 
however they accused Ylast' of attempting to include mertvye dushi in their 
application documents for party registration. " It is indicative of the way in which 
political parties use informal methods to present an image of being well populated 
with members. Moreover, even though they may have used informal methods to 
guarantee registration, political parties are not obliged to maintain their membership, 
so parties can operate with just two to three members'. 12 In some of the smaller pro- 
9 Author's interview with Bakhyt Tumenova, Head of the Central Apparatus of Alga, 6 February 
2007, Almaty. 
10 Authors interview with representative from local a NGO, 21 November 2006, Almaty. 
11 NP Alga! K povtornoi registratsii - gotovy, Press-sluzhba NP Alga (DVK), 8 November 2006 
12 Authors interview with representative from local NGO, 21 November 2006, Almaty. 
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presidential parties this is clearly the case. 13 The lack of membership is illustrated by 
the discrepancy between purported membership numbers and the votes received in 
parliamentary elections. 14 Membership retention is clearly an issue as one figure in 
Nur Otan noted that during the mergers of Asar, GPK and the Agrarian Party (APK) 
with Otan all parties involved undertook a survey of party membership and found 
that Asar had lost 10 percent of their membership and GPK 50 percent. 15 
All these factors highlight the opaque and informal nature of party membership in 
Kazakhstan and consequently it can explain the tendency for low party membership 
activity other than during election periods. ' 6 It demonstrates that a key part of 
neopatrimonialism, that of patron-client ties, alongside other informal forms of 
political behaviour such as the use of mertvye dushi, penetrate party membership and 
are contributing factors to overall membership weakness across all political parties in 
Kazakhstan. The weakness of party membership is indicative of the central role party 
elites play in party genesis and organisation. There is nothing unusual about elite 
level actors dominating party organisations in the post-Soviet world and beyond, but 
what we can examine is why and for what purposes political elites are using parties. 
It highlights the utility of political parties for key elite actors and the use of parties 
for qualitatively different purposes than that which political scientists are used to in 
Western style democracies. The next section tackles this issue by exploring party 
organisation in Kazakhstan. 
13 For example, on the experience of this author it is unlikely the Party of Patriots continues to 
maintain a membership of 172,000, as they could not produce a single person for interview and the 
people they did provide claimed to no longer be involved with the party. 
` There were several smaller parties who received less votes in both the 2004 and 2007 parliamentary 
elections than their official membership numbers. The Party of Patriots, for example, claims an 
official membership of 172,000 yet received only 26,287 and 46,436 votes at the 2004 and 2007 
elections respectively. Rukhaniiat claims an official membership of 72,000 yet only gained 20,826 
and 22,159 in the most recent elections. The fact these parties cannot collect as many votes as they 
supposedly have members illustrate the considerable problem and unreliability of official membership 
figures. Of course, fraudulent elections could explain the discrepancy, as could members voting for 
Nur Otan. Nonetheless, the authorities have nothing to fear in these parties, as they are overtly pro- 
presidential. It is more likely, as suggested by many analysts interviewed, that their membership 
numbers are considerably overstated. 
is Author's interview with senior figure in Nur Otan, 8 May 2007, Almaty. 
16 Most political parties, with the exception of Nur Otan, admitted in interviews that the activity and 
agitation of the general party membership needed to improve. Levels of membership activity range 
depending on the party and external factors, for example party memberships are more active during 
election periods. However, overall the majority of political parties do not sustain high levels of 
membership activity. Nur Otan, however, has been keenly developing its youth section, Zhas Otan 
(Young Otan), in recent years, and with the aid of administrative resources and prospects for career 
development, it has been cultivating strong membership participation. For further details on the 
activities of Zhas Otan, see their website httn: //www. ndp-nurotan. kz/index. php? type=16&f1=1. 
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1.3 Formal Party Organisation 
Before unpacking the dominance and power of party elites it is worth outlining the 
formal structural components of party organisations in Kazakhstan. Formally party 
organisations all follow a similar model. As defined by Article 16 of the Law on 
Political Parties, `the supreme governing body of a political party shall be its 
congress. "7 How political parties organise their other supervising governing bodies 
is not defined by the law, although parties do have to adhere to a territorial principal 
by having a branch in each of the 14 Oblasts (region) and two special city regions 
(Almaty and Astana). Nevertheless, all parties follow a similar structure that has its 
roots in the model set by the CPSU. Whereas the CPSU consisted of a Congress, 
Central Committee and a Politburo led by the General Secretary, the current 
formulation of party organisation in Kazakhstan comprises of similar bodies -a 
Congress, Political Council and a Presidium led by the party chairman. ' 8 
Disaggregate elements are also comparable to the old CPSU structure with party 
organisation based on a three level territorial principle featuring Oblast (regional), 
Raion (district) and Primary Party Organisations (PPOs). 
It is implicit within the general organisational structure of parties (see figure 5.1) that 
power flows upwards from the party congress which is formally laid out as being the 
supreme body within all parties' charters. 19 Congress is made up of representatives 
from Oblast, Raion and PPOs level branches and it is at Congress that important 
decisions are seemingly voted on such as the election of the Political Council, 
Presidium and Chairman of the party and the selection of candidates for electoral 
competition. This too is reflective of the formal power that was invested in the 
Congress of the CPSU which elected the Central Committee of the Party, which in 
turn elected the Politburo. 20 
17 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o politicheskikh partiiakh of 15 Julia 2002 
's Not all parties use the same name to refer to these bodies as illustrated by Nagiz Ak Zhol who call 
their equivalent of their Political Council - the Central Council. Nevertheless, despite the semantics 
all parties have similar organisational structures and these bodies all perform similar functions. 
19 This assertion is taken from a survey of all political parties charters. All of the charters follow an 
identical format, and are governed by the principles of organisation and power dispersion that are set 
out in the Law on Political Parties. The Party Charters surveyed included, Nur Otan (2006), Nagiz Ak 
Zhol (2005), OSDP (2007), Ak Zhol (2005) KNPK (2004), Rukhaniiat (2003), Auyl (2003), Adilet 
(2006), the Communist Party (2004) and the Party of Patriots (2002). 
20 Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (New York: Vintage Books, 1971) 
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Figure 5.1 General Organisational Structure of Political Parties in Kazakhstan 
Party 
Chairman 
Presidium of the 
Youth Political Council (10-12 
Section Members) 
Political Council 
(30-50 members) 
Party Congress 
(Representations from all Oblast Branches and affiliated 
organisations) 
14 Oblast (Regional) Branches & the Almaty and 
Astana City Branches 
Raion (District) Level Branches 
Primary Party Organisations (PPOs) 
The power Congress has to elect the top bodies and positions demonstrates the way 
in which ordinary members of the party are theoretically able to hold their leadership 
to account, indicating members have a stake in the party. Congress, however, is only 
obliged to meet at least once every four years21 and in the periods in-between power 
resides with the Political Council which is convoked no less that once every three 
months. When the Political Council is not in session power and decision-making lies 
with the Presidium and most notably the party chairman. The reality of internal 
power distribution in party organisation is that political elites dominate the decision- 
making processes and the general orientation and direction the party takes. This is 
due on one level to the weakness of general party membership but on another level 
21 Each party on average holds Congress at least once a year. 
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these parties are essentially the creation of elites and are used by these political elites 
for varying purposes which will be outlined below. 
1.4 The Power of Party Elites 
The model of decision-making responsibility being directed from the bottom up 
through the delegation of powers to party elites does not reflect accurately internal 
party power distribution. Instead decision-making powers lay in the hands of party 
elites or in many cases just one individual. This is corroborated by party elite 
perceptions of where power lies in their party organisations. In interviews with party 
elites all were asked the same question regarding what they considered the most 
important level within their organisation in terms of party decision-making. 
According to a senior member of Nur Otan `it is 50-50. The first 50 percent is 
Nazarbaev. He can make any decision he wants inside the party and outside the 
party. The other 50 percent is the party leadership, the political council and 
congress. 22 The case of Nazarbaev as Chairman of Nur Otan is not exceptional. 
Alikhan Baimenov, Chairman of Ak Zhol, stated that `it is the presidium. This 
includes fifteen people and the chairman of the regional branches'. 23 This suggests 
that a small group of elites determine the decisions, strategies and policies of the 
party. This phenomena is not isolated to pro-presidential or regime friendly parties. 
Opposition parties too have similar perceptions concerning where power and 
decision-making lies. Tulegen Zhukeev, co-chairman of Nagiz Ak Zhol, stated that 
the presidium was the most important part of their organisation in terms of decision- 
making and that beyond that `the every day work is done by the three co- 
chairmen'. 24 While a member of Alga's Presidium suggested that `by law it is 
Congress but really it is more the Political Council'. 25 
Elite perceptions confirm what was suggested earlier by the weak participatory 
nature of general party membership, that is political parties in Kazakhstan are elite 
driven vehicles. That power and decision-making resides at the very top of party 
organisations is no real surprise. The more interesting issue, however, is the different 
22 Author's interview with Kazbek Kazkenov. Assistant to Vice President of Nur Otan, 7 March 2007, 
Astana. 
23 Author's interview with Alikhan Baimenov, Chairmen of Ak Zhol, and deputy of the Mazhilis, 6 
March 2007, Astana. 
24 Author's interview with Tulegen Zhukeev. 
25 Author's interview with Bakhyt N. Tumenova. 
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types of rationale behind party organisations and who are driving them. Parties are 
generally established to represent and organise the interests of factional elite groups 
and charismatic politicians. According to Dosym Satpaev: 
"Political parties are not classical political parties. In this sense they do not 
play the role of institutions representing the interests of social or electoral groups. 
Instead, an influential person might establish a political party, for example, 
Aleksandr Mashkevich and ENRC established GPK. Either pressure groups or a 
single individual establishes most political parties. Gani Kasymov, for example, 
established the Party of Patriots, and if he were ever to leave the party it would no 
longer exist. Other political parties were established by elite groups. "26 
This is not a view isolated to external analysts. Party officials are only too aware of 
the extent to which political parties are established and pivoted on the basis of elite 
interest. According to a regional official of Alga, `particular individuals create most 
of the parties in Kazakhstan, for example, Nagiz Ak Zhol, or OSDP, or any other 
party is created by certain individuals and centred around their interests no matter 
whether they are opposition parties. 27 These individuals and groups of elites are 
using political parties as a way of protecting their economic interests. A member of 
Nur Otan's Political Council highlighted, `political parties are either based on people 
holding power or certain individuals and personalities who have enough financial 
resources, or a group of people supporting them who have enough financial 
resources, to form political parties to protect business or private interests 9.28 Parties 
are products of their neopatrimonial environment. Their organisational basis is 
founded on the informal power held by factional elite groups and charismatic 
individuals found in neopatrimonial regimes. Parties are dominanted by informal 
factional elite groups who mobilise their own personal power networks in an attempt 
to capture or protect their interests - either in the shape of economic businesses or 
political positions in formal state structures. Party organisations are characterised by 
patronage networks, or at the very least the membership is defined by the deference 
and power members give to party elites. Parties therefore, are organised on the basis 
26 Author's interview with Dosym Satpaev, political analyst, 28 February 2007, Almaty. 
27 Author's interview with Yelevov Abdurashid, Chairman of the Zhambyl Branch of the Alga, 13 
March 2007, Taraz, Zhambyl Oblast. 
28 Author's interview with Bektas Mukhamedzhanov. 
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of narrow elite interests with power and decision-making concentrated in groups of 
elites at the very top not just of political parties but at the top of politics, business 
and society. Arguably, political parties in Kazakhstan have been established from a 
point of oligarchy. 29 Parties, therefore, provide formal institutional constructs for 
elites to protect and extend their interests. This is particularly the case for elites 
caught up in informal factional conflict. The varied rationales for party organisation 
in Kazakhstan are evidence of the influence the informal aspects of 
neopatrimonialism have, and continue to have, on party development in the country. 
1.5 Five Types of Party Organisational Rationale 
The several types of rationale behind party organisation reflect the interaction 
between the informal and formal in Kazakhstan. As discussed above, parties do 
possess formal structures but are inclined towards having weak memberships that 
have, at times, been appropriated through informal means. At the same time parties' 
formal structures are underpinned by the power of factional elite groups or 
charismatic individuals sustained by extensive networks based on forms of patronage 
and patron-client ties. The five different types of organisational purpose outlined in 
this section reflect, broadly speaking, Gunther and Diamond's thinly organised 
clientalistic-elite and personalistic-electoralist parties discussed in Chapter One. 30 
The five types are parties: 
  Created or co-opted by a `charismatic' personality for retention or 
reclamation of public office 
  Established by `liberal-professional' elite groups who are attempting to 
protect, secure or retain their political and economic interests. 
  Created by oligarchs who use them to represent and protect their interests in 
parliament. 31 
29 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy, (Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001 [1915]). 
30 It is not possible to clearly illustrate the clientelistic mechanisms that define clientalistic parties. It 
is difficult to outline the different exchanges of goods and services that define the patronage at the 
heart of clientelism. However, different types of party organisational rationale demonstrate the 
interaction between informal and formal politics in Kazakhstan. 
" The term `oligarch' used and applied in the post-Soviet world is distinct from classical definition. 
Rather than specifically relating to influential political figures at the top of government, oligarchs in 
the post-Soviet sense are analogous with business magnates. The term is expressly used in post-Soviet 
countries to reflect the power associated with those business elites who captured significant 
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  Established as spoiler parties sanctioned by the presidential administration as 
an attempt to obstruct and derail opposition parties efforts during a 
parliamentary election. 
  Created specifically for supporting and representing the president in the 
legislature and in state and government institutions. 
These types of party rationale are not the only reason why elites and political figures 
form political parties. It is quite possible there are multiple explanations for party 
genesis such as ideology, public good and certain socio-economic cleavages. 
However, the five types described below are viewed as the principle factor in elite 
party formation or cooption. 
Parties created by a `charismatic' personality for retention or reclamation of public 
office 
This first type of party rationale is those parties established by charismatic public 
figures in an effort to hold on to and solidify, or regain, their position in public 
office. Parties falling into this category include Auyl, Party of Patriots, Rukhaniiat, 
and to a certain extent the KPK. The cases of Auyl and Tarty of Patriots are similar as 
both their chairman Gani Kaliev (Auyl) and Gani Kasymov (Party of Patriots) were 
elected to the second convocation of the Mazhilis (Parliament) in 1999. Kaliev was a 
member of the Otan Political Council and Kasymov was elected as a self-nominated 
candidate in a single mandate constituency. 32 Both were distinguished and well- 
known figures that had significant careers during the Soviet Period. 33 After being 
elected in October 1999 Kaliev established Auyl in March 2000 and Kasymov 
created the Party of Patriots in June of the same year. Kaliev broke ranks with Otan 
over the issue of agro-economics believing the party `did not have the support of the 
proportions of former state assets. The terms itself indicates the influence such business elites have on 
political development and politicians. Moreover, oligarchs in post-Soviet countries often gravitate 
towards participation in politics as a way of protecting their assets. 
32 Gani Kasymov, although a self-nominated candidate, did have government affiliation as his 
previous position was as Chairman of the Customs Committee of the Ministry of Finance. 
3 Gani Kaliev had a successful career in the agro-economic sector as director of the Kazakh Scientific 
Agricultural Institute and as President of the Kazakhstan Academy of agricultural sciences he was 
also a deputy in the 12th Convocation of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet from 1990-1994. Gani 
Kasymov rose rapidly to prominence during the Soviet period in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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farmers'. 34 Thus, he established Auyl to represent the interest of the agrarian 
community. Notwithstanding, the party clearly offered Kaliev the opportunity to 
increase his public profile and strengthen his chances of retaining public office at the 
next election. 35 Gani Kasymov established the Party of Patriots to be the political 
vehicle to capitalise on his charisma and popular appeal in an effort to win public 
office. 36 Despite their formal structures and officially large memberships these 
parties are centred on the political interests of their leading personalities, they 
struggle with finances and are mainly inactive outside of election periods. 37 These 
are ambitious political figures who often find themselves in the media and while 
establishing a political party has not translated into election victories, both Kaliev 
and Kasymov have been rewarded by the president for their persistence in the public 
arena and the support of his leadership. Kasymov was given a seat in the Senate in 
2007 and Kaliev has often headed various commissions set up by the president to 
explore issues of democracy and political reform. 
The case of the KPK is different as it is considered to be a `classic party'. 38 It has a 
recognised constituency and ideological platform. The party's leader, Serikbolsyn 
Abdil'din, is a well-recognised figure from the Soviet period and in the early period 
of independence. He was a former colleague of Nazarbaev and had served as a 
34 S. D'iachenko, L. Karmazina and S. Seidumanov `Politicheskie Partii Kazakhstana, god 2000. 
ravochnik', Almaty, 2000 p. 122 
3f It would be fair to suggest that if Gani Kaliev was purely motivated by retaining public office then 
he would have remained with Otan. However, at the time Otan had not fully established itself as the 
dominant party in the political system. This was still a time of fluidity. Moreover, such a premise that 
a political actor would take the least risky option for retention of public office makes the assumption 
that the actor is rational and always makes rational decisions. This author believes not all actors and 
their actions are rational. 
36 Daniiar Ashimbaev, Kto est Kto v Kazakhstan (Almaty, 2005). Another example of a party 
representing a public figure attempting to increase their public profile, stabilise their political career 
and strengthen their chances of obtaining public office is Rukhaniiat. The chairman of the party, 
Altynshash Dzhaganova, had previously been a deputy in the 12`s and last convocation of the 
Supreme Soviet. Dzhaganova lost her seat after parliament was suspended and the new constitution 
introduced. Soon after in 1995 Dzhaganova created the Party of Revival of Kazakhstan which 
focussed on issues of gender, spirituality and culture. 36 In 2003 the party was renamed Rukhaniiat. 
The creation of the party provided a formal vehicle to keep up a public profile with the hope of 
reclaiming a seat in parliament. 
37 One anecdote told by an official from NGO was that when meeting with these parties the main 
thing they were interested in was whether the organisation could offer them any financial assistance. 
An example of activity being concentrated during election periods can be observed by their websites. 
Party of Patriots and Auyl did not have websites until they sprung up prior to the 2007 election. Since 
the election they have been rarely updated offering no evidence or examples of party activity other 
than the statements of their leaders. 
;a Author's interview with luri Buluktaev, Professor of Political Science and the Kazakh Academy of 
Sciences, 1 November 2006, Almaty. 
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deputy of, and the Chairman of, the Supreme Soviet until December 1993.39 
Abdil'din was also the centre of opposition to Nazarbaev in the early post-Soviet 
period and had mustered the oppositional forces in the Supreme Soviet to block the 
president's economic reform package. Since becoming leader of the KPK in 1996 
Abdil'din and the KPK have become synonymous. With the KPK he had 
appropriated a political vehicle in which he could use to mobilise support for the 
purpose of reclaiming a seat in parliament and to act as a magnate for opposition 
against the president. Abdil'din reclaimed a seat in parliament in the 1999 
parliamentary elections and also stood as the main opposition candidate in the 
presidential elections of the same year. 40 The relationship between the KPK and 
Abdil'din was, and remains, mutually beneficial. The KPK needed Abdil'din to raise 
their profile and Abdil'din needed the KPK to pursue his ambition of returning to 
parliament and establishing an organisational structure with which to compete 
against Nazarbaev. Consequently, KPK's survival is tied to the personal political 
leadership of Abdil'din. According to one leading political analyst, `the Communist 
Party is lucky that it has such a leader. If Abdil'din were to leave the party, the party 
would die Out. '41 Abdil'din's desire to return to a form of public office may have 
waned in recent years either due to age (he is 71) or commitment to his academic 
post at the Agrarian University in Almaty. In the 2007 parliamentary election the 
KPK refused to participate, correctly believing the whole process to be a waste of 
time as they would not win any seats due to the president and Nur Otan 's grip on the 
whole political system. 42 That the KPK did not wish to participate in the election 
when typically we understand electoral activity to be a key defining feature of 
parties, illustrates the different nature of parties in Kazakhstan. Despite a sound 
membership base and a strong ideology, the KPK is less a mechanism for electoral 
representation and more a personal vehicle for Abdil'din to maintain a public profile. 
39 S. D'iachenko, L. Karmazina and S. Seidumanov `Politicheskie Partii Kazakhstana, god 2000. 
Spravochnik' p. 40 
4 Abdil'din was forced out as chair of the Supreme Soviet when Nazarbaev cajoled deputies into self- 
dissolution in December 1993. See Chapter Three. 
41 Author's interview with Nurbolat Masanov, Political Scientist, 4 October 2006. 
42 The KPK will have to compete in the next election or face dissolution. According to the Law on 
Political Parties, any party which fails to participate in two successive legislative elections will be 
dissolved. 
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Parties as organisations for the protection of the political and economic interests of 
a new liberal professional elite 
Parties organised for the purpose of protecting the political and economic interests of 
a new liberal-professional elite are those that emerged as a product of elite 
fragmentation (see Chapter Three). DCK, Ak Zhol, Nagiz Ak Zhol (Azat), The 
Republican Peoples' Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK) and Alga were all created by 
newly emergent liberal-professional elites of the post-Soviet period who had 
benefited both from both the privatisation process of the 1990s and Nazarbaev's 
patronage. 43 The elites responsible for creating these parties, prominent figures such 
as Galymzhan Zhakianov, Bolat Abilov and Akezhan Kazhegeldin, obtained 
significant resources during the sell off of former state enterprises or were connected 
with those who had. The conflicts these elites engaged in, either directly with the 
president or with his close relatives (son-in-law Rakhat Aliev) meant they faced the 
prospect of losing, in whole or in part, their economic assets and political patronage 
of, and access to, the president. 44 Dispersed from the loci of power these elite groups 
required formal political vehicles, through which they could secure, protect and 
promote their economic interests and their continued political ambitions. According 
Assylbek Kozhakhmetov, they established parties and `came into opposition because 
they wanted to keep their positions and ownership of business' . 
45 Parties were a 
useful tool with which to frame their opposition to the president and his authoritarian 
rule in full public view. For these elites parties are the perfect vehicle to attract 
public and media interest and organise their network of supporters and clients. The 
emergence of young Western and liberal oriented businessman and politicians who 
created political parties as a way of attempting to defend their interests strikes a 
similar note with the `liberal-professional or economic elites'46 Gunther and 
Diamond describe when characterising the clientalistic-elite based party. Moreover, 
Gunther and Diamond's belief that the clientalistic-elite party's principal function is 
43 Dosym Satpaev, `An Analysis of the Internal Structure of Kazakhstan's Political Elite and an 
Assessment of Political Risk', in Uyama Tomohiko (ed. ), Empire, Islam and Politics in Central 
Eurasia, (Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University), 2007, pp. 283-300. 
44 This was especially the case with Abliazov, Galymzhan Zhakianov, Kazhegeldin and Abilov who 
all found themselves on trial for varying charges, but is was also the case that many who held 
positions in government and were part of the elite fragmentation process lost their positions too. This 
included Baimenov and Zhandosov. 
45 Author's interview with Assylbek Kozhakhmetov, ex-Chairman of the Presidium of the Political 
Council of the Party Alga, 26 January, 2007, Almaty. 
46 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, `Species of Political Parties: A New Typology, ' p. 176. 
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. 
the realisation of notable elites securing power at a national level and therefore, 
securing their political and economic interests mirrors Kazakhstan's `new elites' 
attempts to do the same. Therefore, by establishing parties these elites are building 
organisations which not only support them in their efforts to protect, secure, reclaim 
and retain their economic interests, but also organise and coalesce their network of 
supporters, act as a centre for opposition to the president and increase their public 
profile. In this respect political parties are a crucial formal political institution for 
those elites engaged in informal behind the scenes conflict with the president and his 
family. 
Parties as organisations for the representation of oligarchic interests in the 
parliament 
The GPK is the primary example of a party established to represent the interests of 
oligarchic groups in parliament. The GPK was widely perceived to have been the 
political front of the Eurasian National Resources Corporation (ENRC), a business 
led by Patokh Chodiev, Aleksandr Mashkevich and Alizhan Ibragimov, which 
possess substantial assets in Kazakhstan's alloys, iron ore and alumina industries. 
GPK was utilised by the ENRC `to oversee interests and head off and fix any 
problems'. 47 In alliance with the APK, ENRC had 14 deputies in parliament 
representing their economic interests. It is illustrative of parties being created and 
organised as formal institutional vehicles through which oligarch groups can 
informally influence the policy process and decision-makers for their benefit. Indeed, 
the case of GPK is a succinct example of the way in which formal and informal 
politics intersect. 
Asar can also be viewed as a party created to represent the interests of a powerful 
oligarchical group. Formed by Dariga Nazarbaeva at the beginning of 2003, analysts 
and observers viewed the party as a `family project'48 that was `created in the 
shadows, using the authority of president Nazarbaev. '49 Nevertheless, the party was 
also a convenient way for both Dariga and Rakhat Aliev to establish their own 
political organisation which could represent their business interests in the Mazhilis 
47 Author's interview with analyst from NGO, 2 November 2006, Almaty. 
48`Muzhestvennoe destvie Dariga Nazarbaeva', Respublika Assandi Times, 14 February 2003. 
49 Bruce Pannier, `Nazarbaeva's Asar party moving ahead quickly', RFE/RL, 29 January 2004. 
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and give both of them an independent platform from the president. The party was 
crucial not just in formalising political representation of informal economic interests 
but also in developing a network of clients and alliances to consolidate and extend 
their political position. Soon after establishing the party, a number of independent 
deputy members threw their support behind Asar and formed a parliamentary 
faction, while family members such Aliev's father, Mukhtar Aliev, a leading surgeon 
in the country, were awarded top positions in the party. 5° Informal forms of 
patronage were clearly present in the creation of Asar, from the fact that it was 
supported by the presidential administration and the gravitation of deputies and 
notable figures in its ranks due to the illustrious and influential leadership of the 
party. 
The mergers of GPK and Asar into Nur Otan in 2006 saw the end of parties' 
specifically organised to represent oligarchic interests in parliament. The president 
was keen to ensure that oligarch interests were arbitrated personally through him and 
that they did not form a power base for independent actors. 51 He was aiming to 
reduce their ability to influence the political process and strengthen their political 
position through these parties. 52 The president's move against Aliev in 2007 
demonstrates this was the case - no strong political rivals were to be permitted. 
Parties organised as `spoiler parties' 
Spoiler parties are linked to the `virtual parties' discussed in Chapter Four, those that 
are set up by, or with the blessing of, the presidential administration in an effort to 
create the impression of multipartism. Spoiler parties are `set up to take away votes 
from other parties. ' 53 The spoiler party is used to confuse and confound voters at the 
polls as a way of containing the opposition vote. This can be achieved by having 
similar names or by the parties pivoting on similar electoral constituencies of parties 
the presidential administration perceive as a threat to presidential hegemony of the 
party system. 54 Two primary examples are Adilet and KNPK and as explained in 
Chapter Four these parties provided a useful tool for the presidential administration 
so Ibid. 
51 It is widely believed that Alexander Mashkevich enjoys a close relationship with the president. 
SZ Author's interview with senior figure in OSDP, 14 November 2006, Almaty. 
53 Author's interview with director of Local NGO, 21 November 2006, Almaty. 
54 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics. 
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in diverting votes and public interest from opposition parties that shared either a 
similar name or electoral constituencies. They were both established prior to the 
2004 parliamentary election and it was their role to take votes from Ak Zhol and 
KPK. 
The dilemma for spoiler parties is after the election they left with out an 
organisational purpose. Adilet did succeed in getting one member elected to the 
Mazhilis. However, since the mergers of Asar, GPK and APK into Nur Otan these 
parties have been seeking to find new allies to strengthen their organisational 
purpose. In the first part of 2007 the KNPK came very close to re-uniting with 
Abdil'din's KPK, but eventually failed to find a path forward agreeable for both 
sides. 55 And, Adilet merged with Ak Zhol prior to the 2007 parliamentary election. 
However, after they failed to win any seats they have since split, raising the 
possibility the party merger was not intended to survive the election in any case. 
Parties created on the basis of political personality for representation of presidential 
interests in the legislature 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nazarbaev sought to establish a political 
party that would act in the same way as the CPSU. As discussed in Chapter Three in 
the early years of independence Nazarbaev had attempted to create such a party but 
none had proved reliable or sustainable. However, since 1999 Nazarbaev has 
managed to institutionalise a political party that acts as his platform for re-election, 
ensures there is no opposition to his legislative program in parliament and provides 
him with a political vehicle for elite stability and state dominance. Also, as 
highlighted in Chapter Three, this party, Nur Otan, was completed as a political 
project in 2007 when after the merger with Asar, APK and GPK the party went on to 
win all the seats in parliament in the 2007 parliamentary election. The party has 
consolidated Nazarbaev's hold over the legislature. With his power over local 
executives, state agencies, the judiciary and the government Nazarbaev has full 
control of the political system. 
55 KNPK ne budet ob'ediniat'sia s KPK, Kazakhstan Today, 11 June 2007. 
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Consequently, Nur Otan is typically viewed as a `party. of power' or a cartel party. 56 
Katz and Mair suggest cartel parties are `agents of the state, and employ the 
resources of the state to ensure their own survival'. 57 Nur Otan has a close 
association with the state and many of its critics argue it uses state resources and 
buildings for party organisation and activities. 58 Besides, the party is considered the 
party of bureaucrats, the party in parliament, and since the 2007 elections the party 
of government. 59 Its. links with the state are strong and evident. However, the state 
aspect of Nur Otan is secondary to its overall purpose, organisation and identity. To 
define it solely as a cartel party or a party of power would be over looking its raison 
d'etre, which is to be the vehicle, voice, and extension of the president in parliament. 
Being a cartel party or a party of power would insinuate a degree of power with 
regards to policy making and decision-making within state bodies. Nur Otan instead 
is a vehicle through which Nazarbaev can advance his political ambitions. The 
consolidation of presidential forces was the construction of a party for which 
Nazarbaev could secure his political ambitions by liquidating the political 
organisations of other independent players. Nur Otan's primary function is to 
compete and win national and regional elections on behalf of the president. 
Therefore, the central feature of Nur Otan is not its relationship with the state or the 
cooption of the party by the executive, as suggested by a party of power perspective, 
but the fact that it relies on the president for its popularity and existence. If the 
president were to pass from the political scene Nur Otan would cease to exist in its 
current form and would more than likely split into factions and different parties. 
These five party types are representative of the empirical nature of party 
development in Kazakhstan; however, they can all be more broadly linked to two 
particular party types identified by Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, that of 
56 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, `Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy: 
The Emergence of the Cartel Party'. 
57 Ibid. p. 5. 
58 For example, according to Aleksandr Kholodkov, chairman of the Central Committee of the KNPK, 
the President gave to Akims the task of building offices not only in cities and regional centres but also 
in towns and small villages for Nur Otan party use. All the offices will be paid for out of the state 
budget. ' Author's interview 24 January 2007, Almaty. - 
59 This relates to the fact the 2007 . constitutional changes allowed persons in position of state. authority 
to be members of political parties. This allowed Nazarbaev to take up the post of Chairman of Nur 
Otan, but also saw a raft of government ministers; Akims and other assorted state officials become 
members of the party. For example see, Akim Almaty sdelal svoi Politicheskii vybor, 
www. zonakz. net, 26 June 2007, http: //zonakz. net/articles/18273. 
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clientelistic-elite and electoral-personalistic parties. The clientelistic-elite parties are 
reflected in those parties attempting to protect or secure their economic and political 
interests while personalistic-electoralist party can be seen as those parties established 
by political figures to gain some form of public office, spoiler parties and most 
notably Nur Otan. What is clear from the above exposition of party membership and 
organisation in Kazakhstan is that political parties defined by the formal and 
informal constraints set out by Nazarbaev and his form of neopatrimonial rule have 
developed weak party memberships and are elite and personality centred institutions. 
Within both party membership and organisation characteristics of informal forms of 
politics typical in neopatrimonial regimes are evident and pervasive. The dominance 
of personalism within political parties such as the concentration of party organisation 
around single political personalities also has a considerable affect on party ideology 
as the next section uncovers. 
2. Ideology and Programmatic content 
Parties' relationship with ideology is symptomatic of the neopatrimonial regime in 
Kazakhstan. While formally ideologies are presented as central to the ethos and 
identity of parties, informally ideology and programmatic content is centred on the 
personality of the party leaders. As discussed above, parties are organised around the 
interests of elite figures either for the retention or reclamation of public office, the 
protection of business interests or the representation of presidential interests. 
Therefore, political parties, with a few exceptions, are not in possession of 
unambiguous ideologies. They exhibit a tendency to deal in vague generalisable 
values rather than presenting coherent ideologies. Instead, the focus is on the goals 
and ambitions of the party chairmen or the attractiveness of their personality and 
charismatic strength. It illustrates how parties' ideologies are subject to the 
personalism that is ever pervasive in Kazakhstan's political system. 
Formally parties claim to possess ideological foundations positioned on the left-right 
spectrum (see table 5.2). However, these positions are of only surface value and 
some elites when asked directly about party ideology declined to put their. party on 
an ideological spectrum at all. The head of the Zhambyl Branch of Nagiz Ak Zhol, 
declared his party `is on the right path, not on some ideological spectrum - we just 
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work with, and. for, the people'. 60 Others interpret their parties' ideological position 
in relation to their attitude to, and relationship with, the president. For example, a 
senior figure in the Almaty city branch of Auyl argued `we are centrist party because 
we do not completely oppose the president'. 61 These responses suggest that parties 
possess an uneasy relationship with ideology quite possibly as a product of the over 
ideologisation of the Soviet period. 
Table 5.2 Parties Formal Position on the Ideological Spectrum 
Ideological Position Party 
Left KPK 
KNPK 
Left of Centre OSDP 
Centre Party of Patriots 
Centre Nur Otan 
Adilet 
Auyl 
Rukhaniiat 
Right of Centre Azat (Nagiz Ak Zhol), Alga 
Right Atameken 
(Adapted from A. Zh. Shomanov and N. I. Musmafaev, Partiinoe stroitel'stvo v Kazakhstan: opyt, 
sostoianie i perspektivy, Analytic, No 4,2002 p. 11. Additional information was provided directly 
from interviews with party elites and their party programs. ) 
Therefore, while synthetically parties present an ideological platform, it is not their 
central focus. Rather, parties' ideologies, programs and policies are centred on the 
personality of their leader or leaders. Moreover, the personal nature of power in 
Kazakhstan extends its influence to the development of party ideology due to 
programmatic content being driven by the personal interests and personality of party 
leaders. In exploring the nature of party ideology the analysis presented here divides 
parties into three categories: 1) those with unambiguous ideological positions, 2) 
those who are attempting to represent clear ideological foundations, and 3) those 
parties who lack ideological clarity. What emerges is a form of ideological 
pragmatism used by political parties to counter the influence and dominance of Nur 
Otan, and the centrality of personalism in party ideological construction and 
presentation. In those parties who have unambiguous ideologies and those who 
60 Author's interview with Makhmedun Kossybayev, Chairmen of Zhambyl Oblast Branch of Nagiz 
Ak Zhol, 15 March 2007, Taraz. 
61 Author's interview with Adisha Amanovna, Chief Coordinator of the Almaty City Branch of Auyl 
Party, 25 April 2007, Almaty. 
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attempt to have distinct ideologies, personalism of political leadership continues to 
be a dominant factor. 
2.1 Parties with Unambiguous Ideological Positions 
The KPK and the KNPK are the only two parties who are based on a distinct 
ideological foundation. According to the KNPK's program, the party is based on the 
`scientific and ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism's uniform materialistic theory 
of social development. ' 62 Their policies stem from this principle and are of a clearly 
defined ideological nature, for example this includes a strong role for the state `to 
restore: free of charge education, public health services, provision for old age 
pensioners and the guaranteed right to work, rest and dwelling. '63 The KPK also, 
predictably, presents a clear outlined ideology stating that `it is a Leninist type 
party 964 which `represents the interests of the workers'. 65 
Despite their apparent ideological lucidity the KPK's position vis-ä-vis the 
complexities of a post-communist context highlights some underlying problems with 
their commitment to ostensible ideological clarity. According to the deputy leader, 
the party now `recognises different forms of ownership of property - and is an 
entirely differeit party from the Communist Party of the past'. 66 This suggests 
Abdil'din's KPK has shifted to a social democratic position and tallies with the 
KPK's willingness to compete in the 2004 parliamentary elections in an electoral 
bloc with the right-wing business oriented Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan 
(DCK). 67 The move away from the far left presented those figures in. the Central 
Committee who wished to pursue closer ties with the president a perfect opportunity 
and justification for leaving the party to create the KNPK. In the words of one senior 
member of the KNPK, `the ideological difference between the parties (the two 
communist parties) is Abdil'din's willingness to remake the party into a social- 
62 Programa kommunisticheskoi narodnoi partii Kazakhstan, 6 June 2004. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Programa kommunisticheskoi partii Kazakhstana, 11 January 1997. 
65 Ibid. 
" Author's interview with Tolen Tokhtassynov, deputy leader of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, 
9 February 2007, Almaty. 
67 Interestingly Abdil'din's instance that the party should work with DVK in the 2004 election is 
posited as a reason for why Kosarev and others left the party to form KNPK. 
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democratic right wing party'. 68 Abdil'din's shifting of the party rightwards, as well 
being prepared to enter into an electoral bloc with DCK, demonstrates a level of 
pragmatism and willingness of political elites to dispose of certain ideological core 
values in the pursuit of achieving electoral or political goals. The central role of 
Abdil'din in determining the direction the KPK takes, illustrates that despite a degree 
of clarity with regards to ideological positioning the party is still centred on the 
personal motivation of its leader. The party remains defined not so much by 
communism but by Abdil'din himself, as mentioned above the party and Abdil'din 
are irrevocably tied and the personal nature of leadership is representative of the way 
the informal nature of politics in Kazakhstan intersects with the formal nature of 
political parties. 
2.2 Parties who attempt to present ideological foundations 
Two new parties emerged in 2006 attempting to demonstrate a clear link with 
ideology. OSDP, led by Zharmakhan Tuiakbai is posited as a centre left social- 
democratic party, and Atameken, led by Yerzhan Dosmukhamedov, a former 
associate of the president's son-in-law Timur Kulibaev, situates itself as centre-right 
party committed to the values of a free market. 69 Despite this, the role of personalism 
and the centrality of the party leader tend to supersede the clarity of ideological 
presentation. 
OSDP's programme puts forward an ideology `based on ideas, principles, values, 
positive historical experience and the modern practice of international social 
democracy'. 70 On this basis Zharmakhan Tuiakbai stressed a commitment to 
instituting a social-oriented economy due to Kazakhstan being a country in transit 
68 Author's interview with Aleksandr Kholodköv, Secretary of the Central Committee of KNPK, 24 
January 2007, Almaty. 
69 There is also a Union of Businessmen called Atameken which is led by former GPK leader Azat 
Peruashev, the two organisations have no relationship. Dosmukhamedov used to sit on the governing 
committee of the Union as a representative of the oil industry and Timur Kulibaev. Dosmukhamedov 
sought to create a party from the Union but other members were reluctant. As a result, he decided to 
create his own party. The party Atameken merged with Alash and Compatriot, two parties who failed 
to meet the registration requirements of the 2002 Law on Political Parties. They provided a support 
base for the party and for Dosmukhamedov. 
70 Programma respublikanskogo obshchestvennogo obedineniia obshchenatsional'naia sotsial- 
demokratichesaia partiia, 10 September 2006. 
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and. therefore needing partial state regulation of the market. '71 The idea of the state 
acting as an intermediary between the excesses of capitalism and those in society 
who get left behind is central to the idea of social democracy. However, the party's 
ideological clarity begins to unravel when exploring three features of OSDP's 
ideological underpinning. The first concerns the fact that the party bases its 
programmatic content on the values of `Freedom, Justice and Solidarity' " 
72 Yet, 
these values mean different things in different ideological contexts and according to 
one analyst, `these values are declared in all political programs of political parties in 
Kazakhstan'. 73 Second, the party has no links to any trade unions. Observers in. 
Kazakhstan have argued that `Tuiakbai's party is not social-democratic as it is not 
based on a trade union movement - the experience in the West shows that social 
democratic parties are based on trade unions. ' 74 Lastly, the ideology of OSDP is 
secondary to the personality and the charismatic attributes of the leader. The 
character and charisma of Zharmakhan Tuiakbai is a primary factor in people joining 
the party, not the programmatic commitments to social democracy. One member of 
the party explained that he joined the party because of his personal feelings towards 
Tuiakbai, `I view Zhannakhan Tuiakbai as a really honest and strong person. He is a 
person with strong leadership qualities and a strong will. All this taken together 
. made me 
feel dear towards him. 975 
Atameken was viewed as borrowing directly from Western right-wing parties76 due 
to the party's insistence `that today it is crucial to create conditions conducive to 
domestic entrepreneurs and self-employed workers - the most energetic group 
familiar with the market economy. '" This centre-right ideological position is 
connected to clear policy positions typically associated with centre right political 
'1 Zharmakhan Tuiakbai speaking at the Politon discussion club in Almaty, 6 November 2006. 
Transcript can be found at www. club. kz. 
72 Programma respublikanskogo obshchestvennogo obedineniia obshchenatsional'naia sotsial- 
demokratichesaia partiia, 10 September 2006. 
73 Iuri Buluktaev speaking at Politon discussion club in Almaty, 6 November 2006. 
74 Author's interview with Yevgeni Zhovtis, Director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for 
Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 31 January 2007, Almaty. 
75 Author's interview with Amirbek Togussov, Head of the Almaty City Branch of OSDP 25 April 
2007, Almaty. 
76 `Kazakhstan: New Political Party Borrows from Western Right', Eurasianet. org, 30`h October 2006 
77 'Declaration of the Principals of the Centre Right Political Party of Kazakhstan', in Yerzhan 
Dosmukhamyedov, Atameken Building Democracy in Kazakhstan, Almaty 2006 p. 146. 
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parties. 78 The party has attempted. to re-affirm this by seeking alignment with other 
centre-right parties across the world including the Union of Right Forces in Russia, 
. the 
Republican Party in the US, and the UK and, Canadian Conservative parties. 79 In 
the national press much was made of Atameken's ideological distinctness arguing 
that since the collapse of the Soviet Union there had been no party based on the ideas 
of the market economy on which becoming free and democratic depends. ' 80 Despite 
this degree of ideological clarity the parties' ideological and programmatic 
presentation is tied and entwined with the personality of Dosmukhamedov. All of 
Atameken 's publicity and propaganda is directly. focused on, and attributed to, 
Dosmukhamedov. 8' Atameken has been portrayed as Dosmukhamedov's vanity 
. project 
in order to fulfil his political ambitions. According to one elite figure, 
`Atameken is Dosmukhamedov's creation, he wanted to be the leader of a party and 
he is naturally ambitious. ' 82 Therefore, while ideologically the party is clear the 
presentation of ideology is inseparable from the personal leadership of 
Dosmukhamedov. 
While OSDP and Atameken do formally present clear unambiguous ideology and 
programmatic commitments, the personal nature of political leadership ensures any 
coherent ideological position is second place to the neopatrimonial personalisation of 
party leadership. The reliance on personality is not constrained to parties who are 
attempting to emerge with solid ideological and programmatic foundations. The 
medley of the informal role of personality and formal ideology is central to the 
majority of political parties in Kazakhstan. 
2.3 Parties without clear programmatic distinctions 
Most other parties in Kazakhstan do not demonstrate clear programmatic 
perspectives. Analysts believe `there are no strong ideologies in any parties, because 
all of their programs are alike and none of them have introduced anything new that 
78 For example the party has stated that it is committed to `cutting corporate income tax rates for small 
and medium-sized business from 30 to 20 percent', Ibid. p. 151. 
79 See Atameken website - www. atameken. info. 
80Nasha partiia ne voznikla na ukazke administratsiiax prezidenta ... 
Atameken: sdelat' reformy 
real'nymi , 
Central Asia Monitor, 3 November 2006. 
81 A quick examination of the Atameken's website makes this evident www. atameken. info. 
82 Author's interview with Azat Perushev, Head of the Atameken Business Union and former leader of 
the Civil Party of Kazakhstan, 18 February 2007, Almaty. 
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will make society interested in these parties. ' 83 Despite formally being able to place 
political parties on a left-right spectrum, 84 `most parties do hot have distinct 
ideologies'. 85 Indeed, most parties share strikingly similar programmatic values (see 
table. 5.3). 
Table 5.3 Programmatic Values of Parties 
Party Value Statements 
Adilet Validity, rights and justice for all people 
of Kazakhstan. 
Ak Zhol Democracy, Freedom and Equality 
Auyl Independent, strong- and democratic State 
Nur Otan Prosperous and democratic state for all 
people of all ages, trades, nationalities 
and creeds 
Party of Patriots A pros erous Kazakhstan 
Rukhaniiat Political stability, spiritual revival and 
social justice 
Nagyz Ak Zhol Independent, prosperous, free and 
democratic Kazakhstan 
One member of Adilet admitted their `party program does not differ from others'. 86 
This is reflected in specific policy proposals. For example, in the pre-election 
programmes for the 2007 parliamentary election all parties committed themselves to 
increasing public spending to raise living standards for all groups in society. Nur 
Otan led the way with commitments to; raise the level of the average monthly 
income by 2 times, raise the salary of doctors and teachers, the construction of 150 
new public health service centres, considerable investment in medical and health 
services to the sum of 100 billion tenge, improvements in the system of social 
benefits, and increase in the size of the average pension by 2.5 times. 87 Other parties 
followed with Auyl committing themselves to increasing social security, Party of 
Patriots to increasing pensions and Ak Zhol to building more hospitals. 
83 Author's interview with Andrei Chebotarev, Political Analyst, 20 November 2006, Almaty. 
84 See A. Zh. Shomanov and N. I. Musmafaev, Partiinoe stroitel'stvo v Kazakhstane: opyt, sostoianie 
i perspektivy. 
85. Author's interview with Luri Bulaktaev, Political Scientist, 1 November 2007, Almaty. 
86 Author's interview with Kuanysh Assylbekovich, Head of the Astana City Branch of Adilet, 6 
March 2007, Astana. 
87 Nur Otan, Za protsvetanie Kazakhstana i blagopoluchie Kazakhstantsev (Astana, July 2007). 
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The problem for all parties, with the exception of Nur Otan, is that none of them are 
likely to have the opportunity to implement their programmes whether ideologically 
oriented or not. Even if a party was to gain one or two seats in the Mazhilis it would 
have very little influence on policy or decision-making process due to the imbalance 
of power in the presidential executive and in the legislature, let alone a chance of 
implementing any of its policies. Nur Otan, therefore, is pragmatic in its ideology 
and policies, simply following those set out by the president and also focused 
heavily on his charisma and personality. Therefore, the dominance of Nur Otan and 
their grip on public support due to their close association with Nazarbaev leads all 
parties into a political space where they have to compete with Nur Otan on the terms 
of ideological pragmatism and political personality. All parties, including those who 
have an overall sense of ideological commitment, rely on pragmatism and 
personality as a way to compete with Nur Otan. The section below discusses how 
ideological pragmatism and a reliance of political personality are two of the key 
features of parties' ideological make up, including those who possess on the surface 
a clear commitment to ideology. 
2.4 Ideological Pragmatism 
Nur Otan is a party that claims to speak for all the people of Kazakhstan and the 
party is only able to make this assertion because of its political proximity to 
Nazarbaev. Nazarbaev is portrayed as father of the nation and a symbol of unity and 
stability. Consequently, all parties are competing with Nur Otan not just in terms of 
its command of state and administrative resources, but also their dominance of ideas 
and policies. As such, parties have to pursue a pragmatic approach where a strong 
commitment to an ideological basis is jettisoned in favour of a course of action or a 
series of ideas which can best serve the goals of party elites. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, elites are using party organisations to pursue certain objectives all of 
which, in essence, involve the seeking of public office for protection of political or 
economic interests. The use of ideological pragmatism in pursuit of elite interests 
can be illustrated by the split between Ak Zhol and Nagiz Ak Zhol in 2005 and the 
merger between Nagiz Ak Zhol and OSDP prior to the parliamentary election in 
2007. The 2005 Ak Zhol split was a result not of ideological disputes, but instead 
personalistic differences over how the party leadership could best achieve the goal of 
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obtaining power in the face of Nazarbaev and Otan 's political dominance. 88 The split 
centred on whether the party should work more closely with the presidential 
administration to achieve their goals or come out and defiantly oppose him. This 
demonstrates the pragmatism inherent in political parties. The differences among the 
Ak Zhol leadership concerned the best methods to achieve their aims, not difference 
over policy. Consequently, in terms of ideology, after the partition, few differences 
could be found between Ak Zhol and Nagiz AkZhol's. party programmes. 89 
The merger of OSDP and Nagiz Ak Zhol prior to the 2007 parliamentary election 
also demonstrates how party elites eschew ideological and programmatic 
commitments in favour of pursuing a more, pragmatic approach. In June 2007 the co- 
chairmen of Nagiz Ak Zhol and Zharmakhan Tuiakbai, leader of OSDP, announced 
that their two parties were merging so as to fight the 2007 parliamentary election 
campaign. 90 What was surprising about the merger was the fact their party platforms 
were ideologically opposed. Nagiz Ak Zhol represented a more free market neo- 
liberal economic agenda while OSDP had placed itself as a social democratic party 
intent on the redistribution of wealth. The purpose of the merger was tactical and 
pragmatic as was set out in a statement by the co-chairmen of Nagiz Ak Zhol: `The 
strategic purpose of the association of Nagiz Ak Zhol and OSDP is to create a real 
democratic opposition, capable of becoming the alternative to the party in power, 
Nur Otan, led by, its leader Nursultan Nazarbaev. The tactical purpose of the 
association is to achieve the maximum results in the forthcoming elections to the 
Mazhilis. ' 9' 
These two instances reveal how parties in Kazakhstan exhibit a pragmatic streak as 
opposed to ideological commitment. Moreover, ideological concerns are secondary 
to the goals that are being pursed by their leading political personalities. This in turn, 
illustrates a prominent theme in parties' programmatic content - the central role of 
personality over the formality of ideology. 
88 Rozlana Taukina, `Raskol v partii Ak Zhol: Konflikt liderov iii idei? ' Klub Polyton, 29 April 2004, 
http: //www. c lub. kz/index. php? lan g=ru&mod=analitic s&submod=self&article=277 
89 Ibid. 
90 The merger was pursued because changes to the constitution banned the formation of electoral 
blocs for the purpose of competing in elections. 
91 From a statement released by Nagiz Ak Zhol to members of the party on the 23 June 2007, accessed 
http: //www. akzhol-party. info/activity/statements/2007/06/23/statements 1617. html 
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2.5 Centrality of Personality 
It has been argued that parties' ideologies are linked only to the goals and aspirations 
of the elites that lead them. For example, Sergei Duvanov claimed, `whenever I hear 
about a political ideology of any party I cannot take it seriously because nobody has 
an ideology yet, they just have their own goals they want to reach. ' 92 As suggested 
above, this has been the case with the parties Ak Zhol, Nagiz Ak Zhol and OSDP. The 
central role of personality and personalism within party ideology is illustrative of the 
relationship between the informal and formal within Kazakh politics. It is evident 
across all parties in Kazakhstan, but it is Nur Otan which sets the template across the 
country. 
As noted in Chapter One, one of the dominant typologies of parties in the former 
Soviet Union is the party of power. As analysed in Chapter One, the term party of 
power is fraught with conceptual difficulties, one of which is the lack of emphasis it 
places on political personality. Nur Otan despite being referred to as a party of 
power in fact relies heavily on the personality of Nazarbaev for its popularity and 
ideology. Nur Otan's party's programme is the president's programme. According to 
one. senior figure in the party, `Nur Otan follows the path set out by the president', 93 
and `with all the statements made by the president each year, it is the party's 
responsibility to. make them come true and implement them'. 94 For example, in 2007 
the party based its whole electoral platform on the president's annual address `New 
Kazakhstan in a New World'. 95 Throughout their party platform the majority of 
instances of commitments are based on the president's address from earlier in the 
year. This includes commitments on the growth of social benefits, increasing the 
ethnic Kazakh population, and the building of new schools and hospitals in some of 
the remoter areas of the country all of which were announced in the president's 
92 Authorr's interview with Sergei Duvanov, Journalist and opposition activist, 28 November 2006, 
Almaty. 
93 Author's interview with Galiaskar Dunaev, Nur Otan Political Council's representative in Almaty, 
22 August 2007, Almaty. 
94 Author's interview with Sharipbek Amirbekov, Deputy Head of the Central Apparatus of the 
Political Council of Nur Otan, 10 February 2007, Almaty. 
95 Nursultan Nazarbaev, Novyi Kazakhstan v novom mire', www. akorda. kz, 28 February 2007, 
http: //www. akorda. kz/www/wwwakorda kz. nsf/sections? OpenForm&id doc=BC3DF7C6FB65732 
£46257291002A9331 &lang=ru&L 1=L2&L2=L2-22. 
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speech. 96 Ideologically, the party claims to `represent all of Kazakh society and all 
layers of the population in the country'. 97 This reflects the president's position as 
the key person who represents and balances the interests of all people in Kazakhstan. 
Nur Otan deploys this image of Nazarbaev to great effect in its electoral material. In 
2007, election posters displayed Nazarbaev among ordinary people: with miners, 
labourers, different ethnic groups and young people. The party's main slogan was 
`we are together with the President! We are for Nur Otan! ' (My vmeste s 
prezidentom! My - za Nur Otan! )98 The party's ideology and platform, therefore, are 
focused on the president, his personality and his centrality to the country's 
prosperity. It is the informal politics of personality as opposed to formal ideological 
ideas driving party presentation. 
With parties' organisations based on the interests of informal factional elite groups 
or individual political figures, either for attempting to gain public office or protecting 
economic interests, it has followed that the formal ideology of parties has been 
sidelined in favour of the personal ambitions of party leaders and their personality 
and charisma. Political personality is preferred as a political tool as opposed to an 
overarching commitment to ideology. 99 Parties are willing to cut loose any 
ideological foundations if adjusting programmatic content could assist the political 
leadership in achieving their political or electoral goals. Even those parties with clear 
ideological foundations (KPK, KNPK), or those seemingly rooted in certain political 
ideas (Atameken, OSDP) rely on, or are shaped by, the informal politics of 
personalism. All other political parties in Kazakhstan lack ideological distinctiveness 
and depend on ideological pragmatism to achieve political goals and following the 
example of the president's part% rely almost solely on the personality of their leader 
or leaders to distinguish them as political entities in the public space. According to 
96 Nur Otan: Za protsvetanie Kazakhstana i blagopoluchie Kazakhstantsev, Almaty, 2007. 
97 Author's interview with Sharipbek Amirbekov. 
98 This was the main slogan that could be found on most of the campaign materials collected by the 
author during the election campaign for the 2007 parliamentary election. 
99 Political parties in the West are increasingly accused of such pragmatism and populism as opposed 
to acting on the basis of an ideological core. It is possible to point to political leaders such as Tony 
Blair, Gerard Schröder and Bill Clinton who were willing to fight without the core values at the heart 
of their parties so as to achieve the goal of reaching political office. In this sense political parties in 
Kazakhstan are no different and are effectively demonstrating that parties in Kazakhstan can be 
integrated into a wider typological framework of political parties. 
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one analyst, `the main function of political parties is to promote their leaders. ' goo 
Thus personalism of leadership and the central role of personality, key components 
of neopatrimonialism, displace any commitment to formal political ideology. 
3. Behavioural norms 
As noted above, parties are organised for the interest of either informal factional elite 
groups or individual political personalities and as a consequence it is their ambitions 
and personality which define any relationship towards ideology. However, how are 
these parties willing to act in search of achieving their goals? And, to what extent are 
they willing to accept certain democratic rules of the game? More succinctly, what 
are the behavioural norms displayed by political parties in attempting to achieve 
organisational and ideological goals? 
The extent to which political parties are dedicated to democratic rules of the game 
influences the extent to which pluralism and democracy becomes institutionalised. 
101 
On the formal level all parties in Kazakhstan claim to support and be committed to 
democratic rules of the game. However, using the parameters Richard Gunther and 
Larry Diamond put forward in their typological framework (see Chapter One) it is 
possible to observe three types of behavioural norms in relation to parties in 
Kazakhstan, which all go beyond a surface commitment to democratic rules. The 
first type is proto-hegemonic parties where behaviour is non-competitive and 
includes an unwillingness to participate in fair, democratic and transparent processes. 
Consequently, these parties have been, and continue to be, central to the president's 
consolidation of his personal neopatrimonial authoritarian rule due to their 
compliance to non-competitive electoral processes. In Kazakhstan, the main proto- 
100 Author's interview with Sergei Duvanov. 
101 The term that is frequently applied to parties that are not committed to democratic rules of the 
game is an `anti-system' party. In much of the literature on political parties the term `anti-system' 
refers to those parties which are seen as opposing democratic rules of the game and wish to destabilise 
emerging democratic systems. The term `anti-system' is problematical to apply in the context of 
Kazakhstan. This is because the system itself is non-democratic. So those parties, such as Nur Otan, 
who support the maintenance of the current political system, would possibly be considered 'anti- 
system' in a fully-fledged democratic system. Nur Otan is, however, pro-system in so far that it 
supports and maintains the president's further consolidation of power. On the other hand, opposition 
parties in Kazakhstan may be considered non-anti-system parties in a well-developed democracy - 
but in Kazakhstan itself they are considered radical. Therefore, the term anti-system is problematic 
and complex in the case of Kazakhstan and likely to cause confusion and difficulties in analysis. 
223 
hegemonic party Nur Otan has strengthened, supported and promoted the personal 
regime of Nazarbaev. The second type reflects those parties which are complicit in 
legitimising proto-hegemonic behaviour. They provide legitimacy to the 
neopatrimonial authoritarian regime that Nazarbaev has implemented by creating the 
impression of multipartism. The final type is parties committed to democratic rules 
of the game as it increases their chances of achieving the protection of their political 
and economic interests. Conversely, they are unable to enter into fair and democratic 
competition because of the leverage and attention given to those parties who are 
proto-hegemonic. These parties are prepared to participate by rules of the game 
which are non-transparent and unfair, as they wish to present themselves at all times 
as law abiding and non-radical so as not to be painted by pro-presidential forces, and 
perceived by the population, as parties threatening the apparent stability of the 
country. 
3.1. Parties with a proto-hegemonic outlook 
Essentially, just one party possess proto-hegemonic characteristics. Nur Otan 
believes fully in the president's idea of `step-by-step reform and democratic 
evolution'. 102 However, step-by-step reform in Kazakhstan has effectively seen the 
consolidation of the personal authoritarian rule of Nazarbaev. Thus Nur Otan, 
despite a formal commitment to democracy, is central to, and the beneficiary of, 
political processes that are anti-democratic and have overseen the solidification of 
one man's personal neopatrimonial rule. This proto-hegemonic nature can be 
evidenced by the lack of external and internal competition in the party. Externally, it 
has never had to participate in a truly competitive election and this in turn does not 
provide candidates and deputies with the mentality and tools required for truly 
democratic and competitive elections. For example, Nur Otan's election victory of 
2007 in which they received 88 percent of votes was achieved under conditions 
where 40 percent of polling stations were subject to electoral violations. 103 An 
internal and external culture of competition is absent. An election campaign 
specialist who was asked to run some training sessions with Nur Otan party 
102 Author's interview with Kenzhegali Sägadiev Nur Otan Deputy of the Mazhilis of the 3rd and 4th 
Convocations, 22 August 2007, Almaty. 
103 This was the figure claimed by the OSCE in the preliminary report. International Election 
Observation Mission, Parliamentary Election, Republic of Kazakhstan 18 August 2007. Published 
20th August 2007. 
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members highlights this issue, `I have never seen more weak and less prepared, but 
at the same time confident people in my life. These are people who do not 
understand political competition. ' 104 
The lack of external competition is a result of the party's disproportionate access to 
state, administrative and mass-media resources. In the 2004 and 2007 parliamentary 
election Nur Otan received the majority of positive and favourable media coverage. 
A report from the OSCE concerning the 2007 parliamentary election notes, `the state 
media gave preferential treatment to Nur Otan in news coverage' and `political 
parties did not always enjoy equitable campaign conditions, including access to 
venues for meetings. There were instances of favourable treatment of Nur Otan by 
the authorities. ' 105 Any observer of post-Soviet politics would not be surprised by 
the advantage afforded to a presidential party. What it does reveal, however, is the 
affect on the competitive characteristics of the party. A figure in Nur Otan's Political 
Council recognised that `there is no real competition within the party and among 
party members'. 106 The electoral advantage afforded to Nur Otan resulted in a 
limited competitive spirit within the party. Moreover, the alleged use of state 
resources for party purposes, generally based on the patronage of local executives 
and state agencies loyal to the president, further illustrate the non-transparent 
methods and tools which provide the party with a comparative advantage over other 
political parties. 107 Internally, democratic norms are rejected in favour of ensuring 
political process is guided by a hierarchical principle. For example, the selection of 
candidates for the Maslikhats are decided not by PPOs, but instead from lists drawn 
up by regional leaders of `potentially good quality candidates like doctors or 
teachers'. 108 
Aside from deficient external and internal competition Nur Otan has been a useful 
tool for the president in consolidating neopatrimonialism. The idea that a national 
political figure uses a political party to consolidate their own form authoritarianism 
104 Author's interview with political consultant for OSDP, 14 November 2007, Almaty. 
105 OSCE/ODIHR, `Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Election August 2007 Election Mission 
Observer Report', Warsaw, 30 October 2007. 
106 Author's interview with Bektas Mukhamedzhanov. 
107 See Chapter Four. 
108 Author's interview with senior Nur Otan official, 8 May 2007, Almaty. 
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has been witnessed in places like Malaysia and the Philippines. 109 President 
Nazarbaev is institutionalising a similar process and Nur Otan is central to its 
success. For instance, the constitutional changes introduced in May 2007 that 
ostensibly introduced measures to promote and increase democracy in Kazakhstan, 
were in fact a series of changes that allowed Nazarbaev to exert further his informal 
control of the legislature by formally institutionalising his power in the form of Nur 
Otan. This was achieved through the perceived fraudulent election in which Nur 
Otan won all the seats and complete control of the legislature. As a result, the 
president has hegemonic control of the legislature through his own political party. 110 
3.2 Parties who are acquiescent to the dominance of a proto-hegemonic party 
Rukhaniiat, Party of Patriots, Auyl, KNPK and Adilet do not strictly illustrate 
characteristics of proto-hegemony, but are complicit in legitimising the proto- 
hegemonic dominance of Nur Otan and the consolidation of the president's personal 
power. Their participation in, and reaction to, official processes undertaken to 
ostensibly further democratisation has legitimised Nazarbaev's extension and 
consolidation of personal power. At the same time their ambivalent attitude towards, 
and support of, the Nur Otan mergers and fraudulent election processes legitimises 
Nur Otan's dominance of the party system. 
Rukhaniiat, Party of Patriots, Auyl, KNPK and Adilet were integrally involved in the 
`State Commission for Democratic Reforms Under the President', a process that led 
to constitutional changes introduced in 2007. The alterations seemingly initiated 
democratic improvements to Kazakhstan's political system. "' The reforms, 
however, in effect increased the personal power and control of Nazarbaev by 
essentially making him president for life. 112 Rukhaniiat and Adilet engaged in 
supporting and constructing these reforms. Altynshash Dzhaganova, leader of 
Rukhaniiat, believed `the reforms added up to great changes in the political 
109 See Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratisation, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
"°D. Kislov and F. Dzhani, `Na parlamentskikh vyborakh v Kazakhstane snova pobedil president 
strany', www. kub. info, 21 August 2007, http: //www. kub. info/article. phn? sid=18973. 
111 This included amendments aimed at giving greater responsibility to parliament and political parties 
and moving towards a electoral system based on proportional representation. 
112A1eksei Nikitin, Nazarbaev stanet pozhiznennym prezidentom Kazakhstana, www. kub. info, 18 May 
2007, http: //www. kub. info/article. php? sid= 17526. 
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system'. 113 One senior member of Adilet noted that `as a party we are really pleased. 
the president took all our suggestions into consideration and we are also pleased they 
will be implemented'. 114 Yet,, the reforms led to the president's increased control 
over the legislature and Nur Otan proto-hegemonic domination of the party system. 
The tacit support of the smaller pro-presidential parties provide legitimacy for the 
consolidation of Nazarbaev's personal neopatrimonial rule. 
The smaller pro-presidential parties ambivalent attitude towards the Nur Otan 
mergers and fraudulent election of 2007 illustrate how they are encouraging, and 
complicit in, legitimising Nur Otan's hegemony of the party system. Many in those 
parties considered the Nur Otan mergers to be a progressive step forward believing 
that `it will have a positive effect' 15 in `strengthening the party system'. ' 16 These 
parties did not join the chorus of disapproval surrounding the 2007 election, arguing 
instead that `the results should be recognised and the elections have ended with a full 
and unconditional victory of the party in power, Nur Otan. Not recognising the 
results of voting means to not recognise the opinion of the overwhelming majority of 
the people in Kazakhstan. ' "7 While KNPK and Auyl have been party to some of 
these proto-hegemonic supporting processes, since the outcome of the reform 
process and the election they have moved away from so tacitly supporting the status 
quo. The KNPK counter signed a letter from the opposition parties to the president 
criticising the election and asking the president to cancel the results and call a new 
election. 18 However, all, five parties since decided to participate in the 
Obshchestvennia palata (Public Chamber), the body set up after the 2007 election as 
`a sign of goodwill on behalf of the party which won all the seats in the election'. ' 19 
The body has no power, no right to make legislation and undoubtedly will have 
limited impact. Nevertheless, it demonstrates how smaller political parties by 
refusing to oppose the president, and Nur Otan, are legitimising and nourishing the 
13 Author's interview with Altynshash Dzhaganova, Leader of Rukhaniiat, 7 March 2007, Astana. 
114 Author's interview with Kuanysh Zhalakov, Chairman of the Astana City Branch of Adilet, 6 
March 2007, Astana. 
15 Author's interview with. Altynshash Dzhaganova. 
16 Author's interview with Kuanysh Zhalakov. 
"7 Kazinform, 21 August 2007. 
'8'Otkrytoe pis'mo Politicheskikh partii k Prezidentu Respubliki Kazakhstan', www. zonakz. net. 28 
August 2007, httn: //zonakz. net/articles/19115. 
1901eg Nilov, `Koshki-Myshki Ak Ordy', www. zonakz. net, 30 November 2007, 
b=: //zonakz. net/articies/20252. 
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hegemony of the president and his personal rule. Consequently, the president is able 
to make the case that multipartism exists in Kazakhstan and despite Nur Otan's 
dominance there is an inclusive process. 
3.3 Parties with a tolerant and pluralistic outlook 
The major opposition parties, Alga, Ak Zhol, Nagiz Ak Zhol, KPK and OSDP could 
be considered non-hegemonic and pluralist in outlook. Non-hegemony is an attribute 
of many of these parties due to their general pledge to democratic norms and 
political reform in Kazakhstan. By consistently contesting the unfair electoral 
process they are subject to these parties reveal a commitment to democratic norms. 
For instance, OSDP's electoral program is built on pledges to reform Kazakhstan's 
political system so there is 'fair and transparent government for the people' and the 
establishment of the rule of law. 120 Alga, too believes in changing the political 
system in Kazakhstan so it reflects a more plural and transparent democracy, 
Assylbek Kozhakhmetov, stated that: 
"The parliament should be a real parliament with full representative power. 
The parliament should appoint the prime minister, and all ministers. The president 
should have the power to appoint only the KNB, intelligence and foreign office. The 
rest should be the sphere of the government. Of course, all Akims should be elected 
at all levels. Local representatives, the Maslikhats, should have enough power to 
hold the Akim to account. As the parliament should have a connection over the 
government the same should be for Akims and Maslikhats. Again our local 
parliaments do not have any real influence over Akims. We should have fair 
elections, and the election of the judiciary. Of course we should also have a free 
mass media as well as a commitment to stop corruption, or at least stop the 
development of corruption. We should have full transparency. ""' 
It is evident that on a formal level these parties share a dedication to democratic 
norms and fair rules of the game. However, it can also be argued that these parties 
are former government elites and were, previously closely associated with the 
120 OSDP, Za Novyi Kazakhstana! (Almaty, July 2007). 
121 Author's interview with Assylbek B. Kozhakhmetov, former Chairmen of the Political Council's 
Presidium of Alga, 26 January 2007, Almaty. 
228 
president. Therefore, from this perspective they only committed themselves to 
democratic rules of the game as a way of protecting their political and economic 
interests from the arbitrary persecution of Nazarbaev's neopatrimonial regime. As 
Yevgeni Zhovtis has noted: 
"Yes, of course they start to use democratic rhetoric, and keep in mind they 
are oriented to the West, and at a certain point when they began to be persecuted and 
harassed or gppressed they begin to turn this democratic rhetoric, to some extent, 
into convictions. To some extent their rhetoric and convictions became closer and 
closer they would argue that freedom of speech is needed because they could not 
speak through official channels and therefore they came to the conclusion that they 
. needed 
freedom 
, of association and so on. 
" 1 22 
The conclusion some observers have drawn is that the different opposition parties, 
which emerged from the elite fragmentation process, were established not out of a 
belief in democracy but in an effort `to try and save that side of the political elite 
through political mechanisms ... DVK was far from democratic they were simply 
opposing the other side of the elite'. 123 Formally they argue for democracy and 
transparency but they only arrived at this point because of factional inter-elite 
conflict and that democratic rules offered them protection. 
Parties' behavioural norms represent another dimension of the relationship between 
formal and informal politics. Key elements of neopatrimonialism are evidently 
linked to, and shaping, parties' behavioural norms. Formally all parties state a 
commitment to democracy in some shape or form, but underlying this formal 
commitment to democratic behavioural norms are informal priority. With Nur Otan 
the informal priority is hegemony of the party system which is gained through the 
bias and selective application of formal rules by loyal local executives and state 
agencies. As a result, the party lacks external and internal competition. With the 
smaller pro-presidential parties their informal priorities is to be included in the 
political system in the hope of some form of gain (e. g. participation in big national 
122 Author's interview with Yevgeni Zhovtis, Director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for 
Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 31 January 2007, Almaty. 
123 Author's interview with Sergei Duvanov. 
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bodies or commissions). Their ambivalent attitude and acceptance of Nur Otan and 
Nazarbaev's dominance make them complicit in the consolidation of the president's 
hegemonic neopatrimonial regime. With the opposition parties, while on the surface 
they are committed to democracy and greater transparency, they remain as a part of 
the political elite engaged in factional informal conflict with the pro-Nazarbaev part 
of the elite. Therefore, their belief in democracy was arrived at through a degree of 
pragmatism that it would provide shelter from potential persecution of Nazarbaev 
loyal state agencies and elites. '24 
4. Concluding Remarks 
What this chapter has exposed is that while the external tension between formal and 
informal political behaviour and relations affects party type, internally parties are 
prone to similar informal political phenomena. Informal political behaviour and 
relations affect party membership and organisation. Major pro-presidential parties 
like Nur Otan and GPK have relied on patronage networks of patron-client relations 
to increase party membership. To an extent opposition parties are affected by these 
phenomena too. Party organisation is based on the personal economic and political 
interests of informal elite groups or individual public figures resulting in party 
ideology being driven by personalism and pragmatism. Parties' behavioural norms 
are also being shaped by informal politics. Nazarbaev's control of the political 
system has seen loyal local executives and state agencies provide administrative 
advantage to Nur Otan ensuring their electoral dominance. Consequently, the party 
is proto-hegemonic and lacking the experience of political competition. Smaller pro- 
Nazarbaev parties' accept this hegemonic dominance in exchange for participating in 
public and state bodies. The opposition, on the other hand, are seemingly committed 
to democratic norms only for the pragmatic purposes of interest protection due to 
their involvement in factional inter-elite conflict. 
124 It should be stressed the establishment of political parties has not helped opposition elite protect 
themselves from perceived state persecution. In September-2008 criminal cases were being brought 
against Bolat Abilov, leader of Azat, Amirzhan Kosanov deputy leader of OSDP, Vladimir Kozlov 
leader of Alga, and Assylbek Kozhakmetov. All these figures are considered by some analysts to be 
objectionable in the eyes of Nazarbaev and their criminal cases have been instigated by the 
presidential administration as a way of discrediting the opposition prior to another pre-term 
parliamentary election. See, Il'ia Berezin, `Ugolovnoe presledovanie Bulata Abilova vygodno 
Zharmakhany Tuiakbaiu? ', www. geokz. ty, 29 September 2008, 
http"//www. geokz. ty/article. php? aid=6264 
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As a consequence of this relationship between formal and informal political 
behaviour and relations, we can broadly typologically map most parties in 
Kazakhstan within two types in Gunther and Diamond's framework. The influence 
of neopatrimonial politics on the structural criteria of parties can be reflected back in 
Gunther and Diamond's clientelistic-elite and personalistic-electoralist parties. The 
informal patron-client networks which underpin some political parties and the central 
role of elite groups in party organisation and ideology fits the thinly and weakly 
organised clientelistic party 125 which `is a confederation of notables (either 
traditional or newly emerging liberal-professional or economic elite), each with its 
own geographically, or functionally, personalistically based support'. 126 Other 
parties where the party organisation and ideology is driven almost solely by the 
ambitions and personality of the political leader broadly resemble the personalistic- 
electoralist party which is organisationally weak and thin. 127 However, at election 
time `these parties spring in to action to perform what is unequivocally their primary 
function, the conduct-of the campaign. ' 128 
Placing parties in Kazakhstan within these two broad types makes it possible to 
integrate them with other parties, including those not limited to a post-Soviet 
context. Electoralist-personalistic parties, especially Nur Otan, share characteristics 
with other parties across the globe. For example, Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan's People 
Party, Alberto Fujimori's Cambio 90,. Silvio. Berlusconi's Forza Italia, Thai Rak 
Thai Party of Shinawatra and of course, Putin's party. Of course, each party has its 
own complexities and contextual specificities but they share certain similarities, in 
the sense that they are personalistic vehicles, and highlight that party development in 
Kazakhstan, and even in the wider former Soviet Union, is not abnormal but 
symptomatic of party development in weak democracies, semi-democracies and the 
more benevolent authoritarian systems. 
125 Nagiz Ak Zhol, OSDP, Ak Zhol, Alga, Asar and GPK fit this broad party type. 
126 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, `Species of Political Parties: A New Typology', Party 
Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), p. 176. 
127 Parties who arguably fit within this party type are Nur Otan, KPPK, KNPK, Adilet, Auyl, 
Rukhaniiat and the Party of Patriots. 
128 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, `Species of Political Parties: A New Typology'. p. 185. 
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What this chapter has indicated by highlighting the relationship between formal 
politics and informal political relations and behaviour within political parties is that 
parties in Kazakhstan are inward looking institutions. Their role is not to appeal to 
society and perform the role of representing social interests but rather to act as 
formal constructs for the purpose of informal political elite interests, ambitions or 
conflicts. That parties are top down institutions impacts and affects the relationship 
they have with wider society and the linkages we typically expect parties to establish 
with citizens. The following chapter seeks to explore this issue. 
232 
Chapter Six: Parties and Society 
Driven by the uncertainty and contingency of transition the president of Kazakhstan 
has relied on a fusion between informal forms of political behaviour and 
relationships and formal constitutional power to establish his authority. This fusion 
represents neopatrimonialism, a logical transition from patrimonial communism, 
where traditional forms of political behaviour and relations and residual communist 
legacies are combined with new formal liberal institutions. With power underpinned 
by both formal and informal means, the president depended upon the informal 
powers bestowed upon loyal clients to interpret and selectively apply formal rules to 
ensure pro-presidential parties monopolised the party system thus, assisting in 
consolidating his rule. Naturally the major party to benefit from this formal and 
informal bias was Nur Otan, the party organised to serve the president's interests. As 
noted in the previous chapter, the parties to emerge in this context were elite and 
clientelistic focused serving fundamentally the interests of those elites or charismatic 
individuals seeking to retain or contest power. In these parties general membership is 
weak and party ideology is centred on the interests and ideas of the elites leading the 
party organisation. However, parties do not exist in a vacuum and traditional 
sociological interpretations of party development would require us to consider 
parties' relationship with society. Therefore, this chapter seeks to assess Kazakh 
political parties' broader relationship and linkages with citizens. Additionally, it will 
seek to address how informal forms of political relations and behaviour have affected 
parties' relationship with, and utility within, society and how parties have assisted in 
legitimising and consolidating Nazarbaev's rule. 
As argued in Chapter One, it is not suitable to take a social cleavage approach to 
understanding party society relations in the post-communist world due to the lack of 
clear definable social cleavages understood in the typical Western sense. ' Rather, 
this chapter argues that party-society relations in Kazakhstan are defined by a 
disconnection between parties, citizens and the state and a passivity and disinterest 
on the part of society towards parties. This is caused primarily by a fusion between 
the clientelistic and personalistic nature of political parties, which are a result of the 
' See Seymour M. Lipset &Stein Rokkan, (eds. ) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National 
Perspectives (New York, Free Press, 1967). 
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dominance of informal forms of political relations and behaviour in Kazakhstan and 
some residual communist legacies related to the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU). The most dominant personalistic party is Nur Otan which has 
assisted in shaping homogeneity of opinion within society regarding the centrality of 
Nazarbaev's leadership to the prosperity of the country. They have been able to 
achieve this on the basis of being the president's party (thus claiming to represent the 
interests of all Kazakhstani citizens); through achieving supremacy of visual 
recognition and structural organisation; and by occupying a majority of positions in 
state and local executive bodies. The latter has been accomplished by the preferential 
treatment the party receives from the state media and local and state executive 
bodies. This gives the party a greater advantage over all other parties allowing it to 
shape the context within which all parties establish bonds with society. Moreover, 
Nur Otan in acting as the chief cheerleader for Nazarbaev's leadership and plays an 
important role in explaining the durability of his authoritarian leadership by 
providing the president with further legitimacy with the public. While Nur Otan and 
the president define and dominate the space within which all political parties have to 
build and establish linkages with citizens, some parties are attempting to establish 
connections with citizens by acting as social guarantors and public educators of the 
most marginalised communities in the country. Devoid of the traditional role parties' 
play in terms of interest articulation, many parties carry out acts of public good and 
charity similar to that of NGOs. At the same time many political parties are rushing 
to represent and articulate the interests of the emerging middle classes. However, 
parties are generally restrained in doing so by the neopatrimonial nature of the 
political system, where small to medium size businessmen fear recriminations for 
supporting any party not sanctioned by the presidential administration. These 
developing linkages are limited and operate at the very margins of the political 
system. They represent only emerging shoots of party citizen representation and 
articulation, because broadly speaking the relationship between parties and society is 
defined by the personalistic and clientelistic nature of political parties. 
The chapter is broken into three sections. The first discusses the disconnection and 
passivity apparent in Kazakh society and the explanations for this in structural terms 
with regards to the particularity of Kazakh social organisation and the legacy of the 
CPSU and in terms of the role of agency with the personalistic and clientelistic 
234 
nature of parties. The second section deals with the issue of homogeneity of opinion 
within society regarding the centrality of Nazarbaev's leadership. It discusses the 
nature of this discourse and how Nur Otan actively and importantly promotes this 
narrative within society. The section pays particular attention to how Nur Otan's 
dominance in the regions in a structural, visual and representative sense aids the 
facilitation of this key message about the president's leadership. Crucially the section 
deals with how this is achieved through the informal preference and advantage the 
party receives in the state media and from state and local executive sources. The 
final section explores emerging avenues of party-citizen linkages. It assesses four 
areas where parties are engaging in limited forms of interest articulation at the 
margins of political society: acting as guarantors of social rights, public and civic 
educators, acting in the public good and representing emerging middle class 
interests. This section does stress, however, that these are only very limited emerging 
shoots. 
1. Disconnection and Passivity: The Gap Between Parties and Society and the 
Political Disinterest of Citizens in Kazakhstan 
1.1 The Great Disconnection: Parties, Citizens and the State in Kazakhstan 
Traditionally in Western party systems political parties act as a connecting force 
between citizens and the state. Cadre and mass parties generally acted as instruments 
to represent different interests groups within civil society. 2 In Kazakhstan there is an 
observable trend that `parties are isolated from citizens and exist in a totally different 
world. ' 3 As the previous chapter discussed, party elites dominate parties in both a 
formal and informal sense with party organisation and ideology focused on their own 
political and economic objectives. Consequently, a gulf exists between citizens and 
parties due to this inward self-interested character. While parties might speak the 
language of interest articulation it is not clear how this is formally channelled, if at 
all. 4 Therefore, from a pluralist perspective it is difficult to observe where, and how, 
society is connected to the state through political parties. One factor to explain this 
Z See Richard Katz and Peter Mair `Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: 
The Emergence of the Cartel Party', Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995) especially pp. 8-13. 
3 Author's interview with political analyst, 21 November 2006, Almaty. 
4 There are some cases where the formal channelling of societal interests and party-citizen linkages 
are emerging. These will be addressed towards the end of the chapter. 
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disconnection is the role of Nur Otan as the preponderant political party in the 
system. As will be highlighted later in this chapter, Nur Otan's dominance of state 
and local executive bodies and its role as chief cheerleader for the president's 
programme makes it the only party functionally able to represent and articulate 
interests. In the view of the deputy chairman of Rukhaniiat, of all the parties which 
have appeared in post-Soviet Kazakhstan `none have been able to influence the 
political situation in the country. Therefore, it was quite natural for Nur Otan to 
appear. It has taken the place of the CPSU and while it doesn't have it formally 
written that it can influence government cadre, it does have the opportunity because 
of its position in parliament, local representative bodies and the state'. 5 Nur Otan's 
preponderance, achieved primarily through its informal relationship with the 
president and other state executive actors means it is the dominant channel between 
society and the state. Nur Otan, however, is also the personal political vehicle for the 
president to establish greater control of formal political institutions and other state 
bodies. It is not a channel to articulate societal interests. With no other parties having 
any purchase with the state, and limited influence in, and with, society, due to the 
informal supremacy of political elites and personalities in their construction and 
organisation, there is a disconnection between society, political parties and the state 
as figure 6.1 highlights. This disconnection between society, parties and the state 
exacerbates an already existing passivity of society towards political parties and 
politics in general. 
Figure 6.1 The Disconnection between society, parties and the state in Kazakhstan 
------------ 
Society ' 
Parties 
------------------- 
s Author's interview with Anatolii Volkov, deputy leader of Rukhaniiat, 27 March 2007, Almaty. 
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1.2 The Passivity of Society 
The focus on personality politics, the blurring of class identities, greater affluence 
and the emergence of other forms of social mobilisation have added to a general 
sense of social disinterest in political parties, weakening the traditional links between 
parties and society in the West. 6 Therefore, in the experience of Kazakhstan, any 
argument regarding the passivity of society towards national level politics and 
political parties is not limited to a post-Soviet and neopatrimonial context. Such a 
phenomenon is observable in many different countries. Opinion among analysts and 
party elites in Kazakhstan is generally firm in their belief that society possesses a 
passive attitude towards parties and politics. Yevgeni Zhovtis argued that `people are 
apathetic they do not trust political parties, as there is no possibility to change 
anything'. 7 Therefore, passivity of society is borne out of the limitations citizens 
might feel about the ability of parties to affect power and instigate change. In the 
view of one analyst, `the citizens of Kazakhstan consider that it does not matter 
which political parties there are, because they do not play a major role, because they 
still think there is one large Communist Party. Only about five percent of the 
population actually look through party programmes to see what their ideologies 
are... if you ask people what kind of parties there are in Kazakhstan they would not 
be able to answer this question, accept maybe that there is Nur Otan. And this is only 
because there are a lot of news materials on TV and other mass media sources about 
them. ' 8 The ability for people to see parties instigating or affecting change is limited 
by the monopoly Nur Otan has in state bodies and across media outlets. 9 This 
exclusive control is achieved primarily via the benefits Nur Otan has acquired 
through informal political behaviour and relations as discussed in previous chapters, 
such as local Akims ensuring state employees vote for the party. This directly shows 
how the informality and personal aspect of Kazakhstan's neopatrimonial regime can 
affect the relationship between parties and society. Faced with formal rules 
6 Jose Ramon Montero and Richard Gunther, `Reviewing and Reassessing Parties, in Richard 
Gunther, Jose Ramon Montero and Juan Linz (eds. ), Political Parties: Old Concepts and New 
Challenges (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002) pp. 1-35. 
Author's interview with Yevgeni Zhovtis, Political Analyst, 31 January 2007, Almaty. 
s Author's interview with political analyst, 21 November 2006, Almaty. 
9 The role of Nur Otan's dominance in affecting and underwriting the relationship between political 
parties and society in Kazakhstan will be covered in greater detail in the `Homogeneity of Opinion' 
section below. It is interesting to note that at the end of 2008 Nur Otan announced it was establishing 
its own media holding company, illustrating the even tighter reign it is likely to develop over the 
media. 
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selectively applied to favour Nur Otan, citizens feel no other party is able to break 
these links and affect power and change. As Zharmakhan Tuiakbai has stated, `the 
majority of society does not get the idea of the necessity of political organisations. 
For today the main criteria for defining party interests among the population is either 
pro-power or oppositionist. Today the main concerns of people are the negative 
processes of power, the authoritarian regime and the inability to change power'. '° 
From this perspective it has been argued that `people are not stupid, they understand 
that political parties are not going to serve the interests of people in Kazakhstan'. " 
While Kazakhstan possesses `a politically passive society', it is not built on 
increasing affluence or the decline of previously distinct social cleavages, which 
were not present in the first instance, but rather on the fact that citizens view politics 
and political parties as unreachable. 12 Indeed, in opinion surveys when asked about 
their voting intentions the largest category of respondents are those who are either 
`against all' or `not sure'. 13 For example, regular opinion polls taken by the 
Association of Sociologists and Political Scientists (ASIP) revealed when directly 
asked the majority of citizens are either against all parties or have no answer about 
their preferences. A poll conducted in May 2006 illustrates that 21 percent of people 
interviewed were against all political parties with 35 percent unable to answer who 
they might support in an election. In the poll, the party with the most support was 
Asar14 with 11 percent then Otan with 5 percent and then all other parties receiving 
support of 2 percent or less. 15 A poll from two years earlier in 2004 produced very 
similar results with 29 percent against all and 28 percent unable to provide a 
10 Author's interview with Zharmakhan Tuiakbai, Leader of OSDP, 30 January 2007, Almaty. 
" Author's interview with Dosym Satpaev, Political Analyst, 28 February 2007, Almaty. 
12 Author's interview with Andrei Chebotarev, political analyst, 20 November 2006, Almaty. 
13 The opinion polls and surveys used in this chapter do derive from fairly reputable agencies unless 
stated otherwise. The Association of Sociologists and Political Scientists (ASIP), the Centre of Social 
Technologies (TsST) and the Kazakhstan Institute for Socio-Economic Information and Forecasting 
(KISEP) are independent agencies. This is reflected in their data which generally illustrates less bias 
for pro-presidential parties. For example, in pre-election polls Nur Otan `s vote is usually situated at 
about 50 percent compared to the 80 or 90 percent normally found in state friendly polling agencies 
such as Ksilon Astana. 
14 At the time the public perception was that Asar was a more popular party than Otan. An 
explanation for this is that Dariga Nazarbaeva and Rakhat Aliev managed several TV channels and 
popular newspapers that provided them with important channels of propaganda and a wider reach into 
the public's consciousness. 
15 `Mai - mesiats tsveteniia partiino-politicheskogo `prfogizma' Kazakhstantsev', Assotsiatsiia 
sotsiologov i politologov Kazakhstana, http: //www. asip. kz/arch/kk. html [accessed 7 April 2007]. 
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definitive answer. 16 These polls exemplify that the majority of society is neither 
overwhelmingly interested in political parties, nor has close identification with 
them. '7 It reveals that two clear factors persist with regards to parties' relationship 
with society: that there is a disconnection between parties, state and society and that 
society is overwhelming passive and disinterested in parties. Disconnection and 
passivity derives from both structural and agency sources. Structurally, the legacy of 
the CPSU has defined citizens' mostly negative prior experiences of political parties, 
while the personalistic and clientelistic nature of parties and party elites is cultivating 
disinterest and passivity in the post-Soviet transition. Before touching upon this it is 
worth exploring the extent to which the particularity of traditional Kazakh social 
stratification (another form of structure) can also explain the nature of party-citizen 
relations in Kazakhstan. 
1.3 The Particularities of Kazakh Social Stratification 
We have to consider that Kazakhstan's social organisation, like that of many of the 
other Central Asian states, is not historically comparable to Western socio-political 
development. Rather Kazakh society has long been stratified along tribal lines. 
Society has been divided by three Zhuzs (translated literally as a hundred), which in 
Kazakh historiography denotes tribal unions, `which are conscious of being of one 
Kazakh nationality and inhabit a piece of the Kazakh territory fixed in tradition'. 18 
The three Zhuzs are the Uly Zhuz (Elder Zhuz), Orta Zhuz (Middle Zhuz) and Kishi 
Zhuz (Younger Zhuz) and within each exists a confederation of smaller tribal units 
viewed as geopolitical and ethno-territorial entities. 19 Traditionally, members of the 
Elder Zhuz have held the most powerful senior political positions while the Middle 
Zhuz, even though they are more numerous, have occupied lower-level political and 
military positions. The Younger Zhuz is more rural based and far less influential than 
either of the other two. For example, both Dinmukhamed Kunaev and Nazarbaev 
were members of the Elder Zhuze. Those scholars who have purported a clan 
16 `Kazakhstan i Kazakhstantsy nakanune parliamentskikh vyborov: elektroral'naia aktivnost' i 
partiinye prespochteniia v II kvartale, 2004', Assotsiatsiia sotsiologov i politologov Kazakhstana, 
htty: //www asip. kz/arch/kk html [accessed 7 April 2007]. 
17 ASIP have been one of the leading organisations collecting data regarding public opinion and 
attitudes towards political and social issues, events, parties and politicians. A great deal of data can be 
found on their website - which has not been updated since February 2007 http: //www. asit). kz/ 
18 Nurlan Amrekulov, Zhuzy v sotsial'no-politicheskoi zhizni Kazakhstan, Tsentral'naia Azija i 
Kavkaz, Vol. 3, No. 9,2000. 
19 N. Masanov et. al, Istoriia Kazakhstana: narody i kul'tury, (Almaty, Daik-Press, 2001). 
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perspective (see Introduction) argue that these tribal and clan distinctions based on 
kinship remain important in post-Soviet politics. Zhuz affiliation has continued to 
play a key role in Nazarbaev's elite personnel policy, as it did under Kunaev during 
the Soviet period. 20 The president has had to balance the demands and interests of 
the more influential elder and middles Zhuzs. 21 This has included giving key political 
positions to those from his tribe, while at the same time placating those from the 
Middle Zhuz with positions while seemingly high up and significant that are actually 
lacking importance. 22 While such tribal affiliations may seem important, Zhuzs are 
not `functional organisational structures such as existed in medieval Scotland and 
still exist in some African and Asian countries. Kazakhstan's Zhuz-clans are more a 
way of thinking, a way of interpreting ongoing processes through the prism of the 
genealogy of the individual or group. ' 23 The idea of tribal identity as an ongoing 
psychological process, as opposed to an institutional (both formal and informal) 
driver of political development, makes sense in neopatrimonial Kazakhstan where 
what defines political behaviour is not Zhuz affiliation so much, but economic 
interests. `Only economic interests, not tribes, not other factors, only economic 
factors are the most important in Kazakhstan. ' 24 
Does the Zhuz system have any impact on party development? And can it explain the 
disconnection and passivity inherent in the relationship between parties and society? 
In formal terms any form of influence is difficult to assess. There are no parties 
established along tribal divisions or cleavages, nor has there ever been any attempt 
to. Moreover, the restrictive `Law on Political Parties' with its limitations on parties 
establishing themselves on any form of ethnic or religious basis precludes any effort 
to establish Zhuz or tribal based parties. Informally, however, it might be possible to 
see a connection. Some of the major opposition figures over the last 17 years have 
been members of the Middle Zhuz. Serikbolsyn Abdil'din, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, 
Olzhas Suleimenov, Galymzhan Zhakiianov and Nurbolat Masanov are members of 
20 N. Masanov, The Role of Clans in Kazakhstan Today, Jamestown Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 3,1998. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Kunaev carried out the same policy during his time as First Secretary of the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan. He was careful to place elite from the Middle Zhuz in positions that looked important but 
were in reality of a secondary nature. He also tended to promote those from the Younger Zhuz, as 
such elites were fewer in number and lacked the power bases to challenge his authority and thus 
supplied a more reliable source of loyalty to the more numerous and powerful Middle Zhuz. 
23 Masanov, 1998, Op. Cit. 
z4 Author's interview with Dosym Satpaev, Political Analyst, 28 March 2007, Almaty. 
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various tribes from the Middle Zhuz. From the opposition's perspective Nazarbaev 
has established Elder Zhuz domination of the political system. Therefore, those from 
the Middle Zhuz moved into opposition unsettled by their exclusion from power. 25 
Yet considering three of most high profile opposition figures to emerge came from 
the Elder Zhuz; Zharmakhan Tuiakbai, Altynbek Sarsenbaev and Zamanbek 
Nurkadilov such an argument is weakened in its validity. And, moreover, many who 
moved into opposition from both Zhuzs, did so on grounds of protecting political and 
economic interests, 26 although the increasing influence of the president's family 
(from the Elder Zhuz) was a factor. 27 The case, therefore, for Zhuz influence on party 
development is neither clear nor apparent. The situation is complex, and tribal clan 
and family interests are entwined with political and economic interests which cut 
across clan affiliation. The battle between the Elder and Middle Zhuzs confirms that 
politics, and the establishment of political parties, is agency driven and isolated to 
the manoeuvrings of factional inter-elite conflict. Thus, the disconnection between 
parties and citizens remains based on personalistic and clientelistic linkages and not 
necessarily the social particularity of Kazakh social organisation. 
1.4 Formal Structural Influence: The Role of the CPSU 
As highlighted in the introductory chapter, Soviet structural legacies have been 
utilised to explain post-Soviet political development. 28 Indeed, neopatrimonialism in 
the post-Soviet case can be seen as a fusion between traditional politics, residual 
communist legacies and new formal institutions (see Chapter Three). In the case of 
parties' relationship with society in Kazakhstan we can see both the influence of 
agency, in the shape of informal political relations and behaviour and structural 
legacies in the form of the CPSU. The legacy of the CPSU has produced negative 
perceptions among society about the role and place of political parties in the political 
system. Citizen passivity and disinterest in emergent political parties is directly 
25 It is argued that the majority of opposition members derive from the Naiman and Argyn tribes of 
the Middle Zhuz. See Nurlan Amrekulov, Zhuzy v sotsial'no-politicheskoi zhizn Kazakhstana and N. 
Amrekulov, Puti k ustichivomu razvitiiu, ili razmyshleniia o glavnom, (Almaty, 1998). 
26 See Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in 
Economic Liberalization, Intra-elite Cleavage, and Political Opposition, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 13, 
No. 3,2005. 
27 However, with the president moving against his son-in-law Rakhat Aliev in 2007 and the demotion 
of Dariga Nazarbaeva within Nur Otan, we are now witnessing a decrease in family influence. 
28 Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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affected by the previous dominance of the CPSU and its behaviour. This legacy has 
impacted on citizens' perceptions of parties in several ways. Firstly, citizens have 
become sensitised to a single party system. According to one political analyst, 
`people are used to there being only one party and the electorate has developed 
immunity, not only for realising the plurality of parties, but also participation in them 
and voting for them. ' Secondly, the authoritarian and monolithic structure, 
bureaucracy and corruption associated with the CPSU bequeathed to people a 
negative perception of political parties. The long monopoly of the CPSU failed to 
encourage multipartism and discredited the term 'party'. 29 `Soviet citizens had 
grown tired of the party and the image of political parties as a result was negative. 
They did not understand how political parties could help them. ' 30 The CPSU was 
heavily associated with over politicising society. This helped mould a mentality 
within the population of political indifference and distrust. It reflects the idea put 
forward by Edwin Bacon that a legacy of CPSU rule was that `the freedom not to 
participate in politics is an attractive gain of the post-Soviet era. i31 Indifference has 
been engendered by the formal structural legacy of the Party's domination, while the 
influence of informal political behaviour and relations in the shape of corruption has 
eroded political trust in political parties. Finally, as a result of the domination of one 
party, it has been argued that there is a broader legacy of Soviet rule which has led to 
a form of `totalitarian regime dependency'. 32 This is the view that the state has a 
significant role in caring for its citizens. According to a senior figure within Nur 
Otan, `Kazakh society, similar to other Central Asian societies and Russian society 
are based on collectivism and the mentality of paternalism that the state should take 
care of us'. 33 Consequently, `the government is supposed to help everybody and 
political parties do not play a major role in the political system and in helping 
people'. 34 These factors demonstrate how the structural legacy of the CPSU, and the 
29 Stephen White, Russians and their Party System, Demokratizatsiia, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2006, p. 
19-20. 
30 Author's interview with Sergei Duvanov, journalist and opposition activist, 28 November 2006, 
Almaty. 
31 Edwin Bacon, Russia: Party Formation and the legacy of the One-Party State, in John Kenneth 
White and Philip John Davies, Political Parties and the Collapse of the Old Orders (New York, State 
University of New York Press, 1998) pp. 205-222. 
32 Author's interview with Zharmakhan Tuiakbai. 
33 Author's interview with Kazbek Kazkenov, Assistant to Vice-President of Nur Otan and chief party 
historian, 7 March 2007, Astana. 
34 Author's interview with Andrei Chebotarev. This is something opposition parties are attempting to 
rectify and will be discussed later in section on emerging cleavages. 
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informal political behaviour and relations within it has contributed to shaping the 
passivity and disinterest of society towards political parties, adding to the 
disconnection between parties and society in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. 
Examining only structure (legacy of the CPSU) alerts us to only one aspect of what 
is generating disconnection between society and parties. The disconnection between 
parties, state and society and the passivity of citizens is driven by both the legacy of 
the CPSU and role of personalistic and clientelistic elite based parties. It is through 
the role of elite agency and in particular the personalistic and clientelistic linkages on 
which citizens' relationship with parties are predominantly based upon, that we can 
observe how the underlying influence of informal political behaviour and relations, 
highlighted in previous chapters, has affected the relationship between parties and 
society. 
1.5 The Influence of Informal Politics: Charismatic and Clientelistic Linkages 
The clientelistic and personalistic complexion of political parties, in other words 
parties organised for, and revolving on, the interests of political personalities or elite 
groups, has cemented any pre-existing disconnect between parties and society and 
citizen passiveness. This is due to the self-interested and introspective character of 
political parties in Kazakhstan. Therefore, the linkages to emerge between parties 
and society are based on bonds of personalism (charisma) and clientelism (loyalty) 
rather than an explicit relationship of interest articulation and representation. 
As highlighted in Chapter Five, political parties in Kazakhstan are elite-created 
institutions. They `represent the elites struggling for authority, rather than 
organisations defending the interests of society'. 35 Centred on the politics of 
personalism and loyalty, political parties in Kazakhstan are underpinned by informal 
political relations and behaviour. Organisation and membership are solicited through 
both patron-client relations, such as tying in party members in exchange for 
employment, (Nur Otan and GPK) and through inter-elite factional conflict (DVK, 
Ak Zhol and Nagiz Ak Zhol, ). Political parties, therefore, are a result of `inter-elite 
35 Otrazhaet li sushchestvuioshchii partiinyi spektr Kazakhstan real'noe sostoianie obshchestva, 
Liter, 10 March 2006, http: //www. liter. kz/site. php? lan=russian&id=172&pub=3213. 
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processes which see people [society] playing a supportive and subsidiary role. '36 
These forms of informal politics have assisted in defining the relationship between 
parties and society on the basis of charismatic and clientelistic linkages that are 
present in the structuring of post-communist party competition. 37 The political 
agency of personalistic and clientelistic elite driven parties has solidified the 
disconnection and passivity between parties and society. 
Personalistic Linkages 
Personalistic linkages between parties and society are essentially based on the 
dominant personality of the leader of the party. Party elites recognise this 
phenomenon themselves. The deputy leader of the KPK noted that `there is no 
difference between party programmes; the electorate are oriented towards 
personalities and leaders. To an extent Abdil'din, me, and some other colleagues in 
the KPK have a certain space with the electorate' . 
38 To this extent citizens are voting 
and connecting not with political parties' ideas or programs but on the basis of the 
charisma and personality of leading political elites. As noted by the deputy leader of 
Rukhaniiat, `there always were charismatic leaders who want their own parties and it 
does not matter which group they are representing, it just matters that they have their 
own party. Most parties have such charismatic leaders. ' 39 That the link between 
parties is based on personalistic ties is supported by opinion polls. A poll conducted 
by ASIP in May 2004 found that respondents had a far greater awareness of party 
leaders as opposed to parties and party programs. 40 When given the opportunity to 
indicate the party connected to a particular political personality in most cases three 
quarters or less of respondents could not connect the party to the personality. The 
one major exception was Dariga Nazarbaeva where 58.1 percent of respondents were 
36 Author's interview with Yevgeni Zhovtis. 
37 lerbert Kitschelt also identifies a programmatic party-voter linkage, however, as discussed in 
Chapter Five it is arguable as to whether programmatic parties in Kazakhstan are evident due to the 
lack of clear distinction in ideological tenets and programmatic commitments. For Kitschelt's 
theoretical propositions on clientelistic and charismatic party-voter linkages see, Herbert Kitschelt, 
Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions, Party 
Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4,1995, pp. 447-472. 
38 Author's interview with Tolen M. Tokhtassynov, Deputy Leader of the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan, 9 February 2007, Almaty. 
39 Author's interview with Anatolii Volkov. 
40Bakhytzhamal Bekturganova, Partii lidery, programmy: reitingi uznavaemosti v mae 2004 g, 
www. zonakz. net, 15 June 2004, http: //zonakz. net/articles/6474. 
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able to connect her to Asar. 41 As table 6.1 illustrates, all parties had a recognition 
rate of less that 24 percent. Other surveys also highlighted that political personalities 
have a higher public recognition and support in the public consciousness than the 
parties they represent. 42 
Table 6.1 Average Recognition of Party Leaders and their Parties from May 2004 
(percentage of respondents) 
Personality Party Percentage of Respondents 
Recognition 
Dariga Nazarbaeva Asar 58 
Serikbolsyn Abdil'din KPK 24 
Bolat Abilov Ak Zhol 21 
Galymzhan Zhakianov DVK 20 
Gani Kasymov Party of Patriots 13 
Alikhan Baimenov Ak Zhol 13 
Azat Peruashev GPK 8 
Amangeldy 
Erme iiaeva3 
Otan 8 
Oraz Zhandosov Ak Zhol 8 
Altynshash Dzhaganova Rukhaniiat 7 
Altynbek Sarsenbaev Ak Zhol 7 
Romin Madinov APK 3 
Gani Kaliev Auyl 3 
(Adapted from ASIP opinion poll data from 15 June 2004 see footnote 40). 
Party-citizen linkages in Kazakhstan, therefore, can be viewed as being based on a 
personalistic form and this is particularly the case with Nur Otan. Part of Nur Otan's 
electoral success and position in society is linked to the central use of Nazarbaev's 
personality and charisma in party propaganda. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Nur 
Otan leans heavily on Nazarbaev for its own identity. In truth Nazarbaev is Nur 
41 There should be no surprise in such a high figure due to Dariga Nazarbaeva's stratospheric profile 
as the president's daughter. Asar, due to Dariga and Rakhat Aliev's management of several key media 
companies, and with a degree of support from the presidential administration, was able to heavily 
promote the party and the fact Dariga was party leader. What is maybe more surprising is that 42 
percent of respondents could not identify Asar with Dariga Nazarbaeva. 
421 Data produced by Ksilon Astana CG revealed higher levels of recognition and trust for political 
personalities that led parties to actual levels of support their parties receive. See Ksilon Astana CG 
http: //www. ksilon. kz. Ksilon, however, is a polling agency believed to have links with the authorities. 
43 Until 2007 Nazarbaev was unable to officially take up his place as leader of Nur Otan due to it 
being unconstitutional for members of the executive to be members of political parties. Amangeldy 
Ermegiiaev at this time was acting chairman of the party, even though Nazarbaev was effectively de- 
facto head. Ermegiiaev stood down in March 2004 and was replaced by Bakhytzhan Zhumagulov 
who himself made way for Nazarbaev to become official chairman of the party in 2007 when the ban 
on executive members becoming party members was lifted. 
245 
Otan's identity. For instance, election posters from the 2007 parliamentary election 
pictured Nazarbaev surrounded by hundreds of workers all holding Nur Otan flags, 
while the slogan read, My vmeste s prezidentom! My za Nur Otan (We are together 
with the president! We are for Nur Otan). The emphasis, however, on the personality 
of political leaders undermines parties' claims of, or intention to, articulate and 
represent social interests. Rather, the focus on elite personalism only serves to widen 
the disconnection between parties and society continuing to engender the passive and 
disinterested attitude of citizens towards political parties. 
Clientelistic Linkages 
Clientelism is also another broad form of party-citizen linkage observable in post- 
Soviet Kazakhstan. In Kitschelt's theoretical proposition, clientelistic party-citizen 
linkages are based on clientelistic parties which `make high investments in 
organizational structure ... to provide a constant 
flow of resources ('club goods') to 
their following'. 44 In Kazakhstan a clientelistic linkage appears in two instances. The 
first, discussed in Chapter Five, is where local Akims use their power of patronage to 
coerce state employees under their charge to become members of political parties, 
most notably Nur Otan. 45 In this sense the investment in organisational structure is 
not in the party itself, but in the networks of the patrons of the party. The clientelistic 
party-citizen linkage is clearly defined by the nature of the patron being able to offer 
or prise away employment on the basis of whether they join and support the patron's 
preferred party. At the same time, however, a clientelistic linkage can be observed in 
a far broader social context. For example, the view of many political elites and 
analysts was that citizens assessed their relationship with a political party on the 
basis of what parties can offer. According to one senior figure in OSDP, `the main 
question from potential party members was what political parties could give them. 
This is their main motivation for becoming a member and supporting a political 
party. It is not a question of politics or policy it is a question of consumerism. ' 46 
Citizens, therefore, are interested mainly in the `social benefits a party brings'. 47 
Inherently, there is nothing unique about a supply and demand linkage between 
44 Herbert Kitschelt, Op. Cit., p. 449. 
45 Similarly, the GPK solicited party membership from those employees who worked in industries 
owned by the Eurasian National Resources Corporation (ENRC). 
' Author's interview with Marina Sabitova, Senior Advisor to Zharmakhan Tuiakbai, and 
parliamentary candidate for the OSDP, 18 August 2007, Almaty. 
47 Author's interview with Zharmakhan Tuiakbai. 
246 
citizens and parties. The idea of an economic theory of democracy affecting party 
spatial competition has been both popular and persuasive in Western scholarship, 48 
while recent scholars have also pointed to the clientelism inherent in modern 
Western democratic party systems49 and post-Soviet scholars have proposed a 
market model to study some post-Soviet party systems. 50 It links back to the legacy 
of the CPSU where citizens expect the state and the chief organs of the state to play a 
paternal role, ensuring citizens are cared for. In Kazakhstan, however, the propensity 
towards citizens demanding social benefits from parties, and seeing that as the only 
pretext for involvement, support and interest in their activities, is driven by `a mix of 
Soviet patrimonialism and Western capitalism'. 51 
The personalistic linkage is increasingly important in established democracies too, as 
individual political personalities now play a much larger role in shaping the 
relationship between the electorate and parties. Citizens are ostensibly more likely to 
identify with a party leader than they are with the ideology of the party. So while 
Kazakhstan may not be unique in developing linkages associated with personalism 
and clientelism, its experience is qualitatively different in the sense that in 
established democracies leadership positions are rationalised. A party leader may 
rely on the use of charisma and personality to form a bond with the electorate but 
once removed from the political scene the office remains. In Kazakhstan, that is not 
the case. Most political parties will not outlast their leaders. Even the KPK, 
considered the most `natural' party' in Kazakhstan, since it has a clear ideology and 
identifiable social base (pensioners), is considered to be finished if, and when, 
Abdil'din leaves. 52 Additionally, Nur Otan is so closely tied to Nazarbaev that it is 
considered `only a short term party and will only be there as long as the president 
is. ' 53 Clientelism and personalism are two key linkages between parties and society 
in Kazakhstan and they are a product of the informal political relations and 
48 See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957). 
49 Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I Wilkinson (eds. ), Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of 
Democratic Accountability and Political Competition (New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
so Henry Hale, Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
51 Author's interview with political analyst, 14 November 2006, Almaty. 
52 Author's interview with Nurbolat Masanov. 
53 Author's interview with Mamashev Sadykovich, Chairman of the Zhambyl Oblast Branch of the 
KNPK, Taraz, 13 March 2007. 
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behaviour shaping much of politics in Kazakhstan. The inherent personalism and 
clientelism is augmenting the disconnection between parties, society and the state 
and the passiveness and disinterest of society. 
Structurally speaking, while the particularity of Kazakh social organisation may have 
had little impact, the legacy of the CPSU fused with the clientelistic and personalistic 
disposition of political parties has forged the distance between parties and society. 
The imperious informal forms of political relations and behaviour underpinning 
neopatrimonialism in Kazakhstan are key in influencing parties' relationship with 
society. The inwardness of parties, and their use as personal vehicles for public 
office, or units to protect and secure political and economic interests in the fall out 
from inter-elite conflict, are only serving to establish them as entities unable to 
resolve the issues of ordinary citizens. They are incapable of grasping power and 
affecting change. This ingrains within the population a considerable level of 
passiveness and disinterest in their activities to such an extent they rarely know what 
parties stand for and have difficulty connecting well-known politicians to the parties 
they are the leader of. Nur Otan and its close association with Nazarbaev personify 
this personalism and clientelism. The party does manage to have a degree of 
purchase with the general population due to its close relationship with the president, 
assisting Nazarbaev in constructing and disseminating a broad narrative regarding 
the centrality of his leadership for the prosperity of the country. It has achieved this 
through relying on, and being privy to, patronage and preference from local and state 
executive bodies and the mass media. This permits the president's party to 
aggressively pursue the president's message, helping to consolidate a degree of 
homogeneity of opinion regarding the president's rule. Nur Otan's domination due 
to its close association with Nazarbaev, has resulted in other parties' isolation and 
the stunting of any form of growth in parties' traditional democratic role in 
representing and articulating social interests. Importantly, it illustrates the key role 
played by Nur Otan in sustaining and consolidating the president's authoritarian 
rule, providing political legitimacy with society and offering political stability 
among elites. 
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2. Homogeneity of Opinion 
Rather than the relationship between society and parties being defined by the 
articulation and representation of interests, due to the personalistic and clientelistic 
centred nature of parties, it is instead dominanted by the presence of the president 
and the idea that the president's leadership is central to the prosperity of the country. 
This is a view put forward by the president and promoted, cultivated and expressed 
by Nur Otan which has received wide acceptance in society. It is within this context 
of homogeneity of opinion regarding Nazarbaev's leadership that political parties 
have to find and build support with society. Nur Otan's role in pushing this message 
has been critical and illustrates the extent to which the party, as a personal political 
vehicle for the president, has been central to the maintenance of the president's 
authoritarian neopatrimonial regime. Nur Otan's leading role as chief propaganda 
tool for the president, and its relative success in this capacity, is achieved primarily 
through two means. The first is its positioning, on the back of Nazarbaev's support, 
as a party representing the interests of the whole of the Kazakh nation and promoting 
national unity and ethnic stability. The second is their dominance in the regions, 
achieved primarily through a monopoly of airtime in the mass media and through the 
patronage of local executives. 
The following sections illustrate how the president and Nur Otan have cultivated this 
homogeneity of public opinion, hence aiding the configuration and context within 
which parties develop bonds with citizens and fortifying the disconnect and passivity 
of society. Nur Otan's role in disseminating this grand narrative in support of the 
president exemplifies the influence informal political behaviour and relations have 
on determining the relationship between citizens and parties. Nur Otan's reliance on 
the bias it receives from the state media, the informal patronage of state executives 
and the vast networks of support they provide, and structural and financial resources 
from the state, ensures their message above all others reaches the furthest parts of the 
country. 
2.1 Homogeneity of Opinion: The Centrality of Nazarbaev's Leadership 
One of the key messages circulated by the presidential administration is Nazarbaev's 
centrality to guaranteeing the prosperity of the nation and securing the independence 
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and stability of the country. It is a view widely accepted. 54 Nazarbaev has sought to 
publicise this himself: `I have great experience of policy. I know that the most 
significant is peace in our people and political stability'. 55 These values of inter- 
ethnic peace and political stability and the president's success in achieving these 
through the utilisation of Nur Otan in parliament, are often juxtaposed with the 
experience of other CIS states. For instance, one senior Nur Otan figure argued, `it 
can be said that in some states where the president has not been able to influence 
parliament at all, such as Azerbaijan and Russia, well these states have faced 
crisis. ' 56 The prospect of crisis and conflict is often proposed as a likely outcome if 
the country moves away from the president's policy of gradual reform. 57 In 
particular, Kazakhstan's near neighbour Kyrgyzstan is often cited as an example of 
what can go wrong when radical change is attempted. Video footage of the chaos 
and looting which took place in Kyrgyzstan's capital Bishkek in the aftermath of the 
forcible removal of President Askar Akaev in March 2005 was often aired on state 
TV as a means to hammer home this point. Opposition elites also argued that radical 
change and the experience of other countries are not suitable templates for 
Kazakhstan. One leading member of Alga noted that, `it is wrong to take examples of 
the surrounding countries like Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan or Georgia, because each 
country has its own path. It is wrong to say that because it happened in Kyrgyzstan it 
should happen here. '58 The idea of stability over radical change is broadly 
sa It should be noted that while the president's proportion of votes for the 2005 presidential election 
may seem inflated, and arguably is, it is clear that he is popular. Analysts interviewed in this research 
often mentioned that even under fully free and fair elections Nazarbaev would win easily with 60-70 
percent of the vote. While the obedient state media might assist in such a task it nevertheless 
demonstrates that the president is genuinely popular and is perceived to have done a very good job in 
managing Kazakhstan's post-Soviet transition, in particular with the promoting of Kazakh ethnicities, 
not seemingly at the expense of other ethnic groups. Another perceived success has been the 
consistent high level of growth in the economy since 1999. 
'Nursultan Nazarbaev: Moia tsel' -postroit' normal'noe demokraticheskoe obshestvo', 
Kazakhstanskaiia Pravda, 7 February 2002, 
htto"//www kazpravda kz/index php? uin=1151645457&chapter=1002020700&act=archive date&dav 
=07&month=02&year=2002 [accessed 27.10 2007]. 
56 Author's interview with Sharipbek Amirbekov, Deputy Head of the Central Apparatus of the 
Political Council of Nur Otan, 10 February 2007, Almaty. 
57Yevgenni Konovich, Politicheskie reformy: k demokratii cherez stabil'nost', Kazakhstanskaifa 
Pravda, 7 December 2004, 
httn: //www kawravda kz/index phn? uin=1152520370&chapter=1102378861&act=archive date&day 
=07&month=l2&vear-2004p [accessed 6 May 2007]. 
58 Author's interview with Bakhyt N. Tumenova, Head of the Central Apparatus of Alga, 6 February 
2007, Almaty. 
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acknowledged across the political class and society as a whole. 59 One opposition 
elite stated that, `I have communicated with all classes of society, journalists, doctors 
and so on. They have stated that they support changes but not a revolution. They 
want a smooth transition. ' 60 This view is given credence by opinion polls suggesting 
a majority of citizens support the direction the president is taking the country. One 
poll conducted by a reputable agency found that 68 percent of people supported the 
president's general policy direction, with only 11 percent against and 22 percent 
unable to answer. 61 
This homogeneity of opinion has been utilised by the president to place himself at 
the centre of maintaining stability and peace in the country, guaranteeing the well- 
being of all Kazakh citizens and protecting the integrity of the nation's independence 
vis-ä-vis Russia. The view of many presidential supporters is that Nazarbaev has 
played a critical and historical role in the development of an independent Kazakhstan 
and in the progression of the Kazakh economy62 has made in recent years. 63 Because 
of this he is deemed `a very smart and wise leader'. M Indeed, the perceived success 
of the economy has been one of the underlying linchpins for the president's 
popularity and as long as he continues to provide economic stability he remains 
popular with citizens. It resembles the similar relationship that existed between the 
Soviet leadership and citizens during the Brezhnev era, where a social contract 
sought political compliance in exchange for social security. 65 Similarly, Nazarbaev is 
59 Informal conversations this author had with ordinary Kazakh citizens outside the political class 
fleshed out the view normal citizens had about this subject. It was evident from these conversations 
that the majority of people believed that the `coloured revolution' model was not a path Kazakhstan 
should travel. Nazarbaev's key message of stability over radical change was believed to be the correct 
road the country should take. Even those who were critical of the president still believed a gradualist 
model was the most suitable path of development. 
60 Author's interview with Bakhyt N. Tumenova. 
61 The poll was conducted by the Kazakhstan Institute of Social-Economic Information and 
Forecasting (KISEP) that was led by the well-respected social and political analyst Sabit Zhusupov. 
See, `V ozhidamii peremen', Pravila Igry, No. 8, November 2005, p. 56. 
62 The Kazakh economy has achieved significant growth since 1999 averaging 10 percent growth year 
on year. The president has been largely accredited with this success which has been built to a large 
degree on the revenue the government has received from the country's natural energy resources. The 
president's strategic aim for the economy, to get Kazakhstan among the top 50 competitive states in 
the world, has been widely praised. 
63 Zhazira Bukina, Tak priniato: konstitutsionnaia reforma priobrela real'nye ochertaniia, Liter, 19 
May 2007. 
' Author's interview with Galiaskar Dunaev, Nur Otan's Political Council's Representative in 
Almaty, 22 August 2007, Almaty. 
65 Linda Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why it Failed (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 
1994). 
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praised for maintaining ethnic stability. Despite the ethnic diversity in the country, 
Nazarbaev has been successful in avoiding conflict between ethnic groups and `has 
been working to maintain ethnic stability in the country and consequently there have 
been no inter-ethnic conflicts'. 66 Due to these perceived successes and the coalescing 
of opinion around the conviction that the president is central to the country's 
successful development, pro-presidential forces are attempting to define Nazarbaev 
as a father of the nation figure bordering on the iconic and almost mythical. This was 
underlined in 2008 when Nur Otan deputy Sat Tokpakbaev proposed the renaming 
of the capital Astana to Nursultan. 67 As one journalist noted, `people think that as he 
is the first president he should be the icon of the nation, like Lenin was for the 
Soviets or Atatürk was for the Turkish and Mao in China. It is the belief that there 
should be some legendary figure. 68 Additionally, while he may have promoted the 
interests of ethnic Kazakhs - the president has positioned himself as a leader who is 
concerned with all those who live in the Kazakh nation, not necessarily just ethnic 
Kazakhs, but those of different ethnicities and faith. 69 
2.2 Nur Otan: The Party of National Unity 
Nur Otan has played a significant role in helping forge the homogenised discourse 
regarding Nazarbaev's leadership. This is achieved through two means. Firstly, by 
positioning the party on the same policy goals and values as Nazarbaev and as a 
party representing the interests of the whole Kazakh nation, and secondly through its 
command in the regions which results from the extensive preference the party 
obtains from state bodies and local executives. 
The party projects itself as supporting wholesale the president's agenda and program. 
For example, stating in its 2007 election programme that `we support the strategic 
course of our leader, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev 
on the acceleration of the socio-economic development of the country for the well- 
being of all Kazakhstani citizens'. 70 The party espouses the same message as the 
66 Author's interview with Galiaskar Dunaev. 
67 Mazhilis: V den' gosudarstvennykh simvolov palatoi odobrena popravka v konstititsionnyi zakon, 
www. nomad. su. 4 July 2008, httn: //www. nomad. su/? a=3-200806050425. 
68 Author's interview with independent journalist, 30 October 2006, Almaty. 
69 Indeed the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, created by the president, was established to 
represent the diverse ethnic groups of Kazakhstan. 
70 Nur Otan, Za protsvetanie Kazakhstana i blagopoluchie Kazakhstantsev (Astana, 2007). 
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president and shares his commitment of stability and gradual democratisation. One 
senior figure in the party argued, `the party's values are stability, inter-ethnic peace 
and step-by-step democratisation, not democracy at once'. " What this illustrates is 
that Nur Otan acts as a political vehicle in shaping the homogeneity of opinion that 
has become commonly acknowledged across the country, that of the president's 
policy of stability and gradualism. Simultaneously, it builds on the president's 
position as leader of a unified nation. Nur Otan has established itself as the party 
representing the interests of all people in the Kazakh nation. One senior member of 
Nur Otan suggested the party's creation was `the phenomenon of a union of classes', 
and moreover, `the party is protecting the interests of all layers of the population 
including teachers and doctors.. . we are also trying to get many of the different 
ethnicities into the party. ' 72 That `the party represents the interest of all Kazakh 
society', should not be surprising considering the party is an extensive political tool 
of the president. 73 
Nur Otan, therefore, supports the president in consolidating the homogeneity of 
opinion regarding his leadership, while at the same time appealing to the public, as 
the president does, as being the party to represent the interests of the whole nation. In 
a sense the party is trying to appeal above any factional or divisive cleavages within 
society. The party's allure however is sustained, more or less, only on the basis of 
being the president's party. So while it is an important institution for the president in 
promoting his message and leadership, the party is only able to have any success in 
connecting with the public due to the president being the party's main champion. 
However, it would also be true that the president might not be so successful in 
cultivating homogeneity of opinion around his policies and leadership without a 
vehicle like Nur Otan. The party offers the president a formal political vehicle for 
embedding his legitimacy with society. Conversely, Nur Otan's relationship with the 
president guarantees the party has a stronger connection with society compared with 
any other party while simultaneously providing the president with an important 
vehicle to consolidate his leadership. This symbiotic relationship has been achieved 
due to Nur Otan 's preponderance in the regions which is supported by the significant 
" Author's interview with Sharipbek Amirbekov. 
72 Author's interview with Kazbek Kazkenov. 
73 Author's interview with Sharipbek Amirbekov. 
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preference the party receives, some informally, from state bodies (in particular the 
state media) and local executives. Consequently, the reliance on such preference and 
informal political behaviour and relations to achieve such political monopolisation is 
shaping Nur Otan's relationship with society. It further aids the president's and Nur 
Otan's ability to cultivate wide acceptance of Nazarbaev's leadership and policies, 
thus consolidating his authoritarian neopatrimonial regime. The following two 
sections explore this issue. 
2.3 Nur Otan's Dominance in the Regions 
Aside from orienting on Nazarbaev's policies and leadership, Nur Otan's key 
strength is its reach into the regions of Kazakhstan. This greater presence gives the 
party far more potency in spreading and cultivating the president's message of 
stability over change. This strength in the region is present in two forms. First, it 
exists in the larger number of party branches and Primary Party Organisations 
(PPOs) Nur Otan possesses and their ability to provide a visual presence across the 
country compared to the weakness of other parties. Second, it is expressed in the 
considerable representation the party has in the local Maslikhats (councils) and that 
many local Akims (governors) are associated with the party. This provides Nur Otan 
with the valuable commodity of being able to demonstrate to citizens their ability to 
be active and productive as a party, involved both in public activities and in 
governing the regions. 
The Structural and Visual Strength of Nur Otan 
According to one observer, `Nur Otan is the only important party in the regions'. 74 
This is in part due to the party's organisational strength, `there are representations of 
the party in every city and all the regions have well-developed party branches'. 75 The 
party has PPOs `that reach all the way down to Auyls'. 
76 Such supremacy of 
organisational strength enables the party to have greater presence across the country 
with which to extend the discourse concerning the centrality of Nazarbaev's 
leadership and Nur Otan 's role in supporting his leadership. Indeed the `party's logo 
74 Author's interview with independent journalist, 30 October 2006, Almaty. 
75 Author's interview with Sharipbek Amirbekov. 
76 Author's interview with Kazbek Kazkenov. 
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can be found everywhere', both during and in-between election periods. 77 Such 
ubiquity can be observed when visiting a city like Taraz in Zhambyl Oblast. Many of 
the main streets in the city are adorned with party posters attached to lampposts, 
while a wide banner stretches across the main road in the city proclaiming `Otan - 
the party which is always with you'. 78 Such a visual presence can be observed in 
Almaty and Astana, but it is evident these are not isolated cases and that Nur Otan 
has such a commanding presence across the country. The consequence of such visual 
strength is that citizens have far greater recognition of the party, they are only too 
aware that Nur Otan is the major political party in the country and is connected with, 
and supports, the president. An opinion poll undertaken by the Kazakhstan Institute 
for Social and Economic Forecasting (KISEP) just prior to the 2007 parliamentary 
election found that 60 percent of citizens polled knew well the activities and policies 
of the party as opposed to 28 percent for Ak Zhol and 15 percent for OSDP. 79 
Nur Otan's prevalence in the regions in both organisational form and in terms of 
visual representation can be contrasted with the weakness of other parties in 
Kazakhstan. In particular, the major opposition parties evidently suffer limitations in 
organisational strength. According to one senior figure in Alga, `one of the main 
weaknesses of all opposition parties, including this party, is that the connections with 
the regions are very weak'. 8° It is a criticism often levelled by those in pro- 
presidential parties at the opposition, discussing the development of Zharmakhan 
Tuiakbai's party OSDP, Kazbek Kazkenov, a senior figure in Nur Otan, questioned 
whether OSDP would be able to reach beyond the main urban centres of Almaty and 
Astana. `Will he (Tuiakbai) be able to work not just in Almaty or Astana, but also 
the countryside and the rest of the country? Will he be able to structure the party so 
that it will have a presence not just in the centre but also in villages? '81 The centring 
of other political parties organisational strength in either Astana or Almaty is 
evidenced by many of the party elites pointing to either branch as confirmation of a 
strong regional activity. Some parties' elites were open enough to admit that not all 
their regional branches were active and strong. For example, one senior figure from 
77 Author's interview with independent journalist, 30 October 2006, Almaty. 
78 The author observed this banner outside of an election period. 
79 KISEP, Effektivnost' izbiratel'nykh kampanii partii Kazakhstana v parlamentskikh vyborakh 2007 
0P°oda, 
www. zonakz. net, 9 August 2007, http: //zonakz. net/articles/18810. 
Author's interview with Bakhyt N. Tumenova. 
81Author's interview with Kazbek Kazkenov. 
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Adilet commented that, `I can't say that all the branches of the party are strong. In 
many regions party branches do not conduct a lot of work. One of the strongest 
branches is the Almaty branch. ' 82 This lack of organisational strength and restricted 
presence in the regions can be explained by the shortage of financial resources 
compared to Nur Otan (the advantage Nur Otan possess in terms of financial and 
state resources will be discussed in section 2.4). 83 Notwithstanding deficient 
resources, some commentators have pointed to the role of agency and poor 
leadership as a reason for weak party branches. 84 The consequence of regional 
organisational weakness is that other than Nur Otan the majority of political parties, 
and in particular opposition parties, are at a great disadvantage when trying to 
connect with citizens. Furthermore, they struggle to be heard when putting forward 
an alternative message to society regarding the president's leadership. Opposition 
parties have weaker recognition and lack the tools and ability to shape their 
relationship with society on their own terms as opposed to the terms set by the 
president and Nur Otan. 
Dominance of Local Representative and Executive Structures 
The second feature of Nur Otan's scope in the regions is its supremacy of local 
government structures. The party claims to hold 64 percent of all seats in the Oblast 
level Maslikhats and 72 percent of Raion level Maslikhats. 85 At the same time, many 
regional Akims, at Oblast, city and Raion levels, are members of the party. 86 Such a 
forcible presence in the regions provides the party with effectiveness in undertaking 
visible public projects. Such control in local government structures allows party 
82 Author's interview with Kuanysh Zhalakov, Head of the Astana City Branch ofAdilet, 6 March 
2007, Astana. 
83 Vladislav luritsyn, `Problema neravnykh uslovii v financirovanii politicheskikh partii 
Kazakhstana', in Andrei Chebotarev, Serei Elomnikov and EI'vira Pak (eds. ), Voprosy prozrachnosti 
deiatel'nosti politicheskikh partii i ikh vzaimodeistviia s institutami vlasti, biznesa i obshchestva: 
kazakhstanskii i zarubezhnyi opyt, (Almaty, Transparency Kazakhstan, 2004) pp. 38-41. 
&4 Author's interview with Bakhyt N. Tumenova. 
85See, Kratkii ochet o prodelannoi rabote za period s 2002 po 2006 god, Political Council of Otan 
(Astana, 2006). This figure could be significantly higher due to some independent deputies or 
deputies of other bodies (such as non-governmental organisations (more than likely government 
approved) sit with and support Nur Otan factions in regional bodies. 
86 Many have only become official members of the party after the law was changed in 2007 allowing 
those who hold official state positions to become members of political parties. Previously becoming a 
member of a political party was not allowed for Akims, however, this is not to say that they did not 
implicitly support and worked closely with the Nur Otan members in their corresponding Maslikhat. 
With their powers directly attributable to the president, as he has power of appointment, Akims were 
more likely to favour Nur Otan over other political parties. 
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factions to assert the interests of their regions to state bodies. The party has `created 
deputy groups in the Maslikhats where they can state the specific needs of the 
regions and pass it on to the central organs of the party who can pass it on to the 
executive bodies of the state' . 
87 Other analysts, however, have argued a more 
convincing account of the relationship, arguing that the party only works on the basis 
of command from above with `the central party giving an order to the Aim, and the 
Akim giving the order to Maslikhat deputies'. 88 Nevertheless, the party can clearly 
demonstrate to citizens that it is active and trying to work for their benefit. 89 
Moreover, this dynamic exists at the national level too. The party possesses all the 
seats in the Mazhilis, thus giving it the opportunity to publicly highlight its work and 
effort on legislation, policy and other national projects. For example, in 2008 the 
party was given responsibility for conducting a nationwide campaign against 
corruption. 90 This adds to the perception that the party is working on behalf of the 
president, who is working on behalf of all the people in Kazakhstan. 
The advantage Nur Otan exhibits in demonstrating its participation in high profile 
visible projects ensures greater recognition with citizens. This when contrasted with 
the position of other political parties, is quite significant. Nearly all other political 
parties have minimal to non-existent representation in local government structures. 
Much of the work other parties carry out in the regions is inward looking and 
designed at party strengthening and consolidation rather than outward expressions of 
activities concerning public interest. The fact many of these parties have to spend 
significant time and effort on constructing PPOs, recruiting new members and 
simply discussing their program with their members is a symptom of a wider 
problem for these parties, which is the advantage enjoyed by Nur Otan in the media, 
a principle source of influence of the wider population, and the extensive patronage 
the party receives from state bodies and local executives. The party's supremacy in 
the regions is as a result of the wide advantage and preference it receives. 
a' Author's interview with Sharipbek Amirbekov, Deputy Head of the Central Apparatus of the 
Political Council of Nur Otan, February 10,2007, Almaty. 
sa Author's interview with political analyst, 20 November 2006, Almaty. 
a9 For example, see this article regarding the party promoting business interests of women in the 
Akmola region, www. ndp-nurotan. kz., 13 November 2008, http: //www. ndp- 
nurotan kz/index nhhp? fshow&ft=27&tvne=26&id=58249875422 . 90 Obsuzhdeny voprosy sovershenstvovaniia antikorruptsionnogo zakonodatel'stva - Nur Otan 
www. ndp-nurotan. kz. 4 November 2008, hM: //www. ndp- 
nurotan. kz/index. phl2? f-ýshow&ft=27&tyDe=I 1&id=44524233637. 
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2.4 The Importance of Media Preference and Informal Politics in Consolidating Nur 
Otan's Position 
The role of the media and the informal inclination of state bodies and local 
executives to give preference to Nur Otan underpins their ability to be so dominant 
in the regions. This preference gives the party greater scope in cultivating 
homogeneity of opinion regarding the president's leadership, thus defining and 
consolidating the relationship between Nur Otan and the majority of citizens, and 
legitimising Nazarbaev's authoritarian rule. Additionally, this phenomenon shapes 
the context within which all parties build relations with society. The media, for 
example, as in any country, is one of the most influential tools for shaping public 
opinion. This is particularly important in the regions where media access is limited 
to the state run channels and newspapers. As one analyst noted, `the majority of 
influence in the regions comes from the mass media, and the majority of influence 
from Otan, Asar and maybe Ak Zhol. It is connected to the possession of mass media 
resources. For people who live far away in distant rural areas they perceive politics 
through the TV and newspapers, and most of the newspapers they get in rural areas 
are pro-presidential. i91 Opposition newspapers like Respublika and Svoboda Slova 
are limited in their distribution to the larger cities such as Almaty and Astana. 
Moreover, periodically these newspapers are subject to closure by the authorities. 92 
In the regions `people do not have access to the informational resources of the 
opposition'. 93 The preference Nur Otan, and other pro-presidential parties receive in 
the media is confirmed by various opinion polls and surveys. A poll conducted by 
the Centre of Social Technologies (TsST) in 2005, found that when those surveyed 
were asked about which activities of political parties they observed the most on the 
state TV channels Khabar, Kazakhstan and El Arna, 60 percent said Otan and 49 
percent mentioned Asar. 94 While during the 2007 election TsST undertook periodic 
surveys of mass media sources and found, unsurprisingly heavy preference given to 
Nur Otan across all state media outlets. For example, during the week of July 9-15 
2007 TsST reported that 18 articles appeared in the state press discussing the 
91 Author's interview with political analyst, 1 November 2007, Almaty. 
92 See Tsentr Sotsial'nykh Tekhnologii, Ob'ektivna Ii informatsiia kazakhstanskikh gosudarstvennykh 
telekanalov? www. zonalcz. net, 7 November 2005, http: //zonakz. net/articles/10080. 
93 Author's interview with Dosym Satpaev, 28 February 2007, Almaty. 
9a See Tsentr Sotsial'nykh Tekhnologii, Ob'ektivna li informatsiia kazakhstanskikh gosudarstvennykh 
telekanalov? www. zonakz. net. 
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activities of Nur Otan, while there was only one report of the main opposition party 
OSDP. Moreover, the tone of articles concerning Nur Otan was usually positive or 
neutral in nature while articles about other parties were wholly neutral. 95 That the 
president's party receives such overwhelming preference in state media sources, and 
some independent media sources, is not surprising. 96 It does, however, illustrate how 
Nur Otan's ability to deliver the president's message and agenda, and establish a 
bond with citizens, is underpinned by the advantage and preference it receives within 
the media. The media sources available to the majority of the population are state run 
and these sources, generally speaking, do not permit opposition viewpoints, only 
those of the president and Nur Otan. 
The preference and advantage Nur Otan receives from local executives and state 
agencies has been documented in earlier chapters of this work. State law is 
selectively applied and interpreted in their favour in circumstances of party 
registration, large public meetings, electoral commissions and in other aspects of the 
electoral process. Local Aims will urge their subordinate clients to vote or 
preference Nur Otan in electoral competition. The threat of job loss, in either a 
pronounced or perceived sense, ensures a loyal network of support for the party in 
these circumstances. These informal forms of political behaviour and relations give 
the party representative security in Maslikhats across the country at all levels 
ensuring their command at the regional level. This in turn allows the party plenty of 
public space to promote, cultivate and hang on to the coat tails of Nazarbaev. For 
example, one regional elite member from KNPK noted how `the president adopts a 
decree about opening some organisation and then Nur Otan turns up and says we are 
Nur Otan - we are opening this organisation'. 
97 
95 Tsentr Sotsial'nykh Tekhnologii, Rezul'taty monitoringa upominaemosti politicheskikh partii 
pechatnymi i setevymi sredstvami massovoi informatsii za period s9 po 15 iiulia 2007 goda, 
www. zonakz. net, 17 July 2007, htti): Hzonakz. net/articies/18508. 
' When considering the nature of the media in Kazakhstan reference should be made to a form of 
self-censorship practised by many journalists. This is the tendency on the part of journalists to self- 
censor any form of potential criticism of the president and pro-presidential forces due to the perceived 
threat to their position from writing critical articles. Self-censorship is a significant form of informal 
power held by the executive. Even the simple perceived threat of action enables journalists to fall in 
line with the official position. The authorities do not have to actually carry out a threat; rather the 
perceived threat is a strong enough incentive for journalists to be obedient and loyal to the regime. 
Self-censorship represents a residual legacy from Soviet times - as self-censorship, was 
unsurprisingly, commonly practiced by journalists under communist rule. 
97 Author's interview with, Mamashev Sadykovich. 
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With extensive patronage networks available, the party can utilise such support to 
establish an active base in the regions, calling on people to come out to public rallies 
and other activities if necessary. This illustrates to the public at large that the party 
possesses a popular support base, whether real or not. At the same time, however, 
the party is privy to extensive state and administrative resources, not just in the vast 
human resources and patronage networks available to local Akims, or in the 
preference afforded the party in the mass media which was highlighted above, but in 
structural and financial resources too. The party is perceived to be the recipient of 
new buildings paid for by state resources on the request of the president. One senior 
figure in KNPK suggested that, `he [the president) gave the task of building offices 
for Nur Otan party use, not only in cities and Oblasts but also in towns and small 
villages. And all the offices will be paid for out of the state budget'. 48 It is certainly 
true that Nur Otan holds offices in large expensive buildings in most cities across the 
country and the president is often reported opening new plush party offices. 99 Where 
Nur Otan obtains it finances from is a contentious issue but it is largely believed to 
benefit from being financed through state coffers largely due to the support of Akims. 
The financial and administrative support appears in diverse ways including `the 
compulsion of businessmen to endow money in cash departments of the party before 
rendering free-of-charge services in the parties' interest, transport, premises, 
foodstuffs, rendering of informational support, etc. '10° Due to the patronage of 
Akims, Nur Otan is able to pool together access to resources which other parties are 
simply not privy to. This gives the party a demonstrable advantage over all other 
parties, it enables the party to have a higher visual and structural recognition with 
society, monopolise local representative structures (due to the way in which local 
Akims can still informally influence the local election process - see Chapter Four) 
and assist in promoting the message of Nazarbaev's centrality to the country, thus 
consolidating further his authoritarian rule. 
98 Author's interview with Aleksandr Kholodkov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the KNPK, 
24 January 2007, Almaty. 
99 'Ilead of the state Nursultan Nazarbaev took part in the opening ceremony of the new office of the 
Otan Republican Party's regional branch and visited the Koktem housing estate in the city of Aktobe', 
www. akorda. kz. 8 September 2006, 
httl2-, //www. akorda. kz/Dap-c. jDhl2? nage id=356&lane=2&news id=2238. 
10° Vladislav luritsyn, `Problema nepravnykh uslovii v finansyrovanii politicheskikh partii 
Kazakhstana' p. 40. 
260 
The homogeneity of opinion in Kazakh society is that Nazarbaev's leadership has so 
far been successful and is crucial to securing the future prosperity, security and 
sovereignty of the country. Nur Otan has played a central role in promoting this 
message and thus assisting in consolidating and legitimising Nazarbaev's rule aiding 
regime durability. It achieved this by positing itself entirely on the basis of the 
president's policy direction and in claiming to represent all national interests. 
Additionally, its visual, organisational and representative preponderance in the 
regions heightens citizen awareness of the party and its core message. Such 
supremacy is achieved on the basis of media preference and the informal advantage 
the party receives from state bodies and local executives. 
3. Emerging Cleavages? 
As argued above, the disconnection between parties and society and the passivity of 
citizens is driven by structural legacies and the clientelistic and personalistic 
character of political parties. The broader context within which political parties have 
to develop a relationship and linkages with society is underpinned by a large degree 
of homogeneity of opinion concerning Nazarbaev's leadership, promoted 
successfully by Nur Otan due to their political dominance. Essentially, Nur Otan is 
the ultimate personalistic party relying on the patronage of state bodies and local 
executives. In the face of such factors, and the supremacy of the president and Nur 
Otan, it is difficult for other parties to develop linkages of substantial interest 
articulation and representation. Rather, political parties are pushed to the margins of 
the political process where there are some signs of emerging shoots of interest 
articulation and representation. There are four areas where such phenomena can be 
observed: parties acting as guarantors of social rights, parties as public educators, 
parties acting in the public good, and parties emerging to represent developing social 
cleavages. For the most part, however, these efforts of interest articulation are 
located at the margins of society. 
3.1 Protecting Citizens' Social Rights 
Some opposition parties have begun to emerge perceiving themselves as guarantors 
of citizens' social rights. A pertinent example of this has been the on-going Shanyrak 
dispute. Shanyrak is a housing settlement on the outskirts of Almaty where 
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thousands of people without homes or land built and constructed their own dwellings 
in the years after independence. 101 Many had migrated from less affluent areas of the 
country. Initially, there was little resistance from the authorities regarding the 
construction of these new housing developments and officials were quite content to 
aid these new communities by developing local infrastructure such as schools and 
bus routes. 102 However, by the early part of the new millennium, the land outside the 
city had become prime real estate and the local Akimat moved to try and remove 
people from this land so it could be sold. Violent clashes occurred as the authorities 
forcibly removed some residents from their homes by bulldozing down houses. 103 
Many of these settlements represent the `losers' of Kazakhstan's rapid economic 
growth. They are the marginalised, poor and jobless. 
Since 2006 Alga, and in particular its former leader Assylbek Kozhakhmetov, have 
sought to try and guarantee the rights of the residents of the Shanyrak district. 
According to Kozhakhmetov, `people (from Shanyrak) came to the party for 
protection, but we had to say, no, we can't protect you, but we can teach you how to 
defend yourselves'. 104 The party assisted in helping residents organise their own 
union, Shanyrak, which is now led by Kozhakhmetov, and in creating publicity and 
media attention regarding the authorities' actions. Led by Kozhakhmetov and senior 
officials from other parties, the Union is trying to work with the authorities to solve 
the problems occurring at Shanyrak. 105 Those political parties who have participated 
in the negotiations between the citizens of Shanyrak and the local Akimat see their 
role as that of protecting the security and rights of citizens. According to Serikbolsyn 
Abdil'din, `the KPK is trying to protect the interests of citizens. The instances where 
people are being hurt by the government are occurring more often, for example, the 
destruction of peoples' property in Shanyrak outside of Almaty. ' 106 Parties in these 
'01 Interestingly, a Shanyrak in Kazakh is the top and centre of a Yurt (traditional movable home of 
Kazakh nomads) which is generally a wooden rim with a cross in the middle. It acts as a ventilation 
system and skylight. The Shanyrak symbolises peace and stability in Kazakh mythology which is of 
course, rather unfortunate considering the destruction and confrontation facing its modem namesake. 
102 Andrei Grishin, 'Shanyrak - novyi symbol sotsial'nogo protivostoianiia', www. Ferghana. ru, 17 
0. April 2006, htt: //www. ferihana. ru/alicle. 2h2? id=435 
10 Ibid. 
104 Author's interview with Assylbek Kozhakhmetov, Chairman of Shanyrak Kazakhstan and former 
Leader of the Alga Party, 26 January 2007, Almaty. 
X05 Printsip ravenstva pered zakonom ne dolzhen organichvat'sia Almaty, Press-sluzhba Shanyrak 
Kazakhstan, 29 October 2007, http: //www. kub. info/article. phr)? sid=19844. 
106 Author's interview with Serikbolsyn Abdil'din, leader of the KPK, 30 January 2007, Almaty. 
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circumstances are acting as intermediaries between the local Akims and disgruntled 
citizens. 107 Crucially Alga is aware of the limits of its influence, suggesting that 
while some regions have specific problems there is not much they can do, as they do 
not hold any power. But according to Kozhakhmetov they `can show people they can 
protect themselves if they unite. ' 108 While some opposition parties might view 
themselves as acting to represent and protect the interests of the most marginalised 
groups in Kazakh society, essentially they can only help organise and educate. 
Opposition parties' lack of power, and limited ability to influence those in authority, 
such as regional Akims, demonstrates their lack of effectiveness as articulators of 
interests. However, while parties may have been unsuccessful in halting the removal 
of some residents from Shanyrak, by drawing attention to the issue, publicising it 
and assisting in organising the residents, they have shone a light on the actions of 
authorities. The case of Shanyrak, and parties' attempts to protect the interests of 
some of the most marginalised and vulnerable groups in Kazakh society, 
demonstrates the beginning of a movement away from the clientelistic and 
personalistic behaviour that has defined political parties in the post-Soviet era. 
3.2 Public Educators 
As evident in the case of Shanyrak one of the key roles some political parties have 
assigned themselves is that of public and civic educators. Opposition parties, in 
particular, see it as their role to educate citizens in not just their social rights but also 
in their political and democratic rights. According to Kozhakhmetov, `the task is to 
teach people civil intelligence so they should be brave enough to protect their own 
rights. ' 109 It is a strategy opposition parties feel enables them to advance the 
development and sophistication of civil society in Kazakhstan, while making citizens 
more aware of real democratic processes. One regional official for Alga commented 
on how this works in practice, `our party has a program called door-to-door and this 
basically involves going to every person in the city to explain what the party wants, 
how it is going to deal with the problems in society and how it all works in general. 
The aim is to raise peoples' awareness'. 10 Parties, therefore, are aiming to build a 
107 Author's interview with Assylbek Kozhakhmetov. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
.. o Author's interview with Mamashev Sadykovich, Chairman of Zhambyl Oblast Branch of Alga 
Party, 13 March 2007, Taraz. 
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link between themselves and citizens based on empowering citizens with knowledge 
about how to effectively employ their political rights in the face of authoritarianism. 
According to one senior figure in Alga, `we try to encourage people to demand their 
rights not make them wait for their rights from any leader, either the president or the 
opposition'. 111 
In the most part, parties' role as public educators is limited to those in their own 
party. In the closed political space in which political parties try to operate the 
opportunities for public political agitation are restricted. Parties, therefore, tend to 
concentrate on their own members. The leader of OSDP highlighted this, `the main 
task of the party between elections is structuring the party and educating the activists 
of the party so they will understand their ideology and be ideologically prepared for 
the next election. ' 112 According to another senior figure in Alga, `we try to educate 
our members and teach them. This is why we provide every regional branch with 
assistant staff and computers. Regional leaders and members need to understand how 
to use computers. They need to understand the party program and to understand what 
is going on in the country. We spend a lot of time on their education. '' 13 It is 
primarily Alga which is performing this role. Without official registration the party, 
by demonstrating their continued presence to their members, and by encouraging 
them to become more politically literate and active, is trying to ensure it retains a 
public presence given its inability to compete in elections. 
Parties, and in particular, opposition parties such as Alga, are simply attempting to 
readdress the imbalance and gap existing between political parties and citizens 
caused pre-dominantly by the personalistic and clientelistic disposition of parties. 
With little space within which to manoeuvre because of the supremacy of the 
president and Nur Otan and the successful cultivation of homogenised discourse 
around the issue of the president's leadership, parties such as Alga rely on roles as 
public educators and guarantors of social rights as a means to build relations with 
citizens and to assist in developing civil society. However, it is a role that exists on 
"' Author's interview with Vladimir I. Kozlov, leader of Alga, 8 January 2007, Almaty. 
12 Author's interview with Zharmakhan Tuiakbai, leader of OSDP, 30 January 2007, Almaty. 
113 Author's interview with Bakhyt N. Tumenova, Head of the Central Apparatus of Alga, 
6 February 2007, Almaty. 
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the periphery of the political process representing the interests of some of the most 
marginal groups in society. 
3.3 Acts for the Public Good 
An additional bond parties are attempting to construct between themselves and 
citizens is that of acting on behalf of the public good and charitable causes. Broadly 
speaking this involves parties both responding to public crises and contributing, 
generally in financial terms, to their resolution, or organising and participating in 
public events seen to benefit worthy groups. A prime example of this is was the case 
of the infection of children with HIV through blood transfusions at a number of 
hospitals in the South Kazakhstan Oblast. ' 4 After these tragic incidents some 
political parties acted to show solidarity and support, helping the families of those 
affected. One senior figure from Adilet noted that, `after the events in Shymkent, 
where children were infected with the HIV virus, the party organised the collection 
of one day's salary from all members of the party and we transferred this to the fund 
for these children. Also, many party members and activists visited the children and 
parents of those children to give financial and moral support. ' 15 Aside from acting 
on such tragic events, parties are keen to be seen publicly supporting popular causes 
or charities. In 2008, in the context of worsening economic conditions, Ak Zhol, 
Auyl, KNPK and Rukhaniiat, made public their support for the long time put upon 
miners in Karaganda declaring their `solidarity with associations of workers, the 
collectives of workers who are actively defending their legitimate interests and 
rights'. 116 Other parties explicitly point to their acts of charity, Alga for example 
highlight their support of disabled associations in which they assisted groups in 
obtaining office space and applying for grants, 117 
Such acts of public good are illustrative of a tentative link developing between 
parties and citizens. Yet it remains a very limited role at the periphery of the political 
system. The preponderant presence of Nur Otan and the president, sustained by 
loyalty and patronage, has left little room for political parties to actively engage with 
1" Bruce Pannier, Fourteen Children Infected with HIV in Hospitals, www. eurasianet. or2,22 July 
2006, http"//www eurasianet. or /departments/civilsociety/articles/pp072206, shtmi. 
15 Author's interview with Kuanysh Zhalakov. 
"6 Ak Zhol, Auyl, KNPK and Rukhaniiat Zaiavlenie, www. zonakz. net. 6 February 2008, 
hIV: //zonakz. net/articles/209 10. 
117 Author's interview with Assylbek Kozhakhmetov. 
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citizens. Parties are left to pursue only functional roles as sponsors of charities and 
public causes rather than actively influence policy and provide representative interest 
articulation. It could be argued parties are simply fulfilling the role usually played 
by NGOs and other groups within civil society. 118 The shortage of genuinely 
autonomous groups means parties, restricted in their ability to function along the 
traditional lines present in democratic systems, are able to occupy this space. 
Moreover, parties' role in acting as benevolent institutions assists in strengthening 
the clientelistic linkages between parties and citizens. If people understand parties as 
institutions they go to when they need something, although there may be no 
guarantee of exchange of support for the party on behalf of the client, then it will 
embed that form of relationship between parties and citizens. At the same time, 
parties are working in the available space at the margins of society as a way to 
guarantee political survival and to demonstrate political relevance. In this sense, the 
roles some opposition parties have carved out for themselves are entirely appropriate 
and rational given their marginal status at the periphery of the political process. 
3.4 The Development of the Middle Class 
The three emerging forms of party interest articulation highlighted above, focus pre- 
dominantly on the `losers' of transition, the marginalised and least well off, but what 
of the winners? The economic growth witnessed in Kazakhstan has seen the 
emergence of a small middle class cohort. Large oil revenues and foreign investment 
have assisted in facilitating the emergence of a middle class with disposable 
income. ' 19 The growing use of the Internet and mobile telecommunications, as well 
as a burgeoning cosmopolitan lifestyle in cities such as Astana and Almaty, are 
increasing the perception of growing wealth in Kazakhstan. With initiatives like the 
state sponsored Kazakhstan Mortgage Company helping people buy their own 
homes and the president's Bolashak (the future) education program sending 3000 
Kazakhstani students abroad each year to study, there is an increasing sense of 
affluence among some sections of the population. To what extent, however, has this 
emerging middle class developed a political consciousness and to what extent are 
parties emerging in response to its development? 
118 This is not to suggest, however, that political parties are not multi-purpose with varying functions 
and that acts of charity should not be a function of parties. 
119 John C. Daly, Kazakhstan's Emerging Middle Class, Central Asia -Caucasus Institute, Silk Road 
Paper, March 2008. 
266 
The initial appearance of DVK, Ak Zhol, and Nagiz Ak Zhol, from the process of elite 
fragmentation has been argued as the first political flowering of the political arm of 
Kazakhstan's growing middle class and independent businessmen. According to 
Tulegen Zhukeev, `today there are certain parties emerging that are representing 
particular groups like entrepreneurs, business and the middle class. Our party (Nagiz 
Ak Zhol), sees our main electorate as representatives of the emerging middle class 
and representatives of business structures, and these are the people we orient around 
and these are the people who we get support from. 120 It would be difficult to truly 
describe the emergence of DVK et al., as parties emerging from middle class 
interests, as these were high profile big business figures of considerable wealth and 
prominent government officials, not small businessmen. Additionally, Atameken, 
which emerged in 2006 under the leadership of Yerzhan Dosmukhamedov, was 
purposely designed to appeal to middle class businessmen and entrepreneurs. 121 
Engaging middle class support, however, is not limited to opposition parties, Nur 
Otan, for example, when it talks about growing prosperity and stability, is reaching 
out to the growing middle class in Kazakhstan and suggesting that emerging 
affluence can only come with the stability of the president's leadership. 
To what extent, however, is such middle-class representation viable? In the first 
instance, the growth of the middle class is still far from widespread as affluence in 
Kazakhstan tends to be pocketed in the major urban areas such as Almaty, Astana 
and the key oil city of Atyrau. 122 Second, and most importantly with regards to the 
scope of this work, those who could be described as middle class are reluctant to 
support political parties which have been established principally for their 
representation, if those parties are not connected to the presidential authorities. 
Arguably an explanation for this phenomenon is the threat of recriminations if 
independent small to medium size businessmen openly engage with a party 
120 Author's interview with Tulegen Zhukeev, General Secretary of Azat, former Co-chairman of 
Nagiz Ak Zhol, 21 January 2007, Almaty. 
121 Yerzhan Dosmukhamedov, Atameken: Building Democracy in Kazakhstan (Almaty, 2006). 
122 According to the United National Development Program (UNDP) as of 2004 16.1 percent of 
people still live below the poverty line in Kazakhstan, living on less than $2 a day, a significantly 
reduced figure from 1996 when 34.6 percent were assessed to live below the poverty line. However, 
the poverty gap between urban and rural areas has been steeply climbing in recent years. See UNDP, 
The Great Generation of Kazakhstan: Insight into the Future (Almaty, UNDP, 2005). 
267 
considered the opposition by the authorities. In a famous statement in 2002 the 
president claimed he `could take any businessmen to jail in Kazakhstan'. Simply, he 
understands and knows that most successful businessmen in Kazakhstan have made 
their wealth on the back of non-transparent corrupt practices, overseen by the 
Nazarbaev neopatrimonial regime. In particular, the poorly administered taxation 
system ensures businesses are less likely to pay taxes to the state and instead pay less 
to those officials from the tax office that checks taxes. ' 23 Therefore, just this 
informal tool of fear of recriminations and being estranged from profitable 
businesses is enough to ensure those emerging middle class businessmen do not join 
opposition parties and instead remain compliant to the president. According to 
Vladimir Kozlov, `any businessman can face charges in court. These are the rules of 
the game and as a result businessmen cannot join the party as the party is carefully 
watched. I used to be a businessman. When I joined the party I had a legal profitable 
business. Then representatives from the KNB came to me, and as they were my 
friends they advised me to give the business to someone else... otherwise they would 
have had to destroy the business as a potential source of financing the party. "24 The 
ability for emerging political parties to represent middle class interests is limited in 
the face of the threat from state enforcement agencies. Moreover, if prosperity and 
security of business interests is secured under Nazarbaev's leadership there is little 
motivation for emerging middle class interests to support a party that is not 
connected to him. In the current climate, the only way a political party can emerge to 
successfully represent the interests of middle class Kazakhstani citizens is if it has 
the blessing of the presidential administration. 
This section has sought only to demonstrate despite the connections between parties 
and society being based on personalistic and clientalistic linkages, as a consequence 
of the neopatrimonial political system, and the dominance of Nur Otan in shaping 
public opinion, there are small pockets where parties are attempting to base 
themselves on emerging interests within society. Opposition parties are establishing 
themselves as parties with a growing organisational capacity to represent and protect 
the interests of some of the most marginal groups in society and to publicly educate 
123 Dosym Satpaev, Korruptsiia v Kazakhstane: metody neitralizatsii (Almaty, Tsentral'noaziatskoe 
agentstvo politicheskikh issledovanii, 2001) 
124 Author's interview with Vladimir Kozlov. 
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citizens and their own party members of their social and political rights. Many 
political parties, on the other hand, are keen to demonstrate their role in acting for 
the public good by financially supporting victims of tragedies, supporting groups 
seeking better pay conditions or participating in charitable acts. These, however, are 
very limited activities existing on the margins of the political process and the 
political system. They do not represent the full extent of parties' representative and 
articulative capabilities. Moreover, they offer no satisfactory substitute for the fact 
those parties currently do not possess genuine representative and articulative powers 
or the ability to participate in policy and decision making. The emerging middle 
class is one social group many political parties are keen to associate with in terms of 
interest articulation. However, the prosperity and security guaranteed under 
Nazarbaev, and the fear of potential sanctions against business interests for 
supporting political parties not connected to the president, creates difficulty for 
political parties trying to actively engage and support middle class interests. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The informal forms of political behaviour and relations present in Kazakhstan which 
form part of its neopatrimonial regime and discussed throughout this work, such as 
personalism, patronage and patron-client relations, and informal factional elite 
conflict, are affecting parties' formal development of relations with citizens and 
society. The informal nature of political elite conflict appears to citizens as occurring 
in an arena separate and far away from them. The personalistic and clientelistic 
nature of parties, that is they are inward looking institutions interested only in their 
own political careers, is shaping disinterest and passivity. 
The relationship between parties and society is defined by a disconnection between 
parties, society and the state and a degree of passivity and disinterest on the part of 
citizens. This is explained by the fusion between the residual legacy of the CPSU 
and the personalistic and clientelistic nature of political parties. Consequently, 
citizens possess a negative attitude towards parties and instead linkages between 
parties and citizens are built on personalistic and clientelistic terms. The overall 
context of passivity and disconnection is shaped by homogeneity of opinion 
regarding the centrality of Nazarbaev's leadership to the prosperity and stability of 
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the country and his position as chief representative of the interests of all citizens of 
Kazakhstan. This homogenised discourse is achieved and sustained with support 
from Nur Otan. Nur Otan are able to be so effective in spreading the president's 
message due to placing itself on directly the same position as the president, by 
dominating the regions in an organisational and representative sense and through the 
informal patronage and preference it receives from the state media and local 
executives. Nur Otan, therefore, plays a central role in drumming up public support 
for the president and ensuring the president's supporters and ideas reach to all levels 
of the country. Nur Otan is a key political vehicle for the president in consolidating 
and legitimising his authoritarian rule. Similar to the way the constitution and the 
electoral process give formal legitimacy to Nazarbaev's rule both at home and 
abroad, the use of Nur Otan legitimises and confirms Nazarbaev's strong bond with 
society. The party provides the formal context within which the president's 
legitimises his informal power (patron-client networks) with the country. Despite the 
disconnection and passivity it is possible to observe limited `green shoots' where 
parties are representing and attempting to articulate emerging interests. These 
pockets are focused primarily on attempting to protect and represent the interests of 
the most marginal groups in society, as well as the emerging middle class, while at 
the same time acting as political and civic educators and undertaking acts for the 
public good. Such attempts at interest articulation, however, are at the margins of the 
political process and illustrative how little room parties have to pursue other forms of 
interest articulation and representation due to the dominance of the political space by 
Nazarbaev and Nur Otan. 
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Conclusion: Informal Politics and Party Development in Kazakhstan and 
Beyond 
Over the preceding chapters this work has assessed the relationship between 
informal and formal politics in the Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan as a way to 
examine the development of political institutions (in this case political parties) and 
the overall nature of post-Soviet transition in the region. In this account, informal 
forms of political relations are illustrated to have influenced and shaped the 
development of formal political institutions, thus affecting the nature of post-Soviet 
transition by aiding authoritarianism. At the same time, however, formal institutions 
have been significant in that they provide elite stability, legitimation of informal 
forms of political behaviour and relations, and vehicles for the purpose of informal 
conflict. This concluding chapter seeks to place the study in the context of wider 
debates and generalise the main findings in the comparative context of other post- 
Soviet states. 
This work has argued that the interaction and influence between informal and formal 
politics through the lens of party development is one of the key factors explaining 
why effective democracy has failed to materialise in Kazakhstan. In the case of party 
development in Kazakhstan we can conceive the interaction between the informal 
and formal as occurring in a neopatrimonial political system. Personalism of power, 
loyalty to the leader, patron-client relations and factional inter-elite conflict (the 
patrimonial - informal political relations and behaviour) occur in a system governed 
by rational rules and formal institutions (the neo - rationalised office, surface 
constitutional separation of powers, elections and political parties). This 
neopatrimonial political system, centred on the president Nursultan Nazarbaev and 
the formal and informal power at his disposal, impacts on the development of 
democracy and pluralism due to the preference the system gives to pro-presidential 
parties (namely Nur Otan) at the expense of other political voices. While the high 
degree of personalism and extensive informal patronage influences the development 
of parties by the preference and advantage Nur Otan receives, parties and other 
formal institutions also provide an institutional context for the informal behaviour 
and relations occurring. Nur Otan has been used to support the president in 
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exercising personal political control, developing elite cohesion (in the aftermath of 
elite fragmentation) and providing internal political stability. The party is an 
important factor in explaining durability of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan. 
Simultaneously, political parties are formal vehicles for those fragmented elites 
caught up in a struggle for power. In this context, parties are formal units that have 
emerged in the process of factional elite conflict and are used to stabilise the political 
and economic interests of those elites who were once a part of the ruling elite. 
Formal rules are used to formalise the president's informal power over the electoral 
process. They are designed in a broad manner leading them to be susceptible to 
selective application and interpretation by loyal clients of the president. Therefore, 
the case of party development in Kazakhstan illustrates that the relationship between 
informal and formal politics is complex. It represents a process of mutual influencing 
and impact. This relationship assists in explaining the limitations of democratic and 
pluralist progress, as informal political relations contribute to the consolidation of 
the president's authoritarian rule while formal institutions provide a legitimising and 
stabilising context for his informal power. 
This study yields nine main conclusions that expand our understanding of the 
relationship between informal political relations and behaviour and formal 
institutional development (in this case political parties) in post-Soviet authoritarian 
political development. 
(1) Informal political relations and behaviour and formal institutional 
development are not processes or phenomena occurring separate from each 
other. They share a complex and entwined relationship (best conceptualised 
as neopatrimonial) where both play a crucial role in shaping political 
development and assisting in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes. 
(2) The use and appearance of informal political relations and behaviour derive 
from a fusion of structural and behavioural legacies and the emergence of 
new political institutions (neopatrimonialism) and centres of power which 
threaten the power base of incumbent political elites. It is in this context, 
political elites turn to informal forms of political behaviour to manage the 
contingent and dynamic nature of transitional politics. 
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(3) In transitional regimes where political elites are seeking to consolidate their 
political rule, formal institutional constraints are purposively designed in a 
broad and at times violable fashion so loyal clients of the incumbent 
leadership are able to selectively apply and interpret the formal rules to suit 
the preferences of the leadership. In the case of political parties, it leads to 
party system development from above and weak party competition where 
pro-regime parties receive preference. 
(4) Conversely, formal political institutions and rules can, due to their broad 
interpretative nature, legitimise informal political behaviour and relations 
which stem from instances of personalism of office, patronage and patron- 
client relations. Formal institutions like dominant political parties can also 
induce elite stability by binding in and providing cohesion of a country's 
political elite. 
(5) Due to the above nature of the relationship between informal political 
relations and formal institutions, those formal institutions that emerge from 
this context tend to be oriented towards personalism and clientelism. Political 
parties are particularly susceptible to this. 
(6) Formal institutions can also provide constructs that provide shelter for 
fragmented elite groups who are participating in factional elite conflict 
common to transitional politics. As they fight over access to resources, 
institutions like political parties act to protect and extend their political and 
economic interests. 
(7) Due to the dominance of personalism and clientelism in both the informal 
interpretation of formal rules and formal institutions themselves, formal 
institutions like parties develop a relationship with society based on 
disconnection and passiveness. Linkages with wider citizens are established 
on personalistic and clientelistic terms. 
(8) At the same time, formal institutions like political parties help solicit the 
legitimisation of a leaders' power by developing and articulating 
homogeneity of opinion regarding the centrality of the incumbents' 
leadership to the prosperity of the country. 
(9) In a neopatrimonial political system where informal forms of political 
behaviour and relations are fused with formal institutions, political parties 
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while weak on those attributes typically associated with assisting democratic 
consolidation (interest articulation, representation) are strong on those 
attributes which help the consolidation of authoritarian regimes. 
Reorienting the Formal and Informal 
As discussed in the Introduction, scholarly research on post-Soviet political 
development in Central Asia has focused on a debate between two perspectives. On 
the one hand there are those who argue that informal politics, based on tribal kinship 
and familial ties, has been central to shaping political and institutional development, 
in particular regime trajectory. 
' On the other hand, scholars have argued that formal 
Soviet structural legacies have been the main causal factor in political institutional 
development. 2 Is it the case that informal political organisations such as kinship 
based tribes and clans are the most important driver in post-Soviet Central Asia? Are 
formal institutions in Central Asia of less value and are they outweighed by the 
dominance of informal political relations and behaviour? The case of party 
development in Kazakhstan suggests not. This study has attempted to move the 
debate on from implicitly viewing either as the most preponderant and instead has 
explored the relationship between both informal politics and formal institutions. 
While working from the position that informal politics has a central role in the post- 
Soviet space, as noted by other authors, the study seeks to take a closer examination 
of the relationship between informal politics and formal institutions, in this case 
parties. 3 It has revealed that naturally in a region still dominanted by traditionalism 
informal forms of politics are influencing and shaping new formal political 
institutions, but at the same time formal institutions are not invalid. While of course 
formal institutions in Central Asia such as constitutions, elections and political 
parties do not resemble comparable institutions in consolidated democracies, they do 
t Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) and Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics and Beyond: The Power of 
"Blood" in Kazakhstan (Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 2004). 
2 Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
3 Anna Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics 
(Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2006), Vladimir Gel'man The Unrule of Law in the 
Making: the Politics of Informal Institution Building in Russia, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7, 
2004, pp. 1021-1040 and G. Ilelmke, & S., Levitsky, `Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics- 
A Research Agenda', Helen Kellogg Institute, Notre Dame University, Working Paper N307,2003, 
www. nd. edu/_kellogg/wps/307. pdf. 
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execute an important function in legitimising the informal forms of political relations 
and behaviour which underline the nature of power in Central Asian states. 
Therefore, in transitional states where new formal institutions are weak and lacking 
maturity with regards to the functions we typically expect of them in lending 
themselves to democratisation, they are rather utilised for a very different purpose. 
Instead formal institutions function to provide a form of legitimisation of underlying 
informal political power. The drawing of formal institutional rules in either a broad 
fashion or in a manner which makes violation almost inevitable allows for the 
selective interpretation or application of formal rules. This is undertaken on the part 
of loyal clients to serve the interests and preferences of the patron. Formal 
institutions are utilised to bind in elites and engender political stability, thus assisting 
in the consolidation of authoritarian rule. It illustrates that the relationship between 
the formal and informal, especially in transitional states where political elites are 
seeking to consolidate power, is complex. It is not so straightforward that informal 
politics always trump formal political institutions or that formal institutions are a 
charade. Formal institutions in post-Soviet states do act as political facades in terms 
of their utility to democratisation, but they are crucial in legitimising informal power, 
providing elite stability and authoritarian durability. 
Scholars such as Collins and Schatz are correct to argue that informal political 
relations and behaviour are important for modem power relations and political 
development in Central Asia. However, as argued in this work and elsewhere, these 
forms of informal politics are not necessarily based on kinship ties. 4 Rather, clan 
politics in Central Asia orients not necessarily on kinship ties, although they are a 
factor, but rather on economic interests. It is access to resources and potential 
revenue streams which has incited political competition and elite actors have worked 
together in shared interests across tribal and kinship based cleavages. 5 In addition, 
how we conceptualise informal politics is important for our broader understanding of 
the region and its place in a broader context. As discussed in the introduction, 
4 See Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in 
Economic Liberalization, Infra-elite Cleavage, and Political Opposition, Demokratizatsiia, Vol. 13, 
No. 3,2005. 
S Scott Radnitz, Networks, Localism and Mobilisation in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey, 
Vol. 24, No. 4,2005, pp. 405-424. 
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defining the kinds of informal politics that occur in Central Asia and have been 
highlighted in this study of Kazakhstan is difficult. We can not so easily understand 
them as informal institutions. Personalism of office, patronage networks and 
instances of clientelistic exchange are not patterned or necessarily rule bound. For 
example, this study has illustrated that obedience to informal rules does not 
guarantee rewards. If this was the case, then political figures like Maksut Narikbaev 
and Alikhan Baimenov who have demonstrated loyalty to Nazarbaev would have 
been rewarded with at least a seat between them in the 2007 parliamentary election. 
Moreover, as highlighted above, kinship has been an important tie at times for 
Nazarbaev and other times not. 6 These cases illustrate that there are no consistent 
patterns related to informal politics in Kazakhstan and thus it is difficult to talk about 
them in institutional terms. While Collins conceptualised clans as organisations, 
rather than institutions, it does not make a great deal of sense to understand the 
broader and more general types of informal politics that occur in Central Asia and 
other former Soviet states as organisational. Rather, again this study has attempted to 
move the debate on and view the informal political relations and behaviour which 
occur in Central Asian post-Soviet politics and their relationship with formal 
institutions through the lens of neopatrimonialism. 
Neopatrimonialism 
Conceptualising informal politics through neopatrimonialism is significant in several 
ways allowing scholars to make greater sense of the relationship between informal 
political relations and behaviour and formal political institutions. It creates a suitable 
framework within which to chart and observe the relationship between aspects of 
patrimonial rule (personalism, patronage, patron-client relations and factional elite 
conflict) and new formal institutions which have emerged in post-Soviet states. Post- 
Soviet transition has seen states develop a complex web of informal and formal cross 
cutting institutions, actors and behavioural norms through which political struggle 
and process is channelled. Neopatrimonialism allows us to unpack some parts of this 
matrix by allowing us to view the informal and formal as congruent and a part of the 
6 It is clear the charges brought against Rakhat Aliev (see Chapter Three), the president's son-in-law 
and the demotion of Dariga Nazarbaeva and Timur Kulibaev illustrate that kinship based ties are not 
as central as previously thought. These events indicate that kinship is no guarantee of political 
survival in Kazakhstan. 
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same system, not necessary as separate entities. Importantly, in the case of Central 
Asia, neopatrimonialism allows us to understand how the temporal developments of 
political systems emerge over time in a gradual fusion of institutions and practices. 
In Kazakhstan, neopatrimonialism represents the logical conclusion of a fusion 
between traditional informal politics, communist patrimonial bureaucracy and new 
formal institutions (see Chapter Three). Moreover; neopatrimonialism provides a 
broader conceptual framework within which greater comparative analysis can occur. 
Beyond just Kazakhstan and Central Asia where all states possess the irrational 
personalism of office, excessive loyalty to the leader, the panoply of patron-client 
networks and factional elite conflict alongside formal constitutional liberal 
institutions, other post-Soviet states too exhibit neopatrimonial features. In Russia 
for example, after becoming president in 2000 Vladimir Putin increasingly 
personalised the presidential office. Putin gained the power to appoint all regional 
governors in his first term of office and marginalised the political power of the 
oligarchs replacing them with various factional elite groups who compete for access 
to resources and power. 7 Using neopatrimonialism to study the role and utility of 
informal politics and their relationship with formal institutions in post-Soviet states 
allows scholars to compare and generalise findings with post-colonial transitions! it 
means Central Asia, and the predominance of informal politics within those 
countries, are not isolated from political phenomena in other parts of the world and 
thus are not deemed abnormal or culturally pre-determined towards authoritarian 
rule. 
Neopatrimonialism is problematic in some instances. While it provides a suitable 
framework to draw out correlations between informal forms of political behaviour 
and relations (personalism, patron-client relations and factional elite conflict) and 
formal institutions (constitutions, elections and parties etc. ) it does not provide for a 
framework to understand actors' motivations. There is little within the approach to 
understand why actors persist with either traditional forms of political norms or 
formal rational and liberal institutions. It leads to a dilemma of understanding what 
role structure and agency plays in a neopatrimonial system. For the most part 
Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, (Oxford, Routledge, 2007). 
8 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, `Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in 
Africa', World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4. (July, 1994), pp. 453-489. 
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neopatrimonialism involves interpreting both the structural and agency 
considerations inherent in systems where traditionalism and modernity meet. The 
intrinsic personalism in such systems presumes a significant role for actors to shape 
and influence new institutions, as in the case of Nazarbaev being able to design the 
institutional constraints which have shaped party development (see Chapter Four). 
Yet, at the same time structural legacies in the shape of traditional forms of politics 
and former communist structures (CPSU and the Supreme Soviet) shape actors 
preferences. It leads to a further problem of distinguishing the hierarchy of causation. 
To what extent do traditional norms play a larger role than Soviet structures in 
shaping actors interests and motivations? And what role does the contingency of the 
post-Soviet period play in determining how political actors behave and construct 
new institutions? There are no direct answers within neopatrimonialism to these 
questions. In this study, rather than viewing either rational forms of politics or even 
communist structures as the predominant causal variable, it is rather the fusion of 
these factors in the shape of the contingent process of transition and the emergence 
of new institutions which influence how political actors behave. 9 Indeed, in the case 
of Kazakhstan it is the fusion between traditional politics, communist bureaucracy 
and new institutions which define neopatrimonialism in a post-Soviet context. 
Despite such drawbacks, neopatrimonialism is an appropriate framework to study 
political development in Central Asia. This research has illustrated that the study of 
formal institutions in Central Asia cannot be done without paying heed to the 
important role of informal political behaviour and relations. In the case of Central 
Asia, and many other former Soviet states, studying formal institutions on their own 
(elections, constitutions and political parties) would not be particularly insightful. As 
highlighted in this work on Kazakhstan, elections, constitutions and political parties 
have little influence over the political process. Yet when viewed within the context 
of their relationship with informal political relations and behaviour we can 
understand the role formal institutions play in legitimising informal political power 
and providing elite stability. Thus any study of formal institutions in post-Soviet 
Central Asia cannot be undertaken using the same methods we use to study formal 
9 Vladimir Gel'man, The Unrule of Law in the Making: the Politics of Informal Institution Building in 
Russia, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7,2004, pp. 1021-1040. 
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institutions in established democracies. As with the lack of utility of the 
democratisation literature in the case of post-Soviet transitions, the study of formal 
institutions need to take into account different approaches and methods to fully 
realise their role and significance. It is not simply enough to just apply theories 
relating to institutions derived from the study of formal institutions in established or 
consolidating democracies. We have to take into account the role of the informal. 
This is why an integrated framework which utilised neopatrimonialism and theories 
that apply to party development was appropriate for this study. Therefore, building 
on the approach set out in this work, which has sought to study the relationship 
between informal and formal politics rather than just either or, other studies could go 
on to assess the relationship between informal political relations and behaviour and 
other formal institutions in either single case or comparative studies. Much would be 
gained by a comparative analysis of the relationship between informal politics and 
formal institutional development in Central Asia taking in executive, legislative and 
judicial institutions. 
The Importance of Contingency 
As noted above, and discussed in Chapter Three, the informal political relations and 
behaviour which shape formal institutions in a post-Soviet transitional environment 
derive from a fusion between traditional political norms, communist bureaucracy and 
the emergence of new institutions. This is a different approach from those who imply 
that traditional legacies related to informal forms of political and social organisations 
explain much of post-Soviet political development and those who suggest Soviet 
legacy take primacy. 10 Rather it is the critical juncture, a contingent and dynamic 
transition process, in which informal political relations and behaviour are utilised to 
minimise the transaction costs of transition and to manage the emergence of new 
competing centres of power. The distinction here is that it is not presumed that 
cultural legacies mean that it is inevitable informal politics will emerge, as informal 
political relations and behaviour are subject to change and influence by exogenous 
and endogenous factors. Thus the reliance on informal politics by political actors 
depends on their perceived interests during the dynamism of post-Soviet transition. 
to Collins, Clan Politics, Schatz, Modern Clan Politics and Jones Loung, Institutional Change and 
Political Continuity. 
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In the case of Kazakhstan, the institutional conflict which emerged at this critical 
juncture challenged the certainty of Nursultan Nazarbaev's power. It was in the 
interests of Nazarbaev to utilise his powers of patronage and offer rewards in 
exchange for loyalty to those actors and institutions threatening his position. The 
empirical example of Kazakhstan is mirrored in other post-Soviet states. Many other 
post-Soviets states also found themselves at a similar critical juncture where earlier 
pre-Soviet forms of political norms fused with patrimonial communist bureaucracy 
were amalgamated with new formal institutions. This dynamism shaped how 
political actors reacted. For instance, in Uzbekistan, President Karimov relied on the 
patron-client networks developed through the communist period to strengthen his 
hold on power and keep a lid on emerging pluralism and institutions such as the 
oppositionist Erk/Liberty Party led by the writer Muhammad Salih. " Likewise in 
Russia, Boris Yeltsin relied on the informal power and resources of wealthy 
oligarchs to secure his re-election in 1996 when the unpredictability of electoral 
competition resulted in the prospect of a return to power for the communists. Putin 
too has relied on the informal power of competing networks to gain greater control 
of the commanding heights of the economy to underpin and consolidate his power. 12 
The Influence of the Informal on Institutional Constraints 
This reliance on informal political behaviour and relations to manage the emergence 
of new institutions gave post-Soviet actors the opportunity to consolidate their role 
on the basis of both informal and formal power. New constitutions generally 
centralised executive powers in the presidency which gave considerable power of 
appointment to presidents, thus allowing them to establish informal power on the 
basis of patronage and patron-client networks. This was particularly acute in the 
Central Asian states as well as Russia. It suggests that in terms of post-Soviet 
transitions the debate has moved on from just focusing explicitly on formal 
institutional frameworks as highlighted in the democratisation literature and focus 
more on the role and influence informal political power has on the formal 
" Resul Yalcin, The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era 
(Reading, Ithaca Press, 2002). 
12 See, Olga Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White, Inside the Putin Court: A Research Notes, Europe- 
Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 7, November 2005,1065-1075 and Daniel Treisman, `Putin's Silovarchs, 
Orbis, Volume 51, Number 1,2007, pp. 141-153. 
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institutional framework and its ability to function effectively according to democratic 
rules. 13 As in Kazakhstan, other post-Soviet leaders due to their strong position of 
power (situated on both formal and informal authority) have been able to craft the 
institutional environment within which political parties develop. In Russia, for 
example, Putin has used similar methods to Nazarbaev to manage party development 
establishing a dominant party, creating virtual parties and co-opting the opposition. 
Edinaia Rossia (United Russia) originally established as Edinstvo (Unity) in 
September 1999, prior to the December parliamentary election, as a decoy to defeat 
the anti-Kremlin party Fatherland All-Russia (Otechestvo - Vsia Rossiia). 14 The 
party, however, was commandeered by the presidential administration to act as the 
legislative representation of Putin's policy preferences. Since then Edinaia Rossia 
has become the dominant party in Russia with Putin officially becoming leader of 
the party in April 2008, not long after Nazarbaev officially became the leader of Nur 
Otan. As with Nur Otan, Edinaia Rossia dominates the legislature and is a personal 
political vehicle for its leader. 15 It draws in government elites and regional 
governors offering Putin a structure for elite cohesion. Russia also provided the 
model for the `many layered pie' theory of party development. 16 Party development 
has been managed from above by the establishment of virtual parties. Andrew 
Wilson gives the example of Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia [LDPR] but the founding of Spravedlivaia Rossia (A Just Russia) in 2006 
saw the Kremlin attempt to construct a loyal opposition to Edinaia Rossia. At the 
same time there has been the co-option of the opposition with, in particular, the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) becoming more docile and less 
critical to the presidential administration. Furthermore, recent allegations have been 
levelled that all parties in Russia have been funded by a secret unaccountable fund 
13 See Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1 No. 4,1990, pp 124-140 
and Donald Horowitz, Comparing Democratic Systems, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1 No. 4,1990, 
'' 141-149. 
Henry Hale, `The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in 
Party-System Development', Demokratizatsiia, Vol. 12, No. 3,2004, pp. 169-194 
15 Edinaia Rossia holds 315 of the 450 seats in the Duma. 
16 Andrew Wilson. Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the post-Soviet World (Yale, Yale 
University Press, 2005). 
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from the Kremlin, thus further pointing to the complete management of Russia's 
party system from above. " 
The dominant party model exemplified by the cases of Russia and Kazakhstan is not 
exclusive to either state. In Azerbaijan Heydar Aliev created the New Azerbaijan 
Party (NAP) in 1993 from former communist members and other minor political 
groups after he was elected president. The party was dedicated to representing his 
interests in the Milli Mezhlis (parliament) and allowed Aliev to establish elite 
stability and cohesion. After his death the party was taken over by his son Ilham 
Aliev. In Kyrgyzstan the Edinaia Rossia, Nur Otan and NAP model has proved 
influential with Kurmanbek Bakiev establishing a new presidential party, Ak Zhol, 
prior to the 2007 parliamentary elections. 
'8 All these cases exemplify how in the 
process of state building formal institutions can become subject to personalism and 
the power of charisma. The decision to adopt a presidential system is fraught with 
the danger that executive power becomes synonymous not with the office of 
president but with the individual occupying the office. The presidency becomes the 
container in which personal power is held. The outcome is a greater propensity 
towards a single political actor being able to manage the development of political 
parties through both the formal power invested in the presidency and the informal 
personal power (patronage) available. The institutional constraint of the presidency 
is shaped by the informal nature of power. 
Informal political relations and behaviour also influence other types of institutional 
constraints on political parties in neopatrimonial states. This research has highlighted 
how institutional constraints are designed purposively to be influenced by informal 
political behaviour and relations. Formal rules are designed to look progressive on 
the surface but are in fact broadly composed. It presents clients of incumbent 
executive actors with the opportunity to selectively apply and interpret the rules in an 
effort to meet the preferences of the leadership. States in the former Soviet Union 
present scholars with examples of how political actors use formal rules, designed to 
17 Natalia Morar, Chernaia kassa kremlia, Novoye Vremia 17 December 2007, 
[http: //www. naziobu. ru/press/article2455. htrnj. 
8 Ak Zhol won 71 of the 90 seats in the December election - an amazing result for a party only 
created two months prior to the election. 
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look rational and impersonal on the surface, to consolidate their personal political 
power by using informal political relations and behaviour to selectively apply and 
interpret the formal rules. Therefore, the application of the law shifts from 
impersonal operation to a particularistic personal implementation of the law on 
behalf of a political ruler. 19 
In Russia in 2005, Putin adopted changes to the electoral system shifting it from a 
Mixed-Majoritarian to a fully proportional system where deputies are elected by 
party list. The threshold for entry into parliament was increased to 7 percent and a 
ban on electoral blocs was also introduced, these institutional changes are similar to 
the constitutional changes Nazarbaev introduced in 2007 in Kazakhstan. 20 Yet these 
changes, existing as they do with seemingly liberal tendencies (full proportionality) 
and at the same time restrictive tendencies (7 percent threshold), are subject to 
selective application, informal bias and at times blatant ignoring of the formal rules. 
In the case of Russia, electoral fraud, the manipulation of electoral commissions in 
favour of Edinaia Rossia and pro-Putin candidates, media bias, bias of state agencies 
in favour of pro-Kremlin parties and the arbitrary exclusion of undesirable 
opposition candidates from competing are frequent practices. 21 Similar to 
Kazakhstan, the patronage of local executives is used to engineer a large vote for 
Putin's party. 22 International criticism of the new election code suggests there is an 
overwhelming advantage to Edinaia Rossia which makes it increasingly difficult for 
new and smaller parties to compete effectively. 
23 Such a relationship between formal 
rules and the informal behaviour of interpreting those formal rules can be observed 
in other post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. In Kyrgyzstan, despite being considered 
more liberal and democratic throughout the post-Soviet period, incidents of electoral 
19 See Anna Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works. 
20 With the exception of the 7 percent threshold - which illustrates in this instance the institutional 
environment in Kazakhstan possibly influenced Russia. 
2' Electoral fraud is widespread with practices like the `carousel' where voters are given filled out 
ballots by shady workers outside polling stations and then return the blank ballot they receive inside 
to the workers as proof that they have cast the marked version. See Nikolaus von Twickel, Election 
Officials Share Fraud Stories, Moscow Times, 23 August 2007. 
22 During the 2007 parliamentary election it was claimed that local executives were threatening public 
sector workers with the loss of their job if they failed to vote for Putin's party Edinaia Rossia. See 
Luke Harding and Tom Parfitt, Fraud Intimidation and Bribery as Putin Prepares for Victory, The 
Guardian, 30 November 2007. 
23 `Russian Duma Elections not Held on a Level-Playing Field', OSCE, 3 December 2007 
[http, //assembly. coe. int/ASP/Press/StopPressView. asp? ID=l 979] 
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fraud and state preferencing of presidential parties have often occurred. In the 2007 
parliamentary elections President Bakiev relied on similar tactics to ensure the 
`necessary result'. Administrative resources were utilised: media coverage remained 
biased in favour of Ak Zhol, opposition candidates discouraged from standing by 
threats to their businesses or simply removed from the ballot, opposition parties 
faced harassment and multiple voting and falsified voting practices were 
commonplace. In these cases the impact on formal party development is palpable. 
The incumbent leader's party wins a large majority (usually close to 100 percent), 
thus diminishing the formation of a consolidated and effective multi-party system. 
Another feature of how informal political relations and behaviour affect the formal 
institutional constraints affecting party development is the use of a law on political 
parties. It is a direct constraint that can be utilised by a political leadership to manage 
and control the development of political parties. In states where multipartism has 
little history a party law can be contrived to legalise the place of parties, but as with 
electoral design, formal rules within the law can be drawn in a broad and violable 
manner so selective application and interpretation can be administered by loyal 
clients of the leadership. In the post-Soviet case, Kazakhstan is not a sole instance of 
this phenomenon. For example, the Russian Law on Political Parties shares many 
similarities with the Kazakh version. It places significant obstacles in front of parties 
attempting registration with the Ministry of Justice. Originally, the Russian Law on 
Political Parties required that political parties have 10,000 members with branches in 
at least 50 regions with each branch having at least 100 members. In 2005, the law 
was altered so parties required 50,000 members in at least 45 branches with at least 
500 members in each branch. Chapter 9 of the law provides great scope for the 
authorities to liquidate opposition parties on various grounds of violating federal 
laws. The interpretation, however, of what constitutes violation remains at the 
digression of the Ministry of Justice. Changes to the party law have also been used to 
remove the opposition. 
24 Similar laws regarding political parties have been 
established in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
za The Republican Party, which had a single seat in the Duma, was banned under the new rules, as 
was the National Bolshevik Party. The Other Russia was also prohibited under the new law to 
compete in the 2007 parliamentary election on the grounds that it did not sufficiently meet the 
requirement for membership numbers. 
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All feature less restrictive articles than those in the Russian and Kazakh versions. 
However, in all cases the law is generally used to limit the activities of political 
parties presidential administrations would rather not see operating. This is achieved 
in the most part by designing the law in a manner where violation is likely and then 
only selectively enforcing the law in cases of violation to those political parties not 
supported by the authorities. 
In Kazakhstan, recent changes that have been announced to the institutional 
framework concerning elections and political parties only confirm what this study 
has illustrated regarding how formal rules are framed with interpretation and 
selective application in mind. 25 These changes will have little impact on political 
party development and continue the policy of designing laws which are still broad 
and violable allowing for interpretation and selective application on the part of the 
Central Election Commission and the Ministry of Justice. Local Akims will continue 
to curry favour with the president by ensuring only pro-Nazarbaev parties (namely 
Nur Otan) will be able to succeed electorally in their region. Despite the government 
claiming that they are enforcing democracy from above, by ensuring there will be at 
least two parties in the next parliament, in reality it just allows the presidential 
administration the opportunity to choose which party should be the second force in 
parliament. 26 There will continue to be a high number of members required for party 
registration providing the Ministry of Justice with plenty of room to interpret the 
registration process as they wish. They will continue to reject or stall party 
applications on the basis of parties not being favoured by the presidential 
administration. While the changes indicate that there is to be a ban on refusing party 
registration on the grounds of `minor violations' ostensibly offering parties like Alga 
and Atameken the opportunity to register, the wording of the law will be crucial. The 
term `minor violations' leaves the law wide open to the personal interpretation of 
25 The changes have been pushed through at the request of OSCE prior to Kazakhstan taking up the 
chairmanship of the organisation in 2010. The amendments include; parliament to feature no less than 
two parties even if other parties (other than Nur Otan) fail to pass the seven percent threshold, parties 
now require 40,000 members for registration with at least 600 members per region, parties given one 
extra month (from 3-4 months) to collect signatures and submit documents and there will also be a 
ban on the refusal of registration in cases of minor violations of the party law. See Joanna Lillis, 
Astana's Reform Drive Ahead of OSCE Chairmanship Disappoints Opposition, www. curasianet. org, 
4 December 2008, http: //www. eurasianet. orez/departments/insightb/articles/eavl20408. shtml 
26 Bruce Pannier, Kazakh Government Prepares to Impose Elements of Democracy, RFE/RL, 17 
November 2008. 
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officials at the Ministry of Justice who will be more than comfortable with 
interpreting the law to the preference of the presidential administration. They will 
continue to have the power of selective application. Thus there is no guarantee 
opposition parties will now have a far easier time when registering. 
Formal Institutions and Authoritarianism 
Presidential power that is based on both formal and informal factors, gives the 
authority to an incumbent leader to be able to design institutional constraints to suit 
their preferences. As a result, the nature of the relationship between formal rules 
which are designed purposively to be interpreted and selectively applied, and the 
informal political behaviour which ensures they are, affects the ability of formal 
institutions to operate effectively in terms of their contribution to democratisation. In 
a political system where informal political relations and behaviour are prevalent, 
formal institutions and rules take on a different function from that which we would 
typically expect of them in a democratic system. Therefore, formal institutions are 
cosmetic in terms of their relationship to democratisation, 21 but at the same time can 
play an imperative role in establishing durable authoritarianism. 28 In Kazakhstan and 
many other post-Soviet states the formal rules which are designed to be selectively 
applied, interpreted or ignored act to legitimise such informal forms of political 
behaviour. It makes it acceptable and common practice that regional governors who 
are personally appointed by the president (as is the case in Russia and Kazakhstan) to 
cajole employees under their jurisdiction to vote for the president's party. The 
informal political behaviour where officials at the Ministry of Justice apply the rules 
strictly to opposition parties but with deftness to pro-presidential parties illustrates 
how the devising of formal rules in such a fashion is a way to make legitimate this 
kind of behaviour. Political parties as formal institutions can also assist in stabilising 
authoritarian regimes. The dominant parties established by post-Soviet leaderships 
have proved effective tools for regime stability. Parties like Nur Otan, Edinaia 
Rossia, NAP and Bakiev's Ak Zhol, have been central to the engendering of elite 
cohesion which has formed a stable power base for authoritarian leadership. In 
27 As implied in the clan literature. 
28 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratisation (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 
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particular the case of Kyrgyzstan's Ak Zhol illustrates how, as in Kazakhstan, a 
dominant party has been used to build elite stability. The considerable fracturing of 
elites in the latter years of Askar Akaev's presidency and in the post-Tulip revolution 
period led to great instability and placed Bakiev's nascent presidency on a precarious 
footing. Bakiev established Ak Zhol in the hope that he could build and sustain a 
reliable and stable elite coalition around his leadership. To this extent he has been 
successful. The party won the majority of seats in the December 2007 parliamentary 
election and Bakiev's position has become securer as a result. Political parties, 
therefore, have a central role to play in binding in elite support to a ruler's 
leadership. 
Personalism, Clientelism, Factional Elite Conflict and Formal Institutions 
When institutional constraints are designed in a manner to be influenced by selective 
application and interpretation and when formal rules bind and legitimise this 
informal political behaviour, there is a tendency for political institutions to emerge 
from this institutional context inherent with personalistic and clientelistic features. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the institution of the presidency in Kazakhstan is 
infused with personality of the office holder. This has been common in many post- 
Soviet states. In Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus among others, it is personal 
power not institutional power which defines political process. As Chapter Five 
highlighted, political parties in Kazakhstan are particularly susceptible to 
personalistic and clientelistic features. The types of parties emerging in the post- 
Soviet context enlighten us to the interdependent nature of the relationship between 
the informal and formal. While political parties are informal in the sense that they 
are personal political vehicles influenced by aspects of patronage and clientelism, 
they are also formal units for political elite groups to protect or extend their 
economic and political interests. Fragmented elite groups use political parties as 
formal vehicles as they seek to shelter and protect their interests in the midst of 
factional elite conflict. They act to formalise informal elite competition. 
Dominant parties which base their organisation and ideology on the personality and 
policies of its leader to such an extent that the party is no more than an extension of 
that leader and not a separate entity can be observed across the former Soviet Union. 
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As with Nur Otan, personalistic-electoralist parties are common in post-soviet states. 
Edinaia Rossia purposefully engages in supporting Putin wholesale. The party's 
ideology is centred solely on the policies and vision of Putin's Russia. The party's 
pre-election programme for the 2007 Duma elections puts forward `Putin's Plan' for 
the further development of Russia as its election manifesto. 29 Moreover, the party 
leant on Putin's image for most party propaganda. Edinaia Rossia has become the 
personalised political vehicle for Putin. 
30 
NAP in Azerbaijan too was a personalistic-electoralist party for Heydar Aliev. It 
helped promote his rise to power, assisted in consolidating his position and was a 
critical vehicle in the transfer of power to his son. Despite his death the party 
remains very solidly about the personality of Heydar Aliev as a father of the nation 
and now represents his son Ilham in a very similar fashion. Bakiev's Ak Zhol in 
Kyrgyzstan did not exist until he created it and illustrates how a party which now 
dominates the Kyrgyz legislature does so as the personal political vehicle of the 
president. In Tajikistan the Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) fulfils 
similar functions as a personalistic party on behalf of the president, Emomalii 
Rahmon. What all these cases illustrate is how political parties have been used as 
personalistic extensions of presidential rule. They are political parties which are 
defined ideologically and organisationally by presidential figures and their policies. 
This personalisation of political parties, or parties essentially established to represent 
the interests of a single political figure, is not isolated to the former Soviet space. As 
mentioned in Chapter Five, one of the benefits of using Gunther and Diamond's 
framework is that parties from varying temporal and geographical contexts can be 
viewed under the same rubric, allowing us to understand wider trends in party 
development. Personalistic parties, while of course arising in different contexts and 
for different reasons, can be observed across the world. Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan's 
People Party, Alberto Fujimori's Cambio 90, Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia, Thai 
Rak Thai Party of Thaksin Shinawatra are personalistic parties that share some 
29 The Pre-Election Programme of the All Russian Party Edinaia Rossia, Plan Putina - dostoinoe 
budshchee velikoi strany, www edinros. er. ru, jaccessed 21.12.08 
http: //edinros. er. ruler/rubr. shtml ? 110099) 
30 It still remains his personal vehicle after relinquishing the presidency. 
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similar characteristics with the personalistic-electoralist party evident in the post- 
Soviet space. 
In an institutional context defined by the relationship between informal political 
relations and formal rules, clientelistic-elite parties can also emerge. In the former 
Soviet Union parties have emerged representing the interests of oligarchic and 
professional liberal elites. In the Kazakh case, parties like Asar, the Civil Party, 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and Ak Zhol emerged to reflect the interests of 
various elite influence groups. It illustrates how political parties provide important 
institutions for elites involved in factional elite competition. Parties provide 
institutions which can represent elite interests in parliament related to their economic 
assets. Simultaneously, they can provide vehicles which enable fragmented elites to 
maintain a public profile and compete for power assisting in protecting their political 
and economic interests. Kazakhstan is not a sole example. In Ukraine, for example, 
Yulia Tymoshenko a prominent businesswoman who made her vast wealth in the gas 
industry leads the All-Ukrainian Union `Fatherland'. Regional oligarchic interests 
are also well represented in parties, elites from the Donbas region founded the Party 
of the Regions (originally called Revival of the Regions), while the Social 
Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) represented the interests of elites from Kiev. 31 
In particular the Party of the Regions illustrates the ideologically pragmatic nature of 
elite parties in the post-Soviet space. Prior to the 2004 parliamentary elections it 
ideologically repositioned itself on the left of the political spectrum in an effort to 
squeeze the Communist Party. It was successful, taking a large proportion of the 
communist electorate in Eastern Ukraine. As in Kazakhstan, these parties provide 
formal structures in which elite groups can protect or extend their economic interests 
during protracted factional elite conflict. 
Informal Politics, Formal Institutions and Society 
In an institutional environment where an incumbent leader has been in a position of 
power so as to design formal rules allowing for informal interpretation and selective 
application to suit their preferences, there has emerged a disconnection and 
31 The Party of the Regions also contains a considerable personalistic feature too as, Renat Akmetov, 
Ukraine's richest man, de facto owns the party. 
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passiveness between the institutions emerging in this context and citizens. While 
political parties in Kazakhstan illustrate only one instance of an institution, it does 
reflect on how the nature of the relationship between informal political relations and 
behaviour and formal institutions can shape how society perceives and develops any 
purchase with that institution. However, returning to the dilemma regarding a 
hierarchy of causality, it is difficult to observe where structural or behavioural 
factors play a prominent role in determining this disconnection and passivity. The 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union has contributed to this phenomenon due to its 
legacy of over politicisation of society (suggesting citizens are now appreciative of 
the freedom to not be political), the normalisation of one party rule and the 
contamination of the concept of `party'. Simultaneously, the behaviour of political 
elites who establish parties as personal and clientelistic vehicles has made politics 
distant and unreachable for most citizens. To what extent do either structural legacies 
or behavioural factors take primacy in engendering the disconnection which exists 
between citizens and many formal political institutions? This work has suggested 
that similar to the emergence of neopatrimonialism, and the utilisation of informal 
political relations and behaviour, the relationship between parties and society 
represents a fusion of structural and cultural legacies and the actions of political 
elites in a specific contingent context. Of course, disconnection and passiveness 
between parties and society exists in advanced democratic systems, however they are 
particularly acute in the former Soviet Union where there is not the historical 
background of well-developed interest articulation and cleavage representation. 
Parties in Kazakhstan are exemplary of the feeling among citizens in many post- 
Soviet countries that politics is unreachable and political institutions do not act in the 
interests of the population, but only serve the interests of those elite groups at the 
apex of society. It illustrates how the informal nature of post-Soviet politics 
influences the purchase political institutions have with society. 
Analogous to Kazakhstan many other post-Soviet states possess parallel issues 
regarding the relationship between parties and society. In Russia, there has been an 
evident gulf between citizens and parties. The level of trust in Russian parties is low 
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often coming bottom in surveys of trust in public institutions. 32 The development of 
the idea of personalistic and clientelistic linkages between parties and citizens was 
based on the case of Russia in the mid 90s. 33 Little has changed and the 
personalisation of politics around Putin and his character have only consolidated 
personalistic linkages. Kyrgyzstan is another example where the informal nature of 
the political system shapes the connection that exists between citizens and political 
institutions. In Kyrgyzstan, citizens are unaware and uninterested in the activities of 
parties and view them as institutions that are used for inter-elite conflict. 34 
Formal political institutions in the post-Soviet context are not entirely shaped by 
informal politics in terms of their relationship with society, as might be implied by 
the clan perspective. 35 Rather, as Chapter Six highlighted, formal institutions like 
political parties help solicit the legitimisation of a leaders' power by developing and 
articulating homogeneity of opinion regarding the centrality of the incumbents' 
leadership to the prosperity of the country. The formal institution of a party assists in 
legitimising political leadership. They are used to advocate the benefits a ruler's 
leadership can bring and their centrality to the stability and prosperity of the country. 
Utilising the informal preference a dominant party receives creates a monopoly on 
mass-media and bequeaths it extensive finances not available to other political 
parties. From this position it can dominate the terms of public discourse and 
homogenise opinion regarding a ruler's leadership. Usually dominant parties in these 
instances put forward an argument that their country requires `strong leadership' 
which masks that fact that it is `authoritarian leadership'. 
Such a role played by dominant personalistic-electoralist parties is common in the 
former Soviet Union. In Russia, Edinaia Rossia backed by a large degree of 
administrative resources has been instrumental in putting forward a discourse 
32 Stephen White, Russians and their Party System, Demokratizatsiia, Vol. 14 No. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 
7-22 
33 In the mid 90s it was considered that there were programmatic parties such as the liberal Yabloko 
and the KPRF. Still these parties continued to be focused at the time on the dominant personalities of 
their leaders Grigory Yavlinsky and Gennadii Ziuganov. 
34 Institute for Public Policy, Popular attitudes towards political and public institutions in Kyrgyzstan, 
(Bishkek, M Vector, 2006). 
35 See Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia and Schatz, Modern Clan Politics 
and Beyond. 
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regarding the importance of Putin's leadership to the success and stability of the 
country. Compared to how Russia's international reputation suffered under the 
presidency of Boris Yeltsin and the domestic weakening of the Russian state, it is 
argued that Putin has brought back stability and respect to Russia. He is portrayed as 
a strong leader who was tough on the unpopular oligarchs who had stripped Russian 
citizens of their public assets in the 1990s. He is perceived as having been strong in 
standing up to the international community who are viewed as interfering in Russia's 
geopolitical backyard by encouraging former Soviet states to join NATO and the 
EU. Putin, like Nazarbaev, is seen to have managed the economy well making the 
most of Russia's reliance on high oil prices to drive economic development. State 
employees are paid and pensions have been raised while a middle class has begun to 
emerge. Putin fits typically the tradition of strong authoritarian leaders in Russian 
history - protecting and securing the interests of the Russian state. His image as a 
young and strong leader buys into the overall discourse regarding his leadership and 
it is an opinion widely accepted among the population. Like Nazarbaev, Putin would 
easily win a free a fair democratic election. Even though he no longer remains 
president it is believed that he is still in charge and that it is a case of when he will 
return to occupy the presidency rather than if. 
Without informal support from local and state agencies Edinaia Rossia would be 
unable to be so successful in promoting the discourse regarding Putin's leadership. 
Additionally, without Putin as a patron the party would not be privy to such 
preference. However, as with Nur Otan, it is unlikely Putin's power and leadership 
would remain so durable without Edinaia Rossia. The cases of Nur Otan and 
Edinaia Rossia exemplify how crucial personalistic pro-presidential parties can be. 
Kazakhstan and Russia are not lone examples. Many other parties of a similar ilk 
play a key role in promoting the homogeneity of opinion regarding the centrality of 
their president's leadership to the prosperity of the country which helps consolidate 
authoritarian rule. In Azerbaijan NAP elevated Heydar Aliev to mythic status as 
father of the nation while in Tajikistan the PDPT play a similar role for Emomalii 
Rahmon. In Belarus and Uzbekistan, presidents Aleksandr Lukashenko and Islam 
Karimov have relied on several obedient pro-presidential parties as opposed to one 
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dominant party, but nonetheless the tactic is the same. Political parties are important 
in building support and legitimising political leadership in society. 
What the analysis in this study has revealed is that in a post-Soviet neopatrimonial 
political system where informal forms of political behaviour and relations fuse with 
formal institutions, formal institutions take on different functions to those we might 
typically expect of them. It has confirmed that informal political relations and 
behaviour shape the role and relevance of formal institutional development that has 
been highlighted by other scholars. Yet it has also shown that it is not simply the 
case that formal institutions in post-Soviet regimes are facade institutions or simple 
window dressing for the international community. It is neither no surprise nor 
revelation that informal political relations and behaviour appear to assist in 
preferencing pro-presidential parties and the incumbent leadership through the 
selective application and interpretation of formal rules. What this study has exposed 
is the important and crucial role of political parties, and formal institutions more 
broadly, in consolidating a leader's power, providing elite stability and legitimacy 
with society. In Kazakhstan, as in other post-Soviet states, political parties while 
weak on those attributes typically associated with assisting democratic consolidation 
(interest articulation, representation, reconciling of interests, participation, 
communication and democratic control), are strong on those attributes which support 
the consolidation of authoritarian regimes (personalism, elite cohesion, and 
legitimisation of personal leadership). Therefore, the findings in this work go some 
way to assisting scholars and other interested parties in explaining the poverty of 
democracy in the former Soviet region. By relying on informal methods to develop 
formal institutional rules which mitigate against the dynamics and uncertainty of 
transition the president of Kazakhstan has established the rules of the game where 
his dominant pro-presidential party is effective in backing up his rule by bringing 
elite stability and social legitimacy. Other parties are marginalised and also focus on 
personality and elite politics in order to battle the hegemony of the president's party 
and are used as units to promote or extend interests in elite competition. The linkages 
between parties and citizens are weak resulting in parties not being able to fulfil the 
function as arbitrators of democratic development. 
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There is no guarantee in the Soviet space formal institutions will grow to become the 
rules by which political actors adhere to, in a rational, impersonalised and non- 
particularistic manner. However, neither is the kind of neopatrimonial 
authoritarianism present in Kazakhstan and to varying degrees other post-Soviet 
states, destined to last forever. While informal politics continues to shape the 
democratic features of formal political institutions in Kazakhstan and many of the 
other former Soviet states it is likely in time such features will become diluted and 
the rationalisation of the political system will take place. Currently while the signs 
are not encouraging, as many post-Soviet states continue to display levels of 
personalism and patronage that undermine formal political commitment to the 
separation of power and democracy in their constitutions, there remains the 
opportunity for greater democratic development and transparency of government. 
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